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# THE FIRST AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

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# THE FIRST AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

## FIRST PERIOD

## 1775–1778

WITH CHAPTERS ON
THE CONTINENTAL OR REVOLUTIONARY ARMY
AND ON THE FORCES OF THE CROWN

BY

HENRY BELCHER

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WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS

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

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

From the Painting by Gilbert Stuart in the National Portrait Gallery.

# CHAPTER IX

## THE CONTINENTAL OR REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

GENERAL GEORGE WASHINGTON'S portrait, known as the Pitcher Portrait, presents a man with a hard, straight mouth of liberal measure. A prominent heavy nose, a broad space between eyes not specially remarkable, a fine forehead, and a dignified expression. His features were slightly scarred by smallpox, and his somewhat ungainly mouth, as all portraits represent it, was due to an ill-fitting set of artificial teeth, and in one portrait at least to a partial absence of teeth in the upper jaw. His stature was tall—"the measure of a gentleman six feet high and proportionately made," as he says of himself. As described by another in 1778, "he was remarkably tall, full six feet, erect and well-proportioned. A well-made man, but lanky, with a tendency to emaciation." His voice, by another observer, was said to be "hollow and indistinct, owing, it was surmised, to artificial teeth before his upper jaw occasioning a flatness." A long face, slightly marked with smallpox, with an almost cadaverous tint of skin, illuminated by eyes that, to some observers, were blue, to others grey, lively, piercing, bright, severe, sprightly, dull, and so forth. All accounts speak of him as dignified, grave in demeanour, born to command. Washington.

There are numerous portraits of him, generally quite in accord, except a heroic painting which might with equal propriety be labelled the "Marquis of Granby," or "Lord Ligonier," or "Sir William Howe," or "Lord

George Sackville at the Battle of Minden," the warrior being mounted on an animal balancing itself on its hind legs, with a battle raging in the distance. His fine stature being agreed upon by most observers, including himself, it comes as somewhat of a shock to read that, when measured for his shroud, his remains were those of a man of middle height, and his frame of the same proportion.[1] His education was obviously excellent, but of instruction he got but little in his boyhood.[2] The British aristocracy, as imagined by Mr. Matthew Arnold and by Mr. Disraeli, Cyrus the Great, and George Washington, present, in boyhood (and in after life), the same features; both he and they lived a great deal in the open air, told the truth, rode like centaurs, shot straight, could never spell, spoke no language but their own, and had no taste for reading or book-lore of any kind. Such instruction as he got in boyhood comprised little more than the three R's, not so well taught as in a country school. Washington would have been rejected at any entrance examination for a direct commission in the British army. This is the kind of thing he wrote at the time of life when nowadays examinations await the ambitious:

> I pass the time much more agreeabler than what I imagined I should, as there's a very agreeable young lady lives in the same house where I reside that in a great Measure cheats my thoughts altogether from your Parts. I could wish to be with you down there with all my heart, but it is a thing almost impractackable.

He spells *alleviate* sometimes *allviate*, sometimes

[1] "Doctor Dick measured the body, the dimensions of which were: In length, 5 feet $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches; across the shoulders, 1 foot 9 inches; across the elbows, 2 feet, all exact."—Entry in Diary kept by Mr. Lear, December 15, 1799. *Letters and Recollections of G. W.*, p. 137. Obviously 5 feet is an error for 6 feet. His weight was 210 lb.—15 stone.

[2] *Bancroft*, chap. 37.—"At eleven years old, left to the care of an excellent but unlettered mother, he grew up without learning. All his instruction in school taught him not so much as the orthography or rules of grammar of his own tongue."

*eliviate*, besides making other *faupas* (as being the only French expression he ever used and misspelt) in spelling and grammar. In later years he took great pains to correct these little defects of an early training. Judicious editing of his correspondence was undertaken by his secretaries, especially, as is well known, by Alexander Hamilton.

As a self-respecting man he wished to be well dressed, and took great pains about his clothes. His Journal tells us of the fine garments he ordered from London in the days when trade was brisk and feeling kindly between London and Williamsburg. Colonial tailors were few and very unskilful; they could not be depended upon to take a man's measure correctly.

> I have hitherto had my clothes made by one Charles Lawrence in Old Fish Street; but whether the fault of the tailor or the measure sent, I can't say, but certain it is my clothes have never fitted me well.

The gold-laced scarlet waistcoats, the blue velvet suits, the fine Newmarket coats of *bleu drap* or broadcloth with straps and guards, costly to get and troublesome to import, disappointed him. To the end of his life he retained his taste for fine attire unimpaired. As President he dressed in purple satin or black velvet, with his hair powdered and in a net. A feathered hat, ruffles, a sword with a polished steel hilt and a white polished leather scabbard completed a dignified and becoming official costume.

To his horsemanship and shooting, their neatness and excellence, there is a concurrence of testimony; he not only rode well: he rode as gracefully as did his youthful king George the Third, and he was as fond of fox-hunting as was Lord Wellington in Spain; a taste he freely indulged in the latter days of the Revolutionary War. His demeanour on horseback when in command contributed much to the high opinion of him entertained in military circles. It is an interesting question why his favourite horse, which he rode so

often during the war, was called Nelson, for the animal died long before Horatio Nelson was heard of on that side of the Atlantic. Not being much of a reader, Washington found cards and the card-table an agreeable pastime. He bought packs of cards by the dozen, and when weather was foul, spent much of the day at the game of whist. A faithfully kept journal furnishes most interesting details of his personal expenditure and of his habits, his taste for billiards, his modest cellar, his behaviour and enjoyments at table, matters which it is unnecessary to follow further at present: add to these tastes and habits a total absence of affectation and a certain unstudied naturalness of demeanour which in a society of lawyers and political *poseurs* made him many enemies. Here then was a gentleman of good descent, bred somewhat according to the feudal manner, with a fine estate and some ready money, a man of good exterior and presence, who dressed well and spoke little, ready at his country's call to go and do as the Congress of 1775 might direct.

The Congress was largely swayed by Hancock, John Adams, and his cousin Samuel; it was well understood that Hancock had an eye towards being made Commander-in-Chief himself. It was equally well known that the New England States would have welcomed the choice falling on Hancock. New Englanders not unnaturally regarded it as a prime recommendation of a man to any office that he should be a New England man. Hancock satisfied this condition, and some of his provincial friends believed him to be as competent to be Commander-in-Chief as to be President of Congress; yet to his great mortification, John Adams proposed, and Samuel seconded, the nomination of the Virginian gentleman for the high office.

Neither his proposer nor his seconder liked Washington. His somewhat frigid manner, his native dignity, and the great restraint he placed upon himself as to

much speaking, placed him in a class apart from men of the Adams type.

But men are ruled by many motives, and in filling public offices, a strong motive may be not so much the desire to put the best man into a place of trust, as to keep another man out. John Adams was apparently to some degree actuated by a malevolent feeling towards Hancock. He describes the rage of the President of Congress when the nomination was made. "Mortification and resentment were expressed," says he, "as forcibly as his face could exhibit them."

To a man like John Adams, who was mentally and morally incapable of discerning high merit in any one but himself, this discomfiture of a townsman and a colleague had its charms. But there was another and more potent reason why John and Samuel Adams should join hands to bring in Washington as head of the army.

These kinsmen were devoted to Boston, and felt that their beloved city, which had virtually, and on her own account, declared war on the Mother Country, must either secure the co-operation of the twelve sister States or perish. It was thus necessary at all costs to secure Virginia; and to nominate Colonel Washington for the newly created post was to secure Virginia. It was also obvious to the rest of Congress that these two Boston delegates had named the only man, American born and with long military experience, whom the American people would accept. Old Artemus Ward could not ride; he was too stout.[1] Gates, Charles Lee, and Montgomery were British born men. Nathaniel Greene was an unknown quantity. Israel Putnam impossible. Schuyler of New York was not acceptable for reasons connected with his high family, wealth, and personal demeanour. The choice of Washington, by a

[1] Ward at Bunker Hill was accused of cowardice. "Can you believe it," writes James Warren to John Adams, "he never left his house all day."—Warren to J. A., 20th June 1775 (in Ford's edition, *Washington's Writings*, p. 480).

Washington's appointment.

unanimous vote, after a few days' bickering, was chiefly due to the astute counsels of the Boston contingent in Congress, whose action was of the nature of a deal. It was a matter of mortal interest for New England that the army around Boston should be adopted by the Continental Congress in the name of the Thirteen Colonies; for up to 15th June 1775, the date of Washington's commission, the army was a Massachusetts army under a Massachusetts general, with contingents from other New England States.

The Southern States disliked New England, and were reluctant to offer any help in a dilemma of New England's own creation. Consequently, the setting aside of Hancock and the self-effacement of John Adams and his cousin before the claims of Washington, constituted a kind of act of reconciliation on American soil of the Cavalier and the Puritan, the men of the Church of England with the representatives of the Westminster divines.

Washington, in his cold grave way, was an adherent of episcopacy, and an occasional communicant of the Church. Like most men of leading in that century he was lukewarm towards the doctrines of revealed religion, and had no sympathy with controversial memorials or practices. Hence, as Commander-in-Chief, he discountenanced within his camp public notice of the anniversary of the Boyne and of the Powder Plot. He felt that these annual outbursts of controversial import are encouraged by persons whose aim is not so much to honour the dead as to annoy the living.

It was well that he should pursue this policy, as the bulk of his command, both in 1775 and throughout the war, were New England men. Of the 232,000 men composing the regular Continental army during the Seven Years' contest, no less than 117,000 came from the four New England States. With such a preponderance of Puritan opinion in the ranks, it was politic to ignore the motives and proceedings of religious factions, but the assertion by an English

writer that Washington was of the same way of thinking as Tom Paine rests on imperfect information.

Washington, who had attended Congress in the uniform of a colonel, undertook the terrible responsibility of the position, with the generous personal provision that no pay was to be attached to his office. He merely expressed a wish that his disbursements on behalf of the army or in the public service might be repaid. It is well known that he not only adhered to this line of action, but that he spent much of his private fortune in the service of his country.

What his administrative difficulties proved to be may be gathered from what follows in these pages, but there was one element exceedingly prolific of embarrassments which in itself does not belong to military administration; this element was the cold and steady dislike of the men who were mainly instrumental in putting the bâton of supreme command into Washington's hand. Long after Washington's public career closed, John Adams ventured the statement that had he not married a wealthy lady, whose money he used to promote his fortunes, Washington had never become Commander-in-Chief. Both Samuel and John Adams plotted in 1777 for his removal, and drew nigh to Horatio Gates with a view to his displacing the Commander-in-Chief. It was indeed about these two malcontents that were gathered the men on whom in their degree the general was officially dependent. Gates, the adjutant-general, Charles Lee, a major-general, Reed, Mifflin, Conway, and Richard Henry Lee, to say nothing of the smaller wire-pullers, co-operated and conspired to entangle his plans and to attenuate his influence. Left to the tender mercies of Congress, Washington had been displaced at the end of 1777, but his ragged and incongruous army knew the man at their head and saved the situation.

Washington assumes command.

The newly appointed general, accompanied by Major-General Charles Lee, quitted Philadelphia for Boston in June 1775. A Board of War, consisting of John Adams, Richard Henry Lee, and Edward Rut-

ledge, now proceeded to instruct their General-in-Chief in the arts of war, what to do and how to do it. They also sent on ahead of him an open letter as a kind of handsome testimonial or letter of introduction to men of leading in New England. Little notice was taken of the General himself, whose long face and stern demeanour probably repelled cordial demonstrations; but of Charles Lee, whose recent exploits near Charleston, coupled with manners appropriate to a conquering paladin, the people could not see enough. It was at two o'clock in the afternoon of the 2nd of July that Washington reached Cambridge, and that old manse where he was to lodge for nine months, until Howe, by quitting Boston, released the Americans from their blockade of the town.

July 2, 1775. That afternoon, according to the tradition which, inscribed at the foot of the tree known as the Washington Elm, informs the wayfarer of that stirring incident, the General-in-Chief of the Continental army drew his sword, and took command of the assembled forces. Possibly on no soldier was ever imposed a task more beset with difficulties than that of General Washington. To shape into a fighting instrument the incongruous materials gathered around Boston as a besieging force, appeared not merely a Herculean but an impossible achievement. First of all came the Massachusetts men, and the farmers from the Hampshire Grants, particularised always as a singularly fierce and self-willed class of settler, who, in common with all the New England militia, declined to enrol themselves for a moment beyond the next ensuing Christmas Day. Then reckoning was to be taken of the greybeards and the children, who flocked into Cambridge to offer their services. Stories are told how twenty-four grandsires from Waterbury and Waltham, places now so justly famous for the manufacture of watches, rode into camp armed with blunderbusses and firelocks, or even snaphances of ancient pattern. The total of years represented by this cohort was computed as approach-

THE WASHINGTON ELM AT CAMBRIDGE.

From *Harper's Monthly*, 1862.

ing two thousand. The Connecticut dragoons or horse, fifty strong, appear to have won for themselves a singular reputation for indiscipline and inutility. There were Irishmen in considerable numbers—men of Ulster, Black Protestants, whom every tie of sentiment and religion had bound to the English Crown; but whom the folly and the wrong-headed conceptions of English capitalists had by enactments in restraint of Irish manufactures and Irish trade driven into exile; these were among the most bitter and strenuous enemies of Great Britain,[1] and were for the most part Presbyterians. There were Germans from the hinterland of the valleys of the Delaware, and Indians from the North-Western frontiers, and especially from the lands looking towards Lower Canada.

Negroes in the Patriot ranks.

About the negroes there was protracted discussion. It had been strongly urged that all black men should be set free, and then accepted, each man on his own merits, into the ranks of the Continental army. This measure was recommended by the consideration that if American slave-owners refused to emancipate these bondsmen, the Loyalists would, by promising the blacks their freedom on the condition of enlistment, vastly increase the fighting power of the British army. This suggestion, however, was not acceptable.

1775.

Then at a Council of War held in Cambridge (Mass.), in October, it was unanimously agreed that to reject all slaves from the new army was advisable. In November 1775, Washington issued a general order that negroes, boys unable to bear arms, and old men unfit for service were to be refused enlistment. A few weeks later he was compelled by his common sense to rescind this order so far as it affected negroes, and still a few weeks more both he and the Continental Congress, after a further faint show of resistance, made no further objection to the enrolment of black levies in the

[1] Graydon says of the company, raised by him in 1776, that of 73 men, 20 were Irish, 45 native-born Americans, 6 were English and Scots, 2 German.

Continental ranks. An official return of the negroes in Washington's command in 1778 shows an average of 54 negroes to each battalion. In the Southern States there was, from the circumstances of ownership and slavery in those parts, a strong feeling opposed to the enlistment and services of negroes as soldiers. But this feeling wore down in face of the difficulties of maintaining the levies for the regiments, according to the quotas demanded from each State by Congress. General Nathaniel Greene had a high opinion of negroes as soldiers, and in later years Washington approved of a scheme for the enrolment of negroes in battalions; it was proposed that 3000 coloured men should be brigaded by themselves. That most brilliant child of the Revolution, Alexander Hamilton, argued that slaves should be the best material for the subordinate military life.

"I think," he wrote, "their want of cultivation, joined to their habit of subordination, which they acquire from a life of servitude, will enable them sooner to become soldiers than our white inhabitants. Let officers be men of sense; but the nearer soldiers approach to machines perhaps the better."

1778. After the battle of Monmouth there were under Washington's immediate command 755 negroes scattered through his regiments. The total number of these Revolutionary Patriots of colour will perhaps never be known. Yet, as from the very first, from Bunker Hill forward, there were negroes in the service of Congress, their numbers must have reached a large figure. During the second period of the war, when British operations were directed by Sir Henry Clinton, the Southern States as well as the State of New York offered high inducements to coloured men to join the Revolutionary army. Sir Henry Clinton's retaliatory proclamation[1] illustrates quite clearly the position of

[1] In 1779 Clinton issued a proclamation to intimate that as the Americans were enlisting negroes, all such negroes captured in war were to be sold, the price to go to the captors. Cf. Geo. H. Moore, *Historical Notes on the Employment of Negroes in the American Army of the Revolution.*

affairs. These African aliens made first-class soldiers. They distinguished themselves as good Patriots again and again. In that very smart and spirited enterprise of Colonel Barton's, the capture of the British General Prescott, the critical work was carried out by men of colour. For great patience under privations, fatigue, and wounds, the negro, trained in the hardest of schools, was not to be surpassed. They were as apt as Frenchmen at camp cookery and camp comforts. Their predilection for chickens is a well-established fact; they were good foragers, made the best use of poor materials and scanty supplies, and were cheerful under difficulties. These gifts made them welcome to the ranks of the Patriot brigades, wherein they served with the full approval of General Washington. In fact, at all times in the war, an eyewitness reports, "one sees no regiment in which there are not negroes in abundance."[1] In some cases negroes were bought out of servitude before enlistment. In other cases, black soldiers won their personal freedom. It was not the character of the negroes, but the Peculiar Institution itself that blocked the way to the wholesale enrolment of negroes in the Continental army. And just as Circassian soldiers butcher a Russian revolutionary mob with extra relish because they feel themselves to be exterminating men of the race of their conquerors and oppressors, so black soldiers may have felt some extra delight in driving bayonet or pike through a white man's body.

The French volunteers in the Continental army during the early campaigns caused Washington and Congress endless worries and vexations. After the

The French volunteers.

[1] *Letters to Washington*, Sparks, iii. 331. Cadwallader to Washington, intimates that 750 negroes are to be incorporated at once into his regiments. Greene to Washington, recommends the employment on an extended scale of negroes in the two Carolinas. Laurens to Washington, in the same sense. What these black patriots thought of the Declaration of Independence on the Anniversaries, when, as Elijah Fisher tells us, they fired off *feux de joie* in common with the rest of the army, is not recorded.

disaster of Saratoga and the maturing of the French Alliance, Rochambeau's regiments and d'Estaing's fleet with the French king's money-chest became the mainstay of the Patriot cause which the French alliance ultimately conducted to success; but before the campaign of 1777, with its British victories at Brandywine and Germantown and its British disaster at Saratoga, Washington found the French adventurers and immigrants an intolerable nuisance. On their own credentials and statements they were all officers and gentlemen, all fit for command, all men of latent genius, only demanding a *point d'appui* from which to move the world. Franklin's scathing criticism of them in letters to English friends is well known. Writing to his confidant, Hartley, in Newcastle, he ridicules the eulogistic terms lavished on aspirants to fame by their relations, distinguished members of the *noblesse*, who were solicitous for their boys to be sent beyond the sea where pay and promotion were going begging. Writing to a French correspondent, Franklin says:

> If you have the least kindness for me, if you would not help to drive me out of France, . . . my dear friend, let this, your twenty-third application, be your last.[1]

At the time of writing Franklin was in Paris settling terms and preliminaries with the French Ministry in view of an alliance with France.

Silas Deane, sent to Paris as Congressional agent in 1776, involved his own country and many French gentlemen in serious difficulties. He scattered baits and allurements to secure the services of young gentlemen of distinguished families, and then found many of his agreements disowned by his principals in Philadelphia. Franklin says that Deane, being unacquainted with the French language, was bluffed into bargains of which he had not a clear conception, yet considered himself on a

[1] Franklin to James Lovell, 21st December 1777; cf. Jared Sparks, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution*, iii. *passim*.

point of honour bound to perform his share of the bargain even when its insidious nature became apparent. Hence, with numerous misunderstandings on both sides, hundreds of young officers were thrown at their heads as "officiers expérimentés, braves comme leurs épées, pleins de courage et de zèle pour la cause." Not one in twenty of these men was accepted. But failure in Paris baffled the young warriors only for a brief time. They emigrated to the States in little battalions. They laid siege to the General-in-Chief immediately on arrival. It will be recollected that Congress, in the gloomy hours of the winter of 1776, had devolved upon Washington the appointment of every post and commission below divisional commands in the Continental army.

The invasion, the peaceful invasion, of America by young men thirsting for distinction and full of hatred for perfidious Albion, increased the difficulties and anxieties of the general's work. He had no love for them. He wrote of them:

> . . . that they were men who, in the first instance, tell you they wish for nothing more than the honour of serving so glorious a cause as volunteers. Next day they solicit rank without pay, the day following they want money advanced, and the day after that they clamour for promotion.[1]

But he was overborne by circumstances. Hundreds of Frenchmen had ventured across the sea to a country of which they really knew as little as a modern Frenchman does of Saghalien, in response to promises and persuasions thrown at them in Paris by Silas Deane. There were said to be as many applications lying before Congress for redemption of pledges made in Paris as would have filled every commissioned post in the Continental army. Congressmen behaved in this juncture of affairs with the ineptitude characteristic of their doings throughout the war. In their appointment of native officers to positions of trust they were guided by no principle of selection. From the beginning of the war to the end

[1] Quoted by Hatch, *Administration of Revolutionary Army*, p. 48.

of it there "was an apparent reluctance to give satisfaction to the army by putting the claims of its officers to rank upon a sure foundation." Congress placed foreign officers in command over the heads of better men—native-born Americans, or at least men of British descent and speech. This was notorious by their behaviour in the case of Benedict Arnold, who was the most brilliant divisional officer of the Continental army, as his conduct at Freeman's Farm and elsewhere plainly demonstrated. Nor was Congress in the employment of their foreign auxiliaries guided by principles of selection; for military positions were commonly settled in Congress by ballot, so much did vacillation and factious feeling prevail in that body.

Scores of Frenchmen returned to their native land disappointed and full of animosity towards a country that issued invitations and then refused the invited guest admittance. All complaints, all grievances, found their way in due course to the notice of Washington, who probably made as few mistakes under most perplexing circumstances as might be made. It is, however, no part of this present chapter to dwell on the services of Steuben, Lafayette, Duportail, Launoy, Rachère, Gouvion, Fleury, de Kalb, Pulaski, and Kosciusko.

Of the American officers, omitting Washington himself, whom all these first-rate soldiers learned to admire, none may rank in efficiency with these foreigners except Nathaniel Greene, Henry Knox, and the brilliant and unhappy Benedict Arnold, who repaid ill-treatment by treachery. To Steuben and Kosciusko America owes as great an obligation as she does to Lafayette.

The anomaly of their being set to command English-speaking farm hands and stockmen whose language they neither could nor would learn, does not appear to have affected men, mere military adventurers, of whom the greater part, whether of Canadian or European birth, belonged to the class of people who, in those days at least, believed themselves born to command. Beside the motive noticed above of wishing to do

an evil turn to an ancient hereditary enemy, there was something piquant in the notion of their serving with English-speaking men to slaughter other English-speaking men. It was felt too that if the loss of Canada might not be repaired, much less redeemed, by any device, yet there might be a reasonable measure of private vengeance. So in France, during the British occupation after Waterloo, scores of young Englishmen perished in duels and frays to satisfy the private sense of injury entertained by skilful French duellists in consequence of their nation's disasters. French politicians and statesmen were, as has been frequently pointed out, quite alive to the fact that so soon as the danger of annexation to the French Empire should be brushed aside, the American Colonies would move in the direction of Independence. What really lay behind the successful issue of a revolution in America, the downfall of the monarchy in France, was perhaps too far ahead for political vision, yet from the fall of Quebec to the capture of the Bastille is a short period of only thirty years. French agents and wire-pullers had, in the years immediately after the Seven Years' War,[1] endeavoured to sound the leading men of the Colonies as to the condition of public opinion about the British yoke and British control. Their advances, however, were coldly received. Colonial men were crafty enough to see that to cast off the British chains by French assistance must entail a long price. It might indeed mean changing the domination of St. James's for the domination of Versailles. As will be seen later on, this apprehension was uppermost in the minds of Congress when, towards the end of 1776, the notion of an offensive and defensive alliance with France began to assume shape. Moreover, the large-jawed monarch, who about that time ascended the throne of France, had the sense to see that a serious shake to his brother George's position and royal prerogative might involve a more serious shake to his own not too stable throne.

[1] *I.e.* the war for the liberation of Canada from French control.

The ancient saying that when your neighbour's house is on fire it is time to look after your own, seemed to Lewis a counsel of prudence. Lewis was perhaps a dull man, but he never took to Franklin; neither did the better Parisian Society. Turgot had familiarised Parisian salons with a line of Latin which seemed to suit Franklin very well; and high ladies, in buying portraits of the great republican painted on cups and plates, lisped how he had reft the lightning from the skies and sceptres from tyrants. The King of France had no taste for men who reft kings of their sceptres. His Queen, *volage* as usual, fluttered in admiration of the Doctor's brown coat, his long white unpowdered locks, his oaken staff, his serviceable shoes, with an occasional babble about *these good republicans*; but in her more reflective moods she recoiled from the influence and example of Franklin.

France during these years of anxiety and trouble for Great Britain made her own profit out of her ancient enemy's dilemmas. She furnished the Patriots with ammunition and arms, gave harbourage to American privateers, allowed the proceeds of their captures to be sold in her ports, refitted and revictualled American ships. She violated all principles and conditions of neutrality with the full connivance of French statesmen, if not actually of the French Court. Franklin's correspondence with Whig sympathisers in England refers again and again to the valuable aid to the patriotic cause afforded by the French Government.[1] In 1776 the French agent of the States in Paris had secured the assistance of two French officers who undertook to provide guns for the rebels from the royal factory. Beaumarchais, better known to English readers as the author of *Le Barbier de Seville* and of *Le Diable boiteux* than as a speculator in contraband goods, came into the

[1] On Beaumarchais' intrigues, Lord Stormont's protests, and Vergenne's duplicity, cf. *Autobiography of Franklin* (Macdonald), p. 276. *Beaumarchais* was the assumed name of Pierre Augustin Caron.

business and exported 16,000 guns of the regulation French pattern to the States.

Mr. Arthur Lee, who after education in an English school and at an English university, became an Alderman of the City of London, being also a member of the highly placed Virginian family of Lee, entered into a secret treaty in the name of Congress with the French Government, by which the latter agreed to furnish the Americans with arms and ammunition under the guise of commerce. Beaumarchais, in consequence, started with a capital of one million francs (£40,000) advanced to him, on the guarantee of Congress, by the French Treasury. But though the goods arrived on the other side, Congress was unable to pay for them. These goods appear to have been of the rummage kind kept for poor relations and neighbours. As Congress was unable to redeem the bills as they came due, the supply of these dangerous weapons ceased, not much to the regret of the English cruisers, which captured several consignments of French muskets without much increase of prize-money.

There was no clear appreciation in Paris of the exact position of Congress; it was not understood that Congress had neither ready money nor capital resources. The failure of the American agents in Paris to redeem the money commitments contracted for arms and ammunition sent across the Atlantic, caused in Parisian circles a tendency to look askance at the Revolutionary movement. But the migration westward of young gentlemen of noble families continued unabated. Liberalised as they were, in sentiment at least, by the dominant influences of the hour, that is, by the ideas of the philosophic-radical school, they remained on points of personal privilege as tenacious as a German baron. It does not appear that the junior officers, the striplings of twenty years or so, could have had much experience of warfare, but being acquainted with the ceremonials of the barrack square and accustomed to discipline, their place in a regular army might easily have been adjusted. But

there was no regular army in the service of the revolting Colonies at the time these young Frenchmen reached the American shore. Washington, indeed, and his few intimates appear to have undervalued the lessons of their own personal experiences on active service. "The limited and contracted knowledge," wrote he, a few months after Bunker Hill, "which any of us possess, stands us in very little stead." As a matter of fact, the service he and his companions had seen was exactly suitable to the conditions of war under which the struggle was destined to be pursued. Washington and Schuyler, Israel Putnam and Montgomery, Horatio Gates and Charles Lee, had all served in the war of the expulsion of France from Canada. Braddock's expedition, Abercromby's fatal attack on Ticonderoga, in which George Howe fell, Wolfe's campaigns, the capture of Montreal, and the bush fighting on the borders westward and on the lakes, had initiated these men into the hardest school of fighting. Their experience was the experience of the men against whom they were pitted. Gage and William Howe, the gallant Philips, the heroic Fraser, had graduated in the same school. If, on the other hand, it was pointed out that the elegant Burgoyne had served with distinction in Portugal, so also had served the eccentric Charles Lee.

Notwithstanding these facts, it is intelligible that Congress should adopt the view, that as the war would have to be carried on according to the maxims and practice of the old school, it might be well for them to accept volunteers from France, whose traditional knowledge of arms sprang altogether from the tenets and practice of the men of the *haute école*: the great Frederick, the great Ferdinand, Von Seidlitz, and the heroes of Leuthen and Rossbach. The acceptance of these volunteers attracted others from the French West India Islands—Creoles, who swore and swaggered according to the vogue of the previous generation, prating about exploits in Spain, in the Low Countries, and on the high seas during the last war.

The influence of these incongruous aliens caused Washington grave inconvenience. It must have been a consequence of their innuendoes and impatience that at a dark hour of the Patriot cause, it was more than suggested that some general of established European fame should be commissioned to take supreme command of the discouraged American army. Certain great names were mentioned and submitted by the Agent in Paris to the administration in Philadelphia. Subsequently these intrigues against Washington were hushed up, as were, in the closing years of the war, the intrigues in his favour, to offer him the American crown. The pressure of political expediency and superstitious veneration for the military methods and tactics of the Old World thus bore hardly upon subordinate officers of the American army, and many veterans of the backwoods were passed over in favour of the foreigner. In vain was it pointed out that among these aliens were men of broken record and unstable temperament, men whose vanity, love of excitement, and poverty induced them to seek their fortunes at the expense of America. These objections were, at least at the beginning of the war, fruitless. It is now beyond all doubt that from the very first, in the minds of the vigorous Patriots who intended to make war inevitable, there was a firm purpose to seek the aid of France. And thus word was passed along that to establish an *entente cordiale* with the French it would be politic to accept the services of Frenchmen of some position without too close scrutiny either into their character or conduct.

General Gates, however, when Minister of War, expressed himself unable to understand on what principle French officers were admitted into the Continental army; he does not appreciate the political reasons, and cannot discern the special military qualifications to justify preference for European officers.[1]

[1] See *Board of War Papers*, i. 573, for a long memorandum from Gates about appointments. On the quality of the native militia officers, cf. Graydon, p. 298.

Gates may have been biassed by his jealousy and dislike of Washington, who at least understood clearly the political reasons for standing well with the French officers, although man by man he found some of them almost insufferable. But Gates was not without supporters of his views. A member of Congress told Chevalier du Buysson, a belated applicant for a commission in the Continental army: "We
1776. were in need of officers last year, but now we have experienced men and plenty of them." Gates also mentions that at the end of 1777 the War Minister had at his disposal more officers than requisite for posts in the American army. "Their number," said he, "is all too great for the number of men they have to command." In July 1777 Lafayette was accepted for service in the Patriot army then in Pennsylvania. The terms of his commission are instructive:

> Whereas the Marquis of Lafayette, out of his great zeal to the cause of liberty in which the United States are engaged, has left his family and connections, and has at his own expense come over to offer his services to the United States without pension or particular allowance, and is anxious to risk his life in our cause. Resolved that his services be accepted, and that in consideration of his zeal, illustrious family, and connections he have the rank and commission of Major-General in the Army of the United States.

The apology made by Washington, three years after the war began, in defence of his treating Lafayette with so much favour, expressed fully the sentiments of Congress towards the French volunteer. Yet throughout the war little is heard of the general services rendered by these men. Their ignorance of English made them next to useless on parade, and quite useless in the mêlée of an engagement. Whether the command was to advance or run away they could not give it in a language understanded of the people.[1]

[1] De Fonblanque, in his *Life of Burgoyne*, says that one of the foreign colonels in the Continental services applied for a non-commissioned orderly, expert in that kind of language, to swear at the men.

Hence they were doomed to spend their time in compulsory idleness. These grievances growing like thistles, were all pushed on to the Commander-in-Chief.

His replies to these endless complaints, his letters, now collected in the twelve published volumes of his correspondence, are instructive reading. One instance of the general's difficulties as revealed by his letters will suffice :[1]

> There are many good officers in the service who have been in it from the commencement of the war that have not received such honourable marks of favour and distinction (as you). If there are foreigners who came to America when you did or since, who have been promoted to a higher rank without having better pretensions, it has not been through my interest. Though I wish to see every man rewarded according to his deserts, and esteem emulation in officers a laudable quality, yet I cannot but condemn the over-sanguine, unjust, ambitious expectations who think everything should be made to yield to gratify their views.

There was an abundance of disappointed men to write the impertinent, peevish, or snappish letters, of which indeed Washington appears to have had a copious supply all the time of his public life; yet the French contingent, being the most numerous of the alien office-seekers, gave the most trouble. The American Agent in Paris has been mentioned for his hasty and foolish selections, his entering into ill-considered contracts of service and pledging Congress to obligations which could not be fulfilled. Du Coudray's case is exactly to the point. Deane, in Paris, appointed Du Coudray to the rank of major-general with supreme command over the artillery of the American army. With a signed contract to this effect Du Coudray arrived in America. Instantly he began to talk large about himself, his powers, his experience, his ability. Having thus made himself obnoxious to the Patriots,

Du Coudray's case.

[1] Washington to Major Colerus, 19th May 1777. *Writings*, p. 366 ff. note (Ford's edition).

he proceeded to join Washington, who found himself furnished with a high colleague of whom he knew nothing, and as to whom he had not been consulted. Brigadier-General Knox had in December 1776 been already appointed by Congress to the office and duties to which Deane in Paris appointed Du Coudray on 1st August 1776. Thus Du Coudray, not arriving in the Colonies for nine months after the date of his commission, found Knox in occupation of the post of chief of artillery, the position Du Coudray claimed as his own. When Greene and Sullivan heard their colleague Knox was in danger of being ousted from the post Congress had conferred upon him, in favour of a Frenchman appointed in Paris by Deane, they, joining hands with Knox, submitted a demand to be relieved of their commands. It was about the same time that Washington in the Jerseys was in a most precarious state, for he had with him not more than 3000 men, most of whom were militia, and he could ill afford to part with such tried men as Henry Knox, Greene, and Sullivan. Congress was already cognizant of his being averse to Du Coudray's appointment: so after some vapouring about the major-generals, the Philadelphia lawyers retreated from their *impasse*.

Deane's contract being disallowed, Du Coudray was fain to accept a commission as captain, but when proceeding a year later to join his little command he was drowned in the Schuylkill owing to the capers of a young and skittish horse which pranced off a ferry boat. This accident occurred just before the battle of Brandywine.

Officers and the ballot.

Officers of militia were, up to the end of 1776, appointed by popular vote or ballot. A New Jersey man or a Maryland man looked upon the whole proceedings as being of the nature of a vestry meeting. Wherever he went he carried his voting ticket in his pocket, and whether the post to be filled was that of a mayor, sheriff, magistrate, collector, or captain, the

principle for him remained the same. The militiamen enrolled themselves according to a form of contract drawn on democratic lines; as thus:

We the subscribers do hereby severally enlist ourselves into the service of the United American Colonies until the first day of January next . . . and we severally consent to be formed by such person or persons as the general court shall appoint into a company of ninety men, including one captain, two lieutenants, one ensign, four sergeants, four corporals, one drum, and one fife *to be elected by the company.*

The practice of election extended even to field officers. A Maryland regiment having been called together to poll for a field officer, the colonel fixed a day for the poll and appointed himself returning officer for the declaration of the poll. The men of the regiment disregarded the date fixed by the colonel, refused his services as returning officer, and threatened him with personal violence should he dare to interfere, so fiercely was the democratic principle asserted even in a state of the aristocratic origin which Maryland was proud to claim.

"The orderly books of the period," says Mr. Frothingham, "attest the difficulty of reducing the men to the habits of a soldier's life. Intoxication, peculation, false returns, disobedience of orders, disrespect to officers, and want of soldierlike conduct were the most common offences, and the punishments administered consisted of pecuniary fines, standing in the pillory, riding the wooden horse, drumming out of camp, whipping at the head of the regiment, or in still more public places."

"It was sometimes the case," says Stedman, "that when a company was forming the men would choose those for officers who consented to throw their pay into the joint stock with the privates, from which captains, lieutenants, ensigns, sergeants, corporals, drummers, and privates drew their equal shares. Can it be wondered at that a captain should be tried and broke for stealing his soldiers' blankets, or that another officer should be found shaving his men in the face of visitors of distinction?"

This kindly captain from Connecticut, who shaved

his men in the face of visitors of distinction, is stated to have been a cavalry officer, and a staff officer to boot.[1] The story has gone the round ever since Colonel Joseph Reed wrote to his wife about the sad occurrence. There is another story of the same class of a Revolutionary French colonel, who had been a barber, teaching his men how to plait a pigtail. Insubordination came naturally to the militiamen of New England and Maryland. Graft on native propensity the practice of bringing town council politics into the administration of an army, and you secure every element conducive to military anarchy. There cannot be discipline where to enforce discipline is reckoned, by every one concerned, odious and tyrannical. Election from the ranks of their own officers by a regiment puts too great a strain on average human nature. Men who had shared their ration of rum or pot of spruce beer with Private Obadiah in the morning, found themselves quite unable to salute in military style Captain Obadiah the same evening. The Ezras, the Nehemiahs, the Obeds, the Habakkuks, the Lukes, the Increases, and the Preservèds that from behind walls and trees made a battue of British troops at Lexington, at Danbury, at Freeman's Farm, were restive under the conditions of life imposed by daily drill. Washington said with asperity that his men regarded their officers no more than broomsticks. The same complaint is echoed by men so dissimilar in temperament as Montgomery, Nathaniel Greene, and

[1] Graydon (p. 146) tells how Colonel Putnam, at that time chief engineer of the army, and nephew of the major-general of that name, was seen marching to his quarters, carrying with him his rations of raw beef; he was, he said, setting an example to his officers. He also tells an almost incredible story of the demeanour of General Schuyler towards the New England officers. Graydon was dining with the General at the latter's residence on Lake George. A New England captain arrived on business; his manners were abject, he was treated as a menial, and dismissed as a vexatious intruder. The point is that Graydon was no more than a captain, and had arrived also on mere business, yet he was an honoured guest at the commandant's table.—Graydon, p. 142.

Charles Lee. Greene, perhaps the best of all the American major-generals, had been a Quaker belonging to Rhode Island. He would, therefore, bring to his conceptions of military order the notions dominant in that levelling sect; but Greene, whose knowledge of war antecedent to 1775 was derived from books, and Charles Lee, a professional soldier, agree on the point that the New England officers were the most despicable set of men. Mr. Fisher thinks "the men were quite crazy on the subject of equality; the officers had to control their men by grovelling." Control by grovelling does not carry discipline far. But this intractability is noticeable at every important point in American military history. The war of 1812 was a series of blunders and humiliations; the American militia were as restive to discipline then as their sires had been in 1775. At the outbreak of the civil war in 1860 the insubordination of some of the American levies on both sides of that fraternal struggle was phenomenal. In 1890, at the beginning of the Spanish War in Cuba,

. . . "America," says Mr. Beckles Willson, "heard with profound chagrin that one body of its volunteers had refused to go into action. It heard of one regiment so demoralised as to threaten the whole line, and to avert a panic it had to be despatched unceremoniously to the rear."[1]

At Bunker Hill one of these elected captains ordered his company to go into action, saying he would overtake them soon—he extended his leave of absence until the following day. Washington said in 1775 that he had already made a "pretty good slam of such kind of officers as New England furnished."

"I have already," says he, "broke one colonel and five captains for cowardice, or for drawing more pay and provisions than they had men in their companies."[2]

[1] Beckles Willson, *New America*, p. 127.

[2] 8th October 1776. Congress made a recommendation to the Assemblies and Conventions of the States, "that all officers to be appointed hereafter be men of honor and of known abilities, without a particular regard to their having been before on service."

At the same time he had five officers under arrest. It was customary in the British army for the colonels to draw all pay and allowances for their men, and to administer their regiments on that basis. The Americans had adopted this custom, as, indeed, they were bound to do, for no other organisation was then known. Officers were thus liable to severe temptations to which they not unseldom succumbed. But in the American army there were special features to render this temptation to embezzlement or peculation more acute. Men enlisted only for a period of a few months, generally terminable at Christmastide. Grievances that redress themselves by the effluxion of a short time are not seriously felt. American militiamen, like schoolboys, had ever their holidays in view—holidays they were not chary of anticipating by a few weeks at the end of an unpleasant and unsuccessful campaign like that of 1776; consequently since every man could look forward to a speedy termination of his field service, his complaints of peculation and fraud would naturally exhale as the time of his release approached. Such officers, therefore, appear to have been occasionally a very mischievous element in the Patriot army. Montgomery died early in this struggle. He perished on that steep escarpment above which extends the fashionable promenade frequented in these days by Quebec society. He had served in the British army. He, too, expressed an opinion that an attempt should be made to secure men with a point of honour and some knowledge of the world to serve as company officers. He was anxious to have gentlemen to cope with these insubordinate and intractable American levies. Washington again and again complained of the lack of public spirit among his officers, of their stock-jobbing turn of mind, of their cunning to turn the distresses of their country to profit, of their proficiency in all the low arts that take advantages of the meanest kind; he expressed his poignant regret that he had ever taken command of such an army and such

men.[1] Congress, in the latter part of 1776, echoed these regrets, complaints, and representations, and by a minute in its proceedings expressed a wish to get hold of superior men for commissions. Another element of difficulty was excited by provincial feeling. A Massachusetts man would not serve under a Rhode Island officer. Connecticut and New Hampshire considered themselves inequitably dealt with, in the matter of staff and field appointments. New England generally expected to have the pick of the plums in the pudding, while looking to the whole of the States to pay the bills. It was pointed out to groups of men complaining that they had been neglected in the distribution of good things going round, that the fact of a man being born in New Plymouth, paying his bills punctually, and being a reliable blacksmith did not necessarily make him qualified for command. To construct a fighting machine out of such discordant elements and materials appeared to be a thankless as well as a hopeless task.

"The simple truth is," says Mr. Fortescue, "that so long as the quarrel with England meant no more for the Americans than town-meetings, demolition of houses, tarring and feathering of defenceless individuals, assaults on soldiers who were forbidden to defend themselves, and even shooting at convoys from behind walls, so long every man was a patriot, but when it came to taking as well as giving blows, the number of patriots was woefully diminished."

There is nothing about this class of conduct calling for particular comment. Americans are not unlike other people in not wanting to fight themselves, yet in being quite willing to sacrifice their able-bodied relations on the altar of their country. But even to this day, amidst some signs of better thought and more prudent expression of feeling, American writers maintain the old

[1] As to this, Mr. Fortescue thinks "such defects were so obviously to be expected from the composition of the American forces, and the factitious nature of the quarrel with England, that it is difficult to understand how Washington could have felt surprise at them."—*History of the British Army*, iii. 198.

high note about the moral tone, the moral elevation of this army. Writers have the effrontery to say that until the Hessians in New Jersey taught them, American Patriots never pillaged a cottage of a pig or a frying-pan: that Howe sent men with smallpox on them into Washington's camp to infect American Patriots with that disease; notwithstanding Washington's complaints of the pillage wrought in New York by his troops, weeks before a Hessian boot had crossed a New Jersey threshold; notwithstanding the well-known fact that in colonial days it was customary for friends to make up smallpox parties in order to catch the disease under the most favourable circumstances and get it over.

Recruiting.

Among the peculiarities of the American service for commissioned officers was the duty of recruiting. Captain Graydon, whose account of himself and his adventures, both on active service in the American cause and as a prisoner in the hands of the British, is well known, speaks of this service as terrible drudgery. He imputes the slackness of the people to indifference to the cause.

"Americans," he says, "think the year 1776 to have been one season of almost universal patriotic enthusiasm."

This opinion he holds to be erroneous. The

. . . opposition to the claims of Britain originated with the better sort; it was truly aristocratic in its commencement, and as the oppression to be apprehended has not been felt, no grounds existed for general enthusiasm.

Recruiting in consequence was slow and discouraging; none of the companies in which Graydon served were complete. His own was short by more than half its regulation number. Graydon's commission is dated 6th January 1776, a date at which the war was already six months old, with Boston beleagured, and Washington calling out for more and better men. Graydon spent many weeks in getting together this handful of men,

1775.

who were for the most part countryfolk, hands from the smithy and the plough. In order to win recruits he appears to have used all the cajolery that a recruiting sergeant in the eighteenth century had to employ. He frequented taverns, drank heavily, occasionally knocked a man down in the course of brawls and pot-house squabbles, and was engaged in much work he found intensely distasteful. This way of collecting recruits may have contributed towards the contempt entertained by the rank and file for some of their officers.

Released from captivity on parole in July 1777, Graydon, as he came home to Philadelphia, noticed a total absence of military parade or martial vigour in the Jerseys and Pennsylvania. Washington, he says, was with the little remnant of his army at Morristown, left to scuffle for liberty like another Cato at Utica. Captains, majors, and colonels were dog cheap. Many of them were still potmen and bar-tenders. Their martial fire was chiefly expended in pursuit of men suspected of being Tories. From other sources we learn that the sutlers or commissaries gave themselves military titles, the most acceptable being, perhaps, that of major. Any of these invading warriors would have accepted with glee from General Gates an appointment to a company or to a regiment. But where were the men for their commands? Local witnesses indicate that Pennsylvania at least and the Jerseys in 1777 did not provide enough men to go round. Paine, in his fifth letter on the American crisis, confirms this impression; he chides, exhorts, encourages, and appeals to the Philadelphian sense of shame, of emulation, of honour, but to little purpose. Graydon puts questions somewhat illuminating as to the difficulty of getting men:

"Why do we not," he asks, "turn out *en masse*, surround, and make a breakfast of Mr. Howe and his mercenaries? Could not a population of two million of souls have furnished enough of fighting Whigs for the purpose? Where were the multitudes which used to appear in arms in the commune of

Philadelphia? Where the legions of New England that hemmed in Gage at Boston? Where in short the 150,000 men in arms throughout the continent spoken of by General Lee and others at the beginning of the contest?"

Notwithstanding this posture of affairs there was a fine army on paper, for at the end of 1776, when Washington in full retreat was crossing the Jerseys, Congress resolved that eighty-eight battalions be enlisted, and the number of battalions appointed to each State be proportionate to the population and conditions of each. Massachusetts was to raise fifteen battalions, Virginia fifteen battalions, and so downwards, according to scale, to Georgia, responsible for one battalion. Excepting the appointment of general officers, which Congress retained, the appointment of all officers was, according to the original scheme, vested in the several States, each State being required to make provision of arms, clothing, and all equipment. It was also proposed to deduct the cost of clothing from the soldiers' pay. This paper constitution of an army in the field gave the Commander-in-Chief no patronage whatever; his generals and brigadiers being appointed by Congress, his colonels and captains either by election or at the choice of the Provincial Assemblies, he was left empty-handed. Of its own clumsiness this Provincial structure collapsed. At the end of 1776, when Washington was in Trenton and the Congress (the Rump of it) had fled to Baltimore, full powers of appointment of officers of every rank below that of brigadier-general were formally and expressly lodged in Washington as Commander-in-Chief. To fill up the ranks great inducements were held out to volunteers. Four pounds was the lowest bounty proffered to a recruit on enlistment, added to which was the deferred bonus in the shape of a hundred acres of land for every non-commissioned officer or private at the conclusion of his term of service. To a colonel was allotted an estate of 500 acres; all grants of land made under this contract being free of all charges for entry, title, and so forth. All officers and

Bounties.

privates benefited by these donations were to be protected during their period of service from speculators in real estate, as the beneficiaries were in the deed of gift deprived of all power of assignment until their term of service was complete.

The provision that every State was to be in itself a little sovereign community, raising, arming, paying, and equipping its own troops, aroused to fever heat sour interprovincial jealousies.[1] Inter-colonial jealousies.

It was the way of rival football clubs, anterior to the federation of clubs, to allure, by the bait of heavier bonuses or larger pay, promising or popular players from their fixed engagements. Scandals ensued, until as a measure of strict necessity it was agreed that the supreme control of the game should be placed in the hands of a federated committee. The States of America passed through a somewhat similar experience. Bounties rose from four pounds in one State to eleven pounds in another, to seventeen pounds in another, and as the war proceeded the bounty value rose to the remarkable sum of forty pounds per head.[2] The ruinous effect of this competition is not difficult to estimate. Here would be Smallwood's men from Baltimore, the St. Clair regiment from Philadelphia, Livingston's of New York, and the famous Connecticut cavalry, all on the same duties and purposes, under the

[1] In 1908 appeals were made to the patriotism of Englishmen, Scotsmen, and Welshmen by eminent politicians every day. The territorial army was the subject of these appeals. The Chancellor of the Exchequer (22nd July 1908) wrote a very earnest letter to the Lord Lieutenant of Carnarvonshire in this sense. The National Service League continues to make similar appeals. There are parts of Great Britain in which these appeals make no obvious impression. It is true there is no hostile force encamped in British fields. Much of the backwardness appears due to international sourness and jealousy. Mr. Lloyd George.

[2] In Virginia and South Carolina negroes were offered as bounty—"a healthy sound negro between the ages of ten and thirty years, or sixty pounds in gold and silver at the option of the soldier in lieu thereof"; or "one sound negro between the age of ten years and forty for each and every year's service."

same general and discipline, all under equal national obligations, yet paid according to varying rates and scales of pay. The immediate result was that as soon as opportunity offered, men enlisted anew in regiments paid on the higher scale. Hence some States had more men on hand than required, while other States were unable to maintain their quota. Washington, as a man of supreme common sense, pointed out again and again the ruinous folly of this disorderly system. Although in full retreat in the closing weeks of the disastrous year 1776, he yet sent a strong protest against a proposed rise in the scale of pay of Connecticut men. This State was at no time very keen on fighting for more liberty than it already enjoyed, and troops were not easy to collect. Farmers being prosperous stock-raisers and horse-breeders were reasonably satisfied with things as they stood. To go out for a day's fowling with the hope of a pot-shot from behind wall or tree at a red-coat was a different thing from sustained service in the field, with all its privations and discomforts. It seemed to require cart ropes to drag a Connecticut man from his fireside and feather-bed, to go and fight for Freedom's cause. The Connecticut Assembly proposed to increase their inducements to service by a rise of a pound a month. Washington exposed the obvious mischief of the arrangement. He said it was an injurious, nay, a fatal step. When troops, he urged, come to act together and find some comrade in receipt of higher pay, jealousy, impatience, and mutiny will take place; in fact, the whole army might dissolve. Yet such was the apathy of the people and the disinclination to serve that for every four men requisite for the strength, only one was enlisted. Men living on the coast, or on the Indian frontier, all students, schoolmasters, and certain classes of artisans, were made ineligible for service. Washington, infringing his own principles, had to advance the pay of artillerymen 25 per cent. Even after his brilliant little outpost affair at Trenton, Christmas 1776, he had to pay a bonus of ten dollars a

man to secure the services of time-expired men for another month. While contending with these perplexities the general was compelled to despatch some of his best officers on recruiting duty. Graydon's experience as a recruiting officer fully illustrates the degrading nature of that service. Many recruits joined when under the influence of drink, but enlistments thus consummated were soon found to be irksome to the enlightened conscience of these men on recovering their usual state of high moral elevation. Desertions by the score were the consequence.

A cursory review of these facts may perhaps account for the charge not unfrequently made against American men of those days that their services in the field were absolutely venal. It has been urged in extenuation of this charge that business or commerce is a bad school for Patriots; that the pursuit of the elusive dollar involves so many pleasures and interests that, provided they be left alone to follow the game, commercial men really care very little what flag flies over their head or under what king they live. This is as it may be; but as regards his military pay the Patriot's case in America was very hard. Twenty to forty dollars is a handsome bounty if a man gets it in gold and on the nail, and twenty dollars a month make fine wages if paid. But the rule with the American army was that their pay was always as much in arrears as that of the Turkish troops is said to be in our own day; that even when payment came, it was made in paper money; that the paper money was next to valueless, and that no one would give Congress any credit. Hence, presumably, came Paine's suggestion that to clothe the army, as there was no money to buy anything, people unable to serve in the army should send all their spare blankets to be cut up into military clothing,[1] and Livingston's proposition

Continental money.

[1] T. Paine, *Works*, ii. 88: "As it will always happen that in the space of ground in which a hundred men shall live, there will always be a number of persons, who by age or infirmity are incapable of doing personal service . . . their portion of service

that as the Dutch women of New York State wore more flannel petticoats than comfort or convenience required, they should part with their underclothing to make coats for the Patriots. The State paper money was in 1776, at the date of the attempt to organise a Continental army, of little more value than stuff for paper bags. In that year Massachusetts was issuing paper bills or notes for twopence. On a bill whose face value was sixpence, another State had caused to be printed, "To counterfeit: Death." In 1780, five years after the outbreak of hostilities and when the French alliance was at its best value, the women of Pennsylvania raised 300,000 dollars to be offered to the men of the Continental army in token of esteem for their services. To this fund Lafayette sent by the hands of some woman friend 525 dollars. On distributing the fund it was reckoned that there might be about two guineas a man for an army of 6000 men. After consideration of this generous offer from Philadelphia, Washington suggested that in lieu of giving the men money which would be spent in drink, it would be handsome for the ladies to provide the men with a shirt apiece, a suggestion that proved acceptable as a makeshift. It would thus appear that a shirt then cost about fifty dollars Continental money.

Paper money varies in exchange value from day to day; but the average proportion of paper value to hard money was that a fifteen-dollar bill might find a purchaser for one dollar cash. In February 1780, a pound of fresh pork fetched 5 dollars, a hundredweight of flour 100 dollars, a pair of good shoes 100 dollars. Regimental officers of the Jersey troop apprise their Legislature that four months' pay of a private would not procure for his family a single bushel of wheat; that the pay of a colonel would not purchase oats for his horse; that a common labourer received four times

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therefore will be to furnish each man with a blanket which will make a regimental coat, jacket, and breeches."

as much as an American officer.[1] It would thus seem that the sums mentioned as bounties and pay, reckoned at the rate of their purchasing power, were not large.

Washington wrote, in July 1779, that with the exception of about 400 recruits from Massachusetts, he had received no reinforcements for his army since the previous campaign. Of the 400 sent to his command, a portion were reported to be children hired at 1500 dollars each for nine months' service. This sum in English sterling is now worth, say, £300, but a paper dollar in that year fetched about threepence cash, consequently the 1500 dollars paper comes out at about sixteen guineas cash, which for nine months, even for children's service, was not extravagant pay. Yet unlearned and ignorant men were misled by those high-sounding sums; it was spread about in Pennsylvania that New England men enrolled for a few months' service had been in receipt of enormous bounties, while Pennsylvania men had engaged themselves for the whole war at moderate rates. The consequent discontent gave rise to frequent desertions. The patience and loyalty of Patriots enlisted with Washington were severely tried by these anomalies and irregularities.

Yet the stupidest or least observant of militiamen quickly learned that at whatever standard, or on whatever scale, pay and perquisites appeared on the pay-sheet, the actual value of a soldier's wage tapered away to nothing. There could be no brushing aside the fact that in 1780 there was not a silver dollar in Gates's military chest, while Congress went on issuing paper money at the rate of 80,000,000 of dollars every year for five years. Both Congress and the Provincial Assemblies relied for revenue upon the printing press. It was complained that bills and notes were issued too slowly, because the officers whose duty it was to sign them were either too few or too lazy.

Throughout the whole war the dissatisfaction of

[1] Hatch, p. 102; Bolton, *Private Soldier under Washington*, p. 227.

the troops in every rank sometimes became very acute. Congress indeed applauded itself for paying twenty-seven shillings a month to a full private, asserting that no such liberal amount had ever been paid to the men of any army. But the rank and file appraised this liberality on another scale. A whole month's pay expressed in paper dollars would not have purchased a pair of stout shoes. It was calculated in 1780 that a captain's daily pay of five shillings would hardly suffice to provide for his table a small joint of fresh pork. A commissioned officer had no means out of his pay of sustaining the prestige of his rank, or even the decency of a well-kept plain uniform. It is well known that Washington, Lafayette, and some others accepted no money for their services during this tedious struggle. It is equally well known that both Washington and Lafayette laid heavy burdens on their private fortunes to maintain the contest. But officers like Greene and Wayne were necessitous men, while others like Charles Lee and Gates looked for the substantial prizes of the game. Graydon saw the famous General Putnam with no other trappings than a hanger belted across his brawny shoulders, over a waistcoat without sleeves, and thought him better fitted to lead a band of ditchers or sicklemen than musketeers. He tells how General Wayne, once remarkable for the exemplary neatness and smartness of his uniform, was in 1776 dressed "for a character as Macheath or Captain Gibbett in a dingy red coat with a rusty black cravat, and a tarnished laced hat." Wayne was colonel of the Fourth Battalion, of which the uniform had been blue and white; but apparently the colonel had been unable to renew his kit. It was a common jest in New York, repeated by Graydon and several others, that the American uniform, which according to regulations was blue and buff, was reduced to buff alone.

Of public money there was really none, so that while Legislatures and Congress were offering bribes to allure recruits, there appears to be no reason why, as their

allurements were promises to pay, enormous bounties should not have been offered. It is stated that in 1777 as much as a thousand pounds was tendered as enlistment money, and that even this bait was dangled in vain. Yet even of this worthless money the pure patriotism of the opposition in Congress expressed itself jealously careful. A proposition was made to raise the captain's daily pay from five shillings to seven and sixpence. The coiners of phrases protested that they would not allow the distresses of America to become "a harvest to some, and a famine to others." They pretended to think that if a captain had three-fifths of a paper dollar added to his allowance (cash value of the increase being twopence halfpenny), not only would the officer become bloated, purse-proud, and a hater of liberty, but the people of America would be reduced to the straits of the inhabitants of Bethulia.

Popular distrust of the army.

The people of America, notwithstanding all the statutable penalties of refusal of the legal tender, steadily declined to give credit to government agents whose payments were not made in hard money. Throughout the war matters in this respect went from bad to worse. There were many men whose jealousy of the army was implacable, others whose hearts were as flint when any call for money was raised. Unwilling to pay or impatient of taxation, the citizens of the new Republic showed themselves inaccessible to the complaints of the army. They would neither pay taxes, nor assist by way of private beneficence. The officers, on behalf of themselves and the rank and file, denounced the selfish apathy of the American public.

"In this country," they say, "whose very existence as an independent nation depends ultimately on the exertions of the present time, not a single dollar after eight campaigns has been subscribed in support of the cause by individuals, though abounding in wealth, though rolling in state, though swimming in luxury."

There is abounding evidence that the general welfare

of the people of the provinces was little impaired by the campaigns, at least in the North. The estates, houses, lands, and portable property of the Tories or Loyalists had been confiscated, by which confiscation the Patriots were much enriched. There seemed to be plenty of wealth in distribution among the people at large. Graydon tells how his mother, whose livelihood had been eked out by letting lodgings or keeping a boarding-house, came away up from Philadelphia to Long Island in her own chaise to negotiate for the release of her son on parole; how handsomely she entertained his friends during the course of the negotiations which extended over many weeks; and how pleasantly and comfortably he returned with her to his own home in Philadelphia. His criticisms of the men who, like himself, held commissions in the American forces, for their ragged and forlorn appearance, appear not to have been applicable to himself. Franklin's scathing remarks on the luxury and wastefulness in the great towns, while the army was perishing of distress, have been often noticed. "Every form of wastefulness and extravagance prevailed in town and country, nowhere more than in Philadelphia. Under the very eye of Congress there was a luxury of dress, luxury of equipage, luxury of the table. We are told of one entertainment at which £800 was spent in pastry. The moral sense of the people had contracted a deadly taint; the spirit of gambling was undermining the very foundations of society." Franklin, while particularising Philadelphia, uses general terms of what was known of the country at large. The Newburgh Addresses, drawn up in December 1782, show a truly extraordinary condition of things. The war was over, Yorktown had fallen. The separate existence of the United States as a sovereign power was fully assured, and was awaiting formal recognition from the Court of Great Britain. There was nothing now left to be done but shouting and cheering. Yet what was the condition of the victorious army? Discontent seethed and fermented

Grievances of the army.

throughout the whole force from the major-generals downward. Officers of six States, inclusive of Massachusetts and New York, addressed, on behalf of themselves and their brethren the soldiers, a kind of Grand Remonstrance to Congress, showing how cruelly the fighting men had been treated by the civilians and lawyers in Congress assembled.

They state they have either received no pay or, if paid, the paper notes and bonds issued in payment of their demands were of no value. The subsistence or ration of certain articles had been frequently changed, so that rations had diminished both in quality and quantity. Forage was insufficient and bad. Allowances were years in arrears. Congress had undertaken to supply the soldiers with clothing, and a kit worth one hundred and twenty-five dollars had been spoken of. Somebody had seen such a kit somewhere, but since 1777 the administration of the Clothing Department had come to a complete stop, and no mention was ever made of the deficiency. "Whenever," said the officers, "there had been any real want of means, and defect in system or neglect in execution in the departments of the army, we have been invariably the sufferers by hunger, by nakedness, by languishing in hospital." General Greene declared that the American people thought the army could live on air, as no provision was made for regular and adequate supplies. As to the wounded, they were, it was said, not uncommonly eaten alive of maggots and worms. The officers urged an immediate adjustment of all dues with a view to the re-establishment of public credit. The families of many officers were starving. It was of little or no use sending to their homes, in maintenance of the household, the paper money of certain States, for no one would accept such bills in payment of the smallest article. Major-General Steuben, in March 1781, wrote to the quartermaster of the State of Virginia for waggons, camp equipage, and accoutrements for 500 men. The quartermaster replied that

he had neither money nor materials nor credit, and requested Steuben to place no dependence whatever on anything as likely to come from the quartermaster's department. The substance of all these just causes of complaint being got together and drafted into a form that their high mightinesses the members of Congress—"Our Sovereign Lord and Master," as the army called it—might not consider disrespectful, it was resolved to send a deputation to wait upon Congress with a statement of grievances.[1]

Washington sanctioned the form and substance of the address, expediting the memorial with a covering letter to a friend in Philadelphia recommending to Congress "soothing measures." When all was thus settled three officers of high rank were selected for the deputation. Then the question of expenses arose. Who was to pay journey and hotel money? It was then discovered that nobody had any money. A paper dollar from this quarter or that was all the needy officers could offer. At last the delegates started for Philadelphia, where they found a chilly reception. They were checked upon a point of punctilio. It was argued that it would be unwise for Congress to discharge their just debts on such a summons; it might appear that Congress had been worked upon by fear rather than by generosity, and thus a precedent established for the successful prosecution of similar demands. After these bluffing manœuvres it was resolved to defer consideration of the question for a week. The slender purse of the deputation was subject of common talk in that wealthy town. It was perhaps expected that if funds ran dry before the question was settled, these troublesome military persons would be compelled to get back to their camp,

[1] Their French allies, some of the regiments that served in America, made similar complaints for similar causes. The massacre of soldiers at Nancy in 1790 arose out of an agitation by three regiments for arrears of pay. The measures leading up to the massacre had the authority of Lafayette, "l'ami de Washington," as people used to call him. Cf. *Lafayette's Correspondence*, 17th August 1790.

leaving matters in their former state. Meanwhile the senior officer of the deputation falling ill there was more delay. There ensued in Congress an acrimonious discussion, in which it does not appear that the government had the pluck to face the position with an admission there was no money to meet the demands of the troops, but ultimately an agreement was arrived at that all arrears due up to 1780 should be settled. This settlement left all pay for thirty months unprovided for, but it was the only settlement feasible; it was to be carried out as the Treasury admitted of disbursements, and in such sums as the superintendent of finance thought suitable. With this large allowance of cold shoulder to distribute to their comrades the deputation returned. The army was now without 1783. hope of redress, without pay or clothing, or sufficient rations. The war was virtually at an end. There was no likelihood of any more campaigning. Rumours spread abroad that Congress and the State Legislatures intended to repudiate all liabilities. It was anticipated that the disbandment of the army was imminent, that men of all ranks would be broke without pay, pension, or compensation. Gouverneur Morris wrote to General Knox:

"After a peace," he said, "they (Congress and the States) will wish to get rid of you, and will see you starve rather than pay a sixpenny tax . . . it is my sincere opinion that the best legislature on the continent would do things which the worst man in them would, in his private capacity, be ashamed of."

There was substantial reason to think that some such policy would be pursued. Already in 1781 some men of a Pennsylvania regiment had been shot for demanding arrears of pay. They asked to have real not bogus money served out to them, money that shopkeepers and traders would accept. Within a few hours of making this demand they were shot by a platoon of their own particular friends and messmates.[1] It was at

[1] Stillé, *Life of General Wayne*, pp. 264-266.

this point, as Mr. Fortescue points out, that Washington secured the consent of Congress to the maximum of five hundred lashes as a disciplinary measure. Hamilton certainly anticipated the abandonment of the army, when no longer needed for the national service, to their own devices without redress of grievances. He wrote to Washington :

> I have an indifferent opinion of honesty in this country, and ill forebodings as to its future system.[1]

The wildest schemes of redress were mooted. It was suggested that the crown of America should be offered to Washington ; that the army should take the field to enforce upon the delinquent States the oppressing and immediate nature of their just claims. A conspiracy was darkly hinted at by which the establishment of a military oligarchy would be secured, that the army should migrate to western lands and adopt some scheme of colonisation in those vast unknown regions.

The Newburgh agitation, 1783.

At any rate the pressure of conditions must have become intolerable, seeing that at the end of seven not inglorious years high military chiefs were induced to share a movement perilously close to a general mutiny. Very prominent generals of the Continental army took their full share of the now famous agitation known as the Newburgh Addresses ; Horatio Gates, Henry Knox, and Rufus Putnam, the last reckoned the best engineer officer in the American army, were among the disaffected. An anonymous memorial was, in March 1783, distributed widely among the commissioned men. The writer spoke of himself as an old soldier of considerable rank, but a young man.[2] His arguments were expressed in a style that is always good in any age, for it was clear and pointed. The officers of the

[1] Cf. *An Essay on American Union: Alexander Hamilton*, by F. S. Oliver, p. 109.

[2] The drafter of the address was Major John Armstrong, aide-de-camp to Major-General Gates. Forty years later, in 1823, Armstrong told the story in the *United States Magazine*. Cf. also Sparks, *Life of Washington*, i. 392 n.

General Washington's Headquarters at Newburgh, N.Y.
From *Gleason's Pictorial*, 1852.

army had, he urged, conducted the United States of America through a doubtful and bloody war, and had placed America in the chair of independency.

"Does your country," he asked, "show herself ready to redress your wrongs, cherish your worth, and reward your services; or does she trample on your rights, disdain your cries, and insult your distress? Surely," he urged, "if they had sense enough to discover and spirit sufficient to oppose tyranny, whether it assume the plain coat of republicanism or the splendid robe of royalty, they should wake up and redress their own wrongs. Let Congress," he advised, "be made clearly to understand that the slightest mark of indignity from them will sunder the army and Congress for ever; say that you will court the auspices and invite the direction of your illustrious leader, retire to some unsettled country, smile in your turn, and 'mock when their fear cometh.'"

The writer of the memorial was quite well known either in person or by reputation to every man in the army. The memorial met with unqualified approval as a piece of English, and was much approved as a line of argument.

Washington is reported to have said that in elegance and force the composition had rarely been equalled in the English language. But Washington's knowledge of the products of the English language was as limited as his modesty was boundless. At any rate the document caused a vast sensation. After some hesitation and delay a meeting was called to discuss the situation on the basis of the anonymous memorial. A building had been erected in the Newburgh camp for use on Sundays as a meeting-house; on week days for dances and drums. The officers met in this temple with the intention of adopting measures that might have precipitated a contest. But the Commander-in-Chief had got wind of the conference. He appeared unexpectedly before the meeting had settled down to business, and read to the officers a carefully prepared address.

His appearance and intervention were as dramatic as the consequence was decisive. It was a critical

Washington's supreme influence.

moment in the life of every man in the hall. Had Washington determined to throw his sword into the balance in favour of military revolt, a second civil war had certainly ensued, followed by confusion and anarchy. But the great man was not so moved. The experiments of England in 1656 were not to be repeated on the Atlantic coast. No Fleetwood nor Ireton nor Lambert was invited to do a Cromwell's bidding. On the contrary, it was broadly hinted that much of the movement was intended to discredit Washington, that Armstrong's connection with Gates was not without significance, that Gates's old jealousy of the Commander-in-Chief was always alive if not now demonstrative. At any rate Washington's intervention on behalf of peace was conclusive. As he read his speech every eye was fixed upon him, and attention to this beloved general held the assembly mute. He was not a good reader nor speaker, yet the effect was in no way weaker on these accounts. The officers assembled listened to their illustrious chief as tears rolled down their faces.

"Let me conjure you," said he, "in the name of our common country, as you value your sacred honour, as you respect the rights of humanity, as you regard the military and national honour of America, to express your utmost horror and detestation of the man who wishes, under specious pretences, to overturn the liberties of your country, and who wickedly attempts to open the floodgates of civil discord and deluge our rising empire in blood" . . . "thus you will, by the dignity of your conduct, afford occasion for posterity to say, 'Had this day been wanting, the world had never seen the last stage of perfection to which human nature is capable of attaining.'"

There were those present who wished to say that the Commander-in-Chief was a man in easy circumstances, husband of a wealthy lady, who, besides, had never accepted any pay, and so had no arrears to demand, and hence was not in line with the army as regards their primary grievances. And perhaps some one might have pointed out that there is no such thing as liberty in the abstract, while the first condition of

liberty in the concrete seems to be that there should be neither debtors nor creditors. But nothing was said. The concluding sentiment hit them all fairly between the eyes. That a man for going without his just dues uncomplaining should be reckoned the latest expression of human perfection came right home. The taste and predilections of the period were satisfied. Being called upon to roll themselves up in their own virtue, the officers accepted the call.[1] Cromwell, on a somewhat similar occasion, addressed his officers in sentences of a labyrinthine complexity, roamed all over the Bible from Moses to James, and winding up with an hour's discourse on the 68th Psalm, placed himself at the head of a conspiracy to rule England with a hand of iron. Neither he nor his officers had been for years left neglected and left unpaid; they were made of other metal.

Washington's address closed amid dead silence. After he quitted the hall not a word was said to weaken the effect of his speech. Gates was voted into the chair, and after some business, invented, as it would seem, to save their faces, the officers adjourned. General Schuyler of New York, a man of much ability and personal influence, whom Congress had treated infamously, rode away from the meeting in the company of General Henry Knox. The impression of the meeting, the speech and the speaker, were so powerful that never a word passed between them.

"Never," wrote Schuyler to a correspondent, "did his Excellency achieve a greater victory than on this occasion, a victory over jealousy, just discontent, and great opportunities. The whole of the assembly were in tears at the conclusion of the address."

The notion that Washington should be offered the crown of America was seriously entertained by certain

[1] The meeting was constituted of the general officers, the field officers, a commissariat officer from each company, and a delegate from the medical staff. A full account of the meeting was transmitted to Congress for entry in the Journals (*q.v.*) of that date.

officers; but in answer to a letter broaching the project Washington used language of such stern and uncompromising rebuke that little or nothing more was heard of this proposal.[1]

Haply it may have been the mere muttering and sputter of an impending storm that would have broken had a spirit other than Washington's been there to foment the rebellious movement. It seems, consequently, that whatever inducements to service the army found attractive, the quantum of pay and privileges must be dismissed from consideration. Why, then, did the American army keep the field?

Captain Graydon seems to furnish the answer. Being captured at Fort Washington, he was, after some months' captivity, allowed parole on the usual condition that he was to serve no more during the war. Yet, he says, his hankerings after the soldier's business, dog's life that it was, were strong, because he was really fond of the work, and would have been glad to again take his full share of the perils of a campaign. The sentiment was obviously shared by thousands of his fellow-countrymen.

[1] The letter urged that the same abilities which had led them through so many difficulties to victory and glory, the qualities that had won them esteem and veneration, would more than suffice to conduct them through the smoother paths of peace. Cf. Hatch, Appendix; *Letters from Washington to Governor Harrison, Virginia*; Sparks, i. 386; Marshall, iv. 580.

# CHAPTER X

## THE CONTINENTAL OR REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (*continued*)

ON taking command General Washington, face to face with a Herculean labour, had to reduce to something approaching order this multitude of negroes, redemptioners, mean whites, and militiamen, brought together in disorder and without any scheme of discipline, without regular supply of uniforms, ammunition, weapons, tents, or medical equipments. July 1775.

Of the constituent details, the earlier contingents were from the New England States, others later from New York, others from the Indian border of Pennsylvania and Virginia, and some companies from Baltimore.

A vivid description of the camp by the Rev. William Emerson, kinsman of the famous essayist of that name, tells, as an ardent Patriot should, what a beautiful scene of irregularity it presented. The men were housed according to the customs and opportunities of each provincial group. Some had marquees or tents, some built booths of brushwood, others ran up constructions part of turf, part of timber ; many were contented with a bit of a sail or blanket, or to camp *à la belle étoile*. This chaplain to the forces saw beauty in every line and feature of this encampment.[1] Handsome villas and costly suburban streets now occupy the curve from

[1] Mr. Emerson's account is quoted by G. W. Greene, Frothingham, Sparks, Bolton, and others. The earlier writers take the account seriously, with a secret joy.

Roxbury right round to Charlestown, along which line, in scanty number, the American army lay. But to the Patriot's eye the aspect of things viewed from under the historic tree in Cambridge was much fairer.[1] The chaplain's eye, too, would have been pleased with the varied freedom of the army's attempts at uniform, or the attempts to hide it. Every man dressed according to his own style. The few who came furnished with a uniform appear to have been as well pleased to cover it up or take it off as are the commissioned officers of the British army. The simple coat of blue turned up with red was often hidden beneath an upper covering of blanket or cloak, while many turned out for parade in such garb as the industrious wife or mother had in the home kitchen fashioned from homespun wool. Men from the borderland came, clad in character, all fringes, streamers, pretty scarlet needlework, and buck-skin, having hunting shirts of unbleached homespun linen, with broad lay-down collars edged with fancy stitching, fringed leggings of deerskin, and carrying rifles of which many were at least seven feet long. This costume of *coureurs de bois* was much approved by Washington, who would have been pleased to see his army throughout dressed in this style, with soft shoes and felt hat to complete the array. Washington always endeavoured to be himself carefully dressed, and liked to see his men smart as well as efficient. Whoever came to join his colours without previous provision of uniform was, as far as possible, fitted out with a hunting shirt, long gaiters reaching from above the knee to the ankle, well buttoned home and strapped down, with some little decorations of ruffles or

Dress of the army.

[1] Mrs. John Adams, most ardent of Patriots, wrote about Washington in terms the eighteenth century admired. Miss Seward of Lichfield and Mrs. John Adams might have kissed each other. "Dignity with ease and complacency, the gentleman and the soldier, look agreeably blended in him; modesty marks every line and every feature of his face." Thus she describes Washington's pock-marked, lantern-jawed, anxious visage, about three days after his arrival in Cambridge.

pleatings at neck, wrist, and seams, all of a dead leaf tint of dull brown to complete the costume. Yet for thousands it was found impossible to provide even this plain equipment. Congress gave no order in these days as to the supply of clothing to the Continental army; it offered advice or suggestions or recommendations to the Provincial Assemblies and Conventions that they cause to be made for each soldier a suit of clothes—the waistcoat and breeches to be of deer leather if to be had on reasonable terms—a blanket, a felt hat, two pairs of hose, and two pairs of shoes. But the Assemblies usually found ways how *not* to come into line with Congressional resolutions. Boots and blankets commonly appear in the journals of Congress as things for supply, but with the paper dollar worth threepence cash, and the general reluctance to take Congress paper in payment for goods, many of these votes of supply went the way of other pious wishes.

Some contingents from the larger and more prosperous centres of population came into camp in handsome array.[1] It was an age when men wisely loved gay and lively colours, for which Puritan and Quaker discouragement of all art had not quite quelled a pretty taste; so that the privately enlisted companies ruffling it in apple green, canary yellow, and Hungary red were clad in well-matched hues to look soldierly as well as smart. The New York officers were especially remarked for their *tenue*. It was said that while it was necessary to point out an officer of Virginians, there being nothing to distinguish him from a private, one could immediately identify a New York officer by his general appearance and deportment. These companies marching through the villages with fife and drum attracted much kindly attention, and drew a few recruits for the main army. The Commander-in-Chief knew well that a slovenly

[1] The uniforms of the Continental army are dealt with in *Magazine of American History*, i. 60; *Historical Magazine*, v. 132-133. The information is scanty; the regulations were not carried into effect for reasons obviously connected with the stinginess of the Provincial Assemblies and the impotence of Congress.

soldier is a poor soldier. If a man is in want of the comforts and necessaries of life along with thousands of his comrades, his soldierly qualities may increase in efficiency owing to the sense of misfortunes commonly shared; but a man who culpably neglects his appearance and clothes is likely to neglect other matters contributory to his military value. Washington thought that his men, who were fighting for land and liberty on paper money, ought to be superior in appearance to men who hired themselves as food for powder at a shilling a day.

A few months' service reduced all colours and materials to a uniformity of dinginess. The army was, according to official report throughout the seven years of this struggle, a dingy and a shabby army. Washing-
1781. ton, six years after opening his commission at Cambridge, complains:

> Instead of having magazines filled with provisions, we have a scanty pittance, scattered here and there in the different States. Instead of having our arsenals well supplied with military stores they are poorly provided, and all the men leaving them. Instead of having a regular system of transportation established upon credit, or as funds in the quartermaster's hands, we have neither the one nor the other; and all that business, or the greater part of it, being done by military impress, we are daily and hourly oppressing the people, souring their temper, and alienating their affections. Instead of having the regiments completed to the new establishment, which ought to have been done agreeably to the requisition of Congress, scarce any State in the Union has at this hour an eighth of its quota in the field![1]

"Our men," writes General Greene, "are almost naked

[1] *Diary*, 1st May 1781.—This amazing man had this kind of thing to deal with all his military life; cf. his *Diary*, 25th May 1755: "You may with almost equal success attempt to raise the dead as the force of this country (Virginia). Such is her parsimony that she is willing for the rains to wet the powder, and the rats to eat the bowstrings of the enemy, rather than attempt to drive them (the Indians) from her frontiers." Of the Pennsylvanian Quakers and Germans he says, "They were singularly backward in rendering any aid for the public service." See Washington's Letters to Dinwiddie, 1752-57, in Ford, vol. i.

for want of overalls and shirts, and the greater part of the army barefoot.

"No rum, nor any prospect of any; and we have been for nearly four weeks without any ammunition."[1]

"The troops here" (Ticonderoga), says Schuyler, "are destitute of tents; they are crowded in vile barracks, which, with the natural inattention of soldiers to cleanliness, has already been productive of disease, and numbers are daily rendered unfit for duty. I have not one carriage for field artillery. . . . The anxiety I have suffered since my arrival here, *lest the army should starve*, is occasioned by the scandalous want of subordination and inattention to my orders in some of the officers that I left to command at the various posts."[2] 1775.

In December 1776, being then in full retreat in New Jersey, Washington reported about his soldiers that many of them were entirely naked, and more so thinly clad as to be unfit for service. So at the battle of Eutaw Springs, five years later, the American troops were reported to be entirely naked, and to have worn big bunches of moss to keep their limbs from being chafed by heavy leather accoutrements and steel buckles. Graydon repeats the popular and always welcome jest, that although the uniform of the Continentals was blue and buff the blue had all disappeared. Steuben reports that he saw officers at the Valley Forge whose full uniform at the grand parade consisted of either dressing-gowns or suits made of blanketing. Officers of field rank were so destitute that they could not accept camp hospitalities because of their squalor. To meet the circumstances it was fully understood that a man might go out to dinner in any kind of kit he could muster. Privates allowed to go on furlough are mentioned as spending a day or two in making suits of clothes out of blankets, that in passing through villages on their way homewards they may at least be decently covered. Sept. 8, 1781. 1778.

Colonel Angell of Rhode Island asserted that his regiment was commonly called the ragged, lousy, 1777.

[1] Greene to Washington, 24th January 1782.

[2] Schuyler to Washington, 6th August and 26th September 1775.

naked regiment, because of the unclad and scandalous condition of his men. Similar evidence from the records of the war, whether public or private, is abundant. Moore's *Diary of the American War* contains many very amusing and instructive extracts from the newspapers of the period, in which the hardships and sufferings of the troops are made the object of Loyalist jests and scorn. These terrors of the campaign culminated in the encampment of the Valley Forge, of which more will be said in due course. Yet there is an air of exaggeration about these statements as to the condition of the troops. Commanding officers have a way of speaking about their commands, their wants, and hardships, as it were, through a megaphone, thinking, presumably, that to be heard in a crowd it is requisite to shout loud and long. It is obvious that no troops could survive the conditions of life described by Washington as common to all his army just before Christmas 1776. The Delaware that year, at that time, was partly frozen, and temperature at Trenton, or anywhere along the Delaware, must have been too low for naked men to survive continued exposure. The reported nakedness of the troops in Washington's, or Greene's, or Angell's commands is probably a figure of speech intimating that clothing was insufficient and that generally the army was in a poor way.

1777-1778.

Yet another side of the shield is presented by other observers. Doctor Benjamin Rush reports that in the winter of 1776-1777 along the Delaware, among 1500 Philadelphian militia there were about two cases of sickness and one of death, and that men were so much the better of the regular hours and plain living of the camp at the Valley Forge and elsewhere that cases of consumption and other complaints were rapidly cured during that winter. Graydon, when recruiting in Pennsylvania some months before, mentions with disparagement the general quality of his recruits; yet it was such as these that Dr. Rush reports as surmounting

with ease physical difficulties that ought to have killed them like so many flies.

The reports therefore commonly passed about as to the extreme destitution of the American army should be accepted with some reserve.

The weapons and ammunition.

As regards fire-arms, cannon, and ammunition, the American army about Boston in 1775, and usually throughout the war, was ill supplied. Congress was quite unable to supply men with firelocks or rifles, but every farmer and farm operative possessed a gun of some sort. On enlistment in the militia the recruit was required by his enlistment paper to provide for himself his own "good effective fire-arm," and if possible a bayonet as well, and a cartridge pouch, or in lieu of a bayonet, a tomahawk, a hatchet, or cutlass. This condition of contract could not apply to negroes, or boys, or many townsfolk. Yet about Boston nearly 3000 men are said to have been without either arms or ammunition. Such weapons as were to hand showed an interesting variety of grade, length, bore, and range. The firelocks were of the old type, which during the eighteenth century varied but little. The New England gun was a family utensil, kept handy in the house-place somewhere, loaded, and ready for immediate use. It was very frequently taken out to replenish the larder, and was affectionately regarded as ranking even above the kettle in the hierarchy of domestic utensils. It is said that the rifled gun was unknown in New England in 1776, that in fact this arm was not to be found anywhere along the eastern seaboard at that time. If this be so, the New England farmer's weapon was of the sort known to the British troops as Brown Bess, to the American colonists as the Queen's Arm.[1] It was a smooth-bore gun of short range, about fourteen pounds in weight, with a dreadful

[1] Cf. J. R. Lowell, "The Coortin'":

Agin the chimbley, crook necks hung,
An' in amongst 'em rusted
The ole Queen's-arm that Granther Young
Fetched back from Concord, busted.

recoil such as would dislocate a careless man's shoulder, and useless in heavy rain. Armed with this weapon, the farmers at Bunker Hill loaded up with odds and ends, scraps of iron and nails, waited until the British soldiers were within short range, aimed at the knee, and, by the upward kick of the weapon lodging the charge in the lower half of the trunk, blew the abdomen or groin to pieces.

The rifle grooving of this unhandy piece is due to the necessities of border warfare, and the immigration of Swiss and Tyrolean jägers into the backwoods of Pennsylvania early in the seventeenth century. The old piece was of little value for bush fighting or bush hunting. The rifle improved the border settler's condition so plainly that it was adopted with avidity. The history of the origin of this arm is obscure, but a general knowledge of its value was being diffused at this period. Major Ferguson, whose death on King's Mountain on the confines of the Carolinas was so deplorable a loss to the British cause, had experimented upon the rifle with so much success that on 1st June 1776 he gave an exhibition of its value at Woolwich. Here, in the presence of Lord Amherst, Lord Townshend, and other high military persons, Ferguson made a display of his new rifled gun, "which," says Sergeant Lamb, "astonished all beholders." Notwithstanding the high wind and the heavy rain,

> . . . he fired at the rate of four shots a minute at a target 200 yards distant. He then fired six shots a minute. He hit the bull's-eye lying on his back on the ground. He only missed the target three times during the whole course of his display. He took out a patent for his improvements, which was issued on December 4th, 1776.[1]

[1] *Journal of the War*, Sergeant Lamb of the 23rd or Welsh Fusiliers, p. 308. This matter is again mentioned on p. 156 of this volume, with Lamb's quotation from Ramsay. The *Freeman's Journal*, 7th September 1776, reports that a Hessian of the British force being killed, had an excellent rifle, and that many of the regulars were in rifle dresses.

Ferguson was, as mentioned below, killed in the engagement at King's Mountain,

> . . . "at which affair," says Ramsay, "riflemen took off riflemen with such exactness that they killed each other when taking sight so instantaneously that their eyes remained after they were dead one shut and the other opened, after the manner of marksmen when taking sight."

Although there was no official recognition of the rifle as an arm to be furnished to the British army until about thirty years later than these events,[1] yet colonels of regiments took good care to provide good weapons of this class to selected marksmen to such a degree, that during the actions in America the efficiency of men on either side in the use of the rifle was fairly equal.

The main difficulty in the old firelock was the flint: how to make it, to keep it in good order, and how to maintain it in good supply. The approved variety was a black flint, which by actual use keen sportsmen on both sides of the ocean found serviceable for the longest time. If there were hundreds of backwoodsmen in the American ranks there were hundreds of poachers in the British regiments, so that even in this respect the forces were not unevenly matched. However, the predominant partner of this association of things that kill was the Queen's Arm, or the old Brown Bess, of which nearly every kitchen in New England appears to have been bereft. On the expiry of his term of enlistment the patriot militiaman naturally wished to take with him to his home his trusty gun : whether for the destruction of a brush turkey or of a Redskin was to him indifferent. Washington, however, endeavoured by specific orders to check this practice, and added instructions to his colonels that time-expired men should be paid good prices for the guns left behind in camp. If it be true that in the force besieging Boston there was only one regiment that could on parade muster some ninety-

[1] The 95th (better known as the Rifle Brigade) were equipped with the rifle at Busaco.

seven firelocks, it appears to be also true that even for this moderate number of muskets there was not enough powder to go round. At the outbreak of hostilities it was said that there was not on sale a hundred pounds of powder in the Colonies.

Powder.

"We are so short of powder," wrote Governor Cooke from Providence, R.I., to Washington, in response to an urgent request for powder, "that our supply is greatly insufficient to resist even a short attack upon the town."

Many hunters of game and farmers made their own powder. But as it was desirable for an army to use a standard powder, the Massachusetts Assembly issued a receipt or prescription for the manufacture of the article, coupled with an offer to buy at a standard price powder made according to this receipt, or according to any other approved method. But citizens, quite equal to the opportunity, began to send in powder in such quantities that the offer was rescinded. The materials of the explosive were compounded without much skill, and burned with such rapidity as to make the kick of a gun as bad as a kick from a horse. Throughout the war the quality did not improve, nor was the quantity large. Complaints about the quality of the powder made in the local mills becoming both loud and persistent, commissioners were sent by Congress to inspect the stuff and remedy the grievance.[1] Inspectors, too, at a liberal rate of (continental) pay, were appointed to look after the manufactured article, and report thereon both to Congress and to the Provincial Assemblies. None the less the supply remained scanty.[2]

Powder not supplied by friends or captured from

[1] Cf. Proceedings of Congress from 7th June 1776 to 28th August 1776, *passim*. Washington, before Boston in 1776, said he had been for months together with not thirty rounds of cartridges per man. About the same time New York was reported to hold not five pounds of powder.

[2] In September 1776 three rifle companies in Philadelphia, reporting themselves short of ammunition, were supplied by order of Congress with eleven pounds weight for the whole three companies.

the British came into the country by way of the West Indies, and chiefly through St. Eustatius. This island was a huge depot of stores of all kinds in transit from Europe to America. It was a free port in Dutch hands, with a trade so lucrative that British merchants establishing themselves here, to provide the enemies of their country with supplies of every kind, inclusive of powder, made large fortunes.

Sir George Rodney, however, taking the view that this Dutch free port was a source of mischievous interference with the course of hostilities, and aided to protract a tedious and somewhat inglorious struggle, cleared out St. Eustatius in 1780. How the British merchants pursued him at law for the remainder of his days, and how the Ministry treated him in consequence, belongs to another narrative, but it may be pointed out that Rodney's action was in strict accord with the notions of the time. By many St. Eustatius was regarded as a mere nest of dealers in contraband, who preyed upon the vitals of both England and America. Rodney's action at St. Eustatius proved effective. The Americans found their chief source of supply cut off so completely that American commanders were compelled to draw their stores of powder from the French squadrons cruising about in American waters. Occasionally an American privateer picked up a British ship with powder on board, but this source of the commodity was too precarious to be of practical service.

But from first to last Washington and his subordinates went short of powder. It was commonly stated that want of ammunition prevented Washington from attempting the siege of New York. In an oft-quoted passage Washington mentions in a letter that his exploit of maintaining a series of posts extending over thirteen miles around Boston, within musket-shot of the British and without powder, was an exploit perhaps without historical parallel. In this case it would appear that either the Father of his Country permitted himself the luxury of expansive expression, or that his chroniclers,

who speak of the severe bombardment of Boston, are also indulging in a little patriotic exaggeration. Evidence, however, corroborates Washington's statement. The Journals of Congress in 1775 and 1776 give the impression that there was high activity in the Philadelphian powder mills. Orders are issued for the supply of material of war on an imposing scale. But the financial arrangements being defective no ammunition reached headquarters. The complaints lodged by Washington on behalf of his northern army were echoed years later by Greene in his campaigns southwards. Greene assigns the slack supplies to the apathy or the neglect of the men in Philadelphia. The true reason is to be sought in an empty treasury and a rotten financial system.

The chief weapon on either hand in this dispute being the firelock, the quality of the man behind this gun is not without some interest. Both Brother Jonathan and Mr. Atkins were fairly familiar with the use of the gun. Contrasts have been drawn between the restrictive effect of the British game laws and the freedom of the New England farm-hand from such restrictions. But some laws are made to be disobeyed, while generally the state of society in the eighteenth century made the use of gun and pistol much more common than is the case in these peaceful times. Poaching, smuggling, a little highway work, quarrelling within easy reach of gun and pistol, duelling, the unsafety of the roads, the total absence of police, the necessity for some knowledge of fire-arms in defence of hearth and home, and the generally violent tone and temper of the times, made shooting common enough. It is quite certain that over many a kitchen mantelshelf in rural England there used to be kept a loaded blunderbuss or fowling-piece. But the effect of the American's training in skulking from trunk to bush and bush to boulder in pursuit of game was that he was unwilling to come out into the open, and rightly thought that the best soldier is the soldier that kills without being killed.

Both Washington and Montgomery testify to the anxiety of the American rustic to have his legs and trunk well sheltered; he was good, they said, behind a fence, poor in the open, and afraid of the bayonet.

"I am convinced," said Washington, "as if I had seen it, that they (the American soldiers) will not march boldly up to a work nor stand exposed in a plain."

But this prudence made him a more useful man.[1] In using the firelock of the eighteenth century the recruit was instructed to make twelve separate actions. Of these priming, or filling up the little pan of the musket with enough dry powder to catch fire from the spark from the flint, was the most difficult. The Cromwellian advice to his Ironsides to fear God and keep their powder dry was as sound advice at the battle of Brandywine as it had been at the battle of Dunbar. In a high wind, to get the powder into the pan was difficult; in a high wind with rain, to keep the powder dry was impossible. Hence more than one engagement in this war was closed up by storms of rain. Thus the 20th Regiment (Lancashire Fusiliers) were at close quarters in Pennsylvania during the autumn of 1777 with their American foes, but a violent rain and wind rendering their firelocks useless, the combatants separated. Reloading after the first discharge being a long and complex action, the policy of getting in first with shooting was patent. The British troops trusted for the second course of the menu to the bayonet.[2] In view of these difficulties,

[1] "The proficiency of the American in the use of a gun could not fail to be greater, owing to his larger opportunities, and probably to his greater sagacity." Mr. Fortescue points out that it was the marksmen of the American army, the irregulars fighting in wild and thinly populated country, that vanquished Burgoyne and made sure the crowning victory of Saratoga (Fortescue, iii. 529).

[2] It is a commonplace with some American writers that amidst every other conceivable defect the British soldiers fired high and wild. Paul Revère's woodcut of the "Boston Massacre" is quoted in support of this allegation. That woodcut is of the Noah's Ark school of art. British infantry fire has been adversely estimated by British officers (see above, vol. i. p. 323); but there is another side to this question: cf. Fortescue's description of the Battle of Quebec,

Franklin urged upon commanders the use of bows and arrows. A man, argued he, can see to shoot, for there is no smoke, while the enemy, seeing the arrow coming, would try to evade it and thus create confusion among his neighbours in rank. Many American officers of high position recommended the adoption of a considerable number of pikes in lieu of muskets in the armament of each battalion. It is not evident that either of these propositions was well received. For bullets men relied upon their own industry and a few simple implements. Lead was somewhat scarce. The leaden statue of King George III., erected in New York in recognition of the repeal of the Stamp Act, was used up to make bullets. Four thousand pounds of lead were run off into bullets

. . . to make as deep impressions in the bodies of some of his red-coated and Tory subjects as the superabundant emanations of the folly and pretended goodness of the real George had made upon their minds, which have effectually poisoned and destroyed their souls, that they are not worthy to be ranked with any beings who have any pretensions to the principles of virtue and justice.

The bullets to suit the bore of his firelock were made by each soldier, who was furnished with a little set of bullet moulds of suitable sizes. They inflicted horrible wounds. They smashed the bones; they tore out entire muscles from arms or legs; they stopped a running or charging man immediately. There was a little ridge or seam along the circumference of the ball which, while it ridged and scratched the bore of the musket, caused ragged wounds in the body wherever it got home. The usual weight of the shot seems to have been about from fourteen to eighteen bullets to a pound of lead, and a man's supply for a day's fighting was about twenty bullets. A firelock rapidly heated and could not then be handled. A man's allowance in the British army

and *Memoirs of Baron de Marbot*, ii. p. 177, who imputes all the French reverses in Spain to the deadly efficiency of British fire; and Marshal Bugeaud, quoted by Trochu in *L'Armée française en 1867*, 2nd edit. p. 241.

now is a hundred cartridges for a day's engagement; the weight of his ammunition is 415 grains per cartridge.

The equipment of the private soldier as to fighting instruments being practically limited to the firelock, he naturally became attached to his gun. Consequently on the expiry of his enlisted term, being loth to part with an old friend, and mindful of coming sport at home, the militiaman not unseldom stole away with his gun a day or two before his time was up. Some spirited Patriots, by a judicious system of enlistment into different provincial regiments for short periods, are said to have accumulated six or eight guns in this way for the family armoury. At the same time guns made, as asserted, in the royal factory of France were run over under a friendly flag from Nantes or Bordeaux as consignments of merchandise. Some of these fusees, according to well-founded complaints, were of the gas-pipe order, such as have been sold by the ton to coloured men and tattooed men during these many generations. A stringent caution against these smuggled articles was issued on the authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

Artillery.

Of the artillery and cavalry of the Americans there is little to tell. Colonel Henry Knox, once a Boston bookseller and one of the leaders in that turbulent town in 1770, was early in the war (1776) appointed to the chief command of the Continental artillery. The General Congress put on paper in November 1776 an important resolution for the establishment of an artillery yard or training school. The locality of the school was not fixed in the terms of the resolution. A regular staff, inclusive of Master or Director, was arranged for in the scheme, as well as a course of training for gunners, bombardiers, and matrosses. The matross, or mate, is apparently the servant of the gun as distinct from the gunner or pointer. A little later in the same month Congress gave orders for the manufacture of 226 brass guns, field and battery ordnance, to range from 3-pounders to 24-pounders. At the same time Congress, having no supply of brass, asked the homesteads

of the Thirteen States to furnish brass and copper utensils for the casting of these weapons. These plans and orders were emitted at the time Washington was retreating with his remnant of an army before Cornwallis towards the Delaware, and Congress itself had in contemplation the prudence of removal of themselves and their papers to Baltimore. There is little evidence that these plans were ever executed or the casting of the ordnance proceeded with. Washington's siege-train at Boston consisted of the royal guns surprised by Ethan Allen at Ticonderoga and at Crown Point. A fair amount of cannon was looted at times by Patriots and privateers before the condition of war was fully established. Some sea prizes containing cannon being made, the weapons were at once converted, when convertible, into field-pieces, while at Saratoga the whole of Burgoyne's artillery became a prize of war. On the other hand, at the fall of Forts Washington and Lee a considerable quantity of artillery was taken by the British. The artillery of those days was easily made, provided enough brass or iron was handy. The guns were first cast in a mould and then bored or gouged out by an appropriate machine. Field artillery and the smaller pieces were cast of brass alloyed with copper or tin. Like bell-founders, cannon-founders kept the secret of their metal amalgams to themselves. The expense of manufacture and maintenance of artillery was ever beyond the means of Congress; the roads were not suited to the transit of heavy vehicles, and horses fit for drafting artillery difficult to secure; but at this time there was no organised artillery train in any army. The slowness of movements entailed by heavy artillery was a serious drawback to its utility. Burgoyne, at least, paid highly for the services rendered by his guns. Probably Washington never made so good a show of artillery in the first section of the war as during an hour or two of the brief bombardment of Boston in March 1776. On that occasion, it will be recollected, a terrified spectator saw seven shells in the air at the

same moment. In Boston was found a good supply of cannon abandoned by General William Howe. Some of the pieces were spiked, but all apparently were turned to some use against the British. Slowness of manipulation, bad weather, scarcity of men trained as artillerists, inferior powder, all contributed to diminish the tactical value of artillery. Washington notoriously was unable to keep the Hudson protected from the British frigates because of his feeble shore batteries.[1]

Cavalry.

In this war little use was made of cavalry. It is a question for the learned in military matters whether there were engaged on either side any cavalry at all. Mounted men do not constitute cavalry, and dragoons were not, in the earlier stages of things military, reckoned as cavalry. There were mounted infantry in Washington's army, and towards the close of the war, as the tide of battle rolled south among the planters and growers, who were accustomed to get on horseback if it were to cross a field, mounted infantry increased rapidly. Probably these men may be reckoned as dragoons. In the older military books mention is made of horse, foot, and dragoons, which shows the three arms distinguished. Heavy dragoons had been armed with carbine or rifled carbine and bayonet. A *dragooner* is a horse too slight for the shock tactics of real cavalry, but good enough for mounted infantry.[2] Burgoyne was a cavalry officer who had commanded the 16th Light Dragoons in Portugal, a regiment which, with the 17th (Preston's), constituted the whole of the cavalry arm attached to the regular British forces in America. But this mere handful of men, perhaps never more than 600 in all, was short of horses. Cattle did not easily survive transit of the Atlantic Ocean in those days, and those that arrived were in such poor case as to be fit only for the kennel or the kitchen area. Captain Oliver Delancey (after-

[1] Cf. *Proceedings of Congress*, Nov. 28, 1776 ff. for resolution about artillery.

[2] Cf. above, Chapter VIII., "Military Forces of the Crown," on the mounted troops in the expeditionary army.

wards Colonel of the 17th Dragoons or Lancers, and, on the hanging of Major André, made Adjutant-General to Sir Henry Clinton's force) was commissioned to purchase horses for the 17th while the regiment was quartered in Boston, but, as has been already mentioned, was unable to fulfil this important duty owing to obstruction by Patriots.

While, however, Delancey could raise no horse, Washington was in no better condition; if owners would sell to the British captains, if Patriots refused to permit the horses to get through to their assigned place, yet Patriots would neither sell nor send horses to Washington. They knew his purchase-money would be expressed in paper, and could not afford to strip their farms of draught cattle. New England was famous for its horses; the "pacer" had become as well known in his own day as the "Waler" is in ours. That New England could have raised a large force of mounted troops fit for scouting as uhlans is certain; yet only Connecticut furnished a body of mounted men. The Connecticut Horse achieved some fame. Graydon's account of them is somewhat tinted by the want of love between Philadelphia and New England.

Another of the military phenomena of this campaign, the Connecticut Light Horse, ought not to be forgotten. These consisted of a considerable number of old-fashioned men, probably farmers and heads of families, as they were middle-aged and many of them apparently beyond the meridian of life. They were truly irregulars, and whether their clothing, their equipment, or caparisons were regarded, it would have been difficult to discover any circumstance of uniformity. Instead of carbines and sabres, they generally carried fowling-pieces, some of them very long, and such as in Pennsylvania are used for shooting ducks. Here and there one appeared in a dingy regimental of scarlet, with a triangular tarnished laced hat. . . . These singular dragoons were volunteers who came to make a tender of their services to the Commander-in-Chief. But they staid not long at New York. . . . The General had no use for cavaliers in his insular operations and . . . they were forthwith dismissed, with thanks for their zeal.

One of them was afterwards captured in Long Island who, questioned as to his duties, replied that he had "to flank a little and carry tidings," and a very good answer too. It comprises the whole service that these mounted men were able to render. There were a few cases of shock attacks, for instance at Freehold, where the British charged a body of American cavalry with some success. Scouting, flanking, and the rapid moving of mounted infantry were the chief uses made of horses in this war. But Congress created a brigade of cavalry by resolutions and written instructions. The South Carolina Rangers, 564 men of all ranks, were brought on the strength of the Continental army, as well as the Georgian Mounted Infantry, on a scale of pay by which, for twelve and a half dollars a month (say 1s. 8d. per day), a full private was to provide himself with horse, arms, and provision. There was a further resolution that a body of 3000 cavalry should be formed with full equipment of arms and horses. They also appointed Elijah Sheldon to be a Lieutenant-Colonel of a regiment of cavalry, *if he could raise it* with the assistance of other officers, the selection of whom was left to Washington. In fact, at the time when America's fortunes were at their lowest ebb in November and December 1776, Congress created cannon, horses, artillerymen, dragoons, and dollars, as fast as committees and printing presses could work; but want of men and money for these more expensive and elaborated branches of military service continued throughout the war to hamper the Continental army, hence the war was during Howe's time in America an infantry war. Even in later years, when mounted men formed an appreciable fraction of the forces on either hand, the numbers engaged are small. Thus at the battle of Hobkirk Hill, on the American side were ninety mounted men, on the British side sixty. On both sides the troopers were of Colonial birth.

The dietary scale.

The food of the Continental army was methodically

arranged on a most liberal scale according to a fixed dietary. The daily portions were authorised to be one pound of bread, a pound and a quarter of beef (but in lieu of meat on Fridays, a pound and a quarter of stock-fish), a pint of milk, a quart of beer, a gill of peas or beans, the weekly portion of butter to be six ounces, with half a pint of vinegar. To these articles of food and relish were added, to encourage cleanliness, three ounces of soap. Of the rations, chaplains and surgeons and officers of that rank received three rations, or their value in paper money; higher officers of staff rank, six rations. The nominal value of the ration was estimated at eight-ninetieths of a dollar: with the paper dollar valued at threepence cash, the cash value of a ration was equivalent to a farthing sterling. In their scales of diet Congress insert a cautious remark: "*if the goods may be had.*" The troops seldom enjoyed the rations contracted for, in their conditions of service. Congress had neither means of transport nor any other methodical system of distribution, nor any magazines or stores, nor money to pay for all the beef, stock-fish, and vegetables included in their generous paper tariffs. It was, for instance, permitted to the army that onions or turnips, "if they could be had," might be substituted for the peas or beans. But the farmers and others, always ready to turn politics to profit, declined to sell their goods to Congressional officers for paper money. There was usually an American farm somewhere in the neighbourhood of a British force, and the farmers fancied the face of King George on a guinea quite good enough for them. Paper money was never much in favour with Englishmen in former days, and Howe's commissaries paid in hard cash. The American Colonies were indeed only too familiar with bills of small value. Much of this money was thought so worthless that when Sir William Howe landed in Long Island local Tories or Loyalists are said to have made bonfires of Continental or Provincial notes. At any rate farmers and others were unwilling to supply milk and other

necessaries to Patriot battalions except at exorbitant prices.[1]

The complaints made by officers at Newburgh, that no private gentleman had given a penny of his wealth to maintain the national cause, were echoed in the complaints of the rank and file about the stinginess of the rural population: owners refused to thresh their corn or millers to grind their grain; for the agricultural class in the Jerseys, New York, Long Island, and Pennsylvania was not well disposed to the Revolutionary movement. This antipathy, added to a certain native love of having and keeping, materially harassed Washington. He found it, after the first flow of enthusiasm had exhausted itself, most difficult to maintain supplies. By a special resolution, Congress drew attention to the fact that frequently there was ample supply of food and forage in the proximity of a camp—yet the camp was going short of the necessaries of life. Congress also called upon Washington to consider whether his tenderness towards hard-bitten, hard-mouthed citizens did not almost approach weakness; whether he had reflected that ultimate mischief might accrue to cause and country by overstrained delicacy of feeling. They passed the famous resolve of December 1777. Washington was instructed to proclaim that if all the grain within seventy miles of his encampment were not threshed out by a fixed date, the unthreshed remainder would be seized and sold as straw. The Commander-in-Chief placed his own limits on the execution of this harsh edict. The rural population he found to be, if not unfriendly, at least indifferent to the cause. He was anxious not to turn lukewarm adherents into active enemies. Congress with its logic and lawyers was thus inclined to a greater degree of harshness than the Commander-in-Chief would carry into operation. He had found by actual experience that when occasion

[1] There are numerous examples extant of this little paper money. Facsimiles are given in Steven's *Reprints and Facsimiles*. The present writer has seen a paper bill for twopence.

arose to make requisitions and to impress goods and cattle, the liveliest apprehensions were excited even among the most ardent friends of their country. Patriotism is so often a mere abstract idea that this feeling is not surprising. Amidst all this conflict of authorities, opinions, and sentiments; with a nominal Central Authority, addicted to debate, jealous of the army, and powerless to act; a military chest sometimes absolutely empty of gold and silver coin; a country in many places poor and unfruitful; a population scanty, thrifty, and perhaps with a little more of the brine of selfishness about it than was good for the Federal cause, the work of the Commander-in-Chief was always hard, sometimes intolerable. The condition of the men being thus that of unmitigated privation, they often got out of hand. They plundered friend and foe alike. The Patriot farmer and the Loyalist patroon alike drove into hiding the contents of byre, and pen, and henroost on the approach of the Continental forces. The visit of troops was as if a simoom had swept over the farmstead; even the straw had gone to furnish a temporary bed. This marauding was as persistent throughout the seven years' fighting as were the continued impotence of Congress and the ineradicable greediness or dishonesty of contractors. There were occasions when Washington was compelled to authorise domestic perquisitions, to seize what households could "spare," and many a time households had to "spare" everything movable and eatable. Congress would occasionally do a little to compensate for such perquisitions and losses, but as their money was of so little value the injured proprietor's satisfaction was small. For instance, a Colonel Hazen was confirmed in that rank in the army of the United States by Congress, which at the same session voted him the sum of 1095 dollars in full satisfaction of all demands for his neat cattle, sheep, swine, poultry, hay, and other articles alleged to have been taken by the Continental army. This sum added to a previous payment of

September 24, 1776.

533 dollars constituted the estimated value of all the losses this colonel had sustained. At the same time Congress declined to pay any sums in compensation of damages done to his farm buildings. From this record may be gathered what a clean sweep of his movables and fixtures had befallen Colonel Hazen, though probably had he not been a field-officer of the army he might have had to suffer, as the Cavalier de la Luzerne says most people in such a case did suffer, in submissive silence.[1] That men on the march should endure privations from insufficient provision has occurred again and again; that men should complain of the toughness and poor quality of ammunition beef has occurred in every campaign for many generations. It is well known that within the memory of living mariners sets of chessmen have been carved out of the harness beef served out to the mercantile marine. British naval biscuit, too, has been thought open to severe criticism. These, however, are but incidents of service that has its relaxations and its compensations. But the American soldier was generally as ill-fed as ill-paid. To read the Journals of Congress of 1775 and the year following is to read the transactions of a kind of fairy gathering of gnomes presided over by the Red Queen. This Assembly voted thousands of men into soldiers; ordered up arms, clothing, rations, ammunition, medical comforts and stores with the *insouciance* of Micawber; issued paper bonds in payment according to the same model, and then, fulfilling the whole duty of Congress, reported that whoever would not accept their paper and promises at their full face value was an enemy of the Republic to be treated accordingly.[2] Again and again the Continental army of a few thousand men was for

[1] *Journals of Congress*, 24th Sept. 1776; cf. also Luzerne, quoted by Bolton, p. 299.

[2] "All Bills of Credit emitted by Congress ought to pass current in all payments, trade, and dealings in these States, and be deemed equal in value to gold and silver. Whosoever shall offer, demand, or receive more in the said bills for any gold or silver coins or bullion than is before-rated, ought to be deemed an enemy

days without any supply of bread, not to say of fresh vegetables or any such wholesome food; many times there were no stores of any kind in camp. That much of the suffering consequent on the fussy interference of Congress might easily have been avoided, is now considered to be beyond question. To this centralised source of disorder should be added the veiled disloyalty and apathy of the countryfolk. This morbid jealousy of the army entertained and fostered by Congress seems to be chronic. Mr. Lodge, speaking of the Cuban war, says:

> At the outset of our war we had a bad system really due to the narrowness and indifference of Congress . . . to-day the system stands guilty of the blunder, delays, and needless sufferings and deaths of the war . . . and now reform is restricted by Patriots who have so little faith in the Republic that they think an army of 100,000 men put it in danger.[1]

Mr. Lecky, in his well-known if brief accounts of the Revolutionary war, summarises the influence of Congress as intensely mischievous:

> The extreme jealousy of the army which had always prevailed in Congress, and the meddling, domineering spirit in which the lawyers at Philadelphia constantly acted towards officers, might have produced the worst results but for the self-control and courtesy of Washington.

Professor Sloane's indictment is more detailed:

> Congress, during the progress of the war, became more and more decrepit and inefficient. Its members were constantly absent, preferring the active political life of the separate States to the torpor of a discussion and legislation with no real power behind it.[2] Its sessions were too often the scene of disputes

to these States and treated accordingly." This is in the handwriting of Thomas Jefferson, and is a suggestion to all Patriots to tar and feather the creature who declined to accept Continental money at its face value. Congress hesitated a little before swallowing this measure.

[1] Lodge, in *Harper's*, May 1899, on Santiago.

[2] Prof. Sloane of Princeton, *The French War and the Revolution*, p. 236.

between cliques representing the jealousies arising from the ambition or the spite of Generals in the field; . . . the pretenders and soldiers of fortune who plotted Washington's overthrow seemed always to find sympathy in a body which notoriously failed in the continuous and hearty support of his authority, and in providing the supplies essential to the conduct of the war.

Congress appointed John Adams, Minister of War; Mr. Adams was, unhappily, incapable of seeing conspicuous merit in any one but himself.[1] His jealousy of Washington, of Jefferson, of Franklin, is not to be doubted. With Adams as War Minister Washington was truly much in the position of St. Paul: frequently "in perils of his own countrymen, in perils of false brethren." It was indeed the old story, always new: *delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi.*

Men perished of cold, of hunger, of diseases, of wounds, of nakedness, because of intrigues in Philadelphia, or Baltimore, or Princeton. Administrative military offices were kept vacant for months. Supplies were purchased and distributed by civilian sutlers, who with the assistance of Congressmen contrived to gather plunder out of the contracts to the ultimate misery of the rank and file.

When Franklin with two others was sent with a special commission to Washington to aid the 1775.
General with their advice, Congress despatched to the famishing troops a few hundreds of pounds sterling and thousands of tracts full of highly spiced political matter: copies of speeches and exhortations to go in and win. In some of its "orders" for goods Congress did not even promise to pay, but was content to express a pious hope it might be able to do so. Thus, with a view to the clothing of the new (paper) army in 1775, Mr. John Ross is ordered to furnish 30,000 yards of blue or brown broadcloth, with 3000 yards of various coloured fancy cloth for facings. The

[1] Cf. the *Real George Washington*, by Paul L. Ford, chapter on "His Enemies"; and *Autobiography of Franklin* (Macdonald), p. 292.

Committee *hopes to be able to pay him*, and begs him to be at all the peril and expense of importing all this cloth; while they make it a condition that he must not purchase cloth anywhere in Great Britain or Ireland, and suggest that to avoid capture by British cruisers he would do well to get the stuff consigned either to Martinique, or St. Eustatius, or Curaçoa.[1] If Mr. John Ross undertook this order with its limitations and conditions of execution on the off chance of getting paid if successful, and the certainty of heavy loss if unsuccessful, he belied his obvious connection with Scotland. No one would give the Army Board credit in Pennsylvania, not for a hand-cart, on which account American artillery in 1777 went short of ammunition waggons and all kinds of haulage. What, then, did the Provincial Legislatures, the patriotic citizens of Massachusetts and of Virginia, the Puritans of the North, the tobacco barons and squires of the South to amend the *opéra bouffe* proceedings of the Central Council? They had at least some credit to pledge and some resources to draw from. The Thirteen States had been for generations playing at politics, each in their own place and degree. They had their solemn debates and factions. They had their local political parties, which discovered in Mr. John Adams a great scholar[2] and a great orator, and in Mr. Edward

[1] This order to Ross is reproduced in facsimile, Pl. IV., in *Smith and Watson*.

[2] Bancroft reports John Adams as addressing a New England audience, and saying: "My friends, human nature itself is ever more, an advocate for liberty . . . that all men are equal by nature, that kings have but a delegated authority, which the people may resume, are the principles of Aristotle, of Plato, of Livy, of Cicero." Aristotle (*Politics*, i.) proves to his own satisfaction that some men are naturally slaves, and even if born in a free condition should be reduced to their proper natural condition as soon as may be. Of Plato, who recommended that men should not be free to choose their own wives, nor control the education of their children—of Livy, who wrote his history in apartments allotted to him by his patron, Augustus the Emperor—of Cicero, that sturdy Tory, who was murdered by the Patriots of his day, it is needless to speak. But Bancroft, perhaps, misreports his idol.

Rutledge a splendid politician. But their local intrigues and interstate jealousies had ever been powerful enough to prevent corporate action for a common cause. Neither against Indian nor Frenchman had they ever been able to unite, while in the course of this present struggle their disregard of the counsels, commands, or suggestions of Congress, the Assembly of the Thirteen United States had reduced that body to a kind of plush-clad impotence. This being so, it might be surmised that the States would take upon their shoulders the heavy responsibilities foreshadowed by the flaming oratory of the Court-House at Williamsburg, or of the old South at Boston, but out of a population of three millions of people not more than fifty thousand men were ever at any time under arms in vindication of freedom ; while, by way of contrast, the student of history may notice that in the War of Secession the six millions of the Southern States put 400,000 men into the field in defence of the Peculiar Institution. 2nd Civil War, 1860-1864.

Within the camps themselves, and while the men were marching, the usual blunders and misunderstandings of commissaries were abundant. Meat on the hoof was sent where it was not required ; meat ready for cooking was occasionally so wastefully distributed that joints and pieces were left lying about on the open ground to putrefy. Bread, clothing, ammunition, medical stores and comforts were detained at points a few miles from places where there was much hunger and suffering. The monotony of these incidents during the whole war is most striking. From the commencement to the end, Washington's letters and despatches are full of complaints, representations, protests, and exhortations, all expressed in language the more forcible because it is so temperate. His expostulations (sometimes expurgated) are quoted in every work dealing with the cause of this most portentous yet sombre trouble. What was true in 1776 was true in 1780, when a committee of Congress reported of the army that it had been unpaid for five

months; that it seldom had more than six days' provisions in advance; that it had frequently for several days in succession been without meat; that the forage was exhausted; that the medical department had neither sugar, coffee, tea, chocolate, wine, nor spirituous liquors of any kind; that every department of the army was without money, and had not even a shadow of credit left. The report of 1780 echoes that of 1776 in most particulars but one. In the latter complaint was made

October 31, 1776.

> . . . that the Articles of War and General Orders were frequently transgressed, and the Commander-in-Chief had the mortification to see that some of his officers, on whom he ought to have depended for suppressing disorderly behaviour, encouraged the soldiers by their own example to plunder and commit other offences, or studiously endeavoured to excuse them from just punishment by partial trials.[1]

In 1783 Washington complains that horses had been without food for a fortnight, that General Gates and himself had nothing left to ride through the starvation of their cattle. It is not difficult to follow in detail how, often amidst much plenty, the army was so wretchedly maintained. To all requisitions the farmers offered passive resistance, and it was only towards the close of the war, when peace was practically assured, and cautious shopkeepers and rustics could clearly apprehend on which side of the fence it was better or safer to get down, that provisions and other supplies came in without stint—so that at the very last the troops were in better condition than ever before during this protracted contention. Of the clothing supply something has already been said. It is common to find the word naked as descriptive of the condition of the Continental troops. Probably the word is used in the Biblical or classical sense of thinly clad. Trenton and Eutaw

Clothing of the army.

[1] Washington roundly charges the officers from the Eastern States with a policy aiming at reducing to one level men of all social conditions. Misconduct or cowardly behaviour always, he says, originated with the officers' example. Cf. Ford, v. 187-189.

Springs have already been mentioned in this context. Stuart, who commanded the British at the desperate affair at Eutaw Springs, omits in his despatches to mention that he had to encounter men clad in nothing but belts and clumps of moss. Such a singular incident would have been worth a line or two from the commander who did not immediately withdraw from that field of battle. The heat in 1781 in Carolina was so dreadful that fifty British soldiers fell dead in the course of one march, and this battle was fought in the hottest time of the year; but it can hardly be true that the clumps Sept. 8.
of moss completed the regimentals of the Continental soldiers, however high the temperature. Yet allowing for all highly coloured pictures and rhetorical exaggerations, the clothing of the Continental army was usually in a squalid condition. Moore's *Diary* quotes a grim joke, that if paper money were wanted the army at least could always furnish the rags. There were, of course, some standard regulations as to clothing, but the sour jealousies of the States checked for a while the general use of a serviceable uniform. A Knickerbocker did not wish to be "fixed up" so as to be taken for a Yankee, and the Tobacco Squire despised both Knickerbocker and Yankee. Washington's own preference for the bushranger's uniform, the kit of the rough-rider and frontiersman, has already been noticed. That way of clothing was cheap, clean, light, adaptable, and flexible. He requested to be furnished with 10,000 equipments of this kind.

"If I were left," said he, "to my own inclinations, I should not only order the men to adopt the Indian dress, but cause the officers to do it also, and be the first to set the example myself."

His early experiences always moved a tender feeling towards that style of fighting dress and to the wearer of it. There is a pretty story of his reception of the Virginian Borderers in the camp at Cambridge (Mass.):[1]

[1] Kephart, in *Harper*, 1899, p. 968.

They rode into camp accoutred and dressed in the forest style, fringed cape, moccasins, wampum belt, copper powder horn, and rifle. He stopped the riflemen, drew near, and their commander, stepping in front, made the military salute, exclaiming, "General, from the right bank of the Potomac." Washington dismounted, came to meet the battalion, and going down the line with both arms extended, shook hands with the riflemen one by one, tears rolling down his cheek as he did so. He then mounted, saluted, and rode on.

Reminiscences of Braddock and Border days probably always affected Washington.

He was able subsequently to form this force with other Border contingents into the First Regiment of Foot of Continental Infantry. The Indian uniform was not adopted. Washington succeeded to some extent in getting his army supplied with trousers—overalls, as he calls them. He thought them preferable to the *haut de chausses*, the long tight airless gaiters common at that time in all armies. Thus once more after the lapse of many centuries, men of European descent resumed trousers, those ancient coverings of hip and leg. In winter he desired overalls to be worn over the breeches and gaiters, mentioning the material should be either of wool or yarn. General Sullivan, in Western New York, operating against the Indians about Niagara and Buffalo, got his troops furnished with overalls made of tow. A blue coat or jacket with facings or badges of various colours, and bits of silk or cloth to mark grade and rank, were all recommended and were included in the printed regulations. The customary refrain or burden of all Washington's recommendations is: "As many as possible," "If they may be had," "As far as is reasonable," "If circumstances permit." It is truly among the few stimulating sights of a fast-vanishing past to contemplate the face and carriage of this wonderful man, upon whom really lay the whole burden of the maintenance of that war, confronted with the Adamses and other file gnawers, including Gates, Charles Lee, and Mifflin; with ambitious butterflies like Lafayette buzzing about him; with treasons

shadowing him; with a Congress instructing him to cross this river, but not to cross that; with an apathetic or disaffected or parsimonious population, refusing the most trifling assistance to his sick and wounded; with a militia that more than once deserted him in whole regiments; to regard him unshrinking (with his moments of misery and depression, of course), cheerful according to his nature, helpful, resourceful; finding his way and that of his country safely through the snares and traps laid for him by treacherous friends; leading an army unpaid, poorly armed, badly fed, shelterless and ragged, to final victory.

The description left us of the details of his army is probably touched up for effect, but we read how an eye-witness was startled to see a Virginian cavalry regiment pass by:

. . . "Some had one boot, some hoseless with their feet peeping out of their shoes, others with breeches that put decency to the blush, some in short jackets, others in long coats—all, however, with dragoon caps."

"What makes the matter more mortifying," wrote Washington to General Lincoln, "is that we have, I am positively assured, ten thousand complete suits ready in France, and laying there because our agents cannot agree whose business it is to ship them. A quantity also has lain in the West Indies for more than eighteen months, owing probably to some such cause."

"I never knew," writes Colonel Jackson to General Knox in 1782, "the troops half so ragged and destitute of clothing as they have been this winter. It's true six weeks ago they drew one shirt, one pair hose, and one pair overalls per man; when they received them they were naked, and that clothing has been on their backs ever since without being able to shift them, and there is but few men that is not eat up with the itch."

Greene's letter to the Commander-in-Chief on 24th June of this same year has already been noticed. There is a quiet uniformity of complaint from all quarters all the time, from Schuyler in Ticonderoga in 1775, from Greene in the Carolinas in 1782, from Jackson in New York in 1782, from Gates, chief of the Board of War, in 1778, from Knox, and from all

their colleagues or subordinates. The expenses of the troops in the field were met to some extent by the generosity of officers. Washington's personal munificence in this direction has already been noticed. Lafayette also used up the whole of his large private income, and pledged his fortune to the extent of 700,000 francs (£18,000) for the maintenance of the men of his command in Virginia. But whether it is the ill-starred and foolhardy expedition of Montgomery against Canada, or the movements of Washington in the White Plains, or the operations of Gates's force in the South, or the marchings and countermarchings of Greene in the Carolinas—whether the Continental forces are facing Carlton or William Howe, or Cornwallis or Clinton or Rawdon, the picture of the internal state of administration is always painted from the same palette with the same brush in sepias and umber and lamp-black. Consequently there were many mutinies great and small, very important or quite ridiculous. For a case of the latter kind we may observe the doings of the Pennsylvania State regiment as told in the State archives from the following letter, a little abridged:

Mutinous proceedings.

> We consider ourselves highly aggreaved by the appointment of severall gents to lieutenancies in the regiment who are strangers both to the officers and to the soldiery. We consider this as an infringement of our rights as men of honour. We are, of course, devoted to our country's cause and the sacred name of Freedom, but will resign as men of spirit should, and will not submit to be superceded, but demand our rights to be inviolable preserved.

This little attempt to make their regiment a special, private, and peculiar paddock for their own friends was signed by eleven commissioned officers, of whom three were captains. On another occasion all the officers of certain Virginia regiments refused to leave for the front until their arrears of pay had been settled. It is clear that by some quibble of construction of contract men were entrapped into protracted terms of service. At the fall of Burgoyne, and in the excited anticipation of a speedy termination of the war, men enlisted for three

years, or until the end of the war, whichever should elapse or occur first. It was fully expected that less than three years would witness the close of the campaigning, but many men of adequate spirit joined for three years, so as to allow ample time not only for the cessation of fighting, but for the time of uncertainty common to such occasions, until the conditions of peace were signed. Three years' campaigning, however, did not bring the war to an end. Men who enlisted in 1777 found themselves, to their great disgust and resentment, still under arms in 1782. They belonged, many of them, to the agricultural class, who, although they had taken down the family shot-gun from its accustomed staples, had left the family plough in the furrow. There was no one left at home to get in the hay, the corn, the beans. Probably the boys as they reached the later teens would be absorbed into the local militia. Thereupon the farm and everything connected with it would fall rapidly to ruin. All these facts portending a gloomy future for his family, added to his present miseries, exasperated a man beyond endurance. Besides, there was an increasing dislike and contempt for Congress, as a body composed altogether of lawyers and acute civilians, whose capacity for log-rolling and word-twisting, matured by practice, rendered them too clever by half. Congress committed breaches of faith, and displayed unalloyed indifference to the sufferings of the army, yet somehow always came out clean-handed in debate. Congress believed or affected to believe affairs are controlled by precedent, by logic, by arguments; while the poor, shivering, home-sick, apprehensive men knew, as most people know, that the affairs of the world are for the most part controlled by men's bodily wants. Congress, too, was maliciously jealous as well as afraid of the army: the Puritans' hero, Cromwell, had plainly signified at what price he estimated Rump Parliaments, and Congress was never much better than a Rump Parliament. Some of its members found their way to Congress, if not on the franchise, at

least on the actual conditions of election that excite the scorn of reformers when they speak of Gatton or Old Sarum. Others rarely attended. This jealousy of the army was joined to the tactlessness of suspicion, for they damned with faint praise the invincible patience of the veterans they were incapable of understanding. There seemed to be plenty of gold and silver, it was said, for bounties and enlistment money, and little to satisfy the just demands of the troops, whose services had extended over three or four campaigns. There was also some French money floating about; money, Congress thought it prudent to spend in making recruits rather than in paying men who could not leave the ranks without risk of the penalties of desertion. Under this management and these slights the veterans grew restive. Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New England, in their turn, had a hand in mutiny, and the revolt of Pennsylvania in 1781 very nearly broke Washington. Severe repressive measures, added to some concessions and the distribution of more French money, checked these movements. New England apologised for its share in mutinous demonstrations by pleading the effect of evil example.

Desertions also were, as in all armies at that time, a source of incessant anxiety to commanding officers. State officials, in order to make up their allotted quota of men, encouraged desertion, at least for the object of inducing men to enlist in other regiments.

1777. "Please to send me One Thousand pounds," writes Peter de Haven from French Creek, "as we are in dett for 300 gun barrells and to pay off the Malitia, and for providing provition for them. I am afraid we shall lose all our men as Mr. Lovell offers them the same price wee give, and will give them their Rashons. . . . Mr. Isaac Johns told me he offered him the same he got hear, and he would draw Rashuns for him, which will In Duce our men to leve us as there familys are in town; no more at present, but I remain your friend and humble servant, PETER DE HAVEN.

"To Mr. Thomas Wharton,
Chearman of the Counsel of Safety."[1]

[1] *Pennsylvania Archives*, 2nd series, vol. i.

This letter indicates a process which must have loosened all bonds or ties of loyalty to any territorial system of enlistment. But there were stronger temptations than these. Private Josiah and Corporal Jonathan had always been accustomed in their own homes to a rough plenty. All the records of the times witness to the abundance of meat and pudding in every kitchen. There was, according to the season, always enough of chicken, ham, bacon, stock-fish, butter, apples, cranberries, blueberries, molasses, and pie. There was a fine supply of rum, cider, beer, and other replenishments of the cheerful glass. The wife and daughters of the house spun wool and had it woven into a heavy frieze; they made butter and cheese, good bread, and other things excellent to eat. Such allurements of the flesh-pots were, in the opinion of Mr. John Adams, more than young men could be induced to give up for the hardships of camp life without handsome bribes. It does not appear that the young men pocketed handsome bribes, but they frequently and in large numbers abandoned camp life. Moreover, there was the call of the women. Doubtless there were many Cornelias and many tough matrons willing to sacrifice their first or last born to the cause of the country at the shrine of Liberty; yet the women generally could not dig and delve as Irishwomen do, or drag and carry in the fields as the Dutch and German women do. Perhaps, also, in the backlands there was ever the lurking of Gliding Snake or Red Wolf, or of some white-skinned blackguard, whose afternoon's amusement it might be to leave a blackened roof-tree and scalped children underneath it. At least all these considerations combined to drag Luke and Obadiah homeward, as it were, with cart-ropes. Desertions were so frequent as to constitute an absolute menace to the safe issue of the war. There was much sympathy with deserters of this class; they were openly assisted through the country homewards. The letters of commanding officers show a tender feeling towards

Desertion.

delinquents thus departed on furlough without the customary permit.

But the men whose desertions were prompted by the motives referred to in Mr. de Haven's letter quoted above met with scant consideration. They were lashed with as much severity as if they belonged to the British service, and became acquainted with those "bloody backs," a term the Boston boys had thought to be polite and kindly in mentioning the red-coats. Finally, deserters were flogged almost to extinction or shot: Brint Debadee of the 10th Pennsylvania Regiment was shot on the 10th March 1777 for desertion. As the war proceeded the men became more addicted to execute a sort of barrack-yard justice among themselves. Thus,

> . . . a corporal and two privates were making their escape from the 1st Pennsylvania Regiment, when they were overtaken and captured. After they had been secured a dispute arose. Some of the captors wished to kill them all on the spot, without trial and without authority; others counselled delay. It was agreed, finally, to kill one of the three deserters immediately: the three luckless fellows drew lots and fate selected the corporal, whose head was at once cut off and placed on a pole. This gruesome object was carried into camp by the surviving captives, to be placed over the camp gallows as a warning to all.[1]

Camp discipline.

The camp gallows was a standing article of furniture, as were the wooden horse and the strappado. In the camps, punishments were frequently administered to enliven the common routine of a monotonous life. If a man was sentenced to a hundred lashes, the penalty was exacted by instalments, and his back touched up with hot water and salt well rubbed in. If a man were sentenced to death, but known in high quarters to have been reprieved, the farce of bringing the condemned out to the side of his newly dug grave with a black wooden shell gaping for his remains was played out to the full. The culprit was bound and blindfolded, the firing party placed in position, the firelocks levelled and snapped, every motion of the parade of death com-

[1] Quoted by Bolton from Philips' *Historic Letters*, p. 171.

pleted, and occasionally, as might be expected, a man died of shock. Sometimes an offender was marched at a pace restricted by the point of a bayonet presented to his naked chest, while his comrades of the regiment, ranged for a furlong or two on each side, smote him with belts, switches, or any such implement. Others again were punished with the infamy of the wooden horse, or ridden on a rail, or tormented in some way contributory to an hour's relaxation. It goes almost without saying that Congress had elaborated a complete system of punishments. The Articles of War were directed to be published in September 1776. They were to be read in full every two months at the head of every regiment, troop, or company paraded for the purpose. There were more than a hundred articles, some of great length. They occupy nineteen closely printed pages of the Journals of Congress. To read them aloud and clearly would occupy many hours. There are fourteen offences involving the penalty of death, besides other severe enactments; yet there are so many limitations, concessions, and remissions, that their force or value must have been very small; in fact, they were regarded as a bit of idle ceremony of words such as a Sovereign Congress must needs promulgate. The effect of so much minute regulation could not but paralyse the energy of any officer in the field by weakening his feeling of responsibility. On the other hand, disregard of public authority weakens discipline. Commissioned officers of superior rank were, under these Articles, allowed in one direction too much latitude, and in another no latitude at all. They, consequently, became confused in mind and conduct. Frequently accused of having inflicted severe punishment without due investigation, their indiscretions added to the overwhelming burden of the Commander-in-Chief. It is not, therefore, surprising that Washington should write:

Our army is shamefully reduced by desertion, and except the people in the country can be forced to give information when deserters return to their old neighbourhoods we shall

be obliged to detach one-half the army to bring back the other.

He complained that most of these deserters were aliens or new settlers. Probably this was so, because the bulk of his army consisted of men of foreign birth. The Southern troops, notably the Pennsylvanian troops, have been mentioned above as being foreign born; Irishmen, men who knew little and cared less about the points in dispute; men who had emigrated to America in search of peace, but had found a sword. There were thousands of Germans in Philadelphia and in New York, and of Scotch Presbyterians everywhere in the Middle States; then there were Scandinavians, Huguenots, Frenchmen, and Canadian adventurers dissatisfied with the British overlordship in Canada. Add to these a class of men who always abound on the skirts of warfare, the *francs-tireurs*, the contrabandists, the rufflers and skinners, the marauders and spies, who live between the contending forces in a widespread theatre of action, wherein forest and morass and rock provide infinite opportunities of skulking and hiding. From such a medley of men, races, and occupations was the Continental army drawn, and being loosely attached either to cause or country, men would be easily induced to desert.

Medical administration.

The medical and hospital administrations, and the medical men of the Continental army, merit some notice. Congress, as customary, took every forethought on paper for the medical department of the army.[1] The regulations were probably more careful and more reasonable than any then made for the administration of a European army. Surgical instruments and medicine chests are directed to be got ready at the public expense, and this too at a time when the British Navy and Army surgeons and surgeons'

[1] *Journals of Congress*, Sept. 1776. In the *États militaires* of the regiments sent in the expeditionary French force to America there is no mention of surgeons of commissioned officers. Cf. Balch, ii. "French in America."

mates were finding medicines and instruments for public use at their own private expense. Details, too, as to the examination of the surgeons and their mates in professional knowledge, with many other wise and prudent counsels affecting the sick and wounded, may be found in the Proceedings of Congress. But with these pious resolves operations seem to close; orders are issued (to men who will not notice them) for goods that cannot be paid for, for conveniences there is no money to purchase, for scales of pay there are no means to discharge. It is like an assembly of children playing at keeping shop—a solemn game of make-believe.

About the same time the brain of America was creating paper hospitals and paper surgeons, Wayne wrote to Gates:

> Our hospital, or rather House of Carnage, beggars all description and shocks humanity to visit; there is no medicine or regimen suitable for the sick, no beds or straw to lie on, no covering to keep them warm other than their own thin wretched clothing.

This note was written in December 1776. On Christmas day of the same year another letter complained of

> an inexcusable neglect in the officers; want of fidelity, honour, and humanity in the doctors, and avarice in the sutlers, has slain ten soldiers to the enemy's one, and will soon prevent every man of common sense from putting his life and fortune in the power of such as destroy without pity and without mercy.[1]

The writer goes on to mention that he has proposed a scheme to Congress to palliate or to terminate all this mischief, and that Congress approves, "but say it is the duty of each State to take care of their own men, and they expect they will." But they did not.

On 16th December of the same year Greene wrote to Congress:

[1] Thornton to Weare, 25th December 1776.

I feel a degree of happiness that the Congress are going to put the hospital department upon a better establishment, for the sick this campaign have suffered beyond description and shocking to humanity. For my own part I have never felt any distress equal to what the sufferings of the sick have occasioned, and am confident nothing will injure the recruiting service so much as dissatisfaction arising upon that head.

From these communications it appears that, between the paper administrative regulations of July and the end
1776. of the same year, nothing had been done for the sick and maimed and wounded. The large sphere of lead with the ridge or seam along its circumference caused a terrible wound, such as required the most skilful treatment. The British bullet sometimes weighed more than an ounce. Yet this missile made a less fatal hole in a man than did the bayonet when plied with a turn or slight rotation as it stabbed into the body. At any rate cleanliness, constant attention, and some skill were required to afford a wounded man any approach to convalescence. The American soldier, in such a case, was in a bad way. In his own home sanitation was lightly regarded; in camp it was not regarded at all. Domestic medicine was carried on by recipes found in a popular medicine recipe-book which, called the Queen's book, had a considerable vogue up to 1830. Smallpox swept over the States at intervals like a typhoon, and the inhabitants died like house-flies. To anticipate this pest under the most favourable circumstances it was not uncommon for parties to be made up with the object of getting through with this disease. A similar device touching scarlet fever was successfully carried out in Dotheboys' Hall, under the motherly supervision of Mrs. Squeers. The *Salem Gazette*, of 22nd April 1784 (after the cessation of hostilities), contained an advertisement that at a certain place and time, in a properly appointed building, classes would be admitted for smallpox, presumably to catch it. Occasionally a family would take measures to infect itself with the disease as a matter that should be got through

under the best conditions. Its ravages in the army were incessant. Gates was thanked in Congressional Orders in 1776 for his successful activity in combating the disease. The expeditionary force to Canada, led by Arnold and Montgomery, was eaten up by it. An outbreak in a camp was reckoned in itself adequate protection against external attack. When the British were in Boston this plague broke out in December to every- 1776.
body's alarm and terror, and "the British commanders considered this disease alone as a sufficient protection against an assault from their antagonists."[1] Washington was himself, like nearly every one else, "pockfretten"; and for gout, rheumatism, sciatica, heart complaint, dyspepsia, diseases of the teeth and throat, every magistrate and blacksmith, to say nothing of barbers and wise women, had some nostrum.[2] Distilled earthworms, snail-water, and other similar curious fluids seem to have been a kind of stock for this school of invalid cookery.

It appears that births in American families aggregated commonly twenty or twenty-five children to each couple of parents, yet the number that reached adolescence was small. While this havoc of death ruled in the green tree, it may be surmised what happened in the dry. One surgeon's mate to five battalions! What could the man, frequently nothing more in his profession than an apothecary's assistant—what could he do more than adjust a pillow or smooth out a rug, while the soldier died? Even in peaceful England

[1] Frothingham, p. 280.

[2] Elijah Fisher reports in his *Journal*, "October 12th, 1776.—I withe others of the sick belonging to the Ridgment, were sent to the Hospitable at Newark, and had leave of the Doctors to go and quarter at some house in the neighbourhood." Fisher was taken very ill, and his host went to fetch him medical relief, which the Doctor's wife sent "for gravels in the kitteneys, and if you took a Quart of Ginn, and a tea dish of mustard seed, and a handful of horserdish roots, and steep them together, and take a glass every morning," you would be relieved. Fisher, then twenty years old, was cured, he says, by this potion. Cf. also Alice Morse Earl, "On Doctors and Patients in Old Colonial Times," in *Customs and Fashions in Old New England.*

in that century a wayside apothecary had little more stock than leeches and lancet, an electuary or two, some sticking plaster, a few boluses, and the "twa simples" of the old story, laudanum and calomel. His American brothers of the pestle had not even these little things. So blood-poisoning, gangrene, erysipelas, carbuncles, ulcers, typhoid and other fevers, the whole cohort of them ravaged the ranks, and men died untended, eaten up, as was commonly reported in despatches, with vermin. The officers in Newburgh in 1782 pointed out the callousness of the prosperous class to the sufferings of the army. The movements now so well authorised to stimulate private benevolence to aid public objects were probably unknown. The genteel fuss and social buzzing of ladies eager to nurse, to scrape *charpie*, to give first or any other aid to the wounded, was a thing of the future. The States—not even in Maryland, a State founded for Roman Catholics by Roman Catholics—did not tolerate Sisters of Mercy; and all their gentle aid and skill were wanting to the unhappy sufferers of the Continental army. From the farmers and rural population they received little sympathy. Ambrose Searle says he saw advertisements in 1776 inviting the gift of blankets for the sick and wounded. This would be after the disasters at Brooklyn and in New York, when the revolutionary fortunes were swaying backwards and downwards. But the civilians were appealed to in vain. Congress had put its veto on the importation of British woollen goods, while the British policy had prevented the establishment and installation of Colonial weaving machinery. However well stored with stuff the house chest might be, the thrifty housewife would be chary of parting with blankets she might be unable to replace by purchase or in any other way. The military accused the non-combatants of absolute callousness to the sufferings of the army. It is asserted that the arrival of a cartload of wounded, or of poor wretches suffering from disease, was the immediate

signal for a demonstration against the little convoy. Patients, whose state would admit of no further delay, were accommodated somehow, but a man not quite disabled was fain to crawl away, begging his maintenance from homestead to homestead, spreading erysipelas, tuberculosis, and such other pestiferous matters, as he went along. It is notorious that at the close of the war, when men were discharged by thousands, there were veterans wandering from town to town telling their stories at the village inn or by the fireside to the boys and girls of that time, who have passed many a legend of the war on to our day; for their stories and yarns they got, some "half a dollar, some a quarter, some less, some nothing but frowns." Nothing official was done for the men of the Continental army until no less than thirty-six years later. Break up of the army. 1818.

Of the number engaged in this seven years' fighting it is now impossible to do more than attempt a rough estimate. There seem to have been about a quarter of a million men engaged. Of these not many were killed in the field, but, as usual in those times with all armies, tens of thousands perished of cold and disease and of wounds. As many more returned to their homes, if homes they had, partly disabled. There was cold comfort for most of these cripples. They were cast down like the foundation stuff of a new road and trampled into its depths. But such at that time was the lot of all soldiers discharged from service on the completion of a campaign. They having lost what aptitude for handicraft or business they once possessed, through long discontinuance of such work, were cast on the world with a guinea or two in their hands, unfit for any duty or service, and left to the chances and charity of a selfish and pitiless generation.[1]

[1] Cf. Elijah Fisher, 14th May 1783: "I gos through Brookline, and into Old Cambridge, from there to the Tan Hills, and thence to Charlestown, and then cross the farray to Boston, but there was many that come from the army and from the sea that had no homes, that would work for litel or nothing but there vitals. So I comes down by the markatt, and sits Down all alone, almost Descureged,

Well may an accepted American author say that the army was

> . . . disbanded, not indeed solemnly, as became a grateful people, but stealthily and by degrees, as if the nation were ashamed and afraid to look their deliverers in the face.

On the 18th October 1783, a proclamation was issued for the final discharge of the troops. A few weeks later the whole army melted away. There was no leave-taking on the part of the rank and file; Jonathan and David, whose sufferings side by side had welded them in close accord, parted to meet no more. Men went off as they chose. Crowds had nowhere to go. No provision had been made for their discharge. Four months' pay handed to them in Continental money (other arrears due to them were never paid) was all they had for food and shelter. In many cases this pittance of four months' pay in Continental paper had been already pledged for food and clothing.

Strong men were seen weeping like children; men who had borne cold and hunger in winter camps, and faced death on the battle-field, shrunk from this new form of trial. For a few days the streets and taverns were crowded. For weeks men were to be seen on every road, or lingering bewildered about public places, like men who were at a loss to know what to do with themselves. There were no ovations for them as they came back toilworn to the places which had once known them. No ringing of bells, no eager opening of hospitable doors. The country was tired of the war; tired of the sound of fife and drum; anxious to get back to buying and selling, to town meetings and general elections.

They were cast out, these veterans, like so much draff. That whole generation, for whom the small

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and began to think over how I had been in the army, what ill success I had met with there. I could not get into any besness, and had no home." He goes on to say there were thousands in worse circumstances than himself. After fifteen months' wanderings in a half-mendicant condition he finds his feet; and the last we hear of him is that at twenty-seven years of age, "I gos to School, and followed it pritty stiddy while it cept."—23rd February 1785.

Continental army fought, had all but passed away before America began to have a glimmer of an idea that she had some sort of duty towards the survivors of that world-shaking struggle.

"The history of our pension bills," continues Mr. Greene, "is scarcely less humiliating than the history of the relations between the army and the Congress of the Revolution. Their claims were disputed inch by inch. Money which should have been given cheerfully as a righteous debt was doled out with reluctant hand as a degrading charity. There was no possible form of objection that was not made by men who owed the opportunity of discussing the soldiers' claims to the freedom which the soldiers had won for them with their blood."

Such was the opinion of a candid American lecturing to a Boston audience during the dark and lurid hours of 1862, when Americans were slaying each other by tens of thousands. To the surviving combatants of the successful side in the War of Secession a generous public has handed with lavish munificence pensions on a scale unparalleled in the history of pensions. But to the Grand Continental army, the quarter of a million of enlisted men, for the men who perished of disease, starvation, cold, exposure, and wounds, by tens of thousands, there is, I believe, no public tribute either in bronze or marble.

On the banks of the Seine stands a precedent, a building of which the legend is

"*A la Grande Armée, la patrie reconnaissante.*"

# CHAPTER XI

## NEW YORK—THE OPERATIONS ABOUT THE CITY IN 1776

Howe quits Boston.

WHEN it became necessary to quit Boston in March 1776, the general impression was that Sir William Howe intended to sail southward for Long Island. Both Burgoyne and Clinton had submitted to Governor Gage excellent reasons in support of such a movement, and Clinton, in response to Lord Dartmouth, had indicated the inadvisability of prosecuting any further military operations in the direction of New England.[1] It was urged by both the major-generals that the army was insufficiently equipped with materials, cattle, and artillery. Boston was said to have no strategic value. It lay on the highway to nowhere in particular. It was prudent, therefore, to evacuate the place. Before Christmas the governor, Gage, and both the major-generals, Burgoyne and Clinton, had quitted Boston. Burgoyne saw the little city once more, under still sadder circumstances; Clinton bade the place farewell.

Sir William Howe during the winter maintained rigid discipline under serious difficulties. Deaths in consequence of wounds at Bunker Hill occurred with frequency. The effects of Lieutenant Higgins and Ensign Greene, late of the 51st Regiment, are announced for sale on 10th September 1775, by *vandue* (auction) at 10 A.M., in the mess-room of the barracks at Charlestown. Similar announcements follow through-

[1] See Appendix to Chapter V.



NEW YORK FROM GOVERNOR'S ISLAND.

By Faden, 1776.

out the winter. At the beginning of December a terrible outbreak of smallpox occurred. Inoculation was recommended, but not enforced. The disease became so virulent that it was said the disease itself was adequate protection for the Royal army: no besieging force would enter a town to court the attack of a distemper so poisonous. The Patriots charged Howe with the crime of sending diseased men to positions inviting capture in order that the plague might infest the patriot encampment. Hospitals for isolation of patients were mentioned, but there was little means of executing orders in this direction. Condition of the town.

The women caused great trouble. There appear to have been hundreds of them. The barracks of the 5th Regiment were cleared out to make room for the women of the 35th, 49th, and 63rd Regiments. This arrangement indicates that at least 300 women were on the strength of these three regiments. But there was another class of women outside the camp. The permitted women are warned constantly in Orders that infamous dismissal from the camp would follow any attempt to give or sell rum to the soldiers. What became of the women thus expelled? Some of them were flogged at the cart's tail for offences for which the outrage was considerable. Thus we read:

*26th September* 1775.—Winifred M'Cowan, retained to the Camp, was tryed by general court-martial for having stolen the Town Bull, and is found guilty of the same, is sentenced to be tied to a Cart's tail, and there to receive a hundred lashes on her bare back, in different portions of the town wherever most conspicuous.

An energetic woman, it would seem, but difficult to manage. Women assisted soldiers in the petty depredations occurring during the distressful winter. But the provost-marshal was instructed to shoot or hang summarily any one caught in the act of destroying fences or tearing down plank or panel for firewood, and two men of the 23rd Regiment and a marine or two perished accordingly. There is no question but that Sir William

Howe did his utmost to restrain the men of his command from offences and drunkenness.[1] There is a chilly acknowledgment of his efforts in this direction from the pen of one or two American writers, but probably in the present spirit of American historians a fuller acknowledgment of Sir William Howe's efforts may find a place in their writings.

In March 1776 preparations for embarkation were hurried forward; the general ordered all public-houses to be closed, all surplus rum to be destroyed as soon as the ships had been provisioned, all attempts at looting or incendiarism to be punished by immediate death. He directed the men to be confined to barracks the night before embarkation, and the officers were ordered to sleep in the same dormitories as the men. His orders extended to the protection of trees and pigeons, and other such little details. He caused the streets to be closely picketed, and women discovered loafing about the streets after midnight to be left behind. The embarkation was carried out quietly, and without undue confusion. At the time being, however, it must have been a sorry sight, not so much indeed as touching the troops, who were pleased to go, but for the refugees, the victims of that civil war. Loyalists to the number of 1100[2] abandoned home and country rather than face Washington's resentment or Washington's troops. Among the exiles were members of the Council, magistrates, clergymen, lawyers, merchants, mechanics, and farmers. Of the troops and camp followers many estimates have been made; probably there were 8000 men of all ranks and arms, with 200 horses, to say nothing of women and children. It seems certain that by wounds, disease, and by other casualties, the British force had been reduced by more than one-third of its effective in less than a year.

[1] Major-General Howe's Order Book, *passim*, edited by Edward E. Hales.

[2] Van Tyne says 900 and more; the number in the text is perhaps fairly correct.

All those 12,000 people, with their belongings, troops, refugees, women of the camp and children, artillery, horses, and ammunition, were huddled on board some 180 vessels of all sorts and conditions, which, under convoy of the fleet, left Boston for Halifax. This crazy Armada sailed in the stormiest month of the spring across a bay of atrocious reputation for a harbour that should have been difficult of access through ice. A lady who saw all these sloops, smacks, dories, and fishing brigs, spoke of the sight in superlatives: never was such a flotilla seen. And some entertained a hope, which almost amounted to expectation, that this expedition would find a peaceful sleep at the bottom of the Bay of Fundy. Yet the weather was fair and open, the breezes were favourable, and after six days all reached Halifax in safety. That chilly place received all these loyal derelicts and stowaways not unkindly. Mr. Sabine's very careful and pathetic account of their subsequent experiences shows that Nova Scotia and New Brunswick afforded within their narrow means a generous and fruitful asylum to these fugitives from the Patriot's fury.

By causing the expatriation of many thousands of our countrymen, among whom were the well educated, the ambitious, the well versed in politics, we became the founders of two agricultural and commercial colonies, and in like manner we became the founders of Upper Canada. The Canadian Government gave them lands, tools, materials for building, and the means of subsistence for two years, and to each of their children as they came of age two hundred acres of land. Besides this, they were appointed to the offices created by the organisation of a new Colonial Government. The ties of kindred and of suffering in a common cause created a strong band of sympathy between them, and for years they bore the appellation of the United Empire of Loyalists.

Candid thinkers in America two generations ago admitted the expulsion of these men and their families to have been a grievous mistake. Next to killing him, the worst use to which you can put a strenuous man is to drive him out of the common life of his own people.

The very qualities that made the refugees contumaciously loyal to the England across the seas, are just the qualities that go to knit up the most stable elements in public affairs. And the subsequent effect of their expulsion on the characteristics of New Englanders is held by recent American writers to have been disastrous.[1]

Washington wrote to his brother about these exiles a remarkable letter:

> One or two of them have done what a great number of them ought to have done long ago—committed suicide. By all accounts there never existed a more miserable set of beings than these wretched creatures now are. Taught to believe the power of Great Britain superior to all opposition, they were even higher and more insulting than the regulars. When the order issued, therefore, no electric shock, not the last trump, could have struck them with greater consternation. They were at their wits' end, and, conscious of their black ingratitude, they chose to commit themselves to the mercy of the waves at a tempestuous season rather than meet their offended fellow-countrymen.

Of what crime had these refugees been guilty, who, according to the terms of this letter, chose rather to risk death by drowning, than to face Washington and his Patriot army? They were men and women who preferred allegiance to the British crown to allegiance to the nebulous authority of Congress. Legally their position was unassailable. "Morally," says Mr. Greg, "both parties were on an equal footing." If it suited the Commander-in-Chief to assume that the war was waged between the Colonies as quasi-independent States and the King of England, the British were at least entitled to act on the contrary assumption, and to regard their enemies as individual rebels without flag or government.

The principle on which the Loyalists acted was the principle professed by the Pilgrim Fathers in their emigration. The Pilgrim Fathers had disliked the

[1] Sabine, *Loyalists*, pp. 89-90; Fisher, *American Revolution*, p. 161 *seq.*

form and methods of the Stuart government, and consequently quitted their native land to found New England. The Loyalists of New England in their turn, full of dislike for the methods and proposed government of the descendants of the Pilgrim Fathers, quitted their native land to found Upper Canada. Why then the ferocity of Washington and his army towards men and women whose convictions were at least morally defensible and legally unassailable? Is it another example of the eternal *oderunt quos laeserunt*? It is now admitted that the merciless attitude of the Patriots, of Washington and his staff, towards their fellow-countrymen, is a reproach to their common sense and a blot on their memory.

Sir William Howe is said to have given directions about the destruction of a vast quantity of war material and stores which subsequently fell into the enemy's hands. It was hotly debated whether he could have removed these stores had he so wished. The administrative ability that could embark 12,000 people of such mixed condition—soldiers, exiles, camp followers, and so forth —on a March morning without losing any one, might have directed with success operations for the loading up of the stuff abandoned to the Patriots. Stedman thinks Howe could have removed everything.

"The British abandoned," he says, "250 pieces of cannon, half of which were serviceable, four mortars, 2500 chaldrons of coal, 25,000 bushels of wheat, 2300 of barley, 600 of oats, 100 jars of oil, 150 horses. Sir William might have removed them all."

Quartermaster-General Thomas Mifflin, in March, 1776. submitted to General Washington a long inventory of how he found forty-five vessels of different sorts and sizes, one of them in dock, fully equipped and armed, tons of hay, an astonishing quantity of molasses, barrels of beer, building materials, blankets, and other useful but destructible stuff. Besides these spoils of war, the admiral on the station, having omitted to take measures to warn British vessels bound to Boston that the port had fallen

into the hands of Washington, ships full of consigned goods, ammunition, especially powder and military tools, fell into the hands of the privateers that swarmed in Massachusetts Bay.[1] Among this booty were some hundreds of Highlandmen commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Campbell, who nearly a year afterwards is found writing to Sir William Howe indignantly complaining of the filthy condition of his lodging and the degrading treatment he suffers in Boston.

Washington entered the town two hours after the evacuation by the British was complete, and found the streets surprisingly clean and the buildings quite unharmed. Even President John Hancock's house, standing on the slope of Beacon Hill and overlooking the Common, had escaped outrage. The British troops behaved better in this way than had the Patriots of 1765, who smashed and hacked to pieces the contents of Governor Hutchinson's house during the Stamp Act riots. Washington afterwards reported that the loss to the owners of houses had been grossly exaggerated. Virtually, as military occupations go, no harm was done to the town at all. There was, however, one awful outrage, which had better be described in the words of the reporter :

Washington enters Boston.

> Deacon Hubbard's pew in the Old South Meeting-house was carried off in the most savage manner as can be expressed, and the silk hangings removed.

Similar outrages were mentioned, as the destruction of pigsties for firewood and the pulling down of fences for the same unholy purpose. The conversion of the old South Chapel into a riding school and canteen on the advice of Burgoyne has already been noticed. A few months later the church and rectory of Westchester, the home of Dr. Seabury, later

[1] It appears that a private code of signals but newly issued by the British authorities fell into the hands of an enterprising and patriotic skipper, who used the code to decoy the inward-bound British vessels.

the first bishop in the United States, were similarly treated by Patriot troops.

The stores, cannon, and cattle abandoned by the British composed the happiest of windfalls for the Patriot army. In their joy the officers and men hailed Howe as one of their staunchest friends. They drank his health in cordial recognition of lavish favours received. Not until the arrival of the French supplies at a later stage of the war did the Patriots drop in for so many good things as fell to them by the British evacuation of Boston. The siege of Boston being thus at an end, matters for some three months drifted. The siege itself was at no time active. The bombardment of the town was a mere farce. Washington had such scanty supplies of powder that no bombardment could have been sustained, neither could he have stormed the fort erected by Howe on Bunker Hill nor the fortifications at the Neck. A plan made by him to cross the Charles on the ice and attack the town on the open side, was overruled by his major-generals. It would certainly have failed, an opinion he must himself have held notwithstanding his reasoned propositions.[1] But Congress was badgering him to go in and win, and the great man, who always accepted the most meddlesome messages of Congress with an imperturbable gravity, probably tabled these plans to save the face of the lawyers in Philadelphia. So as both were glad to part company, Howe, as one may say, walked out and

[1] Marshall, ii. 362 ff., refers to the want of ammunition for the Continental artillery. Cf. also Elias Boudinot's *Journal*, p. 71. Frothingham quotes some one (name and authority not given), who says the Provincials threw an innumerable quantity of shells into the town. It may have been so, but no damage was done, and Washington's known want of powder quite discredits the statement. Boudinot, in his brief *Diary*, says: "General Washington told me he had only eight rounds per man left, although he had eight miles to guard, and did not dare to fire a morning or an evening salute. At this juncture one of the Committee of Safety for Massachusetts went over to General Gage and discovered our poverty to him. The fact was so incredible that General Gage treated it as a stratagem of war and the informant as a spy."

Washington walked in, like tenants at quarter-day, without molestation on either side.

As it turned out ultimately, it was for the best interests of the refugees that Howe went northward to Halifax. But every one expected him to make for Long Island. In the memoranda submitted to Gage in August 1775 the advantages of Long Island had been fully enumerated by both Clinton and Burgoyne. The Loyalists, too, pointed out that Long Island, besides being true to the British cause, was full of good things—cattle, poultry, fresh vegetables, and fruit, not to mention opportunities for fox-hunting, shooting, and racing. The position, moreover, was of the highest strategic value; it commanded the waterway up the Hudson northward, and the chain of lakes right to Canada; it controlled New York harbour, and was in other ways a most advantageous and commodious place to await the reinforcements, both naval and military, known to be gathering in Great Britain for despatch to America. Howe's determination to sail for Halifax and not for New York was saluted by the Loyalist party in the Middle States with cries of dismay, alarm, and disgust; it rendered their position in the city of New York untenable.

It is not much to the point now to discuss why his determination was formed. It is possible that on leaving Boston Harbour his plans were still in confusion, and that during the long delay of a week off Nantucket the flotilla was occupied in getting matters on board into something like ship-shape order. He may have consulted the wishes of Oliver and the Hutchinsons, and other leading citizens of Boston, now going into exile, and they may have expressed a strong desire to get out of the reach of Patriots at once and for ever. However this may be, it is certain that from this time forward grave suspicions of Howe's sincerity began to colour Loyalist opinion. He was called the Boston Antony, and compared to that noble Roman flying in the wake of his Cleopatra, away from

View of Halifax, from George's Island.

Aquatint by Parkyns, 1801.

Actium. His lady friends took away, it was said, tons of spoils. Stedman, as already mentioned, charges Sir William Howe with gross neglect in abandoning stores which might have been removed, but in answer to this charge it was urged that there was no room in the British fleet for spare stores. To this the retort was that about eighty vessels of the transport were all that were necessary to carry the army and its followers, yet that the fleet on leaving Boston amounted to one hundred and seventy sail, of which the majority were merchantmen. Jones alleges, on the testimony of the captain of the vessel, that

> . . . one ship, the *Shrewsbury*, commanded by Captain Salmon, carried one hundred and fifty hogsheads of rum, part only of plunder belonging to William Sheriff, at that time quarter-master-general to the British army.

The narrator adds other details of similar import: he charges the British commissaries and administrative senior officers with wholesale robbery.

The close of the winter in Halifax may have been as genial as was the weather in 1842, on the occasion of Dickens's visit to the city. Better-class provisions were costly, eggs not procurable, but stuff of the coarser sort was to be had freely; and of rum and other spirits, as with the starving Parisians in 1870–71, there was a vast supply. Sir William Howe liked his glass, his lass, and his game of cards, as did indeed all British warriors at that time, and American too. Commissary Joshua Loring proceeded to push his fortunes on with success, while his wife pursued hers. She was as fond of the cards as Baroness Bernstein, and would gamble away a hundred guineas or so with any pretty fellow in love with sport. The spring now advancing, the army was refreshed from the hardship and fatigues of the siege, and Howe began to make preparations for taking his little army to the southward, to get into touch with his brother Viscount Richard Howe, who was expected to arrive in the Bay of New York sometime in August.

New York. The Bay of New York is one of the many great inlets of the Atlantic by which ancient mariners hoped to find a waterway westward to Cathay and the East Indies. Columbus, who never saw a square foot of North America, and in any case reached the West Indies a year or two after Englishmen had touched American soil, had nevertheless dreamed of a passage to the North-west, which, traversing the continent of America, would bring adventurers to the great ocean conjectured to lie indefinitely in the sunset. Hudson, who afterwards with his young son, being cast adrift by a mutinous crew, perished miserably somewhere in the North Atlantic, came one day wandering in his little ship, the *Half-Moon*, among the islands lying about the outfall of the great river, now well known by his name.[1] He was an Englishman in Dutch pay, who navigated his little ship into these unknown waters in search of trade and territory. He found both. The Indian chieftains and their squaws proved to be civil, willing to trade, and hospitable. To the Indians Hudson's most acceptable commodity for barter was rum, to which aforetime the natives had been strangers.[2] A few years later the Island of Manhattan was purchased from the Indians for some brandy, gunpowder, and firelocks, and became a Dutch possession.[3] Manhattan

[1] 25th September 1609. Hudson was not the first European who strayed into New York harbour. No one within mention, it would seem, is ever the first to do anything in particular, yet in 1650 the settlers on Manhattan said: "that in the year of Christ 1609, was the country of which we now propose to speak, first founded and discovered, at the expense of the General East Indian Company, by the ship *Half-Moon*, whereof Henry Hudson was Master and Factor"; cf. *History of the City of New York*, Van Rensselaer, p. 3 (1909).

[2] Robert Juet, mate of the *Half-Moon*, narrates how the Master (Hudson) deliberately made some Indian visitors drunk "to trie whether they had any treachery in them." Juet's narrative is given at length in *Hakluyt's Voyages*.

[3] The cash value to-day of this purchase of Manhattan is twenty-four dollars. The price was paid in kind as mentioned above. A similar transaction in a British Colony took place within living memory. Land was bought in Connecticut Valley at this time (1628) for knives, axes, a pair of shears and some toys.



View of Halifax from Davis' Mill.

Aquatint by Parkyns, 1801.

is an island in the sense that Rhode Island or Thanet is an island. At the north end of the island a cross-cut between the Hudson and the East River completes the circuit of water. This cross-cut connects the Hudson with the Harlem River and is now canalised throughout.

At the head of the navigable river, on the left to the traveller going upstream, rose a little settlement, with a block-house, for trade in furs and peltry, now the important city of Albany. On the same bank, with immediate access to the stream, lay the great Indian compound or settlement, occupied by a powerful people, known subsequently to the French as Iroquois, but to the English settlers as the Mohock or Mohawk : the chief and most active element in the confederacy celebrated in later colonial history as the Long House or the Six Nations.[1] There was generally peace between the Indian braves and the new-comers from over the sea ; a phase of things that by and by confirmed itself, and consolidated into a trading union undisturbed for many years.

At the south end of the trapezoid of land forming Manhattan, was built a little log house, with four or five shanties dependent. This was the nucleus of the Empire City, which in size at least may, as Mr. Roosevelt thinks, soon surpass all cities, ancient and modern—an opinion a glance at the map called Greater New York is likely to confirm.

In the years just preceding Sir William Howe's arrival at Staten Island, New York contained a population somewhat less than that of Boston, perhaps about 20,000 inhabitants. It was then a comfortable town, where multiplied signs of prosperity indicated general opulence. Handsome houses were filled with furniture that in these days would fetch astonishing prices, fine old Delft ware, rare and beautiful china, massive plate, tankards, salvers with drinking-cups and punch-bowls,

[1] In 1776 the western limits of the Six Nations lay back on a line almost coincident with 76° longitude, from the Oswego (Ontario) south for about forty miles.

and pictures, chiefly of the Dutch school, with many ancestral portraits.[1] Most of these good things were broken up, stolen, or destroyed by the Revolutionary mobs that for ten years terrorised all Colonial towns equally ; while what escaped the Patriots, perished in the fire of New York in 1776. The houses or mansions in Boston, in Philadelphia, in New York were spacious and beautifully decorated, being either of the bungalow type of house or not more than one storey high. The floors were of a parquet work, wrought out of red cedar, or the red pine, while the walls, emblazoned with armorial bearings displaying the alliances of the owners, frequently presented a fine scheme of colour and decoration. True to its Dutch origin, New York seems to have been famous for the manufacture of bricks and tiles, which for their beauty were appreciated in Virginia as well as in New England homes. The timber work of the Colonial houses was chiefly constructed according to the pleasing and varied interpretations of the Dutch style visible in Amsterdam to-day. Sedan chairs and sundry great lumbering coaches of the period, imported at vast expense from Europe, helped to impart a fashionable appearance to the main streets. At least half the population was in a condition of domestic servitude. The places of public resort, markets, and wharves swarmed with slaves, black and white. The black slaves were, according to Mr. Roosevelt, men of a singularly violent, turbulent, brutal, savage, and ignorant sort ; being but newly imported from the Guinea Coast, always breathing revenge because of terrible wrongs recently inflicted. Thus New York social life, like that of ancient Athens, was based upon slavery, for the whole domestic staff of the manorial house, of any patroon in the Province, was constituted of slaves. The Press of that city, like that of Boston, furnishes scores of advertisements for sale and auction of human chattels.

[1] It was commonly said that a New York house contained more pictures than books.

"To be sold for want of employment," announced such an advertisement as "a likely negro fellow about 25 years of age: he is an extraordinary good cook, and understands setting and attending a table."

With him was offered for sale a negro wench, *his wife*, born in that land of freedom. Negroes were occasionally burned alive in public places, and there were many New Yorkers alive in 1776 who would recall the terrible scenes of 1741.[1]

The white slaves were as numerous as the people of colour, and among them, too, men and women of many nations—English, Irish, Scotch, Welsh, Swiss, and German. These people arrived in shiploads consigned to Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Charleston, as the case might be. For the most part, they were, like the men of Adullam of David's following, runaways, convicts, and bondsmen who had sold themselves to pay debts; but many had been crimped or kidnapped. On the arrival of such a ship in New York, the newly-arrived were first classed according to occupation, and then sold by auction. In the gazettes may be read notices of rewards offered for runaway whites. A heavy reward is offered for their capture. Under such harsh conditions lived at least one-half of the population of New York. Doubtless farther south, as in Charleston or Savannah, the conditions of servitude were still harsher, but these features of New York social life were dangerous and mischievous. The mean white was enslaved for a term of years. After emancipation he might occasionally be found in the ranks of the industrious, having obtained a moderate degree of prosperity; oftener he became a mere loafer and vagabond, augmenting in his person the mob of

[1] Many of the slaves were Indians, captured in warfare, kidnapped, or fraudulently sold under pledges of protection. The burgesses of New Plymouth are reported to have been prominent in the Indian slave traffic; they are reported to have sold on one occasion 150 Indian men, who had surrendered on terms implying personal freedom. (Van Rensselaer, *History of the City of New York*, i. 220, 221.)

vicious and unemployable poverty; with his neck scarred, his back and his ankles still retaining the marks of punishment, he fell naturally into the ranks of the vindictive and the malevolent. He and his fellows played a leading part in the prologue to the Revolutionary drama.

The Colonial City named its streets, as is still customary in our Empire, from the titles and names of princes and potentates; there were Great George Street and Queen Street, Nassau Street, Crown Street, and Hanover Square, all down near the Battery, besides these, the now well-known Broadway and Bowery.

"We rounded the Battery," says Miles Wallingford, "then a circular strip of grass, with an earthen and wooden breastwork running along the margin of the water, leaving a narrow promenade on the exterior. This brought us up to White Hall, since so celebrated for oarsmen, where we put in for a haven. . . . In that day everybody who was anybody, and unmarried, promenaded the west side of the street (Broadway) between the hours of twelve and two, wind and weather permitting."

Broadway or Broad Street, as the earlier plans of the city make it to be, had been laid out, as soon as any plan of city building was possible; so also was Bowery Lane, "leading up to that farm, which being called after the old Dutch Governor's retreat, had acquired the name of Bouerie or Bowery"; the kindred name of Bouverie Street (Strand) illustrates the source of the word.

Population of New York. 1760.

Augmented by refugees from Europe, especially by men from the Rhine Provinces, and Presbyterians from Ireland and Scotland, the population became so polyglot that in the opinion of some authorities nearly twenty different languages were in use, inclusive of Yiddish and native American. The Presbyterians were of all opponents to the English control the most violent and persistent. The vine-dressers from the Rhine could find little or nothing to do, and sank into a

state of grinding poverty, being both ignorant and unskilled in any trade except in one that is no value north of the fiftieth parallel. Their discontent and disappointment brought them into the ochlocracy of New York as willing and potent agents of the mob rulers.

The aristocracy of the city was in 1775 for the most part of Dutch origin. There were the Schuylers, Van Zandts, Van Cortlandts, Van Rensselaers, Van Wycks, Roosevelts, Beekmans, Stuyvesants, and others, among whom mingled the De Lanceys, the Jays, the Morrises, the Livingstons. Of all this latter group of families, the De Lanceys were the most powerful, the wealthiest, and the most loyal to the English cause. They were of Norman origin, coming originally from the Isle of France, and although practically ruined by their loyalty to the British supremacy,[1] were never allied with any English family. The Livingstons were Scots, and as Presbyterians most strongly opposed to the British Government. So far as a foreigner can judge, many of these families, with one or two brilliant exceptions, have gone under the stream.

Religious feeling in the little city ran high. The Jews were barely tolerated, Roman Catholics were not tolerated at all. Early in that century it had been death to say Mass anywhere in American States except in Maryland. The influence of the Jews in New York has been recently strong enough to cause the discontinuance of singing of Christmas carols in the public schools.[2] The influence of the Roman Catholics is now almost great enough to colour opinion in the Roman Church throughout the world. The Church of England was the church of the wealthy and fashionable, of the patroons and manorial lords. Trinity Church,

[1] There is a reservation in respect of General Oliver de Lancey, who became a very rich man, about whom there are interesting details in Fortescue, vol. iv. There is a very interesting review of these Dutch names and their assimilated sounds in Van Rensselaer, i. 146.

[2] This objection has been, it is said, overruled.

opposite Wall Street, is perhaps for its wealth and for other reasons among the famous churches of the world. Miles Wallingford visited it with veneration due to its antiquity. It was what, in awestruck language, used to be called a fane. At the time of his visit it was not a century old. This venerable structure perished in the New York fire of 1776; but a greater church has arisen on the ashes of the former building. King's College, an institution aspiring to university rank but little more than a secondary school of moderate value, with an indifferent reputation for discipline, was under the control of the English Church, and grew into a stronghold of Loyalist opinion and action.

The substantial provision and endowment created for the advantage of Trinity Church, New York, has been frequently assailed in the State Law Courts for a period of a hundred years, but without success. It is to be carefully noticed that amidst the attainders and confiscations inflicted upon the Loyalists, no violence was done to the title of this venerable corporation, either during or after the First Civil War.

Social New York.

Social New York was viewed with disfavour by Mr. John Adams, subsequently the second President of the United States, and first American Minister to the Court of St. James's. Coming from Boston, Mr. Adams discovers in New York very bad manners. The people talk too loud, too fast, and all at once. They ask too many questions and pay no heed to the answers. Something like this has been said any time for the last dozen years of "smart" people in London. Mr. Dickens in 1842 records impressions not dissimilar to those of Mr. Adams. Mr. Adams did not meet with or see one gentleman, one well-bred man, during the whole course of his visit. It is possible the De Lanceys may not have been cordial, while the Livingstons, the acknowledged leaders of the Whig party, appear, according to common report, to have been coarse and arrogant men. But men of New England, at least in times past, have not been slow to expatiate

on their own merits. The New England conscience is a special article in that department of life's commodities. It is true that the novelists and journalists of Paris have, in their own degree, said more in praise of the Parisian way of life. Yet there is not that air of solemn conviction pervading their statements which may be observed in the pages of New England writers. This natural self-appreciation seems to have annoyed their neighbours. Between New York and Boston there was a lively interchange of recriminations and reprisals and retorts not always courteous. Opinions like those of Mr. John Adams, that there was no gentleman in New York, were parried by the counter-opinion that probably he was not a good judge of gentlemen. Riposts of this kind belong too much to the nature of family quarrels for the intrusion into them of a stranger to be prudent. Yet the traces of this inter-provincial antipathy are still deeply marked. The witness of an earlier day, Fenimore Cooper, is corroborated by the opinion of Mr. S. G. Fisher, who in his turn is sustained by many statements in writers still more recent.[1]

Hence New York was, in 1775, lighter and more animated in tone than her eastern neighbours, Boston, New Plymouth, and Salem. While Boston treated strolling players to the bilboes, New York welcomed them to a very bright and comfortable theatre.

"In 1753," says Mr. Cooper, "a theatre was built in Nassau Street, with a stock company, under the care of the celebrated Hallam and family."

The celebrated Hallam was in New York an ever-welcome visitor. He presented many pieces of well-earned fame—*The Beaux' Stratagem*, *The Recruiting Officer*, *The Beggar's Opera*, *George Barnwell*, *Richard the Third*, and *Cato*, with other plays such as the eighteenth

[1] Van Rensselaer, *History of the City of New York*, i. 204 ff., ii. 74 ff. and *passim*.

century loved. There was ever in New York up to the Revolution a larger taste and judgment with regard to the arts of life than prevailed in the eastern provinces. When the merchants of Amsterdam interested themselves in Manhattan, the Netherlands were supreme in many arts and crafts—a supremacy transmitted by their emigrants to lands then afar off. The founders of New England, on the other hand, had approved, in the fury of the times, of the destruction of English art work of every kind, and with their visible expression disappeared many of the cheerful things of life. Thus in New York there were much feasting and fashion, and a contemporary remarks :

> The ladies neglect the affairs of their families with as good grace as the finest ladies in London.

In Long Island there were fox-hunting and racing. Long Island lies almost due east of New York, and extending eastward and northward for about 120 miles, is distant at the nearest point to the mainland by about a mile from the city. It was well wooded, well stocked with foxes, and of good reputation for apples, mutton, and Loyalists. A racecourse called Ascot was the scene of frequent race meetings and coursing matches. In these forms of sport all the gentry of New York—the De Lanceys and the Morrises—with lovers of the chase from Pennsylvania and New England, took the keenest interest. As early as 1750 it was noted that at the Brooklyn Race Meeting there were more than a thousand horsemen on the plains, while at least seventy great coaches had been ferried over the previous day from the city. The general cheerfulness and gaiety of New York in the eighteenth century created for it a reputation which has been fully sustained by the subsequent history of the Empire City. Whatever have been its vicissitudes, and they have been many and serious, a generous estimate of the value of cakes and ale and ginger has been continually maintained in Manhattan. For, unlike Boston with

its undiluted Puritan antecedents, New York society was leavened in the days of Charles the Second by settlers from England, families of Cavalier extraction and of High Church opinions. They brought with them a taste for personal display, for social ceremonies, and for high living. To their influence must be traced the staunch loyalty of the provincial magnates to the British crown in this Civil War. To their oligarchy, whether Dutch or English, and its high pretensions and demeanour, are somewhat due the violent revolutionary propensities of the heterogeneous mob of New York. It is not now pretended that the mob was actuated by any motive but that of hatred for people who despised them.

"The lowest classes of the population," says Mr. Roosevelt, "cared but little for the principles of either party, and sided with one or the other, according as their temporary interests or local feuds and jealousies influenced them. They furnished, both to Whigs and Tories, the scoundrels who hung in the wake of the organized armies, and took advantage of the general disorder to wreak their private spite, and rob and outrage the timid well-to-do people of both sides, with impartial brutality."

Unconscious instruments of a world-moving revolution, these scoundrels were locally called the Skinners, whose work in life was to bring down the mighty from the places on high, whether De Lanceys or Livingstons, Philipses or Van Cortlandts; families feudal, aristocratic, and territorial, both by sentiment and settlement, whichever side of politics their kinsman espoused; men, too, who had every reason to view, with apprehensive disapproval, the turbulence of the streets.

Neither oligarchy nor ochlocracy, in this long-continued struggle for mastery, had any notion of the vast importance of the events engaging their attention; yet is it certain that, at least after the fall of Quebec, the relief from tension liberated forces of which New York soon became conscious. It remains

a matter of dispute whether fear of the French caused the Colonial assemblies to be so passive, as in times past they had proved to be, for the peril of the Province of New York had always been extreme. Her north-western and western frontiers bordered on Indian and French territory. Part of the eastern shore of Lake Erie, the Falls and river of Niagara, all along the southern shore of Ontario, and so by Kingston down the St. Lawrence, constituted the border of the Province in those directions. The most powerful of all the Indian Confederacies hunted and roamed all over this vast western territory. From the mouth of the Hudson upwards to the Rapids of the St. Lawrence, there was practically an untrammelled water-road for the great and swift canoes of the Indians on the war-path. The only obstacles were an occasional portage of a few miles over a watershed. Besides the peril in these quarters, there was danger in the beautiful natural route from Montreal to New York lying almost due south. In the story of bygone America there were few names more associated with battle, murder, and sudden death, fair fight, ambush, and assassination, than these of Bennington, Saratoga, Fort William Henry, Lake George, Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and Lake Champlain, all lying on or near to this natural highway. To these names add, in the western route, Forts Stanwix and Oswego, and the reader of the struggle for Canada will at once comprehend how far the Province of New York was compromised in that long warfare. Besides these landward perils a still greater menace, although imperfectly apprehended by the Provincials, impended from the sea. Louisburg, of which not one stone now stands upon another, designed by French engineers and French strategy to be the Gibraltar of the North Atlantic, threatened the very existence of Boston, New York, and Charleston; for the French command of the sea would have sterilised the commerce of these harbours. Louisburg, however, after its capture by Wolfe, was, at the command of the British Government,

totally destroyed by fire, pick-axe, and shovel. The French fleet taken in the course of the operations likewise perished. Consequently, both from Indian attack and French sea-power being now set free, the Colony, lightened of these long-standing dangers, grew restless and querulous about wrongs and grievances and injustice. But this condition of feeling ensued a little later. The coastwise Colonial towns in 1763 were lifted up and kept holiday. "Boston," says Mr. Bradley, "by a flood of pulpit eloquence, and New York with cakes and ale and a prodigious amount of toast-drinking," showed their grateful appreciation of the blessings of Providence. A cold fit of reaction supervened. The grievances revived afresh.

The British Colonial system.

The corner stone of British policy towards the American Colonies is fully indicated by Mr. Burke.

> "No trade," said Burke, "was let loose from restraint; but merely to enable the Colonists to dispose of what in the course of trade England could not take, or to enable them to dispose of such articles as England forced upon them, and for which without some degree of liberty they could not pay. . . . This principle of commercial monopoly runs through no less than twenty-nine Acts of Parliament —from the year 1660 to the unfortunate period of 1774."

This principle of colonisation was in its degree much the same as that pursued by Rome in her treatment of conquered and annexed countries. The decree of Caesar Augustus, that a census of the whole world should be taken with a view to tribute, was based upon the idea that Ephesus and Alexandria, Syracuse and Antioch, must contribute to pension the unemployable mean citizens in the mother city, to enhance her splendour, to exalt her dignity, to augment her influence. So the merchants of Bristol, of Liverpool, of London, and of Glasgow co-operated to keep up a system of trade regulations, of which the restrictions and limitations were devised to benefit themselves. Their fellow-subjects abroad, they urged, who were tied and bound by these parliamentary restrictions, had

emigrated with full knowledge of them, had no experience either in fact or by hearsay of any other methods of regulating commerce, and had prospered exceedingly under this legislation. As to the great free growth of the American nation from the eastern to the western ocean, few imagined such an increase of territorial occupation in their most visionary moments; nowhere was the idea less frequently entertained than in New York. Cooper describes two men of substance talking familiarly on this matter; they agree that such distant and wild territory as the land along the Ohio is not worth fighting for, nor even deserves attention, because ages and ages must elapse before such remote regions could be of any service for the objects of civilisation. Mr. Burke thought the condition of the American people at this time very happy and enviable.

> "America," he said, "had, except commercial restraint, every characteristic mark of a free people in her internal concerns. She had not only the image of a constitution, she had the substance; she was taxed by her own representatives; she chose most of her own magistrates; she paid them all; she had, in fact, the sole disposal of her own internal government. This state of commercial servitude and civil liberty taken together is certainly not perfect freedom, but comparing it with the ordinary circumstances of human nature it was a happy and a liberal condition."

Yet this servitude galled New York merchants, and the ferment in both city and province against the parliamentary restrictions continued to increase; but the agitation about taxation within a few years after the fall of Quebec does not account for the obvious hostility which everywhere was becoming more accentuated.

Anti-British feeling in the Colonies.

Many influences, however, should have been adverse to a breach of kindly feeling between the Colonies and the Mother Country. The military sense of camaraderie, for instance, is amongst the strongest of ties between men who, side by side, have faced the same danger. In the frontier wars both Colonial and British officers —Howe and Gage, Montgomery and Putnam, Gates

and Washington, as well as Charles Lee—had fought against France and her Indian allies, under the British flag. Howe's conduct at the Anse du Foulon at the memorable battle of Quebec is now forgotten; Gage's coolness and pertinacity at Ticonderoga won much praise; Israel Putnam in frontier and bush fighting was second to none; while of Washington, who for five years was wearing the British uniform on active service, now on the Ohio, now on the Monongahela, it is almost graceless to speak. Yet, within sixteen short years, these comrades in arms were fighting on opposite sides in the most important struggle of these later generations. Of them, while it was suspected that Howe was an unwilling and indolent agent of a policy he disliked, and while it is certain Gage was never at ease under the sterner responsibilities of office, it is equally certain that Washington and Montgomery and Putnam entered with alacrity upon active hostility to their former comrades. This dislike to the old country is not fully accounted for by merely mercantile and civil considerations; there must have been even then at the back of the Colonial mind a resolve to get free from the control of Great Britain. It is now candidly admitted by students of those times dwelling on either side of the ocean, that the Colonials entertained distorted and exaggerated views of their inter-imperial relations. Men in America pretended to believe that in wresting Canada and the West from French control, Britain was playing a lone hand. They had feigned to think that Indian raids and French agitation along the Ohio were no concern of theirs.[1]

"New York," says Roosevelt, "was vitally interested in seeing Canada cowed and the French intrigues definitely stopped; yet the New York Assembly insisted that the whole expense of the conquest of Canada ought to come on the Mother Country. New England looked on unmoved when the French merely raided on New York, and New York sold arms to the savages who attacked New England."

[1] Cf. Fortescue, iii. 19 *seq.*

The Colonies, although they occasionally furnished good fighting men to aid the British troops, were unstable in their policy and sourly jealous of each other: "they swindled and overcharged the very troops sent out to protect them," and were felt to be indifferently loyal to their obligations. The Legislature of Pennsylvania had in 1755 refused to vote a single dollar or equip one man to defend the western frontier during the time that a successful raid, organised by Frenchmen, was devastating, with every circumstance of savage Indian warfare, the scattered and ill-defended white settlements on the border. Of these deeds, which the Quakers and Germans of Pennsylvania did nothing either to prevent or repel or alleviate, Colonel Geo. Washington said he would sooner die a hundred deaths than ever gaze upon the like again. Pennsylvania was then Lutheran almost as much as Quaker in its Christian opinions. But whatever complexion its religious opinions or the mutual jealousies of rival sects assumed, they seem to have agreed that it was prudent not to go westward fighting the Indians or the French. Philadelphia was too fat to fight. Nor were Virginia or Maryland more prominent in taking up their share of the vigilant defence of the western frontier. These tobacco lords and slave-owners abandoned the guardianship of their hinterland, of which the defensible boundary was nearly 400 miles long, to the care of a young man of twenty—the Squire of Mount Vernon, who, as he tells us, had been commissioned

> . . . for more than twenty months to perform an impossibility —that is, to protect from the cruel invasion of a crafty and savage enemy the lives of inhabitants with a force inadequate to the task.[1]

For it appears to have been the allotted duty in the life of Washington to battle more with foes within

[1] The conduct of the slave-owners in their making so little provision for defence on their Indian border is extenuated somewhat by the considerations in Vol. I. p. 3 ff.

than foes without; with jealous, incompetent, and arrogant assemblies, now provincial, now national, of which the latter were doubtless the worse. At any rate, to help him, as Mr. Bradley alleges,

> . . . scarcely a dozen men of birth and character came forward to fight out of two whole Colonies, whose numerous gentry was their pride, and is still the chief burden of their reminiscent literature.

It is not unlikely that the defective spirit of co-operation, these petty mutual jealousies, these provincial and parochial animosities, this selfish apathy, were due to the system of government under which the Colonies lived. They paid no more towards the command of the sea than Canada does now,[1] they had no mercantile policy, their military spirit and activities were subject to the most ludicrous official limitations, they had no national literature nor any co-ordinated system of education, they were forbidden to manufacture, so that the vast restlessness of an energetic race was spent in devious and illicit pursuits: in dancing, drinking, gambling, destruction of wild animal life on the most unexampled scale of slaughter, while their morals were contaminated by illicit contact with slave life and dependence on slave labour. Hence came about that decadence of national and patriotic feeling, which attenuated almost to debility the fat, the prosperous, the aristocratic, the slave-owning feudalities, manorial lords and tobacco masters of the Atlantic border.

The Australian provinces, though still labouring under many disadvantages, have been able to federate without bloodshed into a Commonwealth which has already made provision for contingencies by fostering and paying for the military and naval training of its sons; consequently, Australia, with her own mercantile policy, her domestic freedom, her literature, her art, has been able to follow out peacefully her own pro-

[1] 1910.

gressive course; but as to the American Colonies, sunk in a slough of hard bargaining and slavery and smuggling, nothing short of a seven years' war would have, as it appears, been medicine enough to heal their sickness. In the records of a nation that is still youthful among nations, it is striking to notice the contrasts presented by the Civil Wars in 1775-1782 and in 1860-1864: the imbecility of the acephalous Congress of the former time, and the iron firmness of the President's control in the latter contest. Observe the grim acceptance of the stern course of war by America in respect of Sherman's terrible raid across Georgia from Atlanta to Savannah, and the hysterical clamour raised by Jones, Ramsay, and their later copyists about the Hessians in Long Island and the Jerseys.

# CHAPTER XII

## NEW YORK : MOVEMENTS FOR DISUNION

LET us now revert to the operations of New Yorkers in hostility to the Stamp Act. The stamps despatched from England arrived in New York, conveyed by two men-of-war, about a week before the appointed time of the Act coming into force. The King's ships anchored off the Battery amidst many tokens of public obloquy. The wharves were crowded with turbulent men and women, of whom the greater part were spoiling for a fight of some sort. There was in the crowd a strong infusion of longshore marines and salts, men inured to the tempestuous reaches of the Hudson and East rivers. These children of the deep-blue sea hated with an unappeasable ferocity the red-coats of the British garrison. There was ever the possibility of serious fighting whenever the red and the blue roamed at large. New York in former times was the well-loved of the class of mariner it was customary to call "sea-dog." Piracy, privateering, smuggling or "free trade," always found money, fellow-feeling, and active assistance in that hospitable city. Here was it that Captain William Kidd, most renowned and least truculent of pirates, was furnished with ship and equipment for his expedition to suppress piracy. A leading family of New York contributed largely towards the money raised for this praiseworthy object. But Kidd, turning sea-wolf, hoisted the Jolly Roger, and preyed upon the trading ships of the coast and the West Indies. The syndicate

Reception of the stamps. 1764.

interested in his plunder being at last compelled to throw him over, he was hanged, and popular ballads, chapbooks, and songs soon raised him to the chief pinnacle of piratical fame. With this example, and for other reasons, the waterside population of New York was an amphibious, lawless set, with a deep-rooted objection to lawyers, policemen, red-coats, tide-waiters, excisemen, and every class of executive official.

In the turmoil and bickering subsequent to the arrival of the bales of stamped paper, the marine
1764. population was conspicuous. November the 1st, the date at which the Act was to come into force, was a day of violent agitation, especially among the men, for whom the use of a stamp in any transaction whatever was the rarest of incidents. Bells and brass bands, gun-firing, hoisting of flags to half-mast, and such-like methods of expressing popular feeling and of augmenting men's courage, marked the proceedings of the day. The mob burned the effigy of the governor, smashed his stable fittings and fine chariot, sacked the house of a military officer of position, and completed the day's doings with vast potations of rumbo. Yet on this occasion the mob was not out of harmony with the general opinion of the people.

"All parties," says Judge Jones of the Stamp Act, "all denominations, all ranks of people, appeared unanimous in opposing its execution, so that the peace of the province, as to internal jarrings or political tenets, was not in the least disturbed."

Colonel Gage of Ticonderoga, now become Major-General Gage, was in command in New York. He appears to have felt that as all New York was hostile to the Stamp Act, and the means of enforcing the new law quite beyond his power, it was more prudent for him to hand the documents with their stamps to the Mayor, who accepted them, and, it is presumed, threw them to rot in the cellars of the town office.

But the triumph of negroes, sailors, boys, mean whites, and pickpockets brought about a reaction in

New York. The Livingstons, the family that in former days befriended Kidd, were turned out of office, being displaced by Loyalists. On the repeal of the Stamp Act the city and provincial fathers met, voted an address, and £1500 for a statue of the best of kings to be placed on the Bowling Green. The statue was cast of lead, which a few years later came in handy as stuff for Republican bullets. Loyal New York celebrated the occasion with bonfires, Madeira, and rumbo; the patriotic press stigmatised the Provincial Assembly as the vilest reptiles on earth. From this time forward, party feeling grew excessively bitter. The patriotic movement expressed itself in violence and bloodshed. In the South, black slavery, in the West, border warfare, in New England, Puritan fanaticism and intolerance, with white slavery everywhere, and the current social custom of excessive drinking, all contributed to set up a kind of witches' cauldron boiling over with bad temper and violent deeds. The border men habitually shot down a redskin on sight, their common saying being that the best Indian is a dead Indian. The little school of romance connected with this phase of American story permits itself to say that the rifleman of the frontier was an unerring shot, and that no Indian, even in times of profound peace, would trust himself within range of any of these murderous heroes. The marauding border men called themselves *Schenectady Scalpers*, *Ontario Jacks*, *Champlain Pikes*, and *Split Shirts*. Of these heroes many found their way into town whenever there was a hint of a tea-party or a little free shooting. Consequently the manners of the lower classes were, according to the reports of all travellers, repulsive and coarse even in that coarse age, while gouging, tarring and feathering, riding on a rail, and the free use of the knife, illustrated in their degree the free sentiments of a free people. Of the *couteau de chasse*, afterwards better known as the bowie knife, Mr. O. W. Holmes remarks that it is merely the Roman military sword "modified to meet the daily wants of civilised society."

Dickens, in 1842, sketched Pawkins, Diver, Jefferson Brick, Chollop, Pogram, and Lafayette Kettle from what he observed, not as characters, but as types noticeable in all the Northern and Middle States. Unconsciously he confirmed the observations of Graydon, Cooper, and Mrs. Grant, and the general fidelity of his observations on men and manners is not seriously questioned. Hence in the politics of the hour, as to both the word and the blow, it was commonly doubtful which was got in first. But in these matters the city of New York was relatively quiet and law-abiding. The gross and wanton insults heaped upon the King's troops in Boston, the denunciations in the pulpits, the invectives in the Press, the swollen and heady rhetoric of the lawyers in court and Assembly, the incessant yelling at and bullying of soldiers by boys of a larger growth in the streets, the slights and sneers of idle women of the prosperous classes and of loose women of the masses, were but faintly echoed in New York, which as yet had not sunk to the level of New England towns, in which the pleasures of the chase were usually afoot on fine holiday afternoons—the game being a gentleman suspected of loyalty, who, after a spirited run, usually found himself on his knees at the foot of a Liberty Pole, and at the top of his voice damning King George. There was the accustomed Liberty Pole in New York. It was erected in honour of the repeal of the Stamp Act and, as was said, out of respect to King George. But the troops in garrison could not regard the Pole in that light. To cut it down was felt to be a privilege as well as a duty; the New York Sons of Liberty constituted themselves the guardians of that tree. Frequent bickerings, squabbles, and riots, with broken heads and wounds, ensued. At last on a mob of wharf loafers, stevedores, and sailors coming into combat with a body of redcoats, a sailor was stabbed and killed. On this occasion, as in the case of the "Boston Massacre," there was as much eloquence let loose as if the Sicilian Vespers, the Massacre of the Innocents, and

the Butchery of Cawnpore had occurred simultaneously in the streets of a great city amidst a quiet, an inoffensive, a law-abiding people. A barbarous soldiery, it was said, had been let loose upon the people to wreak on defenceless heads at their will whatever impulse of a cruel, venal, brutal kind bestirred their savage breasts. With such jawbones of asses have been slain and are still slain multitudes.

Smuggling and privateering.

While the spirits of the people were thus maintained, the ordinary life of the town proceeded on its accustomed lines. Free-traders, that is smugglers, pursued their adventures. All the vigilance of the British vessels did not succeed in rendering these adventures unprofitable. The naval authorities having issued strict orders for suppressing smuggling, subjected New York shipping inward bound to an annoying scrutiny with indifferent success. The merchants of New York grew rapidly wealthy. Free-traders multiplied and increased. For many years American mercantile transactions had enjoyed as to the enforcement of statute law what Mr. Burke calls a wise and salutary neglect. The commercial code was a labyrinth of revision, revocation, and repeal, of which hardly any lawyer in New York understood the mazy windings. Practically free from official interference, the exports of America had increased from £570,000 in 1704 to over six millions in 1770, that is, had multiplied by nearly twelve times. Of this splendid growth New York partook her full share. A traveller in 1770 speaks of seeing no less than thirty ships ocean built and ocean bound lying at the wharves. Some of them traded to China and Japan. Others, equipped with a little artillery, seem to have combined a flavour of privateering with the ordinary adventures of a voyage. Strained relations between American mariners and those of nations with which friendly official intercourse existed, appear to have been not uncommon. The real freedom enjoyed by the Colonists is proved by every kind of evidence of freedom that could exist in the eighteenth century. A Colony cannot be much in

bonds that does practically whatever it pleases to do. Under the very gentle control of Britain the prosperity of the Colonies vastly increased, and their purchases in Bristol and London proportionately augmented. The British merchants were intensely pleased. Their accounts with New York and Boston arose to quite commanding figures. Everything, notwithstanding these little ebullitions and riots over the water, was well with the world. But in a day of portentous importance it struck certain English statesmen that there were statutes no one heeded and limitations that did not limit. It was pointed out that disregard of one law makes men contemptuous of all law; that to maintain a just standard of public morals, American methods of commerce must be brought into line with Parliamentary enactments. The omnipotence of Parliament is for many men a fetish which must be obeyed. Mr. Burke had characterised the recourse to theories of government, the assertion of the right of Parliament to do this and disallow that, without careful reference to changed and changing circumstances, as arrant trifling. But Mr. Burke's advocacy of a case seldom improved its immediate prospects. He appears to have been a man whose native temperament led him into opposition. A man who loves to oppose must at times be seriously in the wrong.[1] It was Mr. Burke's misfortune not to inspire general confidence, for on at least one occasion of his being offered high political office he should not have accepted it. His advice in these days, the times of the American Revolution, was listened to with impatience. He advised the Commons not to apply their theoretical rights to American affairs; not to try and raise revenue in America by taxation: their answer was a revised system of taxes that could not pay the cost of

[1] Mr. W. E. Gladstone's opinion of Burke, as reported by Mr. G. W. E. Russell, formerly private secretary to Mr. Gladstone, was that "Burke was perhaps the maker of the Revolutionary War, and without any *perhaps* almost unmade the liberties, the constitution, even the natural interests and prosperity of our country."

collection and a complicated measure taxing tea. New York entered with spirit into the movement for resistance to the tea tax. In December 1773 the committee of tarring and feathering in Philadelphia had announced to the pilots of the Delaware that if any pilot aided the entry of the tea-ship *Polly*, he would be tarred and feathered.

"We have calculated to a gill and to a feather," say the committee, "how much it requires to fit a man for an American exhibition. We hope that none of you will behave so ill as to oblige us to clap him in a cart alongside of the captain."

The pilots of New York harbour and of the Hudson were terrorised by similar menaces called cautions. At any rate the contents of one tea-ship were cast into the water; the shores were outlined, it was said, for miles with tea-leaves, that "poisonous herb." Tea and salt-water, the local jesters loved to repeat, had a most delicate flavour. Yet the failure of this beverage was in domestic circles keenly felt. Although ballads and broadsheets against the herb were printed and sold by the hundredweight, these compositions did not express the sentiments of the women. Excessive drinking being then the mode,[1] men swallowed beer by the vat and rum or punch by the anker, women tea by the gallon. They drank it with every meal; it was as much the favourite beverage with corned pork and beans in America, as it is now on Australian runs with mutton chops and damper. Fenimore Cooper presents a scene in a refined Colonial house in which there is, within the restrictions of polite society, a battle royal concerning a tea-tray at the time when the deleterious herb

[1] For instance, in honour of the French Revolution, there took place in 1793 (Jan. 24) a grand barbecue, given by the Boston men in State (King) Street. Among other generous provision there was punch brewed in hogsheads, "mighty strong," it was said. Twelve horses hauled the hogsheads of punch to the place of distribution; cf. *History of Boston*, W. H. Sumner, p. 261 ff. A barbecue is a kind of *lectisternium* or open-air feast on a liberal scale, consisting usually of some great animal roasted whole, with copious drink; cf. the famous barbecue in Brooklyn in 1884.

was nominally most unpopular. Even the redmen in the forests had learned to infuse and to enjoy the cheerful cup. Tea had been imported in millions of pounds. Hence any interference with supply amounted to a national annoyance. With the men of America it appears tea has not even yet recovered from its unpopularity at that now fast-receding date. It is said they view with disfavour the Englishman who, at the accustomed afternoon hour, flutters around the tea-table. But to drink coffee from the British island of Jamaica in preference to tea from China appears, in 1775, to have been among the many obvious duties of a Patriot. However this may be, it is quite certain that great and general indignation was inspired by a most luckless measure which, in going through the customary Parliamentary stages, attracted little attention, and was enacted when Chatham, that ardent friend of the Colonies, was Prime Minister.

The little splutter at New York attracted no attention at home. It was thought enough to punish the ringleaders and allow the smaller fry to get away. The Loyalists of the city and province were known to be numerous, influential, and quite trustworthy. The waterside mob was notoriously turbulent and uncontrollable. Consequently the moderate Patriots coalesced with the Loyalists to resist the measures of the Radical leaders of the masses. Every one who had any visible means of support unconsciously drew together against the encroachments of the extreme Radicals. Compromise was in the air. Co-operation for the common tranquillity and prosperity suggested a reference to a special committee of representatives from all the Colonies. This step is not unknown as a pleasant way of deferring the consideration of a vexed question to a remote period. Whether the nativity of this not very original idea is due to Mr. Jay of New York, or to Mr. Samuel Adams of Boston, is still a matter of argument. Perchance the mother idea is traceable to Boston, the mother of all caucuses. For many years

some of the citizens of Boston had met privately to talk politics over a pipe and a glass. There was nothing to prevent them meeting openly to talk as they pleased on any subject. Their favourite and quaintly named organ of the press, *The Massachusetts Spy*, was a newspaper as unscrupulous as a section of the Welsh, and as seditious as some productions of the native Indian Press of these days. The expansion of a local caucus into an Inter-Colonial Caucus was in the natural sequence of things. It was determined to meet at Philadelphia, as being the most central, the most comfortable, the best furnished with capable cooks and well-stocked wine-cellars of all Colonial cities. So hither repaired the chosen delegates in September 1774. Separation from the old country was not openly discussed. The subject was *tabu*. Redress of grievances: a kind of Petition of Right with a touch of the Grand Remonstrance was uppermost in men's minds. The tea question, the punishment of Boston for wicked behaviour, the recent Ministerial measures, which quite obliterated the previous kindly feeling evoked by the repeal of the Stamp Act, brought men of opposite parties to support a coalition working for a commonly approved end. The leading men of both sides were perhaps at first sincerely desirous of finding a *modus vivendi* with Great Britain. Some of them had by experience knowledge of the horrors of war, and few men with that experience ever wish to renew it. War they knew to be the only alternative to compromise. There were a few of the fiery sort, with Samuel Adams from Boston,[1] who thought, and in private spoke, of Independence, of Hampden and Cromwell, but their instructions had been to lie low. There are men in Australasia who have used the same kind of language; they have freely discussed the policy of "cutting the painter," but this effusive talk is one of the products of the ink-pot, the tobacco-box, and the tankard. At Philadelphia it was professed in very concise terms that every man

The Congress of 1774.

[1] Lynch from S. Carolina was also of the fire-eating brethren.

was seeking peace. High personages like Washington, Jay, Duane, Galloway, and John Adams, speaking in concert and in unison, as they say, for themselves and for others, repudiated the faintest suggestion of any movement in the direction of Independence. The Congress adopted for home consumption a Resolution, in terms as solemn as a profession of faith, affirming they have no intention, not even a faint desire to sever their connection with the old country. In this spirit at the beginning of these proceedings they appoint committees, receive reports, confirm them, or send them back for further consideration, adopt resolutions, and so forth, according to the forms the English people have invented and love so well. Yet was the unexpressed bent of their minds working towards the inevitable end. And the delegates traversed again and again the old ground with the old arguments. The moth-eaten charters once more came to light, the ancient question whether the King or the Parliament had granted the original charters to the Colonies, whether the King was the nominee and chief executive officer of Parliament, with the inference that his official actions were Parliamentary actions, or whether the King, as supreme executive officer, was also the Supreme Protector of the Empire—these and such-like points of debate for a debating society proved of inexhaustible interest. Some of the speeches were much admired, and, one may say, justly admired. Chatham spoke of the proceedings of this Congress in the highest terms;[1] he said the speeches were among the best efforts of ancient and modern oratory; they would in that case compare

[1] It may be mentioned that the eighteenth century loved superlatives. Chatham's claim to be familiar with the whole range of ancient and modern oratory would at once pass unchallenged, except by a surly few who happened to know something about Demosthenes, Cicero, and Bossuet. With the mantle of the eighteenth century upon him, Bancroft asserts that S. Adams placed the history of the whole human race under review in his speeches and papers, while John Adams, he says, reaffirmed the principles of liberty as advocated by Aristotle and Plato!

with the funeral oration of Pericles, or with the speech on the Crown, or with those orations that Livy works into his pages. The present generation would at least find these Congressional efforts a little overloaded with metaphors and similes, a long way behind, if after the manner of, Mr. Burke—who in one of his flights discovered New Englanders striking harpoons into whales on the coast of Africa, or pursuing the same gigantic game on the coast of Brazil, or at the Antipodes, navigating under the Frozen Serpent of the South. Occasionally in the Colonial oratory there is a touch of Sir Boyle Roche. Reminiscences of the popular revolutionary style may be traced in the well-known letter of General Cyrus Choke, U.S.M.

Yet there was some fine speaking—fine both in expression and thought. Dr. Rush, Dr. Witherspoon, Mr. John Adams, had great gifts of exposition improved by practice and matured by experience. Still there was unavoidably an academic tone running through their debates, ill adapted to the exigencies of the times, and banished as events passed on by the expulsive power of stronger feelings. Even as between 1775 and the end of 1776 there is a great change. The debate upon the propositions laid before Congress in consequence of a message from Viscount Richard Howe, was, as we shall have occasion farther on to observe, of a noble quality.

The Congress protracted its deliberations for about eight weeks, showing, as time went on, the increasing fascination of familiarity with edged tools. It is certain that opinions fermented and the political temperature rose, in consequence, many points towards rebellion. The delegates were lodged well and fed well. Mr. John Adams expresses himself delighted with Pennsylvanian and Philadelphian hospitality. Himself with his fifty colleagues was so full of "wit, sense, learning, acuteness, subtlety, and eloquence," that he says they wasted a vast amount of time. In Washington, one of the delegates, not his most ardent admirers have ever

discovered either learning or eloquence. Anyhow, each evening brought its own copious banquet, its floods of Madeira and of punch, its lengthy toast-list.[1] Around the mahogany, according to the old saying, truth comes out; when the toast of the evening was reached, it commonly took some such form as an aspiration that America's enemies might go off in hot blasts of gunpowder, or that the King's advisers might become sons of perdition. And the newspapers had still warmer sentiments to express in exaggerated language. Messages came to the Press that Boston was swarming with executioners; that the streets might be swimming in blood; that the Mother Country was a parricide because she was angry with her children, and so forth.[2] Mr. Revere, the jeweller, brought supplies of this kind of information to Philadelphia. To any form of sedition the delegates from New York were steadily opposed. They had been sent to do their best to get grievances redressed and to secure a happy, perpetual, and permanent alliance between Great Britain and America. But Boston was too strong for New York; separation and dissent were in the grain of most Boston-born men.

Dr. Seabury, then Rector in the Province of New York and later Bishop of Connecticut, had pleaded:

"To talk of being liege subjects to King George while we disown the authority of Parliament is Whiggish nonsense. If we obey the laws of the King we obey the laws of Parliament; if we disown the authority of Parliament we disown the

[1] These Gargantuan revels began about 3 p.m. The final dinner was given on 19th September 1774, and included five hundred guests, and comprised a toast-list of thirty-two items, beginning with "The King," and ending with "Mr. John Hancock," who was not a member of that Congress.—Jones's *History of New York*, p. 476 (Appendix).

[2] It is a singular fact that these reports reached Philadelphia at the beginning of the Congress, just before the Rev. Chaplain Duché was about to engage in prayer. The debates began amidst the peals or tolls of muffled bells, a fine *coup de théâtre* (Bancroft, vii. 130). Lecky thinks the reports well timed and intended to test the temper of the people.

authority of the King. The King of Great Britain is a Parliamentary King, and being King of Great Britain by statute, he is King of America by statute"; the contention of one section of the Congress being that the Colonies held from the King and owed no fealty or duty to the British Parliament.

In due time Dr. Seabury was interned in New Haven (Conn.) as "a dastardly protester against the proceedings of Congress." The doings of this Congress need detain us no longer, for all the time the sword had been behind the arras. It was brandished freely at the close of the session. Delegates who demanded the summary repeal of eleven Acts of Parliament must have felt that they were offering an ultimatum at the point of the sword to the King or to his Parliament. Aggressive measures directed against the British Government and people being now authorised, commercial, social, political war at once began.

The first attempt was to detach Canada from her allegiance. An address to the Canadians was drafted, in which was pointed out how the present Administration was insolent and oppressive—how opportune it would be for the Canadians to join with their Southern neighbours in casting off the foreign yoke. Differences of religion might easily be compromised or neglected. The liberal sentiments of Canadians would, it was urged, readily understand how easy it would be to join in one common movement for the vindication of Colonial liberty. Switzerland was introduced as a leading instance how Geneva and Rome could locally join hands to protect the liberties of the people.

While this document was circulating the Congress drew up another address to Great Britain, expressing intense surprise that the people of Canada were allowed the free use of their religion at all.

Nor can we express our astonishment that a British Parliament should ever consent to establish in that country a religion that has deluged your island in blood, and dispersed impiety, bigotry, persecution, murder, and rebellion through every part

of the world. . . . Admit that the Ministry by the powers of Britain and the aid of our Roman Catholic neighbours should be able to carry the point of taxation, and reduce us into a state of perfect humiliation and slavery . . . may not the Ministry with the same armies enslave you.[1]

Thus having endeavoured to cajole Canada into participation of their quarrel, and having lectured Great Britain for permitting in Canada any religious freedom at all, furnishing at the same time reason why the people of Great Britain should try a little sedition on their own account, the Congress went home on an October day in a storm of rain and good spirits to await the result of their further measures. They were to be convened anew in May 1775, should the messages from England be thought satisfactory.

This Congress, too, after posing as the guardian and vindicator of every American's liberty, had set in motion machinery which soon ground every Loyalist (who in the aggregate formed the majority of the population) into powder. It set up in every county, city, and town a Vigilance Committee of Correspondence to organise and vitalise a most thorough system of espionage. The Congress had by its delegates, each acting for himself and for his constituents, promulgated a ukase that no man should deal for any commodity with Great Britain, either as to import, export, or purchase of English goods already locally stored or bonded. The Vigilance men were instructed to inspect the books of custom houses, the bills of lading of inward and outward bound vessels, to watch the personal dealings of Loyalists, and in certain cases to post up the names of their fellow-citizens in some public place as the enemies of their country.

[1] This most silly proceeding of the wise men of the Congress of 1774 immersed them in floods of jibe and ridicule, as well it might. Dr. Tucker's oft-repeated jest about the two kinds of transubstantiation favoured by Congress was thought to be a fine instance of the caustic Dean of Gloucester's wit. Cf. S. G. Fisher, *The Struggle for American Independence*, i. p. 277.

The little paragraph which set agoing all this proscription and denunciation was :

> That a committee be chosen in every county, city, and town by those who are qualified to vote for representatives in the legislature, whose business it shall be attentively to observe the conduct of all persons touching this association.[1]

Thus the Congress, acting as a sovereign legislative body, without a shadow of legal or constitutional justification, had practically asserted the Independence of the United States a year or two before the issue of the formal document of declaration. These Vigilance Committees speedily wrought red ruin in every quarter. Encouraged to spy and inform, sneak and pry in all directions, condemning men and women on the information of spiteful and vindictive loafers of the neighbourhood, they set up a reign of terror which in its degree was just as bad as the Protestant Terror in England under Thomas Cromwell, or the Red Terror of France under Robespierre. The proceedings of these Vigilance Committees, as sketched by an American writer,[2] were of the same type in all places. In every village and small town lived some pushing fellow with a following of his own, called a convention—kindred spirits, who constituted themselves a committee. A pot-house orator or common bully would under such conditions easily force his opinions upon his confederates. Hannibal Chollop illustrates to a finish this class of scoundrel. Heated with rum and patriotism, the meeting would begin to inquire what the minister, the squire, the justice of the peace, the doctor, the schoolmaster, thought of the patriotic movement. An adjournment to ascertain the answer to the question being brought forward and carried unanimously, the Committee proceeded to pay a domiciliary visit to the home of the minister, or the squire, or the justice. Animated,

[1] The resolve was printed in full in the *New York Gazetteer*, 10th November 1774 (Rivington's Paper). Cf. also De Lancey's note to Jones, i. 477.

[2] Cf. Justin Winsor, vii., *Essay on the Loyalists*.

some by love of mischief, others by rum, a few by vindictive feeling, a remnant by patriotic ardour, with a sprinkling of ruffians ready on sight to gouge or tar and feather, the mob acted summarily. There were no police, no methodical protection of life, limb, or property. Hence the home selected was at the mercy of the populace. Hence, too, from north to south, in Georgia as well as in New Plymouth, mob-law prevailed.

"Yesterday," writes Lord William Campbell to Lord Dartmouth, "under colour of law they hanged and burned an unfortunate wretch—a free negro of considerable property, one of the most valuable and useful men in his way in the Province. . . . A few days ago the Gunner of Fort Johnson, for expressing his loyalty, was tarred and feathered ten or twelve times in different parts of the town (Charleston), and otherwise treated with great cruelty." [1]

And Lord Dunmore reported that:

A committee is chosen in every county to carry the Association of Congress into execution. They inspect the trade and correspondence of any merchant, watch the conduct of any inhabitant, send for, catechise, and stigmatise him on any pretence. Every city is arming an independent company to be employed against Government should occasion require. Every justice of the peace is a member of the committee. There are no courts of justice open. The lawyers will not attend, nor would the people allow them to attend.

The general boycott of British trade, import or export, was causing general ruin; there were no manufactures, "the people of Virginia being naturally a lazy folk." [2]

The easy-going freedom of the older Colonial life being thus expelled by this new model of tyranny, the

[1] Lord Wm. Campbell to Lord Dartmouth, 19th August 1775.

[2] Lord Dunmore to Lord Dartmouth, 24th December 1774; cf. also the Letters of Thomas Knox Gordon, Edward Savage, Charles Matthew Coslett, John Fewtrell, and William Gregory, judges; and of John Simpson, attorney-general, 1st September 1775. Address to Lord William Campbell: "Being now prisoners we have resolved to decline the execution of our respective offices, until we can resume them with the powers and dignity becoming our office."—Record Office, vol. 229, fol. 447.

well-tried customary methods of Europe, of the Great Council of Thirty, of the Venetian Council of Ten, speedily prevailed. The case of Robert and John Murray of New York in 1775 is instructive. These merchants carried on a brisk trade as direct dealers and commission agents. Early in the year a ship from London consigned to their firm arrived, and was berthed at New York. They began to break out the goods for delivery to consignees, but were secretly denounced to a secret conclave of the New York Branch of the Sons of Liberty, by a letter thrown into the meeting, demanding that Robert and James Murray should be driven from the Province owing to their landing goods in a clandestine manner at New York. Now it was obviously impossible in a small town swarming with spies and informers to unload a ship in a clandestine manner. But the firm quickly offered submission. They

> . . . regretted the imprudent and unjustifiable action they had taken, and promised, if they remained in the city, not to transact any trade or commerce whatsoever during the continuance of the Association, which will be a breach of the same, unless Congress should think fit to indulge them in that liberty; they were willing to deliver to other persons all consigned goods now in their possession and yield the profits of the commission.[1]

Their punishment seems to have been that all the goods still in hand were forfeited, while on those delivered to consignees they lost all profit or commission. In all probability the delinquents in this case, failing to satisfy the Sons of Liberty, would have, in addition to loss of all goods and exile, been tarred and feathered half a dozen times.

[1] Denis de Berdt to Lord Dartmouth, March 1775. Professor Hart, *American History told by Contemporaries*, ii. 470, gives a Tory recantation under the pressure of the Committee of Correspondence of Kent Co., Delaware. The number and personality of these Sons of Liberty are not much known; they were too cautious either to divulge their names or their proceedings; but cf. De Lancey's notes on Jones, i. p. 464 ff.

Mr. Burke was continually in correspondence with the New York Committee, keeping them well acquainted with occurrences and the set of opinion in England. But letter-writing was perilous. "I cannot write on political affairs," writes Henry Cruger to his son, "for fear of letters miscarrying"; Mr. Burke's correspondence with American admirers occasionally got astray; to him, however, a letter intercepted brought nothing but slight annoyance; to a Loyalist of the disaffected States a letter intercepted might bring insult, torture, confiscation, and exile. In its own way the condition of things was not unlike that of England in 1540. Men then felt, as Erasmus tells us, "as if a scorpion lay sleeping under every stone. . . . Friends who used to write, now send no letter, nor receive any from any one, and this through fear." Lieut.-Governor Colden complains to Lord Dartmouth that his letters are interfered with. Espionage pervaded every place.

Among the remarkable measures suggested by this first Continental Congress was a quite unanimous resolve to extinguish the Slave Trade; there should be no trading in slaves, no more importations of these human chattels. The irony of the situation is that these resolutions were supported by the tobacco squires of the South. It has been asserted that but for the opposition of the English Crown, the Colonists themselves would have abolished the slave traffic; that they expressed their wish to wipe out this commerce in human beings, but that their benevolent designs were disallowed by the powers at St. James's. The Virginian slave-owners had a few years before submitted a measure to the Home Government for the better control of the importation of slaves, lest they should become more numerous than required for labour. As a plurality of slaves was an encumbrance, the measure was recommended by Lord Dunmore as desirable.[1] All the

[1] A negro was burnt alive in Poughkeepsie on 28th January 1775, and on the Day of Independence being proclaimed, 4th July 1776, the newspapers contained the usual notifications of negroes for

whites lived in various degrees of terror on account of these imported blacks, who, coming direct from Africa, were savage, violent men, and filthy in their personal habits. Men in New York still talked of the outbreaks of slaves in 1712 and 1741, which had been suppressed by terrible punishments. Negroes were then burnt alive or broken on the wheel. Consequently a continued inflow of African negroes smuggled in American vessels quickly became a local, or even a national menace. For political and fiscal reasons the King was advised not to accede to the measure. A few years later saw the Virginian squires masters of their own economical policy. What then did they do? The emancipation of slaves is heard of no more. How revolting slaves were dealt with in the Southern States, some years later, may be gathered from the suppression of an outbreak known as "Nat Turner's Insurrection." Every negro concerned in it, together with many persons who were not, was hanged, shot, mutilated, or beheaded.[1]

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sale. But cf. *Dartmouth Papers*, *America*, pp. 5, 20, 74, 113. In Virginia a tax of 40s. a head for revenue was levied on imported slaves. Dunmore sent despatches to Hillsborough recommending some strong check on the importation of slaves (Record Office, *America and West Indies*, vol. ccx. fol. 91, p. 95).

[1] After the Federation of the States in 1789, and under the Presidency of Washington, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson, the latter two being active scribes in the drafting of the Declaration of Independence, of which Jefferson wrote the final draft, the importation of negroes increased by leaps and bounds. The Custom House Books of Charleston (S.C.) show that, from 1804 forward, in four years 38,775 slaves were landed in that port alone, of which 18,048 were brought in American ships and 19,649 in British ships, and the rest in French vessels. All the chief towns on the coast, except New York, contributed a quota to the American flotilla engaged in this Charleston traffic, which occupied 202 ships in all. Cf. *History of the Narragansett Church*, by Wilkins Updike, ch. viii., for a most interesting account of slavery in Rhode Island from a Report presented to the House of Representatives of Rhode Island in 1840, by the Hon. Elisha R. Potter.

News from Boston, April 23, 1775.

On Sunday morning, 23rd April, a confused account arrived from Boston of the skirmish at Lexington between a detachment of the King's troops and a part of the rebel army.[1]

So far Judge Jones. The excitement became intense; three well-known agitators with drums beating and colours flying, with a mob of negroes, sailors, boys, and pickpockets at their heels, marched through the chief thoroughfares calling upon mankind to take up arms in defence of the injured rights and liberties of America. After some noise and confusion of this kind they proceeded to turn out into the harbour the contents of a small ship chartered for Boston; which being done, they broke into the Arsenal in the City Hall, and getting hold of a thousand or so stand of arms, made preparations for future mischief. The populace was at liberty to do what it pleased,[2] the authorities being quite powerless to pursue any policy with vigour. Machiavelli is credited with saying that it is better either to let your enemies alone, or to smash them beyond all power of reprisal, for half-measures are usually a series of irritating blunders. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Province did nothing. He could do nothing. The Royal forces in New York amounted to 100 men of the Royal Irish Regiment, while a little

[1] "By four o'clock," adds Mr. C. K. Bolton, "a messenger was on his way to Philadelphia; about two o'clock of the 25th a second express from New England reached New York." It appears that in about three weeks after the little onfall at Lexington, the affair was known throughout all the Thirteen Colonies.

[2] The wrath of the people fell particularly on the Anglican places of worship. The petitions for the Royal family and for the High Court of Parliament in the P.B. gave great offence. They were directed to be discontinued. Consequently the churches in New York were closed. King's College came in for a full share of the popular fury. Jones says: A gang of fellows conspired to get hold of the Principal (Dr. Cooper), to slit his nose, cut off his ear, strip him, and send him adrift. A friendly student warned Cooper in time, who fled by a back outlet from his home in his sleeping gear, and sought safety in a man-of-war. This was a year before the Declaration of Independence. Cf. Colden to Lord Dartmouth, N.Y., 7th June 1775.

A South-east View of the City of New York, North America.

Drawn on the spot by Captain Thomas Howell of the Royal Artillery, and engraved by P. Canot.

sloop of war, the *Kingfisher*, lay in the bay. Colden wrote to Admiral Graves in February 1775, suggesting the wisdom of sending a large ship from Boston to New York. He pointed out that to keep the command of the Hudson River was essential for the maintenance of the British ascendancy; "it must be passed by the Southern people before they can join the Eastern," wrote he. H.M.S. *Asia* came into harbour three months afterwards—too late to be of service, other than to take off the wives and children of the troops. Shortly afterwards the hundred men of the Royal Irish were directed to shelter themselves in the *Asia*. As they were embarking the mob stopped the baggage carts and, in the face of the mayor, aldermen, and others, robbed the soldiers of their ammunition and all the spare arms of the detachment.

Yet New York after its hot fit turned a little chilly. General George Washington, on his way northward in the summer to take command of the Continental army at Cambridge, was welcomed with cautious formality. About this time the newly appointed Royal Governor, Tryon, was expected. Between these two potentates the local authorities were somewhat distracted.

When Washington was at Newark, on his way to Cambridge, it was thought prudent to send a few deputies over the Hudson to meet him, and show the best place for crossing the river. On the same day the Royal Governor, Tryon, was expected to arrive from Sandy Hook. He came up the harbour at one o'clock; one detachment of the County Militia was told off to do him honour; another detachment was sent to the ferry where Washington should reach the New York side; the residue of the battalion was "to be ready to meet either the General or Governor Tryon, whichever shall first arrive, and to wait on both as well as circumstances will allow." June 25, 1775.

It thus seems clear that in the Province of New York the country gentlemen and settlers were still loyal to the British connection. Many of them had estates originally acquired from Indian chiefs for trifling values, which by a century of careful management they had rendered delightful as residences and profitable to cultivate. Property of this origin was imperilled by revolutionary movements. The Provincial Government, therefore, held to the British Crown until the peremptory measures of the populace proving too strong for the squires, their hands were forced; there was no one to protect them;
1775. they did little to protect themselves. In October Governor Tryon was a refugee on board a British merchantman, under the guns of the *Asia*, and a little later the extemporised prisons were crowded with Loyalists. The Civil Governor's authority was obliterated. The municipal offices were in little better condition; the Patriots dominated New York.

The Tories' chief stronghold, however, was in rural New York, and that province with New Jersey and Pennsylvania furnished the larger part of the armed bodies of Loyalists. Among other things they signed loyal addresses of sympathy and approval to Lord Howe and Sir William Howe, affixing a thousand signatures of men of every sort and condition.[1] The British quitted New York at the end of the war, but the lists and the Loyalists remained. Patriots had thus to their hand a directory for the persecution of the "Enemies of their Country."

But, as Dr. Ellis says:

> The terms Tories, Loyalists, refugees, are burdened with a piteous record of wrongs and sufferings. . . . Insult, confiscation of property, and exile, were the penalties of those who bore these titles. Remembering that the most bitter words of

[1] Dated New York, 16th October 1776. All the names are given in Jones's *History of New York*, pp. 437 ff.

Washington that have come to us are those which express his scorn of Tories, we must at least look to find some plausible if not justifying ground for the Patriot party.[1]

[1] Ellis, in *Justin Winsor*, vii. p. 185 : As to the bitter words of Washington, it is reported that after the Battle of Monmouth 1778.
Court House he addressed Charles Lee in language of such lofty tone, that a General Officer, within hearing of the Father of his Country, could only say of him that he "swore like an angel." The actual terms are not reported.

# CHAPTER XIII

## SIR WILLIAM HOWE

WHEN Sir William Howe, with a vast fleet of ships of every class and tonnage, arrived, on 30th June 1776, off that remarkable configuration of land called Sandy Hook, the opportunity of his life had come. His brother, Viscount Richard, arrived on 12th July with a large fleet. The American Patriots would have accepted from these brothers severe punishment with more grace than from any other Englishmen. In America a glamour still attached to the name of Howe.

In Westminster Abbey, as many know, is a monument placed there by New England people, to George Lord Viscount Howe, "in testimony of his services and military virtues, and of the affection their officers and soldiers bore to his command." On that fatal day in July 1758, when Abercromby made his rash frontal attack on Ticonderoga in the early morning, almost at the very beginning of the onslaught Lord Howe was shot through the heart. Of him Wolfe had said he was the best officer in the King's service. With him had served Israel Putnam and Schuyler of the New York contingent of provincial troops. The attack against a fortification, strengthened by an *abatis* of trees in the ancient French or Gallic manner, failed, as it was bound to fail; but of all the losses on that miserable day Lord Howe's death was most keenly felt.

William Howe, brother of this beloved soldier, had behaved with exemplary courage and much skill
1759. in the operations about Quebec, and was not the

least conspicuous among the captains on parade in Montreal on that great day when the French grasp on the Canadas was finally shaken off. His elder brother Richard, the *Black Dick* of naval stories, afterwards Earl Howe, the victor in that memorable battle known for a century afterwards as the *Glorious First of June*, has left a name which is grouped with those of Rodney, Hood, Jervis, and Nelson.

There can be little doubt that as Sir William Howe was among the best academical generals of his day, he was also one of the idlest.

> An inert, pleasure-loving man, his sympathies were in a great measure with the Colonists, and he had not learnt the simple lesson, that however desirable compromise and conciliation may be, the lukewarm conduct of a war is the worst possible way in which to obtain them. More than one of his proceedings cannot be explained except on the theory that he dreaded a decisive victory. Some actions of his opponent (Washington) can hardly be explained unless we suppose he knew and counted on his (Howe's) weakness.[1]

Mr. Fortescue thinks that Howe having led or worked with American soldiers in 1759, had always a tender feeling for them; that his fundamental error was in endeavouring to make war with the arts of peace. Charles Stedman, a commissary in Howe's army, whose work on the Revolutionary War is among the classics on the subject, condemns Howe's actions as in many cases unintelligible. Mr. Lecky implies his astonishment that not a single attempt seems to have been made to break the American lines round Boston, and remarks that on Howe's succeeding Gage in command at Boston, the spirit of indecision and incapacity still presided over the British forces; Washington more than once expressed his strong surprise that Howe made no attempt to dislodge him. That Howe could have done so was commonly believed; his capacity in the field and his courage are equally beyond all doubt; whenever he took work

[1] J. A. Doyle, in *Cambridge Modern History*, vi. p. 211.

in hand seriously he was successful. He turned Washington out of Brooklyn, drove him from New York, captured Fort Washington (a very neat piece of military work), overthrew him at Brandywine, defeated him at Germantown, captured Philadelphia, and again and again had Washington in positions out of which escape was impossible, but then at the critical moment Howe's hands relaxed. Washington's escape over the Delaware, when Cornwallis was checked from hot pursuit by Howe's orders, is the pointed instance of the many incidents which caused Americans to think Howe their best friend.

Graydon, speaking as it were from the position of a company officer and a shrewd observer, says of Howe :

> It has been said we could not have chosen a better adversary than General Howe. It is not improbable that one more enterprising and less methodical would have pushed us harder, yet though he was indolent, often treated us with unnecessary respect, and in too great security of his prey might have meant to play us as an angler plays a fish upon a hook, I am still inclined to think, that when he acted he fought his army to advantage, that his dispositions were good and planned with much discretion.[1]

General Charles Lee, who had rarely a good word for any one, condescended to say of him, "In the capacity of an executive soldier Howe was all fire and activity, brave and cool as Julius Caesar."

If Howe was ever incapable, it was when undergoing reaction from drink and debauch. It is not true that he drank in excess of what men in his position considered fair and reasonable drinking, but his mornings must occasionally have been crapulous, his person wearied and flaccid from the previous night's violent indulgence. He was an inveterate gambler, in which pursuit, it has already been pointed out, he found a partner who for three years shared his counsels, his board, and his society. In Boston, as Americans were fond of saying, this British Antony found his Cleopatra. In her company

[1] Graydon, p. 218.

there is no question but that Howe wasted much of his time, his strength, his opportunities, and his fortune; his vacillations, his native inertness were accentuated by her baneful influence.

"This illustrious courtesan," says Judge Jones, "lost Sir William Howe the honour, the laurels, and the glory of putting an end to one of the most obstinate rebellions that ever existed."

If this be so, this daughter of America was among the best and truest of patriots.[1]

Many and vindictive were the judgments spoken and written about conduct, that to this day stands out from the common mass of the doings of that struggle, as quite enigmatical. Some doubted his capacity, others his zeal. Liberal-minded men excused him on the ground that he found women and wine and the faro table irresistible. It was said that his habits had precipitated his financial ruin at home, that he came as another Sallust or Caesar to a distant imperial province to repair his shattered fortunes. Graydon says that it was understood that he had an interest of an active kind in a big shop or store in New York. It was commonly asserted that Mr. Joshua Loring, the husband of Sir William's *maîtresse en titre*, shared his profits as commissary with her protector. The German officers Rahl, Donop, and Van Heister were reported to bandy about a saying that if the general were paid by the job and not by the day, the business had been settled very speedily. But Howe was also an ardent Whig, and a member of the Opposition. Being a candidate for Parliament at a General Election, in the course of his canvass 1774.

[1] Stedman's reasoned opinion about Howe is noticed at the close of Howe's career as general in America, i. p. 311. American opinion is summed up by Major-General George W. Callum, U.S.A., in *Winsor*, vi. p. 291 n.: "Every true American should be most profoundly grateful that this incompetent general was placed at the head of the British army, not on his own merits, but because of his connection with royalty through his grandmother's frailty: his mother was the issue of George 1st and Sophia Kilmansegg." This seems a harsh judgment so far as George III. is concerned.

he told his Nottingham constituents that under no circumstances would he serve against their fellow-countrymen in America; that were a command offered to him he would not scruple to decline the offer. It is a matter of common knowledge that things are said in the ardour of Parliamentary candidature that are dismissed from memory as soon as the poll is declared. But Nottingham did not understand the falsification of the solemn assurances of an officer and a gentleman, however great the stress of a contested election. When a command in America was offered Howe, he accepted at once. He soothed his conscience by making an idle inquiry whether the offer were of the nature of a request or a command. George the Third appreciated and would use a good officer, whatever his political complexion. Consequently the King, who was determined to subdue the revolting Colonies, chose the most able man to his hand for the execution of his project. But if so cautious a judge as Admiral Mahan hints in the comparative obscurity of a footnote that it was a bad thing for British naval prestige, that during this war Britain's leading sea officers—Keppel, Richard Howe, and Barrington—were all Whigs, it is no injustice to include, in a collateral application of this hint, General William Howe. On his return, after three years' absence (leaving on American shores Calypso inconsolable for the departure of her Ulysses), he was broken in reputation, an object of dislike and distrust to his fellow-countrymen, as one who was thought to have betrayed his country, and became the subject of innumerable assaults by the public and in Parliament, directed for the most part against his personal integrity.

False position of the Howes.

But Viscount Howe and his brother William were in a false position. Their instructions were to make peace if they could, and war if they must. The King, who really directed the early operations of the war, gave his officers instructions *parcere subjectis, debellare superbos*. Sir William Howe's first commission was to act as Commander-in-Chief of the

August 2, 1775.



RICHARD, EARL HOWE.

From the Painting by H. Singleton in the National Portrait Gallery.

Colonies on the Atlantic Ocean during General Gage's absence in England. In the following year he and his brother Richard were appointed Commissioners for inquiring into the state and condition of the Colonies and Plantations in North America, and for settling and composing the disorders that had of late prevailed among them. The King may have had reason to think that he had two capable men in his service kindly disposed towards the revolting people, yet wise enough to understand that the hand of steel beneath the glove of velvet must be vigorously used when prudence so directed. It was said that Viscount Howe being on excellent terms with Franklin, whom he warmly esteemed, had in a friendly way endeavoured, with Franklin's aid, to fashion terms of discussion as a basis of peace.[1] It was known that both the Howes stood well in the opinion and counsels of the High Whig party. That party was not anxious the King should succeed. His war was against them and their domineering pretensions as much as with the revolting Colonies. Consequently both the brothers were in a position, it was impossible for men of their mental capacity to maintain with integrity. Viscount Richard seems to have withdrawn from his share of the trust as soon as he reasonably and decently could. Sir William was too much of a *bon vivant* to be a match for the Americans, whose wits were sharpened by the reflection that, for them, submission to the British entailed political and social extinction. "If Britain cannot beat us," it was said, "she is not fit to rule us." The Patriots, while accepting this saying, were resolved neither to be beaten nor ruled. Consequently

[1] Franklin's kindly feeling towards Earl Howe survived all these alarms and stress of war. His last letter to Howe, 28th August 1784, is in a friendly tone. But, in fact, the sentiments of English society towards Franklin were always benevolent. The Royal Society, in honour of Captain Cook's discoveries, and in memory of his death, struck a gold medal, of which one copy was accepted by the King, another offered to Franklin. This interesting event took place, I think, in 1784.

the powers entrusted to the Howes were vitiated from the very first. As a matter of fact, the negotiations initiated by Viscount Richard and Sir William consisted for the most part of idle correspondence, of which one piece addressed to George Washington, Esq., offended that General mightily, as significant of the slighting attitude taken up by the British plenipotentiaries towards himself. It is hardly necessary to point out that in 1775 every high official in the services of the Crown was addressed as Esquire, unless he held a title of higher degree in the scale of Court precedence. Any Navy List of that period will furnish instances of the custom. Thus as late as 1787, in the case of the well-known trial of Captain Isaac Coffin, by court-martial at Halifax, in Nova Scotia, the commission is issued to Charles Sandys, Esq., Captain and President of the Court, by Herbert Sawyer, Esq., Rear-Admiral of the White and Commander-in-Chief, to try Isaac Coffin, Esq., Captain of His Majesty's ship *Thistle*. It is highly improbable that a gentleman of General Washington's birth and breeding could have been ignorant of this custom of the British service.[1] The offence, therefore, taken seems to show that offence was invited, and that the plenipotentiaries were regarded by Congress and the Patriots with such intense disfavour that even the imputed misdirection of a letter was adequate to fortify a *casus belli*.

The Atlantic Fleet in the Bay of New York, July 15, 1776.

But this polite interchange of views, by no one credited as sincere, took up much time, and meanwhile the whole British Atlantic Fleet was concentrated in New York Bay. Squadrons and groups of ships had been dropping in for some weeks. Captain Henry Duncan, commanding H.M.S. *Eagle*, was of that useful class who keep a Journal. He was Flag-

[1] Nelson's sailing orders, 1st October 1805, are issued, *inter alios*, to Edward J. King, Esq. Charles Lee, who always posed as an authority on all points military, used to talk of Mr. Burgoyne and Mr. Howe. Washington, in his early life, had been of the family of "Mr. Braddock," as it was customary to speak of Major-General Braddock in that way.




From *Atlantic Neptune*, by Des Barres, 1781.

Captain to Viscount Howe, and mentions his pleasant impression of the appearance of Long Island and Staten.

> The country appears to be beautiful; both sides show land well cleared, and only sufficiently wooded to enrich the prospect.

His ship of 60 guns finds, as she comes to anchor, many consorts, the *Asia*, the *Chatham*, the *Centurion*, the *Liverpool*, the *Greyhound*, the *Kingfisher*, the *Orpheus*, the *Merlin*, the *Brune*, the *Senegal*, with many others; finally, on 5th August, arrive the *Renown* and the *Flora*, vessels that had been charged from Halifax with convoy, of which, owing to heavy weather and false signals exhibited by the rebels, they had lost sight.

The army, too, in its degree, was equally imposing. It is quite useless, according to existing accessible information, to do more than suggest the numbers of Howe's army. The troops at his disposal fell little short of 40,000 men. Captain Duncan, assisting Commodore Hotham, transferred 15,000 men from Staten Island to Long Island in one day.[1] Two days later they ferry over Von Heister's division of Hessians, 4000 strong, and so on. Beatson gives the actual names and force of the British regiments engaged, together with details of all arms, his estimate of all combatants being 34,614. To these may be added Loyalist forces anxious to assist the royal troops. Howe's total army was about the same in fighting strength as that placed in the field at Waterloo to meet the Emperor Napoleon, and was much larger than that despatched to the Crimea in 1854. No such army had ever before been sent across the ocean, nor in comparison of the dangers, delays, and difficulties, both of transit and transport in those days, has any greater over-seas effort

August 7, 1776.

[1] Stedman, i. 191, enumerates the troops landed on Staten as two battalions of light infantry, and two of grenadiers, with the 4th, 5th, 10th, 17th, 22nd, 23rd, 27th, 35th, 38th, 40th, 42nd, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 52nd, 55th, 63rd, 64th Regiments of Foot; part of the 46th and 71st Regiments, and 17th Regiment of Light Dragoons.

been attempted since, by the British nation. The fleet is computed to have comprised 52 sail of the line, 27 smaller vessels, and 400 transports.

For five weeks this fine force was kept inactive, chiefly owing to delays on a point of punctilio as to how General Washington should be addressed, and whether some new form of superscription of letters to him should not be adopted. The former letter, addressed to George Washington, Esq., etc., having been rejected on the score of insufficient direction, the Howes sent another letter by a trusted friend (Colonel Paterson), addressed to George Washington, &c. &c. &c.—that is, as who should say whatever rank, dignity, style, or title you consider suitable to your official character. The delicate matter having been referred to Congress, then in session at Philadelphia, the amiable dalliance was kept up with some *pourparlers* about the treatment of British officers captured and in prison in Boston and elsewhere. It does not appear that General Howe,[1] commanding in chief, made any attempt personally to approach General Washington, also commanding in chief. Viscount Howe, on the other hand, did not for some weeks act on his commission. He was empowered to offer an amnesty on condition of a general submission by the rebels, before discussing terms of settlement. He seems to have thought it wise to await some staggering blow likely to induce Patriots to reckon resistance hopeless. The battle of Brooklyn and the capture of the American Generals Sullivan and Alexander Lord Stirling furnished his opportunity. After playing host to them at a handsome dinner on board his flagship (at which, as Duncan reports, their behaviour was coarse and insolent), he sent Sullivan to Philadelphia with verbal messages—there

[1] Note that Howe, after 23rd March 1776, held the rank in America of General: this was, among other reasons, necessary, as the Hessians were in command of Lieutenant-General Von Heister. Colonel Paterson's account of his interview with General Washington is in a paper dated 20th July 1776, Record Office, vol. 47, No. 227.

was to be a general pardon all round, with the express exception of Mr. Samuel Adams. Howe knew this condition, but thought it wise to say nothing about it.[1] Congress, against John Adams's own advice, and against the opinion of some of its most prudent members, selected by ballot three of its number to go to talk the matter over with the Howes. The ballot fell on John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Edward Rutledge. By the irony of events, Viscount Howe had in his pocket the death-warrant of John Adams's kinsman, while for Franklin there would have been, on absolute submission of the Patriots, scanty measure of mercy. Viscount Howe was as courteous and thoughtful in his reception and entertainment of these Commissioners as might be expected from a man of his quality. Mr. John Adams, from whose observant eye few subjects of gossip escaped, tells of the effective appearance of the troops lined up to present arms, of the handsome preparations for their entertainment; he notices the pattern of the carpet, the quality of the claret and of the mutton. But Viscount Howe having declined to treat with them as members of a National Congress, but rather to regard them as private gentlemen of known worth and influence, Mr. Adams emphatically refused to speak, except as the Commissioner of a sovereign and independent State; and affairs being thus at a deadlock, the four gentlemen might, for all practical purposes, as well have played whist. As Adams refused to be considered as a British subject, Howe might have arrested him as a rebel, for whom there could be no mercy. And so the farce ended.

Washington in New York.

These doings occupied a whole month, during which time General Washington, who had come down from Boston with the Patriot army, was in the full occupation of the province and city of New York. It may be inferred that in this interval Washington was

[1] Sir George Trevelyan, ii. 261, makes this statement: "Lord Howe's powers extended no further than the offer of a pardon; and from all hope of pardon the Privy Council had expressly excepted John Adams by name." Is this meant for Samuel Adams?

taking measures to harden and train his troops into something like a fighting machine, while on the other hand the city Patriots enjoyed, unchecked, a pastime of unwearying attractions, the baiting and bullying of Loyalists.

June 6, 1776. "Dear Brother," writes a Patriot, "we had some grand Torry riders in this city this week, and in particular yesterday. Some of them were handled very roughly, being carried through the streets on Rails, there cloaths tore from there backs, and there bodies pritty well mingled with the dust . . . there is hardly a Torry face to be seen this morning."

"The persecution of the Loyalists continues unremitted," says another, "many have been cruelly rode on Rails, a practice most painful, dangerous, and till now peculiar to the humane Republicans of New England."

But this part of the story may better be told in the words of Mr. Roosevelt:

> The lawyers, the pamphleteers, and newspaper writers, who contributed so largely to rouse the people, also too often joined to hound the populace into the committal of outrages. The mob broke into and plundered the houses of wealthy Loyalists, rode Tories on rails, tarred, feathered, and otherwise brutally maltreated them;

or in the words of Washington about his own troops:

> The abandoned and profligate part of our own Army, lost to every sense of honour and virtue, are by rapine and plunder spreading ruin and terror wherever they go.

One form of evening's amusement never palled. Soldiers and marauders, aided by vindictive and designing Patriots, marked down a quiet house for an evening's sport, and at the proper moment alarmed the occupants by a cry of fire. The water-supply of the city was then scanty, and in some parts of the town almost inaccessible, and so continued for fifty years afterwards. Thus any suggestion of fire in a house excited blind terror. People came flying out of their houses in wild panic, leaving the contents of their homes at the mercy of a cruel and thievish mob, who frequently completed their

merciless assault by setting fire to the premises. Washington, unable to prevent these nightly horrors, could only complain of them.[1] There can be no doubt that he and his subordinate officers, Putnam and Mifflin, did what they could to check these atrocities; but as their powers were limited by Congress, the usual military resource of a whiff of shot to quell rioters was not at their disposal. In later years Washington was, amidst thunders of applause, inaugurated as First President of the United States in Wall Street, on the very spot where the new Treasury now stands; but in 1776 it is quite certain that thousands of New Yorkers were glad, on his quitting the city in the autumn, to see the last of him. Himself had said that the mob and his own men were infinitely more to be dreaded by the people he came to protect, than the common enemy he came to oppose. Congress went on issuing chilly proclamations deprecating these assaults on the "enemies of their country," the Loyalists; but the mob, rightly apprehending the inner sense of these documents to be of the don't-nail-his-ears-to-the-pump order, none the less continued their outrages.

The Howes in August finally resolved on active measures, and Sir William Howe, with his splendid army nearly 40,000 strong, began his campaign on Long Island. Captain Duncan says that whenever the British came they were welcomed by the inhabitants with effusions of joy.[2] He himself on Staten Island was the object of embarrassing rejoicings; the loyal inhabitants hoisted him on their shoulders amidst hearty cheers. When he brought over the British troops to Long Island, more than a thousand men, farmers and proprietors, were waiting on the beach to cordially greet the British. The Reign of Terror had made them understand that they had more to fear from the Patriots than

August 22, 1776.

[1] Judge Jones, however, impeaches Washington for his approval of outrages on Loyalists; cf. above, Chapter I. p. 40.

[2] "Journal" of Captain Henry Duncan in *A Naval Miscellany*, Transactions of the Navy Records Society.

from any other quarter. The Hessians and the Guards had arrived from England in excellent health. Only nineteen men of the whole force had been lost on the voyage.[1] The Earl of Dunmore and Lord William Campbell, having arrived from the South, contributed to the gaiety of the General's suite, while Clinton and Cornwallis added to the military ability at the General's disposal. Sir Peter Parker, with Commodore Hotham, joined the naval suite of Viscount Richard Howe.

On the 22nd of August the dance began. The sequel of events is described by Ambrose Serle, by Commissary Charles Stedman, by Sergeant-Major Lamb, and many others, who either were under fire or related what passed under their observation.

The American troops under the command of General Putnam were encamped and strongly fortified at Brookland (Brooklyn).[2] In front of their position ran a range of hills, well timbered and adapted for bush fighting. These were also occupied by the Americans under the command of General Alexander (commonly called Lord Stirling) and General Sullivan. There is a dip in the hills, forming a pass, to the left front of which lay the village of Flatbush. Of their numbers there are irreconcilable estimates and accounts. They seem to vary with the antipathies or sympathies of the reporters. Judge Jones estimates the Rebels at 45,000 half-clothed, undisciplined fellows, of whom the most part were mere militiamen—"a hat and a coat and a stick in the middle"; while Sir George Trevelyan estimates the Patriot army at 8000. Washington's own report on the field state of his army on the 26th of August puts the total at about 20,000, of whom about

[1] Howe's Despatches, 15th August 1776.

[2] Israel Putnam was a fine old chip of the American block, but not overburdened with brains. As a man advanced in years, he was placed over Sullivan as much to keep that enterprising officer in order as for any other purpose. Sullivan, like Burgoyne and Charles Lee, wielded the goose-quill with more success than he did the sword. All these three literary generals had the distinction of being captured by their enemies in the course of this war.

PLAN of NEW YORK ISLAND with part of LONG ISLAND, STATEN ISLAND & EAST NEW JERSEY, with a particular Description of the ENGAGEMENT on the Woody Heights of Long Island between FLATBUSH and BROOKLYN, on the 27th of August 1776. between HIS MAJESTY'S FORCES Commanded by General HOWE and &c. AMERICANS under Major General PUTNAM. Drawn by the Landing Place at New York Island and the Village of the City of New York on the Island of Nutten Island and the Adjacent Country of both the Armies.

Published by Faden, 1777.

# LONG ISLAND

August 27, 1776




Scale of Miles

1 0 1 2 3

British

Americans

*Stanford's Geog.l Estab.t, London*

London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd.

*Chiefly from Stedman's account.*

Battle of Brooklland (Brooklyn), or of Long Island.

one-third were non-effective through sickness. Allowance being made for the retention of men to defend the city of New York from attack should any attempt be made from Staten Island, perhaps the American force amounted to 10,000 men, of whom half were now despatched to occupy the hills in front and give as much trouble as possible. But Sir William Howe defeated the Americans with the precision of a master; using the classic frontal attack as a mere feint, he executed the equally classic flank movement with a clockwork regularity. Crumpling up the foe like a piece of paper, he captured three generals, ten field-officers, eighteen captains, forty-three lieutenants, with other details, and 1006 rank and file, together with thirty-two field-pieces. Of the slain, the total remains uncertain. Of the Americans, the loss was much deplored of the Maryland battalion, which, consisting of five companies from Baltimore, was wiped out. According to the field report, the British force lost five officers killed, among whom was Lieutenant-Colonel Grant of the 10th Regiment, three sergeants, and fifty-three rank and file; while of the wounded there were 256, inclusive of Lieutenant-Colonel Monckton, 45th Regiment. Among the Hessian troops there were two casualties. The disablement of about one-fiftieth of his whole force left Sir Willam Howe in a highly advantageous position to complete the day's work by capturing the fortifications at Brooklyn, and thus breaking up the American army. During the day Washington had crossed from New York with three regiments to reinforce Putnam. He took command, and did what was possible to strengthen the entrenchments that were now crowded with disheartened and beaten men, whose first experience of warfare was that of being out-generalled, out-manœuvred, and out-classed.[1] On the night of the 27th the weather

[1] Major-General Callum, U.S.A., rightly thinks the battle of Long Island quite unnecessary. When Washington had committed the blunder of sending 10,000 men across the water, the British admiral had these troops, so to speak, in the palm of his hand. There

broke, the red, angry sun of the morning had presaged heavy wind and rain. It rained in torrents, every firelock became useless, cartridges were turned into pulp; every trench became a little canal of dirty water, through which the miserable defenders had to wade, with a strong north-easter blowing their heads off.

Sir William Howe's staff urged him to complete the victory by an attack on the entrenchments. Clinton, Cornwallis, Grant, Vaughan, all who had shared the day's burden and triumphs with him, respectfully represented to him how easy it would be to capture the remainder of the American force. But Howe demurred; enough had been done for one day, said he. Let well alone was his motto. Nelson, in a certain affair in which he was subordinate to Hotham, said he considered no victory won as long as there was anything left to capture that might be captured.[1] But Howe was of a different stamp.

It has become a fixed idea, repeated by English and American writers, that Howe was, after his experience of Bunker Hill, afraid of frontal attacks, and especially of the deadly fire of the American rifle at that engagement. But at that date, as mentioned above, the rifle is said to have been unknown in New England, and unused in the eastern districts of other Colonies. On 14th June 1775, Congress resolved that six companies of expert riflemen be immediately raised in Pennsylvania, two in Maryland, and two in Virginia; that each company join the army near Boston, and be there employed as light infantry. It is thus more than probable that not one rifle was in Patriotic hands at Bunker Hill. The rifle was, at least, known to the British army in 1680. Mr. Hans Busk says that in that year eight rifled carbines were issued to every troop of household cavalry. Mr. Beaufoy,

June 1775.

was no difficulty in navigating up the East River that Captain Henry Duncan did not shortly afterwards overcome in Lord Howe's flagship the *Eagle*.

[1] Nil actum reputans dum quid superesset agendum.

writing in 1808, says no one knows the early history of the rifle. His book on rifled guns was dedicated to Lord Moira, whose services, when in the Carolinas, against General Greene had rendered him experienced in the use of this arm. Major Ferguson, 1776, had made before Lord Amherst and other high officers experiments with an improved rifle which "astonished all beholders." The British officers in America rapidly organised rifle companies, of which, at the battle of the Bronx, the practice was much admired. Sergeant Lamb, a combatant in the campaign in which Major Ferguson was killed, adopts Ramsay's statement that at the battle of King's Mountain,

> . . . riflemen took off riflemen with such exactness that they killed each other when taking sight, so instantaneously that their eyes remained after they were dead, one shut and the other open, in the usual manner of marksmen when levelling at their object.[1]

Moreover, during the torrents of rain on those days the smartest of backwoodsmen would have found it next to impossible to prime his gun without getting his powder wet; consequently, it is morally certain the entrenchments could have been carried at the point of the bayonet.[2]

Strictures on Sir William Howe.

There is overwhelming evidence that contemporary opinion, both in America and in British ranks, severely censured Howe.

"It is to be lamented," says Charles Stedman, "that the advantages (of the victory) were not pursued, for in the confusion into which the enemy were thrown by the rapid march of the English army, a most decisive victory would have accrued to the British arms. The works of the enemy

[1] Lamb, *Journal of the American War*, p. 308. The 63rd Regiment is said to have shown excellence in the use of the rifle.

[2] Stedman, i. 195; cf. also Gordon (edition 1788), ii. 313. Report of the Council of War held in Washington's lines: "The heavy rains which have fallen two days and nights with but little intermission have injured the arms, and spoilt a great part of the ammunition, and the soldiers, being without cover and obliged to lie in their lines, are worn out."

could not have resisted the attack; it might have been made by that part of the army under Sir William Howe which had not been engaged."

General Putnam wrote to the Governor of Connecticut on 12th September 1776:

> General Howe is either our friend or no general. He had our whole army in his power at Long Island, yet suffered us to escape without the least interruption; not only to escape, but to bring off our wounded, our stores, and our artillery. . . . Had he followed up his victory the consequence to the cause of liberty must have been dreadful.[1]

There is much more to the same effect in the current journalism and letter-writing.

While matters were proceeding thus on land, the north-easter is alleged to have prevented Viscount Howe from lending an effective hand along the East River. Had the customary summer wind from the south-west set in, the East River would have been covered with men-of-war, and notwithstanding Sir William Howe's delays, not a man of the American army could have escaped. Attempts were made by some ships to beat up against the wind, but the little ground gained was lost on the next ebb, which runs strong down the East River. But onlookers declared that the ships might have run up on the flood, and anchored in commanding positions.[2]

Lord Richard Howe was subsequently severely

[1] Cf. Jones, *History of New York during Revolutionary War*, i. 119.

[2] From the anchorage off-shore at Staten Island, Howe was distant from Red Hook battery (say) two miles, from Red Hook to north-eastern corner of Governor's Island (say) one mile, and from this point to Brooklyn Ferry one mile. "The squadron of five ships," says Lord Howe, "could not be moved up because of the adverse wind." The officer in command could have box-hauled the ships. Tens of thousands of colliers have come up the Thames on the flood tide with adverse winds, by a very simple setting of sail — a top sail, a topmast stay-sail, and a spanker. Duncan brought the *Eagle* (64) over the ground next day, but one. Cf. *A Naval Miscellany*, p. 126.

censured for his inertness on this critical occasion. His defence was:

On August 27th, 1776, I gave Sir Peter Parker directions for proceeding higher up in the channel towards the town of New York next morning with the *Asia*, the *Roebuck*, the *Renown*, the *Preston*, the *Repulse*, and to keep those ships in readiness as occasion might require, but the wind veering to the northward soon after daybreak, the ships could not be moved up to the distance proposed; therefore, when the left column of the army were seen to be engaged with the enemy that morning, the *Roebuck*, Captain Hammond, leading the detached squadron, was the only ship that could fetch high enough to the northward to exchange a few random shot with the battery on Red Hook, and the ebb making strongly down the river soon after, I made the signal for the squadron to anchor.

The retort was and is that there had been a fair wind for some days before, of which the Admiral had taken no advantage, and that in any case the squadron might have advanced on the flood-tides, anchored during the ebbs, and so made the four miles required. It was firmly believed that Viscount Richard Howe had no goodwill for the commission he had undertaken, and it was stated that the Loyalists from that time forward to the date of his final departure despaired of the British interests in America. It was at least in the words of his critics:

An unhoped salvation to the rebels, who had had nothing before them but instant death or captivity; it gave the rebels an opening into the whole future conduct of the British Commanders, and confirmed the rebellion.

During this downpouring of rain for some two days, Washington was enabled to mature his plans for extricating his little army from its network of danger. He knew that should the wind change both himself and the cause were ruined.[1] Already a ship

[1] Washington seems to have had a shrewd suspicion the Howes were not sincere. Had the wind changed the last palliative of the Admiral's policy had then vanished. "The

of smaller tonnage (the *Roebuck*) had got within range of a redoubt, somewhat to the south-west of his position at Brooklyn, and had knocked the place to pieces. The whole fate of America seemed dependent in those two days. But the north-east wind and Sir William Howe saved the situation. Undisturbed by an army that lay within random shot of his lines, and unheard by ears that were more than obliging, the American General got everything away with absolute impunity. When everything had been moved, down to a glass of rum, the British pickets placidly strolled in and fired a few shots at the retreating rearguard. Stedman says no one was hurt. Captain Duncan, however, reports:

> Some of the rebels, not knowing of the precipitate flight of the others, were overtaken by our people, by the time they got into their boats and received a heavy fire from them, which the General believed did considerable execution. This evening we with some of the ships moved up within random shot of the town.

It was noticed by the Americans that although the wind blew clear and strong on that fateful night, yet towards morning, as the day broke, the wind fell, and a fog came up from the river, obscuring and deadening both sight and sound. The fog hung about Brooklyn, all was clear on the New York side.

The day after Washington's escape with his army over the mile-wide ferry from Brooklyn to New York, Captain Henry Duncan, in the *Eagle*, came up and lay right across the line of the Patriots' retreat. The wind had changed to south-west.

Having thus captured some undefended fences and water-logged trenches, Sir William Howe seems to

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retreat," says Stedman, i. 197, "was effected in thirteen hours, though nine thousand men had to pass over the river; besides field artillery, ammunition, provisions, horses, and carts." Dr. Ramsay says some heavy cannon were left behind. He states that the British were within 600 yards of the operation.—David Ramsay, M.D., of South Carolina, *History of American Revolution*, edition 1791.

have thought enough had been done for the present, while Viscount Howe having complete command of the waterways remained inactive. Thus as neither of the brothers did anything to prevent the Patriots from removing from Governor's Island the men and materials that lay impounded and helpless after the American defeat at Brooklyn, it is presumable that neither of them was desirous of pressing their enemy beyond very moderate limits of coercion.[1] The Hessians occupied Governor's Island on the 2nd September.

It is pathetic in the light of these events to read a paragraph of Lord North's letter to General Howe: June 25, 1776.

> I will now take leave of you with my most hearty wishes for your success. War and peace, the honour and happiness of Great Britain and British America are entrusted to Lord Howe and to you, and never were such great concerns placed in better hands. We know that the justice of British arms will be maintained, and that if tranquillity is restored to America, it will be in such a manner as to do credit to all those who are concerned in it.

What, then, were the Howes' real incentives for jeopardising the King's sovereignty in America, as they undoubtedly did at this juncture? Were they merely tools of the most factious of all oppositions? In later days, when both of them were at the bar of English opinion for their ruinous conduct of the immense interests entrusted to them, there were dark hints about diplomatic motives and secret instructions which swayed the brothers in spite of all directions given in public official documents.

Stedman is charged with an animosity amounting to prejudice against Sir William Howe because of his adverse criticism of the General's conduct. His

[1] Governor's Island, on which were two regiments, was evacuated, likewise. "The Americans finished the removal of their military stores from thence, and took everything off but a few pieces of cannon; notwithstanding, the ships of war lay within a quarter of a mile of some part of it."—Gordon, *History of the American Revolution*, p. 316.

strictures on the escape from Brooklyn are surely not unreasonable. They amount to this:

Stedman's strictures.

> Had two, or even one frigate moored as high up as Red Hook as the *Phœnix* and *Rose* men-of-war had done before, the one carrying forty guns and the other twenty-eight, the retreat of the Americans would have been cut off completely: and, indeed, so decided were the Americans themselves in this opinion that had only a single frigate been stationed in the East River, they must have surrendered at discretion. It is to be observed that in the very same boats in which the Americans crossed from New York to Long Island, they recrossed after their defeat from Long Island to New York, the boats having lain for three days on the Long Island shore in readiness to carry them off. Now it is evident that this small craft by the above precautions might have been effectually destroyed.
>
> In reviewing the actions of men the historian is often at a loss to conjecture the secret causes that have given them birth. It cannot be denied that the American army lay almost entirely at the will of the English. That they were, therefore, suffered to retire in safety, has by some been attributed to the reluctance of the Commander-in-Chief to shed the blood of a people so nearly allied to that source from whence he derived all his authority and power. He might possibly have conceived that the late victory would produce a revolution in sentiment capable of terminating the war without the extremity which appeared to be, beyond all possibility of doubt, in his power to enforce.

This passage is remarkable for its moderation of tone, and for the kindly apology for Sir William Howe's behaviour. In fact, Stedman urges in extenuation of the General that humane counsels guided him to let his enemies escape from a trap in which their own mismanagement and his tactics had entangled them.

After a fortnight's picnicking in that most pleasant and comfortable of bivouacs, amidst plenty and to spare of good beef and beer, with farmers anxious to sell and commissaries ready to buy, the troops began to move. They marched leisurely up the coast road for a mile or two, and then, under cover of a pounding

fire from five men-of-war, crossed and disembarked on the Island of New York (Manhattan) without a casualty. The line of crossing would seem to have been that of the Pennsylvania railway tunnels.

General Nathaniel Greene, writing to a friend, describes the subsequent course of events in which he took some part:

> We made a miserable disorderly retreat from New York owing to the disorderly conduct of the militia, who ran at the appearance of the enemy's advance guard: this was General Fellows' brigade. They struck a panic into the troops in the rear, and Fellows' and Pearson's whole brigade ran away from about fifty men, and left his Excellency on the ground within eighty yards of the enemy. So vexed was he at the infamous conduct of the troops, that he sought death rather than life.[1] The retreat was on the 14th of this instant; from New York most of the troops got off, but we lost a prodigious deal of baggage.

His Excellency's behaviour was characteristic. He rode in among the fugitives, laid his cane over the officers' backs, beat the privates with the flat of his sword, damned them all for cowardly rascals, and was so blind with rage that had not one of his own *family* grasped the bridle of his horse and sent him in a different direction Washington had ridden right in among the British. Cowardice or poltroonery seems to have been the one thing that invariably caused the Father of his country to lose his usual self-control.[2]

All the ground of these historic skirmishes is now covered by buildings, for the little city of those days did not comprise much ground north of Thirty-Fourth Street. A march of a mile or two across Manhattan Island to the Hudson River, directed with that military skill of which Howe was an undoubted master, would have imprisoned and captured Israel Putnam and four

[1] Greene to Governor Cooke, R.I., 17th September 1776.

[2] "Though the British did not exceed sixty, he (Washington) could not prevail on a superior force to withstand their ground, and face that inconsiderable number."—Ramsay, *History of the Revolution*, i. 306.

thousand men. But General Howe, according to the popular story, had accepted an invitation to lunch. Mrs. Murray, whose son Lindley subsequently wrote for British youth the English grammar of our grandsires, kept open house for Sir William and his staff. Here he delayed for hours; his divisional troops presumably were marking time somewhere outside the Murray mansion, while other British troops awaited orders on the farther side of the park. Meanwhile Putnam with his men escaped northward along the skirts of the Central Park. Mrs. Murray's house could not have contained every officer of rank in the British force, and it is quite incredible that Percy and Clinton and Cornwallis and Vaughan, or any of them, were hoodwinked by such a device; Mr. Fiske, however, seems to think Mrs. Murray saved the situation.

> Had Howe now thrown his men promptly across the line of Thirty-Fourth Street, he would have cut off Putnam's retreat from the city. But what the New England brigades failed to do a bright woman succeeded in accomplishing. . . . She sent out a servant to invite Howe to stop and take luncheon.

The British Commander's conduct is so unintelligible, unless on grounds highly uncomplimentary to his loyalty, that fairy tales hang round his adventures.

It is certain that Byng was shot twenty years before for failures and defaults less important, less mischievous. Byng was shot not for cowardice, nor for treachery, but for an error of judgment, and for insufficient activity. He had not done his best, it was decided, to deliver Minorca from the French.

Sir William Howe was now in complete possession of New York, which remained in British hands for the next seven years. A week after the occupation, the town was set on fire. This famous conflagration, common report at the time traced to a den of prostitutes and waterside characters near the Old Wharf;[1]

The Great Fire of New York.

[1] "The fire broke out at a dram-shop, close in with the waterside on Whitehall Slip, about one o'clock in the morning."—Gordon, ii. 330.

but the fire seems to have been carefully planned. Washington had sent to Congress a reasoned despatch, of which the conclusions were it would be good policy to fire the city. Many members of his *family* or staff were of the same mind. General Greene's advice was to reduce the city and neighbourhood to ashes.[1] Jay, the Livingstons, Morris, and others, the leaders of the Patriotic party, supported this proposition, as far as the bulk of property in New York belonged to the Tories; it was only right, men said, to burn out such vermin. An eyewitness of unimpeachable integrity describes the scene.

"This morning, about one of the clock," writes Captain Henry Duncan, "the officer of the watch called me, and gave information of a house in New York being on fire. I immediately went on deck, observed the fire to spread, and saw the fire *break out at several points in the city*, sent several boats on shore to the assistance of the place, made the signal for all lieutenants, and ordered boats from each ship for the same purpose. It was evident from many circumstances that the city was maliciously set on fire, by the fires breaking out at different places at the same time, from lathwood split in small slips tarred and brimstoned, with tow and all manner of combustibles being placed in different parts of the city. Several people were taken up against whom proof seemed very plain. These the soldiers, sailors, and mob immediately put to death; many others, perhaps thirty or forty, were put in jail on suspicion. The fire was out by the evening, loss estimated from one-third to one-sixth of the city. Wind shifted from west and slacked off during the fire."[2] September 21, 1776.

[1] Greene sent a private letter in this sense to Washington, 5th September 1776; cf. also Jones, i. 613.

[2] Captain Henry Duncan's *Journal* was edited for the Navy Record Society in 1905 by Sir John Knox Laughton. Stedman's account of the fire, published in 1794, agrees substantially with Captain Duncan's.

There are numerous accounts of the fire collected in Frank Moore's *Diary*, i. 311, etc.

Captain B. James's *Diary* (N.R. Society, vi.) reports: "September 29th, about eleven o'clock, the town of New York was set on fire by the rebels, and one-fourth of it burnt to the ground." Captain James seems to have posted up his *Diary* at intervals. "29th September" may be a lapse of memory.

Captain Duncan complains of the water-supply. Sixty years afterwards it was said, "that perhaps in the Union, there was not a city so destitute of the blessings of good water as New York." In 1776 there was but one pump that supplied water of quality fine enough to make tea, hence its name of the Tea Water Pump. In some parts of the town potable water was sold at one penny a gallon. The fire consequently was got under by means always used when water fails. From the other side of the Hudson, looking on, like Captain Duncan from the deck of the *Eagle*, the Patriots saw their town ablaze, and when the steeple of Trinity Church fell they set up a loud Hurrah. But whether the conflagration was sanctioned by Congress or not will not now be known, for "this will be conceded by all, that if it had been destroyed by Congress, it would not have been avowed at the time and probably never afterwards."

Captain Joseph Henry saw the fire from the deck of a ship. He was afterwards a judge in Pennsylvania. His evidence corroborates that of Captain Henry Duncan. He says:

> It was not till some years afterwards that a doubt was created, but for the honour of our country and its good name, an ascription was made of the firing of the city to accidental circumstances. It may be well that a nation in the heat and turbulence of war should endeavour to promote its interests by the propagation of reports of its own innocency and prowess, and accusing its enemy of flagrant enormity and dastardliness; but when peace comes, let us in God's name do justice to them and ourselves . . . as the fact occurred within my own view; the eloquence of Cicero could not convince me that the firing was accidental.

The flames consumed the ancient church of the Trinity, Wall Street, and all that part of the city which lies down contiguous to the Battery.

The British being now in the possession of New York, into which they entered, as Mr. Lecky points out, more as deliverers than conquerors, the loyal

inhabitants of Long Island and of the city, after exposure to the capricious tyranny of mob rule for many years, breathed once more in comparative freedom. The New Yorkers attributed the burning of their city to New England incendiaries, whom they accused of attempting to destroy their city as an act of vindictive hatred. A similar charge against New Englanders in connection with the burning of the village of White Plains was made later in the year.[1]

Meanwhile General Washington withdrew to a chain of heights close to the Harlem, keeping that river on his left rear.

Here he resolved to make a stand, if only his troops would behave with "tolerable bravery." A little engagement, sometimes referred to as the battle of Harlem Heights, highly creditable to the troops on both sides, took place. It had little appreciable effect on the course of the campaign, but seems to have assisted the Patriot army to recover somewhat of its confidence and self-respect. The poltroonery of the day before had lowered the *morale* of Washington's men, while the behaviour of the British, never backward in this particular, had increased in arrogance, for the British buglers blew the call familiar to fox-hunters when a fox has run to earth. In this action Washington, for the first time in this war, found his opportunity as a tactician, and the British once more showed how they muddle into trouble, and muddle out again with

[1] The animosity of the Middle States (New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania) towards the men of New England was so great that it was commonly reported they would sooner fight them than fight the enemy. "The infamous and cruel ravages which have been made on the wretched distressed inhabitants of this unfortunate island (N.Y.), by many of our soldiers, must disgrace and expose our army to detestation"; cf. Gordon, ii. 332; also General Joseph Reed's correspondence in a letter, dated 4th July 1776; and Graydon's *Memoirs*, p. 193. The outrages were imputed to the New England troops, and especially to their officers. Graydon is scrupulous to add that the New Englanders had better men to send as officers if they would but take the trouble.

needless and useless loss of life, through their contempt of an enemy.

The Patriot officers did wonders; they persuaded some of their men, by flat of sword and toe of boot, that a fighting man's duty is to fight. A little poltroonery seems to be incidental to the apprenticeship of arms. Washington was intensely pleased with this skirmish. Next day, in his well-known and modest style, he expressed approbation of his troops.[1]

Another interval of four weeks elapsed. Sir William Howe was enjoying himself in New York; a series of dinners and entertainments occupied his best energies. When in the House of Commons, three years later, he was called upon to account for his supineness on this as on other occasions, during his conduct of this campaign, he mentioned obstacles that men of the stamp of George Howe, James Wolfe, or Guy Carleton would have considered a part of the ordinary difficulties of a responsible position. His apology for himself convinced no one. He spoke of himself as moving in a country of quagmires, morasses, and bush-covered land full of devious and dangerous places. Other writers describe Westchester County, thus slightingly portrayed, as being settled country, easily traversed in any direction, with well-furnished homesteads at regular intervals; homes of the old Colonial style with white walls and green shutters, and four sturdy timber pillars supporting the stoop on the front of the house. The time of the campaign was during that beautiful fall of the year known as the Indian summer, when for a week or two the splendid colours of foliage and sky are in their maturity. Westchester County to this day presents the accustomed marks of the old Colonial life. The traveller going northward from New York, passing the flourishing town of White

[1] In a letter to Major-General Gates. The Americans engaged on this occasion are said to have been the same men that ran away the day before, following the lead of their officers; but reflection seems to have made the officers repent and reform themselves.

Plains, observes on either side of him for some seventy or eighty miles evidence of the many generations of settled life. The village of White Plains is now almost included in the outer suburbs of New York, twelve miles or so from the city. To this flourishing pastoral and agricultural society, quite contented with the British connection, not wishing for change, not likely to consider any change an improvement, the British army was welcome. It is difficult to imagine a country offering more and pleasanter facilities for the campaign of an irresistible force than did Westchester County as described by travellers of that period.

The British troops brought by the fleet up the East River, through difficulties Captain Duncan describes, were landed at points from which a demonstration could be made to the rear of the strong defensive position which the four weeks' delay had allowed Washington to construct along the line of the Harlem. Both the Generals knew, what indeed was obvious to the newest recruit, that whoever commanded the waterway between New York and Albany could sever in twain the revolted Colonies, could keep apart New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and all the North-Eastern land, from the Jerseys, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and the South. To prevent the line of the Hudson falling into the hands of the British there had been constructed two forts—Fort Washington on the New York side and Fort Lee on the New Jersey side of the Hudson—in the expectation that their fire range would sink any ship attempting the river. This precaution proved vain, for two frigates passed both forts without serious loss. In fact the *Phoenix*, the *Tartar*, and the *Roebuck* appear to have moved about the Hudson at pleasure. This being so, and to avoid being trapped in the island of New York, the American General determined to retire into the interior towards the White Plains. Sir William Howe followed his adversary in a leisurely style, getting over about twelve miles of ground between October

1776. 18th and 28th. After some preliminary movements, the British army found itself in a position with the Bronx River on its left front, and opposite to the entrenchments constructed by Washington about two miles to the south of White Plains. On the left front of the British, and posted on the summit of a long ascent, lay a force of 4000 Americans, somewhat out of touch with the main American army, as the Bronx, a rapid and deep stream, flowed between this division and the rest of Washington's force. The hill was called Chesterton's Hill.

Battle of the Bronx.

Howe directed his second brigade (Leslie's), consisting of the 5th, 28th, 35th, and 49th Regiments, with a battalion of Hessians and a few dragoons, to dislodge the American force.

This order was executed at once, and within sight of Washington and his staff the British troops occupied the hill, while the Americans fled to their own lines. Two days elapsed, but nothing more was done. Again occurred one of the many unaccountable delays of this extraordinary campaign.

Howe remained in his tents with his Briseis, and left unaccomplished the object for which tens of thousands of men had made a most painful and perilous voyage, and millions of money already had been expended. He afterwards alleged that his instructions were of such a kind that he thought it wiser policy not to press Washington to extremes; and pleaded in his personal defence that had he proceeded to a great severity in prosecution of the war, he would not have retained the consistent and steady support of Ministers, who would have thrown him over in response to a popular cry. He had no instructions to prosecute the war with vigour.[1] He appears to think that the House

[1] This statement, in view of Lord North's letter to him, and the full confidence in his judgment and integrity expressed by Lord North, is not intelligible. But his excuses for himself, and those made by Lord Cornwallis on his behalf, excited both in America and in Great Britain a notion that he never intended to bring

of Commons and posterity would accept this defence, that he was to go and play at soldiers with the largest army, the largest expenditure, this nation had ever authorised; that this most costly and man-consuming undertaking was mere parade and glitter. It was, of course, left to his discretion to settle what, under current circumstances, should be done with a view to the permanent success of the expedition. In fact, the lapse of time involved in the sending of messages to and from New York to Saint James's would have entailed such a ruinous waste of money and men that Howe's instructions could not be otherwise drawn than in the most general terms. There is overwhelming evidence to show that Howe and his brother Viscount Richard, by their policy, filled every one of their own side, except the adherents and myrmidons of Fox, Richmond, and the little Englanders, with either disgust or disappointment or dismay. The rage and terror of the American Loyalists, the breaking down of their well-grounded expectations, the grinding to powder of their reasonable hopes, the contumely visited upon them by Howe's commissaries, the plundering of their goods by his agents, the insulting behaviour of the younger commissioned officers towards the Loyalist yeomen and farmers of Long Island, Westchester, and the Jerseys, are indescribable. Mr. Jones, in his well-known book, tells the tale of a heart-sick man—of a man highly placed, devoted to King and Parliament, a man of strong convictions, and of a passionate nature, not too much under control. It is impossible to read his pages, while making all due allowance for a mind overwrought by disappointments, losses, and exile, without retaining a sense of the weight of his indictment of the Howes. Of the sentiments of the Ministry, and of the English people, it is needless to speak. Fox, in his perversity, expressed himself disgusted with the success of the

the war to a close by military means: an idea that was certainly entertained in the Netherlands, especially in Brussels, at the same time.

British army in Long Island, and like Byron and Wordsworth at the news of the victory of Waterloo, hung down his head whenever the British arms were crowned with success; but with such sons as these, the *enfants terribles* of the British family, this country has for many generations had to reckon. It is rarely that men of this kind have the ear of a commander-in-chief, or can in any degree control his hands. But it was thought and asserted at the time, that the Howes used their power to aggrandise their own political party, which was the party of the great nobles of these realms. The great Whig houses, after the final overthrow of the Jacobites, had been inclined to consider themselves seised of the services and politics of England, as in fee simple; and under a guise of a special, peculiar, and jealous love of liberty, were slowly crushing out both the prerogative of the Crown and the liberty of the people.

Stormy weather, with very heavy rain, impeded the operations of the King's army. Washington was strongly posted on the top of slippery slopes, up which the Englishmen, it was said, could not advance; while the incessant wet rendered the muskets well-nigh useless. It was consequently determined not to attack the American position until better weather ensued. But on the 1st of November Washington evacuated the lines, and after setting fire to the village of White Plains, returned across the Croton River to a place in which Howe thought it better to leave him undisturbed.

The parade of war now turns to the banks of the Hudson or North River, towards Forts Washington and Lee mentioned above, as having been constructed to bar the passage of the King's ships upwards towards Albany. Other obstructions had also been placed in the fairway to impede navigation.

But neither the forts nor the obstructions checked frigates from freely running up and down the Hudson. Once a vessel of smaller tonnage got into difficulties under sail and was badly knocked about from the shore.

Hence the American Commander had his eyes opened to the possibilities of having his retreat on Connecticut barred by the British frigates. Then the question arose, What should be done with Fort Washington on the New York side? Should it be dismantled, denuded of troops, or should it, by way of encouraging the *morale* of the Patriot army, be defended as was Bunker Hill? The latter was an affair of a half-finished redoubt and some clothes-horse constructions festooned with fresh-cut hay, such as one sees in Norway. Fort Washington was fairly well fortified.[1] We have been told that

> In every heap of fresh-turned mould Howe seemed to see the blood-stained earthworks of Bunker Hill, and he was appalled by the possibility that he might have to look on at the slaughter of his soldiers from the safe distance where as Commander-in-Chief he was bound to remain.

The pretty quarrel among American writers about the responsibility for the sequel of events need not detain us. Bancroft and his followers impeach Greene of ruinous impetuosity and careless judgment in his defence of Fort Washington.[2] Whether the fort, being really no longer tenable, should have been abandoned is a question military experts have left unsettled. Washington was in Fort Lee, on the other side of the river, on the 13th of November. There was free communication between the two forts. He might have gone over to inspect the fort on the New York side. But instead of doing so he rode off up the North River to inspect arrangements for a new fort at West Point. His instructions to Greene were to do what he thought it best to do. The responsibility therefore lies with Washington, who placed it at the discretion of his subordinate to decide on a movement so

[1] Graydon considered the entrenchments quite incomplete; but other views support that given in the text, for, as Stedman points out, the strength of the position was in itself very great.—Stedman, i. 216.

[2] On which see a pamphlet by G. W. Greene in refutation ot Bancroft's strictures on Major-General Greene, p. 30.

important. De Lancey's summary of the course of events appears quite just :

> Washington's private opinion was opposed to holding Mount Washington, but he was governed by a vote of Congress and the Council of War, each of whom decided to retain it as long as possible. After the British men-of-war passed up the river, he, by letter, authorised Greene to evacuate the post, but did not directly order it to be done. Greene thought it should be retained, and as the matter was left to his discretion by Washington's letter, he exercised that discretion by holding it, as he had a perfect right to do. When Washington first arrived at Fort Lee on the 13th and found the post still occupied, he did not direct its evacuation as he might have done, but yielding to the doubt and hesitation he felt between his own opinion and the views of the Council, Congress, and of the Generals there present, let the garrison remain.

De Lancey thinks the loss of Mount Washington due to treachery. Greene thought it better, seeing that the Patriot army had been doing little but retreat for nearly three months, to ascertain if the experiment of Bunker Hill might not be successfully repeated. Yet here his terror of Americans behind walls and hedges, surmised to be at the back of all Howe's hesitations and delays, seemed to vanish in face of the most formidable place the British army had yet attacked.

Capture of Fort Washington, November 16, 1776.

The place was stormed from many sides at once ; the plans of attack were carried out in clockwork fashion, and after one of the smartest actions of the whole war, 2700 Patriots were made prisoners. "A pretty little action," says Mr. Fortescue, "neatly designed and very neatly executed." As to which remark, had the rest of the campaign been pursued with the same vigour and tenacity, the war might have been terminated in a few weeks. The honours of the day lay chiefly with the Hessians, of whom it may be said it was their one victory. Misfortune afterwards marked them down for victims who, from Trenton to Saratoga and from Saratoga to the Carolinas, seemed to expiate in their persons the perversity of custom that had embroiled them in a quarrel in which they had no living concern.




London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd.

Graydon thinks that the Pennsylvanians and Marylanders killed and captured in this futile defence of an untenable position were sacrificed to please the New Englanders, so intense were inter-provincial jealousies, with their endless sour bickerings and complaints.[1]

Sir George Trevelyan calls attention to the excellent behaviour of the British troops to their prisoners on this occasion. The account given by him from authentic sources is pleasing and full of interesting detail. There is one remark arising out of contemplation of this excellent conduct that is perhaps worth making. The recruiting grounds of the British army are described as gaols, houses of correction, and low-class haunts of drunkenness and vice. The behaviour, however, of the British soldiers throughout this war was not that of drilled blackguards, but rather that of decent but unfortunate men, belonging to a rough but stable-minded peasantry. Compared in behaviour with some regiments on certain occasions during the Peninsular War, Howe's troops were angels of light. The comparison becomes accentuated in view of the discipline which earned for Wellington the name of the Iron Duke. Military experts say that drill and discipline are no deterrents when once men get out of hand, when the original sin explodes with perhaps greater violence because it has been so long smothered by discipline and drill. The good conduct of the British troops in this war is therefore significant.[2]

The next blow inflicted on the Patriot army was

[1] Graydon was captured at Fort Washington. His commanding officer, Colonel Cadwalader of Philadelphia, had invited Graydon to survey the ground about the fort. "We went and reconnoitered it, and the result was that it was absolutely untenable and must be abandoned." This being their opinion, they were yet compelled to take part in its defence. Graydon gives a long and very interesting account of the operations which culminated in the capture of the place; cf. *Memoirs*, p. 185, foll. 3; Gordon, ii. 348; Ramsay, i. 309; Stedman, i. 217; Fortescue, iii. 192. Marshall's estimate of the value of the fort differs much from Graydon's; cf. Marshall, ii. 586. But see the plan of the attack facing this page.

[2] Cf. the Chapters on the Forces of the Crown, Vol. I.

dealt by Cornwallis, who crossed the Hudson with six thousand men at about eight miles north of Fort Lee, and, assisted by sailors from the fleet, got some cannon into a position commanding the fort, before General Greene seems to have had timely notice of his adversary's movement. General Greene was, in fact, asleep in bed when the alarm of the British advance was given. There was nothing now to do but for the Patriots to retire as speedily as possible. This they did with such despatch as to leave behind a vast quantity of stores and baggage, besides a large number of heavy guns. "The very pots," says Jones, "were boiling on the fires."

Washington, after the fall of Fort Washington, could make no further stand. His army was defeated and discredited; the terms of service for the majority of his men were fast approaching; the wintry season had set in; his men were ill-fed, ill-clad, and discouraged, and on the most favourable estimate reduced to 4000, whose daily defections and desertions were rendering his position unspeakable. Practically, he was the chieftain of a dwindling body of ill-armed and ragged guerillas. The militia of the two Jerseys would not help; Pennsylvania openly rejoiced in the discomfiture of the Patriots. Lee refused to rejoin his superior officer with the 6000 men left under his command north of the Croton. On Washington's crossing the Hudson, he was deserted by the New York Militia and by the militia of the four New England States.

Greene wrote to Washington:

November 5, 1776. I am informed by Colonel Hawkes Hay that the militia which he commands refuse to do duty. They say General Howe has promised them peace, liberty, and safety, and that is all they want. What is to be done with them? This spirit and temper should be checked in its infancy.

This spirit and temper reached maturity a little later. In Philadelphia the same reluctance to fight prevailed. The resolutions of Congress this time testify to the

fluttering anxiety of the delegates. Both Mifflin and Putnam were instructed to go about Pennsylvania with expostulations, and entreaties, and exhortations, to arouse a lukewarm people, but the result of their efforts was disheartening.

The Committee of Safety of Philadelphia addressed a circular letter to the burgesses and citizens at large in spirited terms:

December 8, 1776. SIR—There is certain knowledge of General Howe's army being now on its march from Brunswick to Princetown, which puts it beyond doubt that he intends for this city. This glorious opportunity of signalising himself in defence of our country and securing the rights of America for ever, will be seized by every man who has a spark of patriotic fire in his bosom. . . . Delay not a moment, it may be fatal, and subject you and all you hold dear to the ruffian hands of the enemy, whose cruelties are without distinction and unequalled.

By order of the Council. DAVID RITTENHOUSE, Vice-President.

But the appeal fell flat. In fact, every one just now found, as Christmas was approaching, there is no place like home, and men continued to quit Washington in whole companies. Urgent messages, too, were sent to Virginia and Maryland that Philadelphia was in dire straits, fearing immediate occupation by the enemy. After crossing the Hudson at Peekskill, Washington fell in with the runaways from Fort Lee, and with these broken remains of regiments fled towards the Raritan River, reaching New Brunswick on the main road to Philadelphia. Cornwallis and Vaughan, pressing on, nearly overtook Washington at New Brunswick, but being forbidden by the Commander-in-Chief to proceed farther, halted at New Brunswick, awaiting instructions. The panic among the Patriots at this time was so great that it was commonly reported that a captain and fifty militiamen, meeting with some teamsters in red coats during this *débâcle*, ran for their lives. This sounds like a pleasant jest concocted over a bowl of punch in some Philadelphian tavern, when Patriots

At New Brunswick.

1777.

were at the very lowest ebb of their fortunes, and Loyalists were rejoicing over the victory of Brandywine.

Dejection of the Continental troops.

Washington's men were now as much discouraged as footsore, hungry, and defeated men are wont to be. They limped along the rain-sodden roads and paths to reach the Delaware, but slowly as they moved the British troops were always somewhat slower. Sergeant Lamb says the American army was frequently in sight of the van of the British army, which generally arrived just in time to be too late to catch the Americans. Cornwallis seems to have had instructions not to keep the Americans on the run, but to keep them in sight. Left to himself, this energetic soldier would have dispersed and captured the American army before the end of November. He apparently got out of hand one day, leading his men, in a few hours, over twenty miles of rain-sodden ground. Such energy may not have been approved at headquarters, still a little more of it would have brought about a speedy termination of the war. Peace would have been welcome to the larger part of the American people, who at this time showed the strongest disinclination to do any fighting at all. No amount of inducements, not the prospect of free shoes and stockings, brought volunteers to the Territorial army. Congress itself shrank to a mere handful of delegates. Some States failed to furnish their proper quota of representatives. In October of this year, after the capture of New York by the British and during the operations on the White Plains, a letter from President John Hancock was going the round of the States, but with little result.

"Congress," he said, "being deeply engaged in matters of the utmost importance to the welfare of America, have judged it absolutely necessary that there should be a full representation of the several States as soon as possible. For this end I am to request, in obedience to their commands, you will immediately take proper measures to comply with the enclosed Resolve, in order that the United States may be fully represented in Congress, and that the sentiments of America may be better known upon those intervening subjects that lie before them."

The Journals of Congress of the period are full of references to the management and movements of the Continental army, to the Flying Camp, to its efficiency or non-efficiency, and of reports thereon of visiting commissioners. Congress had not then discovered for itself the secret that, if you want the best or worst out of a man in authority, it is well to leave him alone. Congress was now permanently in a state of fussy excitement. It gave General Lee, for example, leave to cross the Hudson in one direction and General Washington in another, and forbade the evacuation of Fort Washington; filled subordinate yet responsible posts in the Flying Camp, not by direct open choice, but by ballot; summoned an important officer from the front in New York to attend a committee in Philadelphia without asking the concurrence or consent of the Commander-in-Chief.

With all this confusion and meddling activity in Philadelphia and dismay in his camp,[1] Washington had every reason to consider the American cause hopeless. There was now practically no American army. It was seriously proposed that the fighting section of the community should retire to Augusta County in Virginia, organise themselves into predatory bands, and so keep the torch of rebellion alight for better days. Yet the infatuation, as Washington calls it, of Sir William Howe preserved the Americans from this desperate policy. Campaigns are not won by running away. It is naturally a matter of speculation whether, in case guerilla frontier warfare had been thought the only way of continued resistance, Americans would not have founded independent republican States in the interior of the continent. But, as was then

[1] *The Flying Camp* is a pet phrase of Congress. It was an imaginary force evoked out of the riff-raff of the militia of the Middle States with a view to forming the *franc-tireur* class of combatant, every man of which should, according to military custom, have been shot on capture. But the Flying Camp, about which so many directions are given in the Journals of Congress, appears to have been a *chose gâtée*.

pointed out in reply to this proposition of despair, they would have soon discovered independence to be a mere high-sounding word. There is no such thing as absolute independence. Cut off from the sea and reduced to a condition of interminable border warfare, the refugees must have slowly dwindled into an almost negligible quantity. That Washington took no such step and maintained a stout heart amidst all the cross purposes and defections of the time, not only testifies to his invaluable gift of knowing his own mind and to his tenacity of will, but also to his knowledge of his opponent. Both generals were in early middle life; both of them strong, big men; both had many years' experience of war's alarms; both of them were men of renowned personal courage. Washington in New York and Howe at Bunker Hill had displayed this splendid quality to perfection. With these admirable gifts and powers at their best, and doing their best with equal opportunities and resources, they might have been evenly matched; but Howe's secret sympathies, his personal sluggishness, owing partly to his Dutch blood and partly to his libertine habits, his dread of offending high Whig families at home, and the divided councils, the feeble execution inspired by these clashing and discordant motives, made him no match for the pure-living, single-minded Virginian soldier who, with one mind and one purpose, bent all his great powers to its accomplishment.

Washington and Howe.

It does no despite to Washington to say that in this dull, stupid war, as he had no special opportunities to display the supreme qualities of a great general, so there is no particular evidence of his possessing them; neither is it any special credit to Sir William Howe to admit that he had first-class gifts and powers as a commanding officer, which, when not unnerved by women and untrammelled by politics, he exerted with obvious and conspicuous success. Of the one it is demonstrably true, that he put his talents to the best account; but who would venture to say this of the other?

Washington arrived at Trenton, at the fords of the Delaware, whence he sent a letter to Congress describing the condition of the army and his intentions. December 6, 1776.

This letter of the 6th from General Washington says Howe on the same day resumed his onward march from New Brunswick towards Princeton, ten miles distant, and thence to Trenton, twelve miles, which he reached next day. As Washington was in Trenton on the 6th December with the miserable remnants of his shattered forces, why did he delay there two days with regiments reduced to such skeleton conditions that one regiment found ample room on one barge? He had previously taken steps to secure every boat or barge on the Delaware for miles on either side up or down stream from Trenton. As Washington got away all Putnam's force, with entrenching tools and ammunition, from Long Island during a short August night, amidst drenching rain, with a north-easter blowing hard and a strong tide to boot, why did he delay two days in Trenton in imminent danger of capture? There may be an easy explanation of this delay. Washington had full and careful information of all Howe's movements. Secret service money to the amount of 20,000 dollars hard cash had been voted by Congress, to be expended at the direction of the Commander-in-Chief. Every dollar of that money was judiciously spent. Consequently, the American Commander-in-Chief was enabled to calculate to a nicety his adversary's movements. Thus Stedman's well-known sarcastic comment on the British arrival in Trenton appears not without justification:

> On the 17th December our army marched from Brunswick at four o'clock in the morning, and about the same hour in the afternoon arrived at Princeton. This place General Washington in person left not one hour before the British arrived. At Princeton the British General waited seventeen hours, and arrived at Trenton at four o'clock in the afternoon, just when the last boat of General Washington's embarkation crossed the river, as if he had calculated with great accuracy the exact time necessary for his enemy to make his escape.

Washington got away safely, and was on the other side of the Delaware, within random shot, when a German brass band came marching in pompously at the head of Waldeckers and Hessians some thousand strong. This fine show of brass, banners, and pipe-clay, must have afforded the inhabitants of the two hundred wooden shanties and bungalows constituting the town of Trenton a pleasant Sunday afternoon. The delicate question now arose, How were the British to get across the Delaware? Detachments were sent up and down stream to find boats, but as all boats had been either scuttled or seized the quest was unsuccessful. But it was pointed out there were stacks of timber behind the General's headquarters, right opposite his back bedroom window. Besides, there were large barns, sheds, and storehouses, all built of timber, to say nothing of four blacksmiths' shops: in fact, all the ways and means for the construction of rafts. Had Cornwallis, or Henry Duncan of the *Eagle*, or even young John Moore (of Corunna) been in command, the matter had been settled in a few hours.

Duncan, who superintended with success the navigation of Hell Gate in a thick fog on the morning of
1776. 15th September, would have successfully taken the Delaware job in hand between darkness and daybreak. For, as Gordon wrote a century ago,

> Trenton could have supplied him (Howe) with materials which industry might soon have constructed into sufficient convenience for the transportation of the troops over a smooth river not more than a quarter of a mile wide at the most.

The British go into winter quarters, Christmas 1776.

Other contemporary observers confirm Gordon's statements. But Howe was satisfied with what had been done. A holiday was now due to himself, his staff, and his ladies. Each winter of his three years' command was spent in a comfortable town house, with card-tables, copious beverages not weak, if cool, and his Lalage, first at Boston, then in New York, then in Philadelphia; and had there been a fourth campaign

under his command, perhaps he would have sojourned in Charleston. So he hied him back to New York for Christmas, gave general instructions for the control of the army, and granted Cornwallis leave of absence to go home for the winter.

While Britons and Germans were preparing, with brandy, rum, and spruce beer, to make Christmas merry along the Delaware and in the Jerseys, the patriotic cause was now smitten to death; Washington had been turned out of Long Island, driven from New York, manœuvred out of position in the White Plains, had lost the two forts on the Hudson with a prodigious number of men, considering the size of his army, and had done nothing but retreat for five continuous weeks before the advancing British troops. In addition to these calamities his troops deserted in batches, others refused to re-enlist on the expiry of the time of service; calls to arms were in vain, and no prudent man in backing his anticipation of the result of this struggle would have ventured a Continental on Washington's expectations of success. Philadelphia was making ready for the conquerors. That cheerful city welcomed all comers. If there had been cakes and ale for the Deputies in 1774 and 1775, there were still more cakes and better ale for the victors of 1776. But the victors did not arrive. Sir William Howe broke up his army, for disposition during the winter, into a chain of cantonments extending over a line of eighty miles, from the Delaware to the Hackensack. It so fell out that the cantonments nearest to the enemy were weakest in numbers, and made up of Waldeckers and Hessians. The frontier posts were Trenton, Bordenton, Burlington, and White Horse. The total force scattered among these four appears to have been little more than 3000, of which 1200 were in Trenton. It is highly probable that this disposition of an army that was none too numerous was made for the protection of the Loyalists of New Jersey, who now discovered themselves in shoals. The Howes had power of amnesty touching the conduct

of any American who had partaken in the revolutionary movement. New Jersey woke up to the prudence of being on the royal side of the hedge, and accepted with effusion the certificates of good conduct attainable for the asking at any headquarters. In return for this concession of pardon the Loyalists appear to have looked for protection, which after some ten years of patriotic effervescence must have been indeed grateful and comforting. Probably already much impressed by these expressions of loyalty, the royal officers were further influenced by the state of Philadelphia. Gordon says that Putnam dared not at this juncture withdraw a man of his command from that town for fear of an insurrection in favour of the British. The opposition to Independence in that city had always been strong, especially among the Quakers, and the Loyalist party in Philadelphia was too powerful to be left unwatched.[1] Misled, perhaps, in this way, Howe made the disposition of troops which brought about that amazing escape from the ruin from which, as Washington said, nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could save America.

And thus on Christmas Eve, 1776, the curtain falls over the British army, posted in ten portions from Trenton and Burlington on the Delaware, by way of Princeton, New Brunswick, and Newark, up to the west bank of the Hudson, with occupation of Perth Amboy at the outfall of the Raritan. In Trenton the Hessians made every preparation to spend in the German style a merry Christmas.

[1] Gordon, ii. 390, 393.

THE BATTLE-GROUND AT TRENTON, 1776.

# CHAPTER XIV

## THE CRISIS

Sir William Howe's disposition of troops in New Jersey was made, it is said, against his better judgment, on the advice of Lord Cornwallis.

In the defence of their conduct of this campaign set up by Viscount Howe, the Admiral-in-Chief, and Sir William Howe, the General-in-Chief, the latter excused his share of the failure in New Jersey by pleading he had acted on the advice of Cornwallis, a statement confirmed under examination by Cornwallis himself. Similarly in the case of the disaster at Fort Washington, imputed by Bancroft and others to Greene, to whose judgment Washington had deferred, an attempt was made to shift responsibility from the shoulders of the senior to those of the junior officer. Similarly it was common report in 1900 that Sir Redvers Buller was persuaded against his better judgment by Warren and Cleary to attack Spion Kop, an attempt which involved the British arms in disaster. Such apologies in mitigation of adverse judgment on a high officer's work should be taken into consideration; but they do not carry far, and leave an indictment of this class pretty much in its original condition. It says much for the shrewdness of that singular compound of wisdom, gossip, and vanity, John Adams, that on hearing of Howe's march across the Jerseys, and the subsequent disposition of the troops, he condemned the measure.[1]

[1] "You know I ever thought W. Howe's march through the Jerseys a rash step. It has proved so."—J. A. to his wife, 14th January 1777.

The fundamental mistake of placing troops in a chain of cantonments over a tract of country, so much intersected by running streams and dykes as is the land north of the Delaware, soon discovered itself.

The Trenton disaster, 1776.

Trenton, Princeton, Bordenton, and Burlington all lie in the basin and on the left bank of the Delaware, and many miles south-east of the lines of occupation originally contemplated by Howe. Of these posts Trenton was left in charge of Colonel Rahl with a force of 1200 German troops. Christmastide, a season that both German and British customs associate with much joviality and relaxation, was at hand. The Delaware was not frozen solid, but was a jumble of cold water and great blocks and plates of ice. The wind set in from the north-east with drifts of sleet and snow. With weather and river in this condition, and with an enemy in the most absolute disorder, Colonel Rahl seems to have considered himself as safe as if he were still in Cassel. Howe's instructions to him had been to get some spade and pick-axe work well finished, and to keep a sharp look-out on Washington. The country swarmed with Loyalists whom either fear or hatred turned into spies. Information reached Colonel Rahl that ought to have aroused his vigilance. But he had no English, and the vernacular of that district happened to be English; he was thus at a disadvantage.

Colonel Rahl.

Placed as he was, by the custom of military etiquette, at the extreme left of the line of posts on the Delaware, common sense should have guided Howe to post in that very sensitive terminal a gentleman who at least understood the language of the country. Messages reached Rahl that he put unread in his waistcoat pocket. In fact, under the relaxations of the season such interruptions were not welcome. Add to this that Colonel Rahl is reported to have been frequently addlepated through fondness for the punch-bowl. The German troops, too, had surrounded themselves with hostile hearts and hands in an other-

CHARLES, MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

From the Painting by Gainsborough in the National Portrait Gallery.

wise friendly country. They brought with them the methods and manners of mid-European warfare. Whatever a Hessian saw and liked, whether in cottage or mansion, were it feather-bed or clock, he carried off. Such was the custom of his ancient trade. A considerable fraction of the population was furnished with testimony to their loyalty to King George in the shape of certificates quite newly signed. Holding these documents, the possessors believed themselves to be protected from pillage. Of this notion the Germans disillusioned them. In the first place, the foragers could not read English; in the second, the papers might be forged and spurious certificates; in the third, the foragers did not want to understand the papers, but they did want the goods—the sweet ham, the feather-bed, the kitchen clock, the copper warming-pan. There was a clean sweep of kitchen, cellar, pigsty, and hen-roost all round Trenton, and whatever enjoyment Christmas moves in the placid Teutonic mind, was enhanced by the notion that the goods were fetched home from cottage and mansion tenanted by English folk. No copper captain, military crimp, or hired foreign knave had ever before pillaged an English cottage. As to pillaging itself, Patriots had set the example in their raids on Tory houses and Tory farms for years past. It is quite possible that among the holders of the certificates of exemption were men who had assisted in quaffing the contents of many a Tory cellar.

Plundering and robbery compose the sum of Washington's complaint against his own men within a few weeks of the rapine at Trenton.

"The American troops," says Stedman, whose admiration for the Americans frequently appears in his pages, "were suffered to plunder the loyalists, and to exercise with impunity every act of barbarity on that unfortunate class of people."[1]

"The General," says Gordon quoting Washington's order, "prohibits both in the Militia and in the Continental troops,

[1] Stedman, i. p. 243.

in the most positive terms, the infamous practice of plundering the inhabitants under the specious pretence of their being Tories."[1]

"These tarrings and featherings, this breaking open houses by a rude and insolent rabble in resentment for private wrongs, or in pursuance of private prejudices and passions, must be discountenanced," wrote John Adams to his wife.[2]

And there is much more evidence of the like nature. Yet few events have so deeply affected the national imagination as the recital of the behaviour of the Hessians in New Jersey in 1776; while more than one American writer of repute thinks that the German example was the evil impulse of Patriots' pillage and wanton mischief. Thus at the cost of the people they had come to protect, the Hessians made preparation for Christmas. They were possessed of vast quantities of rum, but were short of good beer. Christmas trees and holly, egg nog, punch and rumbo,[3] sweet hams and poultry, all contributed to furnish the Christmas cheer; and if there were tears, chill, and starvation in the disordered and melancholy homes of Trenton, there were plenty of good things and to spare in the German quarters. While plunged thus in the sleep or turbulence of debauch, Washington fell upon them and put their whole force out of action. His enterprise at Trenton has been regarded on all hands as the most brilliant achievement of his military life. No one has ventured to prove that he was inspired in this exploit either by Benedict Arnold or by Charles Lee. His reputation which, at the beginning of December 1776, had receded in public estimation to the lowest ebb, was perhaps contributory to his startling success, for his adversaries appear to have regarded him as a thing of straw, incapable, and what, from a soldier's point of view, is worse, unlucky.

He had been on the run for months, and had at

[1] Gordon, ii. p. 420. [2] J. Adams to his wife, 7th July 1774.
[3] Rumbo is a variety of punch based upon rum.

last subsided on the safe side of the Delaware. The splendour of the action at Trenton set his admirers in Great Britain babbling. The writer of an Impartial History of the war puts the previous runaway proceedings of the Americans in the Jerseys in the light of cautious tactics.[1]

"Our men," says he, "were at first flushed with success when they saw their enemies flee from one post to another, and concluded that it was fear that made them retreat and desert their posts; but they, the British, were mistaken. The Americans only fled because it was wise and prudent to do so."

The recently despairing friends of America, both in the Colonies and England, were filled anew with hope. The local militia, galvanised into something like activity, began to think resistance no longer a vain thing. Let us examine briefly by what circumstances, added to his own indomitable patience and surprising resources in emergency, Washington was aided in this most fruitful achievement.

On the 12th December the American Commander-in-Chief, fully informed as to the habits of the Hessian colonel, and of the arrangements made by Sir William Howe, and rallying his men behind the Delaware, had begun to devise a scheme of reprisals. He was quit of the fussy interference of Congress, which body, being in full flight, was shorn of both dignity and influence. 1776.

In the pride of their supremacy Congress had on 1st December sent a message to General Washington, which for absurdity is among the foremost records of the absurd: they give him leave to cross a river.

"General Washington," said they, "is informed that he has the full approbation of Congress to order the troops on the east side of Hudson's River, over to the west side, whenever he shall find it conducive to the public service to do so."

[1] Murray (of Newcastle-on-Tyne), ii. p. 185: a work furnished with unflattering woodcuts of portraits of the Howes, Burgoyne, Chatham, Charles Lee, and others, and still more unflattering estimates of British bravery and common sense.

But now in their panic Congress proposed to make Washington dictator under a time-limit. Preparations were going forward for setting alight all ships in the Delaware rather than permit them to fall into the hands of the British, whose occupation of Philadelphia was daily expected. Bulletins were issued in the city announcing the enemy to be in Trenton, and public meetings were called, urging the men to arm themselves at this juncture, the women and children to retire to some remote place for safety.

Harrowing stories of the barbarity of the British troops were printed and circulated.[1] No woman's honour, it was said, was safe, no man's life. But these representations were coldly received. Impassioned speeches produced but few recruits, and the women did not migrate. Meanwhile citizens were advised to place themselves under the direct protection of Sir William Howe. Congress melted away by adjournment to meet again in Baltimore. The printer, whose little printing press was used for the Journals and other printed matter, disappeared, but was exhorted in a Resolve to repair to Baltimore, with an assurance that he should be reimbursed all cost of travel and transit attending obedience to the call. Many of the Congressmen discovered important business elsewhere. On the first appointed day for meeting in Baltimore there were not enough members to form a House.

Washington was now not only dictator, but also sponsor and protector of Congress. It was commonly reported that this body had finally dissolved itself. The President of Congress was instructed to apprise

[1] Gordon quotes some instances of violence and rapine from Almon's *Remembrancer*, part iv. p. 307.

There is an interesting account of Almon in Horace Walpole's *Memoirs of the Reign of George III.*, vol. iv. (edition 1894), p. 105. "He was reckoned," says Walpole, "to have made a fortune of £10,000 by publishing and selling libels." Almon's *Remembrancer* is the compilation of a man who remembers all that he has heard to the discredit of his fellow-countrymen. He lived in Westminster.

the Commander-in-Chief that, in view of this false and malicious report,

> . . . he be desired to contradict the said scandalous report in General Orders; this Congress having a better opinion of the spirit and vigour of the army and the good people of these States than to suppose it can be necessary to disperse.

The message was ignored by the prudent dictator, and was subsequently deleted from the Records of Congress.

The extraordinary powers conferred on their General witness to the prevailing panic. The Parliament that a short time before had appointed junior officers by ballot, and debated long and warmly about hogsheads of rum for the troops, now announced:

> That having maturely considered the present crisis, and having perfect reliance on the wisdom, vigour, and uprightness of General Washington, Congress had resolved to invest him with full and ample and complete powers to raise and collect together any army possible.

Charles Lee.

Events also rid him of Charles Lee, his second in command, the source to him of endless embarrassments.

There have been numerous Lees in the American service, of whom many have held positions of great trust in the social and commercial life of the States.

Of the Lees of American birth the most prominent are the men of the famous Virginian family of that name. Richard and Francis of that ilk were signatories of the Declaration of Independence; there were also known to contemporary fame their brothers Arthur and William, of whom the former became a Fellow of the Royal Society, the latter an Alderman of the city of London, both of them quarrelsome and captious men. In the later generation came General Harry Lee, "Light Horse Harry," as he was affectionately called; in the third generation the illustrious Robert Edward Lee, the famous Harry's more famous son, who in the Second Civil War fought unsuccessfully in

maintenance of the principle of separation and independence, which his grandsires had done so much to establish. Yet Charles Lee was not of this noble stock; he was a Cheshire man (Jones says he was an Irishman), the son of a soldier, and himself bred to be a soldier. When Braddock in 1755 started on his ill-starred expedition against the French and Indians on the Monongahela, Charles Lee was of the general's *family*. At Ticonderoga he was severely injured, and for a while escaped the unpopularity his unbridled tongue and boundless insolence everywhere incurred, for it was not without reason that the Indians of the Long House knew him as "Boiling water."

He was, it was said, "under more arrests, had more courts martial held upon him, and more courts of inquiry into his conduct than all the officers of the army put together."

1762. After the French evacuated Canada, Lee, while still on the strength of the British establishment, served as a captain in Portugal, was nearly frozen to death in the Balkans, and all but killed in an earthquake in Constantinople. On the outbreak of commotion in America, Lee, still in British pay, crossed to the States, and there engaged in a course of lectures or speeches to hearten up the resistance to King and Parliament. Being an unscrupulous man, he was a convincing speaker, and did much to promote the movement for Independence.

All this time, and up to 1776, he retained his commission in the 44th Regiment of Foot, drawing his half-pay from the pockets of the British people, against whom he was endeavouring to excite the wildest animosities in the Atlantic Colonies.

The American leaders, ill acquainted with military men, and flattered by the prospect of securing the aid of a great European soldier, accepted him at his own valuation. Lee, on the other hand, although abating none of the King's officer's contempt for the Patriots, whether as militia or as men, managed at the outbreak of hostilities to secure a very high price for his services.

Congress, filled with a just opinion of his high abilities, resolved to reimburse him for all losses he might be likely to sustain by turning his coat, and advanced him the handsome sum of thirty thousand dollars to help him to settle in Virginia.

When the Continental army was in organising, Congress made him second in command. In this capacity he posed as a kind of Barlow to Washington's Merton, and when the two generals rode northward from Philadelphia to Cambridge, it was a matter of comment that people were much more curious to see Charles Lee than to see George Washington. Like Brooke of Middlemarch, he would drop fructifying hints about things, and subsequently claim the credit of any achievement remotely associated with his germinal suggestions. His speech and conversation were about onfalls and traverses, and curtains and *flèches*, and what he knew not of war, was not knowledge. Not honest Dugald Dalgety himself could express himself with more spirit and *expertise* than did Lee in his expansive moods. His criticisms of Howe, of Greene, of Washington, were equally full and free.

He endeavoured to entangle Burgoyne in a correspondence little short of treasonable, which that officer, whose love of writing long letters was second only to Lee's own passion for pen and paper, entered into with some spirit.[1] He carried on a correspondence with Gates in terms of condemnation of their superior officer, General Washington, whom he characterised as damnably deficient. His opinion of all his superior officers, whether Austrian, Polish, Portuguese, or American, was practically that they were not fit to black Charles Lee's boots.

"He set himself up," says an American writer, "for a military genius, and there was no campaign in modern European

[1] Lee's correspondence with Burgoyne was dated 7th June 1775, and received in Boston 5th July, and was subsequently reprinted as a broadside from the *New York Gazetteer*, on 6th July, for distribution in Boston and the Continental army.

history which he could not expound and criticise with the airs of a man who had exhausted the subject."[1]

For such a man to disobey orders was the natural consequence of his temperament; while his vanity made him reckon himself a good bargain at any cost to any purchaser.

1776. His Commander-in-Chief had in November directed Lee to bring his division to join the main army in New Jersey. But Lee, who was then on the east bank of the Hudson, had other designs. He was carrying on what was virtually a treasonable correspondence with Major-General Gates, and with the adjutant-general of the army, Colonel Reed, in order to secure himself not only in separate but in independent command. For him the disasters of the campaign of 1776, which so far had been almost ruinous to the Patriotic cause—the defeat at Brooklyn, the fall of New York, the capture of Fort Washington and Fort Lee, the miserable retreat across the Jerseys, were all the direct consequence of the incompetence of Washington, to whom it would be dangerous, he thought, to entrust the management of a sergeant's guard. After all the complicated manœuvres on the White Plains, Lee, by his superior's orders, had withdrawn to the north side of the Croton, and had taken up a strong position in the Highlands, there to await instructions,

Lee disobeys orders.

1776. and now, in December, he saw himself evidently the heaven-sent deliverer of a distressful country. Could he secure the co-operation of Gates, he would be powerful enough to move across the Hudson and down through the Jerseys on the flank of the British army, threatening lines of communication, cutting off reinforcements and supplies, and sweeping before him the jaded and weakened battalions of Britain into the Delaware or the sea. An urgent command from Washington to come southward Lee reluctantly proceeded to obey, advancing as far as Morristown. Here

[1] Cf. Appleton, *Dictionary of American Biography*, 8 vols. "Charles Lee."



WASHINGTON'S HEADQUARTERS, MORRISTOWN, NEW JERSEY, 1777.

RAHL'S HEADQUARTERS, TRENTON, NEW JERSEY.

his forces were augmented by some troops sent from Lake Champlain by Major-General Schuyler, to reinforce the defence of Philadelphia. With about 6000 troops at his disposal, Lee felt himself equal to the extinction of Howe, a sentiment expressed in a message to Washington, saying it were better for him (Lee) to remain hanging about the rear of the British army. Having thus flatly disobeyed superior orders, and being as fond of letter-writing as Micawber, he spent each day in moving forward a few miles and in penning despatches. But resting at a short distance of his command, in the tavern of one White, at Baskinridge, and under the protection of a few troopers, he was lounging after breakfast in an elegant deshabille when, about eleven o'clock, seventy men of the British Light Dragoons, led by Colonel Harcourt, surrounded the little tavern, and after a short bickering, captured Lee. Colonel Harcourt owed this extraordinary piece of good luck to the keen eyes of a Jersey Loyalist. A ride of thirty miles to the nearest British post ensued, with Lee still in slippers and dressing-gown. The sensation excited by this capture was very great. It was reckoned to be the final shock which should wreck the American ship, for Congress, mere Rump that it was all this December, had the most childish confidence in Major-General Lee.

Capture of Lee, December 13, 1776.

President John Hancock received, on 10th December, from Lee a letter, written at Morristown, which apparently contained inspiriting tidings, for in an address authorised by Congress that day, and circulated chiefly in Pennsylvania and the adjacent States, the President assured his people that "their arms had been successful," and in other respects

> . . . our sacred cause is in the most promising situation. . . . General Lee is advancing with a strong reinforcement and his troops in high spirits—and that the opportunity now presented of destroying the principal (British) army should be promptly laid hold of.

President John Hancock promulgated this infor-

mation when Washington's broken army was on the south side of the Delaware, and after three days of Charles Lee's having overslept himself into the arms of the British troopers. Nor was the tender belief of Congress in him abated by his capture. On the first meeting of the Rump at Baltimore, their thoughts about him took the shape of a Resolve:

December 20, 1776. That the President write to General Washington and desire him to send a flag to General Howe, and enquire in what manner General Lee, who has been taken prisoner, is treated, and if he finds that he is not treated agreeable to his rank and character, to send a remonstrance to General Howe on the subject.

Permission was requested for enough money to be sent to the prisoner to support him in his captivity, according to his degree.

But as Lee had been a British officer and in receipt of half-pay for twelve years, it became a sporting question whether he would be hanged or shot. Betting on the event was brisk, as he had made an unfavourable impression in New York.

January 1, 1777. "General Lee," says Ambrose Serle, writing to Lord Dartmouth, "behaves since his captivity with the meanness of spirit expected of him."

In London it was suggested to the King that Major-General Lee should be sent prisoner to England. It is noticeable that in the Cabinet minute comprising this suggestion Lee's American rank is conceded. The interesting prisoner, however, remained in New York. Jones says he was confined in one of the genteelest rooms in the city, an apartment of the Council Chamber, where he had every convenience, plenty of wine, a good table, with four or five guests of his own choice each day, firewood and candles; in fact, according to a well-known character in classical fiction, "he had come upon a gold mine as well as tea and sugar."

Here he enjoyed himself with reams of paper and dozens of quill pens, putting down his reflections

about General Howe and others. Yet was it reported through the countryside that Lee was languishing in a common prison, undergoing incredible hardships.[1] But similar reports were industriously spread about the condition of all Patriot captives in the hands of the British. How is it that Lee was able to make such an impression upon American opinion? Perhaps Mr. Fisher's very frank book may furnish the answer.

> He was one of those curious Englishmen who, down to our own day, have been able to impose themselves upon Americans. He talked in a striking clever manner, with a shrewd affectation of great knowledge of the world and of high society, which is a form of humbug that our people have always been very slow to detect.[2]

His fondness for two great dogs, his constant companions, augmented somewhat his reputation for eccentricity, and there was in him a kind of freakishness which still charms smart American society.

The capture of Lee was a stroke of kindly fortune for Washington. On the disaster being reported to Sullivan, to whose command Lee's capture transferred the troops, he, mindful of his own misfortunes at Brooklyn and elsewhere, determined to get his men and himself under the wing of the Commander-in-Chief as soon as possible. With these reinforcements from Schuyler's and Gates's divisions, as well as the main force left with Lee after the operations on the White Plains, Washington found himself at the head of what was really the flower of the American army. Being then untrammelled by the fussy interferences and espionage of the Rump, and feeling there was nothing before him but the most hazardous of strokes, or a retreat into the backwoods, in company with snipers

[1] These reports, however, were discredited by John Adams, who speaks of Lee's being very well treated.

[2] S. G. Fisher, *True History of the American Revolution*, p. 321. Much of this book is reproduced in Mr. Fisher's later work (1908), *The Struggle for Independence*; the passage quoted above, however, is omitted.

and Skinners, Washington determined on the former course and attacked Trenton.

Trenton. Trenton is now occupied by a population of many thousands. It has its opera house, its famous pottery works, its handsome boulevards, and some forty places of worship, as well as daily, weekly, and monthly papers or journals. Lying at the head of the tidal waters of the Delaware, and being the terminus inwards of the steam traffic of that river, there is a good service of boats to Philadelphia, which lies about twenty miles farther down the stream. The town has crossed the Assumpink Creek, of which inlet something will be said farther on; but both the old town and the new are proud of the audacious exploit planned and executed with brilliant success by Washington, in the most despondent hour of despondent Patriots.

Washington's plans, matured on the south bank of the Delaware, were favoured neither by wind nor weather. The river was blocked by broken ice, the morasses and plains were swept by wind, driven snow, and sleet. The General divided his little force of 6000 men into three divisions. Of these 2500 were under his personal command; with Greene and Sullivan for his lieutenants, the former of whom, at least, he could trust to hold his own in tight places. The idea of the action was to deliver a feint on Bordenton, a few miles below Trenton, to make a frontal demonstration over the ford of the Delaware at Trenton, to cross the stream higher up, and develop a flank movement with artillery and infantry on Trenton from the westward, along the north bank of the river.

Of these movements the first succeeded so well that the German Count Donop had his hands too full to give help to his colleague at Trenton. The second movement failed; the river and the weather were said to have baffled the crossing of troops at this point. There was lingering in Philadelphia some unfriendliness to Washington; enough at least to check whole-hearted help for this part of his enter-

prise. Putnam either would or could do nothing. The collective wisdom had migrated to Baltimore. Gates was in Baltimore log-rolling, hinting at Washington's incapacity. Thus what with the weather, and the feeling in certain quarters that Washington's failure would not be unwelcome, the frontal demonstration against Trenton came to nothing. The German troops heard and saw nothing to arouse alarm. But Washington's own action from the west turned out to be a complete and unqualified success. Having apportioned his men between his two lieutenants, his force crossed the Delaware at some three hours' distance above Trenton, about half-past six in the morning, and reached their objective by two separate routes about nine o'clock. December 27, 1776.

The little township was completely surrounded by the Patriot forces. Greene and Sullivan fell on Trenton along their assigned routes, at practically the same moment. The Germans were asleep—the somnolence and lethargy of Christmas being upon them. Rahl lay abed—the note of warning handed to him during a copious meal, and stuffed unheeded into his pocket, remained unopened. The American assault was for the most part an affair of pikes, spontoons, and bayonets, for wind and wet prevented priming of firelocks; consequently the action proceeded in comparative silence. There were a few cannon shots, and a little musketry by the Germans; but in forty-five minutes Trenton was lost and won. Rahl was killed; there were about one thousand prisoners; the rest of the German forces either perished or escaped to join Donop. The American casualties were one private killed in action, one frozen to death, and a few frostbites. It was a smart piece of work, both in design and execution. Washington's detractors immediately said the design was due to Benedict Arnold; they offered no evidence in support of this opinion, except that an officer who had been guilty of such a series of blunders as the campaign of 1776, could not have devised such a brilliant stroke.

Like Homer, Shakespeare, Thomas à Kempis, St. Matthew, Spenser and Burton, Washington had, it appears, an understudy somewhere, who did all his thinking for him, and was content to leave the credit to his chief as to a mere mask or figurehead.

Rahl's folly and self-indulgence are at the root of this disaster. He had many subordinate officers who fully appreciated his dangerous apathy, and, although it is hazardous work for a subaltern to argue with his commanding officer, did what was possible to arouse him to a sense of peril; and their accurate and careful drawing of maps and plans of the campaign in the Jerseys proves their military capacity. Lieutenant Von Wiederhold's plan of Trenton is admirable.[1] The course of the movements during that fateful fraction of an hour may, by the aid of this map, be followed with ease.

Washington passed the next few days in a salutary activity. He restored to the inhabitants of Trenton stuff looted by the Germans; he caused to be knocked in the heads of many barrels of rum, a too abundant liquor as he thought. He then marched his prisoners down to Philadelphia, only twenty miles distant, that the Quakers and Germans there might for themselves see the captives of his bow and spear. With him went the German band upon whose services the late Colonel Rahl is said to have put a high value. The band was playing in Philadelphia when Sir William Howe captured the place, while the prisoners were ultimately absorbed into the general population.

Judge Jones[2] says:

> The prisoners were sent to Philadelphia and treated with insult. They were paraded about the town as a spectacle to the people. The officers, though some of them field ones and connected with some of the best families in Germany, were not exempt from this parade. Officers and privates all fared

[1] It has been frequently reprinted; cf. Justin Winsor, vi. 411.

[2] *History of New York*, i. 169.

alike. This was Rebel generosity of which they made such a brag during the war.

As a matter of fact Philadelphia was not easy to arouse. The parade was directed to excite martial ardour among the children of Penn, but, as Graydon points out, they remained unmoved. The news of this enterprise, its success, and its omens, threw the British headquarter staff into confusion. Lord Cornwallis had packed his valise, and had taken passage for England. His projected voyage was abandoned. He hastened southwards to Princeton, towards which Von Donop, thinking himself somewhat isolated after the disaster at Trenton, had hastily retired, leaving his sick, wounded, and heavy movables behind in Bordenton. Sir William Howe remained in New York, where, according to contemporary observers, he enjoyed a truly agreeable season with his ladies, his cards, and his punch-bowl. At any rate he sent Cornwallis down to maintain the struggle for the Delaware. He had previously detached Clinton to Rhode Island with an expeditionary force, and as Burgoyne was in the north maturing his leave of absence from Canada, there was no choice left : either he must take the field himself or send his lieutenant. Consequently, on New Year's Day, 1777, Cornwallis was faring towards Trenton to exact severe reprisals.

Meanwhile Washington, having returned from Philadelphia, reoccupied Trenton, and began to ply pick and shovel. His spirited militia, their term of service having terminated, were all for quitting camp to go home, but accepted bribes to remain with the Commander-in-Chief a few weeks longer. Congress had no money, but these Patriots would not accept pay in paper promises, although the General was in the direst straits and their cause at grips with death. He pledged his own fortune. Mr. John Stark of New Hampshire and a few other men of public spirit followed his example, while Mr. Robert Morris in Philadelphia collected from his friends one hundred pounds in hard

December 31, 1776.

money, and then made a house to house collection of two thousand pounds more; ready cash that helped most substantially to save the situation. Thus Washington was able to detach about six hundred men to waylay Cornwallis between Princeton and Trenton. Greene, placed in charge, handled his men very well, causing much annoyance to the British. This was the kind of fighting the American militiamen loved; they ran little or no risk; they were past masters of the art of potting and sniping; and so, lurking in the woods on either side of Cornwallis, they hit many of his men, without themselves incurring much loss. It was on occasions of this kind, notoriously in the affairs and actions about Saratoga, that the American militia were beyond price as killers of men, that is, when the militia chose to turn up—

. . . "for the militia come in," wrote Washington, "you cannot tell how; go out you cannot tell when; act you cannot tell where; consume your provisions; exhaust your stores; and leave you at last in a critical moment."

Yet occasionally the militia came in at a critical moment; for when the news went round the farms and homesteads and clearings that the British troops were entangled in the bush and hampered, then the militiaman, farmer or ploughman, took down his long fowling-piece, and left home for a day or two's shooting. Both Burgoyne and Anburey praise their skill in this sort of safe enterprise; and Anburey notes the American love of taking human life, which, he thinks, was due to their perpetual contests with the Redmen of the frontiers. Anburey chimes in with the opinion of Washington, Montgomery, and Greene, that the militiaman was a poor soldier anywhere out of cover; or as Sir George Trevelyan ingeniously suggests:

The Americans had now acquired the self-respect which would cause them to be ashamed of the rashness of sacrificing in killed and wounded a heavier toll than the performance of their duty unavoidably exacted.[1]

[1] *History of American Revolution*, iii. 131 (Cabinet edition).

It was thus under a fusillade, somewhat of the Lexington type, that Cornwallis brought his force along towards Trenton. The roads (for the weather had changed since Christmas) were soft and soon churned up into mud, whereby the English regiments arrived at sunset before Trenton somewhat fatigued, and a good deal knocked about by the scrambling actions of the day.

Cornwallis on arriving before Trenton should have called upon his men, weary as they were, to storm Washington's entrenchments. These lay along the south bank of the creek called the Assumpink, being breast high and giving good shelter of the Bunker Hill and Brooklyn type. The British in their slow advance had succeeded in driving the Americans before them over the creek and into their earthworks. It is eleven miles from Princeton to Trenton, and as the British had been marching and fighting all day, Cornwallis determined to cease fighting and to assault on the morrow at daybreak. His officers urged upon him the policy of attacking the American militia that night, for they were quite as worn out as the British, and dispirited to boot by the day's retreat. But Cornwallis, who appears now to have imbibed much of the spirit of Howe, whose staunchest friend he ever remained, declined the advice. It was a question of one hour's fighting, and the storming of the entrenchments would have certainly ended the war. That Washington expected his entrenchments to be stormed, had the assault proceeded, is certain.[1] He therefore determined not to await attack. It is doubtful whether Washington had ever heard of Hannibal, except as a name popular among negroes; but at this time he showed a talent for *ruse*, which the Punic

January 3, 1777.

[1] Marshall, *Life of Washington*, ii. 623. "The situation of Washington was now again extremely critical; if he maintained his present position, it was certain that he should be attacked next morning by a force in all respects superior to his own, and the result would most probably be the destruction of his little army;" cf. also S. G. Fisher, *Struggle for Independence*, i. 565 (ed. 1908).

general might have envied. To cajole and deceive his complacent foe, the farce of doubling guards and digging entrenchments by lantern light was kept up all night, the bivouac fires were replenished, and every symbol and token of camp life on the *qui vive* were practised with success. Behind this well-executed *ruse*, Washington got away by the back door of his position, marched round Cornwallis's left flank, and plodding on all that long winter night, arrived within easy striking distance of Princeton, leaving Cornwallis and the British troops behind him, and posting himself astride their communications with their base.

At Princeton there had been left three British regiments, the 17th, the 40th, the 55th, with a fragment of cavalry. The total force amounted to over seven hundred men. Of these the 17th and 55th, with two cannon, and the cavalry set out at daybreak to join Cornwallis before Trenton. A heavy winter frozen fog lay above and about the roads, which during the previous night had become as hard as pavement, so that the British marching briskly south, and the American militia forming the van of Washington's force coming north, came to an encounter. The point was settled by a charge home executed by the 55th regiment, which, with the bayonet, drove back the American militia, and mortally wounded General Mercer in command. Colonel Mawhood, the British commandant, now perceived that a large American force was in supporting distance of the force he had just routed. He had captured two cannon, and put to the bayonet the American artillerymen. Inspirited by this success, and believing it to be his imperative duty to hold up at all hazards what he thought to be a retreating American army, he summoned up the 40th regiment from Princeton, not more than a mile to his rear, and began to make a sturdy resistance. The situation becoming critical, Washington rode up, exposing himself to instant death with the same splendid fearlessness that animated Sir William Howe at Bunker Hill, or Marlborough

at Blenheim. The British force, which came into action about five hundred strong, and had now by accession of the 40th regiment increased to about seven hundred and forty, broke into two parts, of which one part, the 17th, charged right through the American troops, and reached Cornwallis coming up from Trenton. The 17th came into this engagement two hundred and twenty-four rank and file; they emerged with the loss of a hundred and one. During this contest the British troops displayed the most invincible valour, and the action of the 17th is rightly regarded as among the most brilliant exploits of the war.[1]

The 55th and the 40th, of which the latter regiment a little later on at Germantown, under Lieut.-Colonel Musgrave, gave such a splendid account of itself, retired with some loss on Princeton, and in good order to New Brunswick.

Washington's objective had been to destroy stores at New Brunswick, the chief depot of the British cantonments in Western Jersey, but recent engagements having tired and attenuated his force, prudence suggested a change of plan. Some of his best men, the Virginians under Scott and others, had plodded over that weary ground twice in eighteen hours, fighting with Greene against Cornwallis's advance from Princeton southwards, and again accompanying Washington in his night march from the Assumpink Redoubts northwards, to meet at the end of these movements a very small but very determined British force just outside Princeton. And there appeared to be a more ominous reason for this change of plan; it was observed that

[1] *The Annual Register*, 1777, says of Mawhood: "In this trying and dangerous situation, the brave commander and his equally brave regiment have gained immortal honour;" cf. also Lamb, *Journal of the American War*, p. 133, and F. Moore, *Diary*, i. 372, where there is a spirited account of the valour of the 17th regiment. "One of the most gallant exploits of the whole war," says Stedman, i. 237. "Captain Scott, who led the regiment, received very deserved applause for his conduct on that occasion. It was a day of much bravery on both sides."

while the number of private soldiers falling on the field of battle was small, the number of officers killed was very considerable. A general officer, two colonels, and many men of much promise and some performance suffered mortal injuries,[1] and Washington himself, by the doctrine of chances, ought also to have been killed.[2]

Considering it therefore prudent to abandon his original project, he proceeded by easy stages over the few miles dividing him from Morristown. His arrival here concluded a very remarkable month's work. On the 7th of December 1776 he had been on the west bank of the Delaware, cleared out of the Jerseys. A few days before that date the Jersey and Maryland Patriots had abandoned him on the plea that their time of service had expired;[3] Charles Lee in an important command was insubordinate, almost mutinous; Congress was directing Washington to do impossible things; and the British had possession of New York, the two Jerseys, and were within twenty miles of Philadelphia; add to these facts that Washington had acquired the reputation of being unlucky and wanting in decision. In the course of four weeks Congress, after appointing Washington dictator, had broken up and fled into Maryland. Lee was a prisoner in the hands of the British, Trenton had been recaptured, Cornwallis outclassed; the British force weakened by nearly two thousand men, either prisoners or disabled; while Washington's reputation as a soldier of the first order was everywhere trumpeted, and nowhere more than in Germany.

January 7, 1777.

[1] General Mercer lingered in intense suffering for a few days (he was bayoneted). Colonel Hitchcock of New England, Colonel Hazlet, Captain John Fleming, Captain William Shippen, U.S.N., with Morris, Neal, and many others; cf. Frederick D. Stone in "The Struggle for the Delaware," Winsor, vi. A partial list of these losses is given in Marshall, *Life of Washington*, i. 626.

[2] Washington at Princeton behaved with the same reckless courage he had displayed at New York when trying to rally the flying militia on the occasion of Howe's landing on Manhattan Island.

[3] 2nd December 1776; cf. F. Moore's *Diary*, p. 357.

At Morristown the American force dissolved.[1] The time-expired men of the New Year, who had joined on for a few weeks longer in consideration of largess, now dispersed to their homes, stealing guns and ammunition on their leaving. No other militia came in before March; Washington at this juncture had no army worthy of the name, and for the few who remained by their obligations, supplies of all kinds were lacking. Gordon reported that by the time the Patriots reached Morristown, they were so excessively fatigued, that a fresh and resolute body of 500 men might have demolished them all.[2] Numbers lay down in the woods and fell asleep regardless of the inclemency of the weather. Of these men a considerable number a few days later went to their homes. Yet here Washington lay for four months undisturbed. January 7 to May 28, 1777.

The condition of the Continental troops all this time was deplorable. Washington's complaints are incessant. "Men," said he, "are taught to set a price upon themselves, and refuse to turn out unless the price be paid." Mr. Lecky, summing up the doings of these months from January to May, remarks:

If indeed, as most historians are accustomed to assume, the bulk of the American people were really on the side of Washington, their apathy at this time is almost in-

[1] Morristown during this war was twice occupied by Washington for many consecutive months for his headquarters. The house tenanted by him is now State property, and the town being within one hour's run of the Empire City, is much frequented in holiday times. But in January 1777 both the town and its military occupants were in a sorry plight.

[2] Washington's design on leaving Trenton had been to march on Brunswick, to capture the undefended stores and treasury in that place. Seventy thousand guineas in hard money lay there, as he thought, for the taking; but the American troops were clean worn out, shoeless, without tents or blankets, and all longing to get home. Cornwallis was close behind the American army, and could have marched it down to a standstill, but timorous for Brunswick and the military chest he got back to his base with all despatch, leaving Washington unassailed, who thus within less than a week escaped imminent peril three times.

explicable, and it could only be surpassed by the stupendous imbecility of the English, who appear to have been almost wholly ignorant of the state of the American army who remained, and remained waiting for the reinforcements from England long after the season for active operations had begun, and at a time when there was scarcely any enemy to oppose them.

Unimpeachable evidence shows this apathy was general and widely spread.

1777. "Washington," Gordon says, "wrote to complain that after the 15th of March we shall have only the remnants of five Virginian regiments. Little dependence can be placed on the militia, they come and go as they please. If the enemy do not move it will be a miracle. Nothing but ignorance of our numbers and situation can protect us.[1]

Yet it is difficult to reconcile these statements of fact, with other facts about which there is no reasonable doubt. The American farmers appear to have harassed the British by a continual and galling vigilance.

Within striking distance of Washington lay Cornwallis at New Brunswick, with Vaughan at Amboy, and a good army of 10,000 men. It was settled country, well wooded, and fairly well known to the British commanders. A day's march would have brought either of them within random shot of the American cantonments. But as no demonstration was made in strength, the farmers of New Jersey, plucking up courage, took to stalking red-coats for pastime.

"Not a stick of wood, a spear of grass, or a barrel of corn," says Jones, "could the troops in New Jersey procure without fighting for it. . . . Every foraging party was attacked in some way or other. The losses on these occasions were nearly equal."

Hundreds of men were disabled or killed. The British losses could not be repaired with facility. Their foes were not soldiers enlisted under military articles, but mere *francs-tireurs*, who, according to all modern laws of warfare, if captured, would have been

[1] Gordon, ii. 421.

immediately hung, or shot at sight. Many of them carried in their pouches an attested document to show they were good and loyal subjects of King George; in another pocket were more papers to show their allegiance to the United States.

Washington quite understood the high value of keeping raw troops ever on the run. They were not allowed time to think of their rags, their insufficient food, and miserable equipment. It was said in New York that there was not a sound pair of breeches in the Continental army, nor a pair of boots. This may be so; but the sagacity of their Commander, together with their exasperation at the conduct imputed to the German troops, made them keen sportsmen at the game, and obedient to their General. They annoyed and worried a force of three times their numbers and twenty times their resources. It is now admitted that the most butcherly attack on Washington at Morristown would not have cost the British army so many men as were put out of action by the incessant sniping of pickets and cutting up of foraging parties during the spring of 1777. The common opinion among the Americans was that Howe was afraid to attack them.[1]

A brief glance at the position of the armies during this period will perhaps make the situation a little clearer. This spring campaign, if it may be so called, spluttered out. There were affairs at Boundbrook on the New Jersey side, at Peekskill on the New York side, and at Danbury in Connecticut, in which much damage was done by fire and sword, many lives crippled or lost, and General Wooster of the Continental army killed; but these actions had little or no effect on the general course of events. Howe seems to have arrived at the conclusion that a road to Philadelphia no longer lay open to him. What he might have done with impunity at Christmas 1776,

[1] An opinion elaborated a century later by Dr. E. E. Hale, and accepted by one or two English writers of repute. Cf. Hale in Stevens' edition of Sir W. H.'s Order Book, 1775-76.

was absolutely beyond his power at Midsummer 1777. He did not assault Washington in his lines at Morristown; nor, on the other hand, could he induce the American General to hazard a general engagement. Consequently, the whole British force was withdrawn from the Jerseys, and the friends of the Ministry, the Unionists or Tories, were abandoned to their fate. And this fate was the fate proper to men who essay to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. For at this time the New York Tory papers used to call, and rightly call, Washington the Lord Protector, and likened him to Cromwell. He had not the shadow of legal or constitutional authority; but the exigencies of the times caused men to surrender their ill-understood civic rights into his hands and to accord him a cheerful and intelligent obedience.

June 1777.

Washington supreme.

Now Washington's hatred for Loyalists or Tories was an unmitigated hatred. His letter to his brother, when Howe quitted Boston and took with him some eleven hundred refugees, has been already noticed. The tenor of that letter is traceable in all his subsequent behaviour towards the Tories. The awful sarcasm of his treatment of the Tories captured with Cornwallis at Yorktown, about whom he stipulated that they should be left to be "tried by their peers," is qualified by John Adams as "striking Toryism dumb and dead."[1] He seems to have regarded them as cowards, for whom no contempt could be too acid.[2] This term was commonly applied to them by Patriotic writers. Samuel Adams, writing as "Candidus" to the people of Pennsylvania,[3] described his opponents as "puling, pusillanimous cowards." Franklin's sentiments about them were equally savage.[4] Consequently, the chief sufferers in the course of this scrambling warfare were the Tories or

[1] John Adams to his wife, dated Amsterdam, 18th December 1781.

[2] Cf. *The Real George Washington*, Paul Leycester Ford, p. 271.

[3] 3rd February 1776, in Wells's *Samuel Adams*.

[4] Franklin to Maseres, Passy, 26th June 1785.

Loyalists. Washington's proclamation on his arrival at Morristown made them outlaws. They were offered the alternative of submissive allegiance to the United States of America, or of withdrawal within the lines of the British occupation. The alternative was embarrassing. There were no United States of America, and within a very short time there were no lines of British occupation. The Thirteen Colonies were independent powers severally, and Congress was, during the Revolutionary War, nothing better than a central committee of advice, or of grievances, or a committee of public safety. It was neither "a Legislature nor an Administration"; it never had the powers of a governing body, although at times it presumed to use them, as when it made Washington dictator, and turned out paper money by the bale, with orders that such money was, under very severe penalties, to be everywhere accepted as legal tender. The Union of States and the confirmation of Congress as a Legislature did not take place till 1789. Consequently Washington, in demanding of a New Jersey man allegiance to any one of the twelve States of which a New Jersey man was *not* a subject or citizen, went a long way beyond the powers vested in him as dictator. Congress saw this flaw as soon as it was brought to their notice and repudiated the pretension. But the unhappy New Jersey man was not acquainted with the constitutional rights of his own position. He, in common with scores of thousands of other men, thought Congress invested with the powers of a constitutional central government, yet there was no constitutional central government. Congress or any deputy of Congress had no more power in New Jersey without the concurrent consent of the Legislature of New Jersey than it might pretend to exert in Alaska. On the other hand, by the middle of 1777 there were no British lines of occupation in New Jersey. Hence the miserable Tory had to make his profession of allegiance to an authority quite nebulous, or to seek the protection of an equally nebulous defender.

Condition of the Loyalists.

The long ill-starred line of cantonments in New Jersey had been established to shelter the Loyalists or Tories. The fact is the Tories at this time shrank from fighting, and looked to Howe and Cornwallis for protection. Consequently, at first they came in for the penalties usually incurred by the class of man who has no convictions; they were impartially kicked by either party. In course of time, however, hard usage made many Tories into first-rate soldiers, and their influence on the course of hostilities was such as to convert the struggle into a mere rivalry in savage reprisals.[1]

Jones makes many charges against Howe for his indifference to the sufferings of Loyalists. He alleges instances of barbarous cruelty which, in his opinion, Howe might have punished.

In civil wars barbarous reprisals are inevitable. No one questions that all along the routes traversed by the combatants, British or American, there were waste, pillage, and cruelty. The commanding officers on both sides did what they could to prevent these excesses, but it does not appear that on either side the provost marshal was busy hanging marauders, according to the discipline exercised in Wellington's army in the Peninsula. Washington complained that his men could not be restrained from plundering and riot during his occupancy of New York. Jones enlarges on the treatment, the insults to women, the destruction of house and home befalling the unhappy Loyalists. He tells of more than one ghastly murder by Patriots and names the murderers; on the other hand, he speaks in terms of violent disapproval of Sir William Howe and the lack of control of his men.

Howe's troops in September 1776 plundered and destroyed the great library of New York, which contained in the City Hall 60,000 volumes.

"I saw," says Jones, "an *Annual Register*, neatly bound and lettered, sold for a dram, Freeman's *Reports* for a

[1] Cf. Bernard, *Recollections of America*, p. 60, New York, 1887.

shilling, and Coke's *Institutes*, or what is usually called *Coke upon Littleton*, was offered to me for 1s. 6d. I saw in a public-house upon Long Island, 40 books bound and lettered . . . under pawn from one dram to three drams each."

Howe's troops did the same thing at Princeton in December 1776. They plundered Principal Witherspoon's library, and broke the philosophical instruments and mathematical appliances. On the other hand, the American militia demolished the organ of the College chapel in Princeton. The organ-pipes were possibly turned into bullets. The library of Yale University was sacked and scattered by British troops in 1779. It may be well to recollect that in London a year or two later the No-Popery rioters sacked, destroyed, and burnt Lord Mansfield's library, an almost unique collection of books. The destruction or mishandling of books seems to have a pleasure of its own. In the English universities in 1547, for instance, there was hardly a College Library that had not been either burnt or scattered by Protestant Reformers. The quadrangle of a well-known college was one day knee-deep with maimed, mutilated, and dismembered books. During the English civil wars the destruction of libraries proceeded apace. Very few indeed of the troops could read; still fewer cared to read; books in such a case are looked upon as useless lumber. But beyond this vandalism, plundering by British troops appears not to have been excessive. Soldiers showed some propensities for pigs and pullets, but outside this range of action they did not behave so badly. Their demeanour in Boston is valid testimony in this direction, but of our German allies much more has been said. Their doings at Trenton were of the most grotesque rapacity. It occupied Washington some time to get the Hessian booty, big grandfather clocks and feather beds, restored to their lawful owners. "Hessian" is, according to Hosea Biglow, a name that in America still stands for any marauding thief. Yet all the plundering by everybody concerned was a mere pin-prick

compared with the harrying of Georgia in 1864; the ravaging of American territory by American troops.

Harrying of Georgia in 1864.

Let us then look at a page or two of American history later by some ninety years than the records against Briton and German in New Jersey in 1776. There is in New York a very finely devised and executed statue of General Sherman. General Sherman, being in a hostile country, Georgia, at the head of a strong force, in a field order of 9th November 1864 directed, "The army will forage liberally on the country during the march."

This announcement was made preliminary to the famous raid through Georgia. One of his biographers says that

> John T. Sherman had not only determined to live off the country, but also that the enemy should find no subsistence wherever he (Sherman) passed.

This being the principal idea, the arrangements for systematic foraging were made and carried out with military precision. Each brigade would send out a party of about fifty men on foot, who would return mounted, driving cattle and mules, and hauling family carriages, loaded with fresh mutton, smoked bacon, turkeys, chickens, ducks, also with jugs of molasses and sacks of sweet potatoes. As the crops that year were large and had just been gathered and laid in for the winter, and as this section had never before been visited by a hostile army, the land was rich in provisions and forage. In this way Sherman destroyed everything on either side of him.

> "We have consumed," he reported, "the corn and fodder in a region of country thirty miles on either side of a line from Atlanta to Savannah, as also the sweet potatoes, cattle, hogs, sheep, and poultry, and have carried away more than 10,000 horses and mules, besides a countless number of slaves. I estimate the damage done to the State of Georgia and its resources at 100,000,000 dollars, of which 20,000,000 have inured to our advantage, and the rest is simple waste and destruction."

Added to this official violence and pillage is the incommensurable rape and rapine perpetrated by the unofficial marauders, the bummers, the Nyms, the Pistols, on whose doings Sherman looked with a lenient eye. No punishments ensued. Of other outrages, the alleged rape of the girls in the high school of Atlanta, and such-like stories, there is now a general hush.

The newspapers of Charleston, of Richmond, of Augusta, of Columbia, of Atlanta, have one story to tell, and Sherman's friends and admirers another. The latter seem to think it enough to say that Sherman "never heard of any case of murder or rape." Of course not! What general officer ever heard of such crimes done by men of his command, or who is likely to tell him? Sherman wrote about these charges:

> The editors in Georgia profess to be indignant at the horrible barbarities of Sherman's army, but I know the people don't want our visit repeated.

So far as regards larger raids and exploits, now let us turn to specific performances in towns.

Columbia in the census of 1860 was a town of 5000 houses. In 1865 it was crowded with refugees from the outer regions of South Carolina, of which State it was the official capital. The place was, under the white flag, surrendered to General Sherman, who accepted the surrender and placed it in charge of one of his colonels. Within one hour every man of this officer's command was blind or furiously drunk. The sack of the city had begun before Sherman's entry; incendiaries from every brigade set the town ablaze.

> Drunken soldiers ran through house after house, and were doubtless guilty of all manner of villainies, . . . and it is these men that, I presume, set new fires farther and farther to the windward in the northern part of the city. . . . The flames made fearful ravages, and magnificent residences and churches were consumed in a very few minutes.

Sherman is said to have been ill-informed or unaware that so much violence and plunder were proceeding; he

gave no orders to check destruction. For had he not previously ordered that Columbia's public buildings, railroad property, manufacturing and machine shops were to be destroyed? His orders were interpreted by his troops and camp followers in a sense akin to their reading of his famous foraging order of 9th November 1864. In after-years Sherman was quite impenitent about his doings in Columbia; he desired to put an end to the war, and burnt Columbia with no more compunction than the French, in their conquest of Algeria, burnt, in their cavernous places of refuge, Kabyles and other Arab tribes. Doubtless Sherman was quite right.[1] If Howe had carried on war in this style, his task would have been completed in a few months. It was not British incendiaries that set fire to New York. And if Howe had set fire[2] to Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, as Richmond (Virginia), Atlanta, and Columbia were sacked and burnt in the Second Civil War, he had not exceeded the custom of war. There is a school of military philosophers that alleges the quickest wars are the most merciful, according to whom Howe might have saved millions of pounds, indescribable suffering, tens of thousands of lives, by the adoption of a thoroughgoing military policy. But be this as it may, what is to be said, on the one hand, about Jones's complaints that Mr. De Lancey's beautiful house was sacked by the Patriots, and one of the ladies scratched her leg in the shrubbery as she fled from the mansion; or, on the other hand, of the Patriots' complaints about the sack of Danbury, when twenty houses were burnt, and the loss to each man having claims upon the county was assessed at about sixteen pounds a head! In face of what has since taken place on American soil, the complaints made, echoed, and reiterated on both sides of the Atlantic from that day to this against the Royal army

[1] Cf. Rhodes, *History of United States of America*, v. ch. 25, pp. 22 *seqq.*

[2] Jones warmly supports the idea that he should have followed Cromwell's example in *his* dealing with Irish rebels.

in 1776 and following years, are like the shrieking of a girls' tea-party at the appearance of a mouse. As a matter of fact, as compared with the Patriots themselves and their treatment of their fellow-countrymen, the Royal army comes out a length or two ahead. It is not charged with burning any one alive, the fate said to have befallen the Rev. John Roberts at the hands of Patriots in Charleston; nor is it alleged that 1776. they stripped Patriots naked and laid them out in a freezing puddle to cool their loyalty, as is stated to have been the lot of the terrorised Loyalists along the Delaware. Sherman's policy is quite intelligible; he was a kind of American Attila who began public life somewhere in the West as a lawyer, and appreciated the policy of "Thorough." He is credited with a statement that, sooner than allow the Southern States their independence, he would massacre every man in the South. He devastated the Southern territories in a style unknown in Europe since the fall of Magdeburg. As a matter of policy, his proceedings have had defenders and admirers on both sides of the Atlantic, and his statue on the heroic scale is in New York. Passing him by as an admissible figure among military heroes, what are we to say of General Butler, the Massachusetts attorney, and his infamous "woman order" in New Orleans? Americans do well to endeavour to plunge into the deepest depths of Lethé the cruelties and ravages of Sherman's bummers, the insolence and arrogance of Butler and his myrmidons in that awful Civil War; but it is well for them to reflect that in estimating the actions of the Royal army under Sir William Howe, they are compelled, by the irony of their own history, to look at that distant scene through the gloom and flame of campaigns fought on their own soil, of the most ruthless war that has ever, within record, been waged by kinsfolk upon kinsfolk.

It is, however, encouraging to reflect that in America the association known as the Grand Army of the Republic appears to be doing what it can to obliterate

the ghastly memories of that terrible time. On Memorial Day (31st May) the few survivors of the soldiers of that war join together in a kindly attempt to close the wounds of their quarrel. The men of the South are no longer referred to as rebels. Possibly the time may come when statues, monuments, and memorials, that already have little or no meaning to the children of the United States, may vanish with the mournful memories of these Civil Wars; and perhaps even Mr. Russell Lowell's savage verses about the men of the South may be forgotten, and Franklin's advice to fill school-books with fancied British barbarities be blotted out from record.

# CHAPTER XV

## THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN OF 1777—OPERATIONS ABOUT PHILADELPHIA—THE BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE

In March General William Howe was created by his grateful master a Knight of the Bath. His successes, as seen through British spectacles, had been conspicuous: the American cause was reckoned as lost. Lord North wrote in terms of warm approval of Howe's operations, and told him that his countrymen rested satisfied in his best endeavours to complete what he had so well begun, and that he would have the assistance of every exertion from England with cheerfulness, although its resources in men were not equal to its spirit or readiness to procure or pay for them.[1] Curwen reports that in London it was firmly believed that the American game of independence was up. 1777.

"You will scarcely meet," says he, "one that entertains the least shadow of a doubt that the government must succeed in the utmost extent of its views before the fall. I wish the old Latin proverb may not with too much propriety be applied to these implicit believers, 'Canunt triumphum ante victoriam.'"[2]

News in the coffee-houses and taverns was always fanciful and generally false. The expresses from America brought the most trivial information. The daily papers manufactured their reports to suit the public wishes, and little could be relied upon except the despatches from Sir

[1] North to Sir William Howe, 5th March 1777.
[2] Curwen to Rev. Isaac Smith, 6th April 1777.

William or from Lord Howe. Even these documents were passed through a little cooking before publication in the *Gazette*. As to the American papers, which might be seen at the New England Coffee-House, they were more unworthy of credit than their London contemporaries. The Ministry were thought to be victorious all along their line of action; a success measurable by the curses and oaths of Charles Fox at the winning by his fellow-countrymen of an engagement or two in Long Island and New York.

But in the scene of action, amidst the hurly-burly of the struggle, another view prevailed. Many of the Loyalists had already begun to feel suspicion that their game was up. They despaired of their cause so long as it was entrusted to the Howes. Jones probably expresses in his plain language the general feeling of the New York Loyalists:

> This month was remarkable for the investiture of General Howe with the Order of the Bath, a reward for *evacuating* Boston; for *lying indolent* upon Staten Island for two months; for *suffering* the whole army to escape him upon Long Island and *again* at the White Plains; for not putting an end to the rebellion in 1776 when so often in his power; for making such injudicious cantonments in New Jersey as he did; and for suffering 10,000 veterans under experienced generals to be cooped up in Brunswick and Amboy for nearly six months by about 6000 militia under the command of an inexperienced general.[1]

Ambrose Serle, on the other hand, thinks the general sentiment at New York was that the power of the rebellion was nearly broken, and beyond any apparent probability even of rallying. He speaks of himself as making out pardons in hundreds for rebels. Serle's position in the service of the Crown made of him the kind of man who tells his employers smooth things.[2] Jones having been expelled by the Patriots from his post as a judge of the High Court, and kept out of it

[1] Jones, *History of New York*, i. 177. The italics are his own. Howe got the Red Ribbon in place of Lord Onslow, deceased.

[2] Serle to Lord Dartmouth, 1st January 1777. (The letter is in Stevens' *Facsimiles*.)

by the abolition of Civil Courts during the British occupation of New York, was equally incapable of impartial witness. Evidence notwithstanding goes to support the contention that the conduct of the Howes had filled many Loyalists with great despondency.

Germaine enters the Cabinet.

At this juncture Lord George Germaine enters into the network of affairs.

During the siege of Boston certain changes had taken place in the King's cabinet. The gentle, peace-loving, and methodical Dartmouth, most conciliatory of Colonial Ministers, being relieved "from so troublesome a charge as that of the American Colonies," became the object of many amicable congratulations on his removal to the respectable obscurity of the Lordship of the Privy Seal. Lord George Germaine kissed hands on acceding to Dartmouth's chair in the Colonial Office. No Cabinet Minister has brought to the Inner Council Chamber of the Empire a record so sinister, so exposed to justifiable strictures, as did this new Colonial Secretary. As Lord George Sackville (of Minden) he is only too well known to military notoriety. Directed at the battle of Minden by four separate and distinct messages to lead his brigade of cavalry against the enemy, he managed somehow to misunderstand the messages. His brigade consisted of the Blues, the First and Third Regiments of Dragoon Guards, the Inniskillings, the Scots Greys, and the Tenth Dragoons, than which regiments there were none finer in the cavalry of Europe. On a fifth message from his commander, Prince Frederick, he rode himself to enquire the exact nature of his instructions, and was coldly informed that the opportunity was now beyond recall. His name being omitted from the Prince's Order of the Day extolling the behaviour of the British troops, Sackville demanded a court martial. Arrested in February 1760, he was in April of that year dismissed from the King's service.[1]

[1] Cf. *Story of the Household Cavalry*, Sir George Arthur, D.S.O. (1909); Fortescue, iii. 174; Leveson Gower, *Life of the Marquis of Granby*, Appendix.

It was among the final official acts of George the Second to strike out with his own hand Sackville's name from the list of Privy Councillors, and to direct that the sentence on this high officer should be read at the head of every British regiment in Germany, "that officers may understand high birth and high employment cannot shelter offences of such a nature (disobedience to orders), and to let them see there is a censure much worse than death to a man who has any sense of honour." It was generally surmised that Sackville would be sentenced to death; both the King and military opinion in Germany were surprised at the leniency of the sentence. In consequence, he lost various appointments worth about £8000 a year, and, besides being forbidden to appear in the King's presence, was adjudged unfit to serve the Crown in any military capacity whatever. It remains a question beyond the reach of settlement whether Sackville was guilty of cowardice, or whether he was simply a man of mulish obstinacy and ungovernable pride, to whom any order, even from the highest quarter, was an unpardonable slight. His native ability is beyond reasonable cavil, but he seems to have been one of that class of men who, by espousing, ruin any cause.

Such being the man who, having disgraced himself and the army in the same year that Wolfe fell so gloriously at Quebec, whose abasement, too, in the eye of his fellow-countrymen was so completely unqualified; whose name was a reproach to the great service he had once shared; him the King now called to superintend the movements of a war that menaced the Empire with irretrievable disaster. From the very first he was beset by failure.

"In Parliament," says Walpole, "he was browbeaten by daily insults, and his former parts so entirely forsook him that younger men, who had not seen his outset, would not believe what was attested to them of his precedent abilities."[1]

[1] Walpole thought him a man of great courage; describes his duel with Governor Johnstone as highly creditable to his coolness and intrepidity; and considers his reputation in this respect beyond

He brought with him to office a strong dislike of Sir William Howe and a hatred amounting to rancour for Sir Guy Carleton. With Howe, notwithstanding, he found it prudent to deal circumspectly. Howe had sent to London a request for 15,000 rank and file, a battalion of artillery, and 300 horse and ten ships. In a letter, of which the full text for example's sake has been placed at the end of this chapter,[1] Germaine with much circumlocution declines to fulfil any of these demands. November 30, 1776.

"I am really alarmed," says he, "at your Requisition; as soon, however, as I found from your returns that your army, if reinforced with 4000 men, will consist of very near 35,000 rank and file, I was satisfied that you would have an army equal to your wishes."

Having thus suggested to Sir William Howe that Whitehall was much better able to judge the actual requirements of the army than was the officer on the spot, Germaine proceeds to deal with the demand for artillery.

"This corps," he remarks, "has had so desirable an effect upon the enemy, I wish it was in my power to procure you another battalion of so useful a corps, but it is not."

On the question of the 300 horses he writes:

It would be impossible to procure for you in any reasonable time the 300 horses you desire. And as the expense of sending them is enormous, and the hazard of their arriving safe very great, it is intended to send you only 100, which is more than will be necessary for completing the establishment of those you have.

Both the Howes having joined in a requisition for ten ships of the line, Germaine replies politely that the

question. Walpole, *Memoirs of the Reign of George the Third*, i. 327, and iv. 153.

[1] See p. 352. This letter appears to have been despatched in February 1777, from which it may be concluded that Germaine had difficulty in getting together 100 remounts in two months. Howe's demand reached Whitehall in December 1776.

matter has been referred to Lord Sandwich at the Navy Office, where doubtless the demand would meet satisfactory attention. This remarkable document deserves some notice, being of a piece with other letters and instructions sent to commanding officers in America during this critical period.

1777. Early in this year were matured the plans for the fatal campaign closed by the disaster at Saratoga. Burgoyne, of whom we have heard but little since
1775. his quitting Boston, had again appeared in London after sharing in the somewhat fruitless expedition from Canada southward in the following year. The untoward incidents and results of that campaign, conducted under the direction of Sir Guy Carleton, caused Burgoyne to meet with a very chilly reception
1776. on his return to town in November. It was then the privilege of military gentlemen with a seat in Parliament to resume attendance at St. Stephen's on the suspension of hostilities at the beginning of winter. Burgoyne, as member for Preston, had availed himself of this privilege, and had arrived in London a few days after the adjournment of the House for the Christmas holidays. The King's attitude towards Burgoyne was that of disapproval. At a levee soon after Burgoyne's return, it was noticed that the King scarcely spoke to him, and that he was obliged to crave an audience.[1] This coldness to Burgoyne expressed, we may presume, the attitude of the Court towards the participators in an unsuccessful expedition. That Burgoyne himself had urged on Sir Guy Carleton a more active and energetic conduct of the war appears credible from a letter sent by Major-General Philips to Burgoyne.[2] This unfortunate general, who had already shared in two unhappy and fruitless campaigns in America, and was

[1] *Correspondence of George III. with Lord North*, 1768-1783, vol. ii. p. 44. Edited, W. B. Donne, 1867.

[2] Philips to Burgoyne, 23rd October 1776, quoted by De Fonblanque, *Political and Military Episodes in the Life of Burgoyne* (1876), p. 218.

Sir John Burgoyne (1780).
From a Painting by Ramsay.

destined to be chief actor in the greatest of the many disasters of this war, quitted town for Bath to recruit his health and spirits. He left behind him in London a plan of campaign from the side of Canada, which, being revised and amended by the King, was finally adopted as the official scheme of operation. The King's notes in his own handwriting betoken a remarkable knowledge of detail, and a close attention to suggested movements. But so far as one who has been over some of the ground may presume to judge, the expedition was from the very first doomed to failure. In a skeleton map of the land it is easy to trace the waterways from the Battery in New York to the St. Lawrence at Sorel. Here lies some of the most exquisite of American scenery, decorated by lakes with charming names, and by hills with poetic associations.

The New York Central traverses much of that country, in its work of linking Montreal to New York. Going northward, the traveller passes Bennington with its disastrous memories, and leaves on his left Saratoga, the beautiful Adirondacks, Ticonderoga (soon to be renovated and restored), Lake George, Lake Champlain, and all those sylvan and lacustrine scenes which the wealth and rural tastes of the Eastern American cities have adorned with cottages, villas, mansions, and bungalows. Flowers, lawns, and *Old Glory*[1] have displaced and dispensed the gloomy conditions of that ancient wilderness of tree and water Burgoyne knew so well. In his *Reflections upon the War in America*, Sir John had said much that, but a year or so later, must have recurred to him with poignant force.

Composed as the American army is, together with the strength of the country, full of woods, swamps, stone walls and other hiding-places, it may be said of it, that every

[1] Perhaps it is necessary to note that *Old Glory* is a pet name for the most brilliant and, I believe, the oldest of official national flags. It dates from 1777. The Union Jack, the Tricolor, and other European flags are later.

private man will in action be his own general, who will turn every tree and bush into a kind of temporary fortress, from whence, when he has fired his shot with all the deliberation, coolness, and certainty which hidden safety inspires, he will skip as it were to the next, and so on for a long time until dislodged either by cannon or by a resolute attack of light infantry.

But what Whitehall appears to have imagined, is that one can, with a blue pencil, mark a long line through a map, and win through any opposition or obstacle the enemy or the physical features of the land put in the road. The whole force in Canada was short of 12,000, of which the King said: "I should think not above 7000 effectives can be spared over Lake Champlain, for it would be highly imprudent to run any risk in Canada." The King's estimate was very close to the mark; of the European troops engaged in that expedition the number was 7251. With this handful of troops it was proposed to march more than two hundred miles, carry all supplies, and maintain some sort of communication with its base.

Censure of Howe:

A considerable weight of opinion combines to lay at the door of Sir William Howe the responsibility for the failure of this expedition from Canada. On the whole, later American opinion seems to be faithful to the earlier tradition, which is that Howe was guilty of neglect, besides being constitutionally unable to maintain strenuous effort for a protracted time. From Charles Stedman, whose sympathies, although he served in the British army, were with the Americans, to S. G. Fisher the continuity of American censure of Howe remains unbroken. The opinion of authoritative British writers moves in the direction of saddling all the burden of meddle, muddle, and disaster on Lord George Germaine. The Colonial Office in Germaine's day was, according to a candid critic, an idle place, and the clerks were said to be men of corrupt morals, and of more than doubtful integrity; it was a nest of incompetency, dishonesty, and carelessness. This

Germaine's interference.

# BURGOYNE'S EXPEDITION FROM CANADA

**Plan showing 130 miles of route**

**June 20—Oct. 10, 1777**




Stanford's Geog' Estab', London

London Macmillan & Co. Ltd.

critic considers the course of the campaign owes its baneful issue to the methods, or want of them, prevailing in the Colonial Office itself.[1]

"The inconsistent orders given to Generals Howe and Burgoyne could not be accounted for," wrote Lord Shelburne, "except in a way which it must be difficult for any person who is not conversant with the negligency of office to comprehend."

What then was this inconsistency of orders? We have already seen that Burgoyne's scheme for the reduction of New England by an expeditionary force, with Canada for its base, had been fully approved in Whitehall. A copy of the scheme was sent by Germaine to Sir William Howe for his information, and to Sir Guy Carleton for his instruction. Germaine's rancour against Sir Guy Carleton was so far a matter of common knowledge that the King, in writing to Lord North the previous December, advises him to let Germaine's tongue run loose on the occasion of the usual weekly Cabinet dinner without setting up any defence of Carleton, other than that to supersede Carleton was at the time impossible.[2] Germaine, therefore, sent a covering letter, insolent in detail, to Governor Carleton, directing him to take all preparatory measures for the promotion of Burgoyne's authorised plans; but to Howe, for whom too he entertained a hearty dislike, he sent nothing but these authorised plans. There was nothing in this batch of letters sent from Whitehall to invalidate or modify the plans for the capture of

March 26, 1777.

[1] *Life of William, Earl of Shelburne*, by Lord Edward Fitzmaurice, i. 360. Shelburne (the Marquis of Lansdowne), was a stalwart Whig, whose doings political were in their degree always pro-American. Shelburne, when young Lafayette came to England on his way to America to promote rebellion there, gave the French adventurer his patronage and protection.

[2] The King writes (13th December 1776): "What I would suggest, therefore, is to let all these invections (*sic*) against him (Carleton) to be thrown out to-morrow without other answer than it is impossible to send out any orders now." The whole letter deserves attention as evidence of the king's awe of Germaine.

Philadelphia, which had been submitted by Howe at the close of 1776, and confirmed by Germaine at Whitehall under date of 3rd of March 1777.

It has perhaps escaped attention that Howe had himself submitted a scheme for the isolation of the New England Provinces by occupying the line of the Hudson.

November 30, 1776. In a long despatch, addressed to Germaine, Howe advanced three propositions as follows :

1st. An offensive army of 10,000 rank and file to act on the side of Rhode Island, by taking possession of Providence, penetrating from thence into the country towards Boston, and, if possible, to reduce that town—2000 men to be left for the defence of Rhode Island, and making small incursions under the protection of the shipping upon the coast of Connecticut.

This army to be commanded by Lieutenant-General Clinton.

2nd. An offensive army in the province of New York to move up the North River to Albany, to consist of not less than 10,000 men, and 5000 for the defence of New York and adjacent posts.

3rd. A defensive army of 8000 men to cover Jersey, and to keep the southern army in check, by giving a jealousy to Philadelphia, which I would propose to attack in autumn, as well as Virginia, provided the success of other operations will admit of an adequate force to be sent against that Province.

Howe's plan demanded 35,000 men. Germaine's rejoinder was :

January 14, 1777. Your well-digested plan for operations of next campaign has been laid before His Majesty, but I must decline for the present to trouble you with any remarks upon it. For as your next letters (of which I am in daily expectation) will probably throw new lights upon the subject, His Majesty thinks proper to withhold his royal sentiments thereupon, until he shall have had an opportunity of taking into consideration the whole of this momentous affair.[1]

Howe's plans being thus waived for the time being, do not appear to have been taken into future consideration.

March 3 and 26. Consequently, the March despatches, brushing aside

[1] Cf. the whole of this remarkable despatch at the close of this volume ; cf. also above, p. 223.

all previous plans and suggestions, put Howe in the position of executant of quite explicit orders.

He had, therefore, no option but to take note of the plans on which Burgoyne was to move and to begin operating according to the plan of campaign devised by himself and subsequently approved at Whitehall. He had no instructions to co-operate with Burgoyne. A few weeks later, however, it appears to have struck Germaine that to capture New England by seizing the line of the Hudson, and thus to isolate the Eastern States, demanded a powerful expedition northward from New York to distract and weaken the American resistance to Burgoyne's advance. Consequently, Germaine some time in May drafted a set of instructions intended for Howe, directing him to co-operate immediately with Burgoyne. The Colonial Minister was leaving town for a few days. His clerks were directed to make a fair copy for his signature. Lord Shelburne asserts that the clerks promised to send the despatch to the country house for the Minister's perusal, but failed to do so. The despatch was pigeon-holed, and on his return to town Germaine "forgot" to ask for, nor did anybody remind him of, this most important paper. Some time after Burgoyne with his army had been captured, a junior Barnacle discovered the despatch and mentioned to his chief the nature of his find. It is a pretty story; the chief risking the fate of a continent, lest he might lose his promised visit to the country; the clerks' disobedience according to their official habit; the chief's "forgetting" a business of world-wide importance; the clerks failing to remind him because of their own neglect; and the young secretary finding the dusty key after the horse had been stolen. Had this letter reached Howe late in June or at the beginning of July, as it easily might, then it had not been too late, for the British troops still lay at the mouth of the Hudson.

It is well known that Howe disapproved of this

attenuated scheme of invasion from Canada. When the three Generals during the blockade at Boston found an idle hour, they appear to have discussed at considerable length the feasibility of an expedition from the north along the lakes down the Hudson, for, as they said, "the reduction of New England" schemes, and plans for the accomplishment of this projected capture of the line of the Hudson, had been sent by Howe to Lord Dartmouth, as well as submitted to General Gage.[1] The topic was familiar to the Commanding Officers and to members of their *family* or staff. But a man may be very familiar with devices or schemes in the stage of academical discussion, and yet entirely disapprove of their being carried into execution: an attitude of mind quite consistent with Howe's indolent disposition, which would lead him to acquiesce in many suggestions so long as he considered them to be mere suggestions. When Howe found his suggestions and schemes of 1776 being materialised in 1777 under the plans and supervision of Burgoyne, he appears to have considered himself slighted.

Nor does it seem compatible with what is known of his character that his approval of any scheme not his own was easy to win. Unlike Washington (at this stage, at least, of Washington's career), he was very chary of councils of war, impatient of advice, and seldom invited it. And this trait of his character disposes of the contention that he owed the suggestion to go southward to Philadelphia to the traitorous mind of Charles Lee, who is said to have drawn up a detailed scheme for the capture of the line of the Chesapeake. Lee's idea did not include the capture of Philadelphia, which he regarded as a place of no military value whatever. The story is that this scheme of Charles Lee's was found some time afterwards among official papers by Howe's secretary. It is doubtful if Howe ever saw the paper. Commanding Officers are inundated with plans and hints

[1] See documents given above, Vol. I. p. 204, Clinton to Dartmouth.

of no value, documents that a smart secretary takes care to stop in transit; and in any case an English gentleman of Howe's parentage and breeding was not likely to have noticed with favour any suggestion from a man of Charles Lee's unbounded conceit, unrestrained expressions, and dubious character.

Movements of the army, 1777.

However this may be, the position of affairs towards the end of June and at the beginning of July may be set out as follows. Howe, withdrawing his detachments from Eastern New Jersey, had concentrated his army at Perth Amboy. Thirty-six battalions, inclusive of light infantry and grenadiers, together with the Queen's Rangers, of whom so much is heard under Colonel Simcoe in later stages of the war, some poor squadrons of dragoons, and the artillery, were got on board ship ready to sail to the south for the Delaware. For some reasons not too obvious, these unhappy men and still more miserable horses were kept sweltering in these stinking, fever-haunted transports for eighteen days before the fleet weighed anchor. By those who know by experience what the temperature and heat of July in New York can achieve in the way of intense discomfort to man and beast, the sufferings of the troops may be appreciated.[1] It was an uncommonly hot summer, and most of the horses perished either in New York Bay or on the voyage to the Delaware.

July 5.

There were detached from the main army for service in New York seventeen battalions, a few troops of dragoons, and some provincial volunteers. In Rhode Island were posted several battalions; the men detailed for service in these two States under the command of Sir Henry Clinton amounted to about 7000. These soldiers, either in Rhode Island or in the Province of New York, had nothing to do but keep reasonably sober and be ready for work at the front. Burgoyne, with his 8000 men (that great army, as

[1] The sufferings of travellers by sea in hot weather in those days are matter of common remark; cf. Eddis, *Letters from America* (9th August 1776), p. 326.

Professor Tyler calls it), was plunging southward into the wilderness of swamp, water, and timber beyond
July 12. Ticonderoga. Sir Guy Carleton remained in Canada, as directed, with a force of observation not exceeding 4000 men. Colonel St. Leger, with another force of about 1700, of whom a thousand were Redskins, was operating around Ontario. Howe's force at sea may have amounted to 12,000 men of all ranks and arms. Consequently, the British army in America about the 12th of July was broken up into six commands, locally remote from each other and practically without any regular means of communication either with each other or with the Commander-in-Chief, Sir William Howe. As the main responsibility for breaking up into three parts the northern division of the British army certainly lies with Germaine; as the wasting of force by keeping men idle in Rhode Island was approved in Whitehall; and as the expedition southward to Philadelphia was also approved by the Colonial Minister, it would appear as if the ultimate ruin of the English predominance in America had been carefully provided for in London.

Isolation of the Generals commanding.

The three Generals, Howe, Burgoyne, and Clinton, were so isolated with regard to each other that Clinton complained late in September 1777 how, for six weeks, he had no news whatever of his chief. As for messages from Howe to Burgoyne, after once the latter was entangled in the woods and swamps, frequent attempts to convey them terminated either in the messengers giving up their task as hopeless, or sending back false statements to headquarters, or getting hanged for their pains, which was the fate of not a few. The story of how a message enclosed in a quill reached Burgoyne is one of the minor adventurous episodes of this scrambling war. Neither could Clinton communicate with Burgoyne, with whom he had no
October 8, 1777. instructions to co-operate. Being at Fort Montgomery and within a comparatively easy distance of Burgoyne, Clinton sent off a man with a message in a tiny silver pellet, but his man was captured and hanged. Clinton

also complained that he could get no directions from his chief in Philadelphia what to do by way of making a diversion in favour of Burgoyne, the fact being that, from whatever district the British troops withdrew, the lip-service Loyalists turned Patriots, and the stalwart Patriots became aggressive, and every man became a detective. It was, therefore, a service of extreme danger to convey letters for the British Generals. The pay was poor, and the penalty, death.

To summarise Howe's responsibility for the disastrous results of the Northern campaign of 1777 is, owing to his own silence in the abortive enquiry by the House of Commons into his conduct of the war, beyond the scope of exact statement.

Abortive enquiry into Howe's conduct of the war.

It is, perhaps, just as well that the enquiry into Howe's conduct was not concluded. The course of the enquiry filled both Opposition and the Ministry in turn with panic. The Whig Opposition had maintained that the war should have been forborne as soon as the local difficulties of warfare had been fully understood; it being quite impossible for the War Office to find an army large enough to carry on the extensive operations necessitated by the nature of the country. Howe's own defence, supported by that of Cornwallis and of Grey, was altogether based on this contention. This evidence by men in the high social position of Cornwallis, Major-General Grey, and Sir William Howe, all of them good Whigs and in high favour with the powerful men of that party, struck a chill into the breasts of Germaine and the Ministerialists. When, however, the tables were turned, Germaine, aided by Galloway, Johnston, and General Robertson, with many other witnesses, refuted the statements of the three Generals, and asserted that the war might have been prosecuted with every prospect of a successful issue, as the roads were good, the country people, both in New Jersey and in the Middle States, not ill-affected to the British arms, and the country open and easy. The Opposition, alarmed at the turn affairs were taking,

now began to desire the close of the enquiry. The constitutional custom of England favoured this aspiration; Parliament was prorogued, and on the resumption of Parliament the enquiry was not resumed.

Unconvincing nature of Howe's defence.

Howe's own apology was felt to be unconvincing. There were too much reserve and suppression of important facts and statements to satisfy open-minded people. The general impression in later years seems to be that both himself and his brother Richard had not the moral courage to apply in America those principles of warfare that both of them undoubtedly understood. It has been said over and over again that a general, who has every reason to think conspicuous success will crown a vigorous pursuit of operations, and is hampered by his own dread of the price in human life to be paid, is unfit for his position—is, in fact, a moral coward. To this general charge is attached a suspicion of disloyalty to the Ministry and to the King. This is the charge pressed home against the two brothers in all the more serious writings of American Loyalists. There is, from the American Loyalists' point of view, a strong case against the Howes. It may be freely confessed that it is hard to satisfy oneself as to the reasonable explanation of Howe's movements in 1777, and as to the fatal interferences from Whitehall, of which there has been so much in recent wars, not to say anything about wars more remote; about Germaine's baneful influence we may, perhaps, never know the exact extent. But given a man very capable, when circumstances roused him to action, of a mental turn resentful of interference, a man naturally indolent and submissive to the vices of that age, gaming and drink and loose living, we arrive at a disposition, apathetic, cynical, irritated by the officialdom of Whitehall, unable to make the best of adverse conditions, and quite willing to seek in coarse amusement and relaxations some solace and palliative of an intolerable position.

This somewhat long digression from the main line

of the story seemed necessary as a kind of prologue to the disasters ensuing upon Howe's famous movement to the south at this juncture of affairs, but we now return to the fleet, both convoying and convoyed, starting from Staten.[1] Baffling winds, light airs, and flat calms delayed movements and protracted for a month a voyage of less than 300 miles. Arriving off the mouth of the Delaware and the Capes, Lord Richard Howe told his brother it was not feasible to take the fleet up the Delaware. Philadelphia is ninety miles from the sea, but vessels of very great tonnage are berthed at the wharves both of the Schuylkill and of the Delaware. Cramp's vast shipbuilding yard is here. There has always been plenty of water to accommodate the King's or any other fleet, but Lord Richard had heard tell of obstacles, *chevaux de frise*, and mines, with batteries fixed at the water's edge on either hand, to say nothing of fire-galleys and certain mysterious kegs full of powder ready to explode, it was said, on contact. For these and other reasons, technical and familiar to the navigator, the fleet was again put to sea, and after the protraction of a most tedious voyage, arrived at the top end of the great Chesapeake inlet, at a place called Head of Elk, where disembarkation immediately began. The Head of Elk is thirteen miles from the nearest point on the left bank of the Delaware. Ten days before the debarkation at the top of Chesapeake of what may be referred to as the army of Philadelphia, the disastrous battle of Bennington had cut off every prospect of realising Burgoyne's plan of campaign from Canada, shattering beyond repair all expectation of his reaching Albany. Thus Germaine's dream that Sir William Howe might complete his campaign on the Delaware in time to reach out a hand to Burgoyne on the Hudson vanished in mortification. In complete ignorance that his col-

July 25, 1777.

Philadelphia.

August 16, 1777.

[1] Eddis, who saw it sail, gives the date as the 23rd of July 1777. He enlarges upon the magnificent appearance of the fleet (Letter of 11th August 1777).

league in the north had already failed, and, as it appears, unable to get messages through to Clinton, Howe pushed forward the landing of his army of probably 12,000 men, and without molestation from Patriotic farmers or others began to move on Philadelphia. Six weeks having now elapsed from the time troops were taken aboard at Staten Island, the question arises, What was Washington doing? For many weeks after he broke camp in Morristown in May, Washington had been marching this way and that way about the British position, seeking what damage he could do, while Howe had been laying military traps to catch the American commander napping, and to force the Americans at close quarters to fight some decisive action. But Washington, too wary to be caught napping, yet remained quite in the dark as to his adversary's real design, and appears to have been astonished when news came that Howe was loading up his transports as if to quit American shores for ever. As the British fleet and convoy worked slowly down the coast, friends of the Patriotic cause sent reports inland to Congress and Washington, but in a few days the last of the ships dipped below the horizon of the watchers, to whom and to whose friends nothing remained about Howe's movements but conjecture.

August 26, 1777.

Washington's dilemma.

When, however, news came to the American headquarters that Howe had gone southward, every Patriot was filled with amazement and delight.

"Where the scourge of God and the plague of mankind is gone," wrote John Adams to his wife, "no one can guess. An express informs us that a fleet of one hundred sail was seen off (the capes of Delaware) last Thursday. The time spends and the campaign wears away, and how many men and horses will be crippled by this strange coasting voyage of five weeks! Never was a more glorious opportunity than Burgoyne has given us of destroying him by marching down so far as Albany. Let New England turn out and cut off his retreat." [1]

[1] John Adams to his wife, 11th and 29th August 1777. The conjecture about the horses was realised, as most of them perished; the east coast of Maryland was in places strewn with their corpses.

This was the general cry when Howe's movements were understood. "Let all New England turn out and crush Burgoyne," wrote Washington, in words echoing John Adams. But for weeks the American General was in great perplexity.

"The conduct of the army is difficult and distressing to be understood," he wrote. "The enemy was off Sinepuxent Inlet, about sixteen leagues to the southward of the Capes of the Delaware, on which I have halted for further intelligence." August 3, 1777.

Beacons, and flares, and expresses let him know that his enemy had entered Chesapeake, and that there was not the least danger of Howe's going to New England. August 22, 1777.

Thus at the end of August the British forces had landed at the ford of Elk and were occupying a day or two for recovery from the fatigues and hardships inseparable from a sea voyage, but intensified that year both by baffling winds and by the extremely hot weather,[1] while efforts were made to remount the handful of dragoons, whose horses had perished by scores in the voyage from New York.

Meanwhile there were strange doings in the neighbouring city of Philadelphia. In that comfortable place was dominant the influence of the Quakers, who, it is said, were "with much rancour and bitterness disaffected to the American cause." Papers and documents had been captured inculpating many wealthy Quaker gentlemen of high misdemeanours against America, which documents, after reference to a committee of Congress, were declared to be authentic and genuine. It was, therefore, recommended that many prominent members of the Society of Friends be deported to Virginia, where they could not mischievously interfere in favour of the royal cause. Among others, the Hon. John Penn, Esq., was removed to a place of security under military guard, as if he were a prisoner of war. The Quakers being also suspected of

[1] John Adams to his wife, 1st September 1777, says the extreme heat of the summer had weakened and exhausted him much.

treasonable correspondence with other States of America, it was recommended to the executive power of the respective States "forthwith to apprehend and secure all persons, as well among the people called Quakers or others, who have in their general conduct and conversation evidenced a disposition inimical to the cause of America."

Apathy of the city.

General opinion or at least practice in Philadelphia was opposed to active resistance. When Graydon was released on parole after his six months' experience of being a prisoner of war, subsequent to his capture at Fort Washington, he returned to his home in Philadelphia by way of Morristown, the headquarters of General Washington. Invited to call on the General in the evening, he tells us that in course of conversation the General expressed an opinion that Howe's objective was Philadelphia. Graydon took an opportunity of having a look at the American army, but there was nothing, he thought, in view that deserved the name of an army. With this sense of the national necessity of an army fresh in his mind he repaired to his native town.

"We saw," he reports, "no military parade upon our journey, nor any indication of martial vigour on the part of the country. General Washington, with the little remnant of his army at Morristown, seemed left to scuffle for liberty like another Cato at Utica."

Graydon goes on to hint that the patriotism of the locality was restricted to Tory-baiting. His account, too, of the expulsion of the Quakers merits a passing notice. The prisoners were not much dejected, probably looking upon themselves as martyrs to the cause of their country, and "in fact their manner rather indicated they considered us more objects of pity than themselves."

The disaffection in Philadelphia being quite appreciated at headquarters, Washington thought it prudent to march his army through the streets of the city, with

a view to encourage the Patriots and overawe the Malignants. The American army, estimated to have numbered about 11,000 men effective and figured on paper up to 20,000, made a fine parade. With the Commander-in-Chief at their head, they passed down Front Street at a good swinging step with well-burnished arms and a soldierly carriage. Ill-clad as they were, their clothing would perhaps have compared favourably with the rags and tatters of the famous army of Italy of 1796.[1]

Pipe-clay and polish, according to the painters of an older school, ever adorned the soldier in the most strenuous moments of war's alarms; but rage, blood, mud, grime, powder, sweat, and agony are the true ingredients, as one may say, of Bellona's palette. Probably Washington's men marching through Philadelphia were, with the gay sprigs of green stuck in their hats, nearly as trim as any of the German infantry regiments at the conclusion of their forced marches on Sedan in 1870.

In any case the military parade in Philadelphia was a salutary display of force. It had at least the effect of allaying the public alarm, and of checking the public clamour. Congress resolved that to save the reputation, if not the possession of the town, a battle was imperative. Consequently the two little armies came within random shot of each other at about 25 miles from the Head of the Elk, where the British expeditionary force had found an easy landing-place.

The Brandywine is a stream partly tidal, which runs in a south-easterly direction from its source, and joins the Delaware at Wilmington.

[1] The Continental army impressed John Adams very favourably. "There were four grand divisions of the army, and the artillery with the matrosses; they marched twelve deep, and yet took up above two hours going by. General Washington and the other general officers with their aids on horseback. I feel as secure here as if I was in Braintree, but not so happy."—John Adams to his wife, Philadelphia, 24th August 1777.

"Among the rivers tributary to the Delaware," says Governor William Penn, "are Christina, Brandywine, Skilpot, and Sculkil, any one of which has room to lay up the royal navy of England."

Passing through beautiful scenery, its banks vary in contour and height from declivities with rolling outline to easy slopes affording easy access to the river. Chadd's Ford lies at a point about halfway between the Head of the Elk and Philadelphia. Below this ford, the bed of the stream contracts and the banks rise to an important height; the river consequently runs with too much force to admit of passage on foot. As the British sappers' equipment, pontoons and all, had been left behind at New York, the route for the army lay through the stream at Chadd's Ford, for the Brandywine crossed almost at right angles the road by which Howe desired to reach Philadelphia. At this point, then, Washington determined to make his stand.

The Battle of Brandywine.

It is now generally conceded that the armies were about equal in number, that the ground favoured the Americans, and that discipline and experience made the British prospect of success slightly superior. Neither army had any cavalry, for such starving animals as were landed by the British at Elk were only fit for the kennel. Forage for three weeks had been shipped at New York for a voyage that lasted over forty days. The few beasts of burden requisitioned in the country of Howe's occupation barely sufficed for transport of artillery and baggage. Washington, on the other hand, was no better off for horses. A few score light dragoons to push home the action when Sullivan's force broke at Brandywine, would have made a very toilsome and hard-fought day as truly profitable as it was victorious for the British.

Every step of Howe's advance was duly reported at the American headquarters, and there appear to have been a little potting and sniping during his slow march of about two miles a day. An occasional brush with handfuls of the Patriots enlivened matters


BRANDYWINE
British
Americans
Scale of Miles
0 ½ 1 2
Road to Chester
GREENE
DILWORTH
SULLIVAN
CORNWALLIS
HOWE'S HEADQUARTERS AFTER ACTION
BRITISH PURSUIT
ENTANGLED IN WOODS
Birmingham Meeting house
SULLIVAN
GUARDS
GREENE
CORNWALLIS
SULLIVAN
WASHINGTON
WAYNE
MILITIA
RESERVE
CHADS FORD
Jeffrey's Ford
Brandywine Creek
KNYPHAUSEN
Road to Kennet Square
Trimble's Ford
London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd.
Stanford's Geogl. Estabt. London.

before the armies came within striking distance of each other. September 11, 1777.

As the ensuing battle was the first engagement in which Washington and Howe measured their strength, it has been frequently analysed, and as often described. Washington's position had been selected with great care. His right front, under the command of Sullivan, lay opposite Brenton's Ford, and to the right again of Sullivan's position extended ground heavily timbered and full of natural entanglements. It is alleged that neither Sullivan nor his superior officer was well acquainted with the land to their extreme right, and that they were misled by the apparent natural strength of the position on this flank. Washington himself, assisted by General Anthony Wayne, took his stand by Chadd's Ford, which had been carefully fortified by entrenchments and batteries. Immediately to his rear lay General Greene with a few regiments in reserve; on the left front was posted General Armstrong with militia regiments to watch from the cliffs their enemies operating on the other side of the river. The Americans consequently stood in a very advantageous position, with heavily wooded broken ground on their right, high banks with a rapid river on their left front, and a carefully fortified position commanding Chadd's Ford at their centre.

On the British side a start was made at four in the morning from a village called Kennet Square. The first column paraded under the command of the Hessian Lieutenant-General Knyphausen, assisted by Major-General Vaughan and Major-General Grant. The division consisted of nine British regiments, four Hessian battalions, and a few dragoons. The Queen's Rangers, a force of irregulars raised locally,[1] some September 11, 1777.

[1] The Queen's Rangers, like Tarleton's British Legion, did excellent work at a later period of the war, when most of the British army of 1777 had perished or disappeared. Reinforcements from home were refused to Sir Henry Clinton, who had to carry on the war mainly with Provincial or Loyalist volunteers; cf. Simcoe, *Journal of the Operations of the Queen's Rangers*, New York, 1844

howitzers and twelve-pounders completed the force. This division marched directly forward eight miles towards Chadd's Ford, meeting with no serious opposition, yet suffering a little from the fowling-pieces and rifles of Patriotic farmers. But as neither Maryland nor Pennsylvania was very keenly engaged on the Patriotic side, there was no real danger from this kind of sportsman, although he caused some annoyance. The column therefore pressed on, and arrived about ten in the morning within shot of Chadd's Ford. The column deployed to begin a brisk attack on Washington and Wayne, and by maintaining a well-nourished artillery duel for an hour or two kept the Americans fully occupied. Meanwhile Cornwallis, accompanied by the Commander-in-Chief with a second column entangled somewhat in its own baggage and camp furniture, was marching away to the north-east to execute the turning movement which, then a comparative novelty in military tactics, was much approved by Sir William Howe. Cornwallis appears to have had excellent information about his route, supplied perhaps by the Loyalists of those parts, for he made direct along the Doncaster Road, crossed a stream or two, and arrived
About 2 P.M. on the American right flank somewhat to the rear of Sullivan's position before ever Washington was certified of the completion of the British movement. The American Commander-in-Chief, believing that his left was unassailable and his centre impregnable, must have conjectured that the British were manœuvring him out of position ; but as has already been said, he appears to have had but a scanty acquaintance with the embarrassing country lying beyond Sullivan's right, and had little means of correcting this imperfect information. As neither side in those days had any system of telegraphy, and as horses were hard to get and always poor creatures, Washington remained in partial ignorance of the actual

(earliest edition, published at Exeter 1787) ; and Fortescue, iii. 399, a very interesting summary of the Provincial Services after Saratoga.

state of affairs in another part of the field of battle. To create a diversion he resolved to cross Chadd's Ford and assail Knyphausen and the British position. This counter attack was fruitless; his troops were repelled, and on their recovering their former position the rumours from his right becoming alarming, Washington most prudently withdrew his centre from the defence of Chadd's Ford, falling back upon Greene's reserves. Meanwhile Cornwallis, at some time in the early afternoon, after a march of nearly eight hours, was threatening the rear of the Americans, having for his lieutenant Major-General Grey (No-Flint Grey of a later exploit) and Brigadier-Generals Agnew and Matthew. His division consisted of eight infantry regiments of the line, with two battalions of the Guards, two of light infantry, two of grenadiers, as well as a few dragoons of the 16th, some Hessians, and four twelve-pounders.

Thus of the two British columns Cornwallis commanded the smaller, showing a field return of about 5000 men. General Sullivan moved two miles obliquely to his right rear, halting over against the Birmingham Meeting House on a well-defined circular hill protected on each flank by thick, almost impenetrable bushes. The British infantry having already marched in the fettering and strangling uniform of that age rather more than seventeen miles, now deployed into two lines of attack and one of reserve. It was bush fighting, with the confusion and disorder attending that kind of action, fighting too of the nature which the Americans, according to Burgoyne and Anburey, thoroughly appreciated; but eventually Sullivan and his force were driven out in a south-easterly direction towards Dilworth, where the Americans broke up in a complete rout. Knyphausen meanwhile, on hearing a sharp cannonade to his left front, realised that his colleague with the second column was closing in on Washington's rear, pressed forward over the Brandywine, captured the American entrenchments with some guns and stores, and, brushing Wayne's force aside, pressed along the

Rout of the Americans.

road to Chester. Meanwhile Washington had sent Greene with his reserves towards Dilworth to disentangle Sullivan and so secure the road to Chester. Howe and the division Cornwallis had now been marching or fighting for nearly fourteen hours, and were exhausted; Greene's reserves, on the other hand, came into action comparatively fresh. A sharp struggle for the Chester Road ensued, in which Greene held his own until the September day died into night and the combat ceased. A singular incident of the engagement was that the battalions of Guards and the unmounted Hessian chasseurs became entangled in the bush country, lost touch of their comrades, and were practically out of action for an hour; but when they did emerge, they dropped upon the right flank of the Americans, engaged with Knyphausen, and thus completed so far as their force was concerned an unpremeditated flanking movement. The bulk of the American army, about six o'clock, was streaming in confusion along the Dilworth Chester Road, hastening past the rear of Greene's covering force, which saved them being cut to pieces or captured. Three or four squadrons of light dragoons, if only tolerably mounted, would have ridden through and through that stream of fugitives in a kind of cross-hatch action, as the Lancers did in 1899 in the rout of the Boers at Elandslaagte. But either their remounts were poor cattle or the squadrons were much under strength, or the ground was unsuitable; for little is heard of this force during the battle.

The Marquis de Lafayette, serving as a volunteer in the American ranks, was wounded in this engagement, and the 10th Virginian Regiment, in rebutting the British advance towards the Dilworth Road, was almost cut to pieces. Sullivan's division behaved badly. The right, which was in some disorder, first gave way. Their flight afforded the British great advantages over the remaining divisions, whose flank was thereby exposed to a very galling fire. Sullivan's men con-

tinued to break away from the right, and in a short time the whole line gave way, and was completely routed. The extreme right attempted to rally, but on being briskly charged by the British, again broke and the rout became general. Washington was badly served by the Intelligence Department of his army; two men sent out as scouts to report on the movements of the enemy brought in word that there was no enemy in the direction towards which Cornwallis was making his flanking movement. The success of the British army for that day was complete.[1] But again ensued that pause of inaction characteristic of Howe's work during all his American command. The men of the division Cornwallis were doubtless fatigued, but the troops under Knyphausen had been but little engaged before five o'clock of the evening of that September day. Having executed a march of a few miles to their own front, while Cornwallis was making his long detour of fifteen miles, Knyphausen's men had been in active operations for only two hours.

The main object for this movement of Washington's was to save the face of the Philadelphians. And there seems to be little doubt that a strong if transitory feeling had been entertained in Philadelphia that Howe's force would be eaten up.

"Howe," says John Adams, writing to his wife a fortnight before the battle, "will make but a pitiful figure. The militia of four States are turning out with much alacrity and cheerful spirits. The Continental army, under Washington, Sullivan, and Nash, besides, is in my opinion more numerous by several thousands than Howe's whole force. I am afraid that he will

[1] For Howe's Report, see Appendix to this chapter. Washington's own report is brief; in the Valley Forge *Orderly Book* no mention of the battle occurs. Two days later Washington's headquarters were at Germantown, 30 miles distant from Chadd's Ford. Chief-Justice Marshall gives an impartial account of this battle, in which, I believe, he took part. Lafayette's account is not complimentary to the Americans; he was wounded while endeavouring to rally fugitives.

be frightened, and run on board his ships, and go away plundering to some other place."

A few days later he says :

Washington has a great body of militia assembled and assembling, in addition to a grand Continental army. Whether he will strike or not I can't say. He is very prudent, you know. I should put more to risk if I were in his shoes, but perhaps he is right. I wish the Continental army would prove that anything can be done. I am weary of so much insipidity.[1]

A few days had wrought a material change in Mr. Adams's mercurial temperament ; he passes within a mere breathing space from set fair to stormy weather.

Graydon, then in Philadelphia on parole, appears to have shared the hot and cold fits of which Adams was the sensitive victim. Writing several years later in the spirit of reminiscence, he asks :

Why not turn out *en masse* and make a breakfast of Mr. Howe and his mercenaries ? Where were the multitudes who used to appear in arms on the commons of Philadelphia ? Where were the Pennsylvanian riflemen, those formidable, those unerring marksmen, each of whom could venture to put a ball in a target held by his brother ? These things promised well ; they were flattering in the extreme, and admirably calculated to bear us up in a confidence of the material superiority of freemen to slaves.

It is obvious that for a while at least Patriots were buoyed up by all the show and promise of the thousands reported to be hastening to Washington's standards. But the thousands did not arrive. In fact the Pennsylvanians and the Marylanders were not keen promoters of their own independence. Had the farmers and rustics of these States acted as the farmers and rustics of New England were at that very time acting about Burgoyne near the Hudson, Howe had not ventured beyond the shelter of his brother's guns. But the Quaker element and the German

[1] John Adams to his wife, 29th August 1777 and 2nd September 1777. Cf. in confirmation of the opinion, Graydon, p. 310. "Confidence prevailed in Philadelphia that Howe could be beaten."

element in the local Pennsylvanian conglomerate were either for peace at any price, or for a safe market at the British price. Their minds were in their shops, their farms, their merchandise, and in the pursuit of gentle forms of pleasure. The German element predominated in the population of the open country.

"The people are," says John Adams, "chiefly Germans, who have schools in their own language, as well as prayers, psalms, and sermons, so that multitudes are born, grow up, and die here without ever knowing the English. In politics they are a breed of mongrels, or neutrals, and benumbed with a general torpor. If the people in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, and Jersey had the feelings and the spirit of some people that I know, Howe would soon be ensnared in a trap more fatal than that in which, as it is said, Burgoyne was taken."[1]

From the above statements it appears that the country generally was open, and not unfriendly to Howe, and that there were no unsurmountable obstacles in the way of his scattering the American army to the four quarters of the compass. On the morrow of the battle Howe lay nearer to Philadelphia by some miles than did the Americans. On the 15th of September the British camp was at Chester, on the right bank of the Delaware, within fifteen miles of Philadelphia. Strictures on Howe's dilatory action seem to have been passed about, and are reproduced at length in Stedman and in the Loyalist gazettes and pamphlets.[2] It is, however, to be noted, immediately after the battle, that the weather terminating an unusually hot summer broke into storms of rain. Howe's army consisted only of infantry and artillery. In that roadless country, and in the then condition of the fire-arm, an infantry-man's ammunition became useless in rain, and his marching powers dropped to about a mile an hour. Howitzers and twelve-pounders, without larger and

[1] John Adams to his wife, 28th October 1777.

[2] Stedman, i. 294; Jones, *History of New York*, p. 191; Galloway, *Reply to Observation of General Howe*, p. iii.

sturdier teams than the British General had been able to collect, remained unmovable, added to which incidental facts was the notorious slowness of the German contingent under the most favourable conditions.

At any rate, Washington's rudimentary army, like certain animals of low organisation after injury, rapidly recovered its vitality, and withdrew towards Philadelphia, leaving behind killed and wounded to the estimated number of 1200, besides incurring heavy losses of artillery and material. Of the four cavalry regiments Mr. John Adams saw marching through Philadelphia there is little said; probably there is little to say. Washington concentrated on the left bank of the Schuylkill.

## APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XV

### HOWE'S REPORT ON THE BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE

(Public Record Office) Colonial Office, 5, 236.

Sir William Howe to Germaine, 18 October 1777.[1]

September 11. [P. 144] On the 11th at Day Break the Army advanced in two Columns; the right commanded by Lieutenant-General Knyphausen, consisting of four Hessian Battalions under Major-General Stirn, the 1st and 2d Brigades of British, three Battalions of the 71st Regiment, the Queen's American Rangers, and one Squadron of the 16th Dragoons under Major-General Grant, having with them six Medium Twelve Pounders, four Howitzers, and the Light Artillery belonging to the Brigades: This Column took the direct Road to Chadd's Ford, Seven Miles distant from Kennets Square, and arrived in Front of the Enemy about ten o'Clock, skirmishing most Part of the March with their advanced Troops, in which the Queen's Rangers, commanded by Captain Wemyss of the 40th Regiment, distinguished themselves in a particular manner.

[1] This despatch was sent home under the same cover as the despatch about Germantown: hence the date 18th October, a fortnight after that battle. See Appendix to Chapter XVII.

The other Column under the Command of Lord Cornwallis, [P. 145]
Major-General Grey, Brigadier-Generals Matthew and Agnew, consisting of the mounted and dismounted Chasseurs, two Squadrons of the 16th Dragoons, two Battalions of Light Infantry, two Battalions of British, and three of Hessian Grenadiers, two Battalions of Guards, the 3rd & 4th Brigades, with four Light Twelve Pounders, and the Artillery of the Brigades, marched about twelve Miles to the Forks of the Brandywine, crossed the first Branch at Trimbles Ford, and the second at Jeffery's Ford, about two o'Clock in the Afternoon, taking from thence the Road to Dilworth, in order to turn the Enemy's Right at Chadds Ford.

General Washington, having Intelligence of this Movement about Noon, detached General Sullivan to his Right, with near ten Thousand Men, who took a strong Position on the commanding Ground above Birmingham Church, with his Left near to the Brandywine, both Flanks being covered by very thick Woods, and his Artillery advantageously disposed.

As soon as this was observed, which was about four o'Clock, the King's Troops advanced in three Columns, and upon approaching the Enemy, formed the Line with the Right towards the Brandywine, the Guards being upon the Right, and the British Grenadiers upon the Left, supported by the Hessian Grenadiers in a second Line. To the Left of the Center were the two Battalions of Light Infantry, with the Hessian and Anspach Chasseurs, supported by the 4th Brigade. The 3d Brigade formed the Reserve.

Lord Cornwallis having formed the Line, the Light Infantry [P. 146]
and Chasseurs began the Attack, the Guards and Grenadiers instantly advanced from the Right, the whole under a Heavy Fire of Artillery and Musquetry, but they pushed on with an Impetuosity not to be sustained by the Enemy, who, falling back into the Woods in their Rear, the King's Troops entered with them, and pursued closely for near two Miles.

After this Success a Part of the Enemy's Right took a second Position in a Wood about Half a Mile from Dilworth, from whence the 2d Light Infantry and Chasseurs soon dislodged them, and from this time they did not rally again in Force.

The 1st British Grenadiers, the Hessian Grenadiers and Guards, having in the pursuit got entangled in very thick Woods, were no further engaged during the Day.

The 2d Light Infantry, 2d Grenadiers, and 4th Brigade, moved forward a mile beyond Dilworth, where they attacked a Corps of the Enemy, that had not been before engaged, and

were strongly posted to recover the Retreat of their Army by the Roads from Chads Ford to Chester and Wilmington, which Corps not being forced until after it was dark, when the Troops had undergone much Fatigue in a March of Seventeen Miles, besides what they supported since the Commencement of the Attack, the Enemy's Army escaped a total Overthrow, that must have been the Consequence of an Hours more Day Light.

# CHAPTER XVI

## HOWE'S OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH: PHILADELPHIA, GERMANTOWN

THE famous city of Philadelphia was laid out in 1682.

"The situation," wrote Governor William Penn, "is a neck of land, and lieth between two navigable rivers, Delaware and Sculkill, whereby it hath two fronts upon the water, each a mile, and two from river to river. Delaware is a glorious river, but the Scullkill, being a hundred miles boatable above the falls, and its course north-east towards the fountain of the Susquehannah that tends to the heart of the province, and both sides our own, is like to be a great part of the settlement of this age. I say little of the town itself, because a platform (*i.e. a plan*) will be shown you by my agent, in which those who are purchasers of one will find their names and interests. It is advanced within less than a year to about four score houses and cottages, such as they are, where merchants and handicrafts are following their vocations as fast as they can."[1]

Thirty years later Philadelphia contained a population estimated at 15,000, and was considered the noblest town of the Atlantic States.

"There are," says a visitor, who knew London well, "several streets two miles long, as wide as Holborn, and better built after the English manner. The chief are Broad Street, King's Street, and High Street, though there are several other handsome streets that take their names from the productions of the country, as Mulberry, Walnut, Beech, Sassafras, Cedar, Vine, Ash, and Chesnut Streets. There are several coves and docks where large ships are built; and by a moderate

[1] Report of Governor William Penn, August 1683.

computation there has been launched from the stocks of this city in forty years near 300 sail of ships beside small craft."[1]

The traveller is enthusiastic about the place. Many merchants keep their coaches. They have built stately mansions "facing the key" at a cost of many thousands of pounds. As for the unearned increment of land value, there is no easy measurement.

"Ground that cost a few years before the sum of £10 would fetch in 1710 at least £300, while there is not a yard of uncleared or ungrubbed land within ten miles of the city. . . . If I were obliged to live out of my native country, I should not long be puzzled to find a place of retirement, which should be Philadelphia," adds the traveller in his admiration.

When Graydon in 1760 attended the Academy, which is now the University of Pennsylvania, the town was well paved and furnished with street lamps. Franklin, whose genius for detail is so well known, proposed a great improvement on the London street lamp, already introduced into Philadelphia by a spirited citizen who gave a sample of the utility of lamps by placing one at his own house door. "I suggested," says Franklin, "the composing of the lamps of four flat planes, with a long funnel above to draw up the smoke and crevices below to facilitate the ascent of the smoke," a device to keep the lamps clear and practicable for a whole night. It is the shape we still commonly use, and is an adaptation of a lamp used at Vauxhall Gardens, where the good Doctor occasionally spent a casual hour during his sojourn in London.

Philadelphia, then, at the time of Mr. John Adams's
1774. first visit, was a really handsome place, with its two splendid streams on this side and that, its fine broad streets "laid out like a chess board," its noble mansions, and its high standard of convenience and comfort, not to say luxury. Unlike Boston, which in those days

[1] *The Voyage, Shipwreck, and Miraculous Escape of Richard Castleman, Gentleman, included in the Voyage and Adventures of Captain Robert Boyle*, London, 1726.

consisted for the most part of cottages and shanties, with an occasional "elegant mansion" of the Hancock type or a building of the terrible appearance of Faneuil Hall, Philadelphia presented, as cities were then, a somewhat uniform dignity of structure and arrangement which gained for it pre-eminence among the four leading cities of the Atlantic seaboard. It has not lost that pre-eminence. All the country to the north and west about and over which these two little armies came to grips in 1777, is now occupied by the suburbs of Philadelphia. Germantown, of which the centre is six miles from the city hall, and the scene of the last of Howe's actions in the field, retains to this moment many "elegant mansions and villas" dating from the Colonial period. Chestnut Hill has been taken in, and the city computed in 1790 to contain 28,000 souls now contains myriads; yet the same type of home and of domestic comfort is said to be maintained unimpaired by time or use. Philadelphia by her devotees is asserted to surpass every city in the world for the high standard and wide diffusion of her domestic comfort. She is hailed as the City of Homes. The well-known influence of the Society of Friends or Quakers in promoting national prosperity is felt still in every direction. William Penn built better than he knew. The good patriots of 1777 banished Penn's descendants and abolished their proprietary rights; but the city of Philadelphia, having returned to her first love, has hoisted William Penn to a prodigious height, from which cold eminence he surveys the city of his own planning, in all its efficiency and splendour. He can see the great yard which builds the American *Dreadnought*. The bright hospitality of to-day has ever been a feature of Philadelphian society. It was impartial hospitality, showing itself as open-handed to Sir William Howe as it had been to Mr. John Adams.

Germantown.

"I shall be killed with kindness in this place," writes John Adams on the occasion of his first visit to Philadelphia.[1] "We

[1] John Adams to his wife, 29th September 1774.

go to Congress at nine, and there we stay until three in the afternoon; then we adjourn and go to dine with some of the nobles of Pennsylvania at four o'clock, and feast upon ten thousand delicacies, and sit drinking Madeira, claret, and Burgundy till six or seven."

After which revelry there was a levee somewhere every evening. Yet Mr. Adams was a seasoned vessel. To the end of his life a large tankard of hard cider was his morning draught for breakfast. All these dinners, too, were accompanied by a fore drink or preparatory posset of cold punch, of which a bowl was passed around from guest to guest without the adjunct of ladle, tumbler, or glass. And that he enjoyed his sojourn in Philadelphia is certain. "I hold out surprisingly," he says. And portraits of him show a handsome gentleman with a fine sense of *savoir-vivre* in his countenance, a lively imagination, and a keen sense of humour.

All these good qualities of the nobles of Pennsylvania were not conjoined with the fighting spirit. The lukewarmness of the people towards the movement for Independence has been noticed again and again. The spirit of Penn strongly prevailed half a century after the remarkable founder of the colony had passed away. He had been a man of intrigue, of plots, of pushing others into danger, a fisherman in many turbid and blood-stained waters, but not a man of arms. It is rare that men of the peculiar taste of William Penn are endowed with the soldier's heart. The man who in the same day hastened from the spectacle of the hanging, burning, and quartering of Alderman Henry Cornish in King Street, Cheapside, to the burning alive of the aged Elizabeth Gaunt at Tyburn,[1] indulging, it is said, a morbid curiosity, was not compounded of the stuff that makes soldiers. And quite independently of temperament, the principles of his sect forbade any appeal to arms for the settlement of any dispute whatever. It is true that succeeding Penns had fallen away from grace,

[1] Cf. Macaulay, *History of England*, vol. i. c. 5, p. 327 (Popular Edition).

and had taken refuge in a mild Anglicanism. This secession of the proprietary family from the Society of Friends had engendered a strong contentious theological feeling towards the Penns, but the principles and practice of both parties moved along converging lines. The Penns owed their vast estates and their proprietary pre-eminence to the bounty of James II. They were ardent adherents of the principle of monarchy. They were already in the position of *beati possidentes*. The Quakers, in their turn, had been purchasers from the Penns of all the choicest frontages and plots about Philadelphia. They had nothing to gain, everything to lose, from any change in the principles or processes of government. It was in vain that Washington, in the dark days of December 1776, wrote his warnings and expostulations to Philadelphia. It was in vain that Samuel Adams denounced the Philadelphians as guilty of infamous conduct. He characterises the men of the city as Quakers, proprietaries, timid Whigs, Tories, *petits-maîtres*, and trimmers. "Pennsylvania," he said, "had disgraced itself by remaining idle spectators while the enemy was overrunning lands adjacent to her borders." Nor had the fiery outbursts of Paine affected the burghers of this too prosperous city. He reproached them with launching their partial invectives against the injured and insulted only, and of sparing their denunciations and invectives against the King and his Ministers.[1] He censured them for so blending their religious tenets with politics as to merit the disavowal and reprobation of every inhabitant of America. But like other philippics this blast of rhetoric passed ineffective. At the time of the march of Washington's army through Philadelphia a few days before the battle of Brandywine, many of the leading Quakers had been expelled from the city, but Graydon mentions with some irony there

[1] Paine, "An Address to the Representatives of the Religious Society of the People called Quakers," an addition to the pamphlet *Common Sense* (ed. 1817). For Samuel Adams's opinions see Wells, *Life and Letters of Samuel Adams*, s.v. "Quakerism."

were among the spectators many who equally disclaimed the epithet of Whig or of Tory. Standing at "the Coffee House Corner" he observed at windows on the line of route the anxious and troubled faces of citizens who desired nothing better than to be left alone; for, as one of them used to say, "Whoever is master, I shall be subject, and I do not invite change." The neutrality, then, of the well-to-do citizen of Philadelphia is beyond question. It must not, however, be inferred that the town did not contain a very strong infusion of Patriots.[1]

Loyalists in Pennsylvania.

Outrages on Loyalists in Philadelphia, as was pointed out at the time, were not of the cruel or brutal kind so common in New England, and it appears that while acting with the approval of the town mob, the doers of violence were, as in many other places, men of the militia. The case of Dr. Kearsley, a highly respected citizen, is described by one who witnessed the incidents from a favourite point of observation, the well-known Coffee House Corner. Dr. Kearsley had doubtless spoken in the unguarded terms of an impetuous man about the Whigs and their proceedings. For this offence the militia seized on him at his own door, stabbed him with a bayonet, hoisted him into a cart, and paraded him through the town to the tune of the "Rogue's March" amidst a mob of boys and idlers. Bleeding, and beside himself with rage and indignation, their victim became crazy, and subsequently fell into insanity. He had been spared the ignominy and torture of being tarred and feathered, yet none the less never recovered his mental balance, and died in an asylum. Similar instances at this time were not uncommon, although infrequent compared with outrages in the Northern and Eastern Colonies. In a later period Pennsylvania became notorious for her merciless treatment of Loyalists and Tories. In none of the Thirteen

[1] The population before the war was estimated at 30,000. Some American writers say that during Howe's occupation the population fell to about 5000. Such statements do not now admit of proof.

States were the Statutes and Enactments levelled against the Tories so searching and so vindictive as were the Test Laws of Pennsylvania. This untoward severity was the natural reaction from the preceding laxity. After Clinton's evacuation of the city the rage of the Whigs arose to fury. The Black List of Pennsylvania was a merciless document.[1] It contained the attainder of 490 persons. Of these men a large number fled, never to return to America. Of the rest some were hanged. The execution of Mr. Roberts, a citizen of Philadelphia, whose marked assiduity in support of the British cause had attracted hostile attention, was among the most tragic. His wife and children appeared before Congress, and on their knees vainly begged for mercy. Roberts was hanged, as he said, for his loyalty to his oath and for doing his duty by his sovereign. 1778.

But in September 1777 the Loyalists of the city, feeling comparatively safe, were in high feather. Washington with a broken and dispirited force lay up on the Schuylkill, on the left flank of the advancing victorious army, which came on in a leisurely fashion towards Philadelphia. Public opinion demanding that another effort should be made to save the honour of the town, Washington marched to meet the British, and the two armies being within striking distance and the preliminary skirmishing having already commenced, a storm of rain rendered the ammunition of both sides quite useless and so stopped the engagement. Washington afterwards withdrew to his former position on the Schuylkill, and crossing to the left bank of the river made the scattered fords of the stream as safe as his means permitted. The British forces marching westward along the Lancaster Road were exposed to attack on their left flank. Consequently the American Commander-in-Chief wrote on 19th September to Major-General Anthony Wayne : September 16, 1777.

[1] Cf. Van Tyne, *Loyalists in the American Revolution*, Appendix B, pp. 270, 322.

By the advice of general officers I have determined that the army under my immediate command cross the Schuylkill at Parker's Ford, and endeavour to get down in time to oppose the enemy in front, while the corps under your command in conjunction with General Smallwood act to the greatest advantage in the rear.

Wayne's disposition of his force of 1500 men was soon reported to Howe, who despatched Major-General Grey towards the left rear with the 40th, the 42nd, the 44th and 55th regiments to dispose of Wayne. To secure the thoroughness of a night surprise, and to restrict the engagement to "push of pike," General Grey ordered all flints to be removed from firelocks. The Americans appear to have been inadequately protected by either outpost or scout. Wayne was taken completely unawares, his camp stormed, his men bayoneted, and his force reduced by the loss of 400, killed or wounded or prisoners; the rest fled, abandoning all their baggage—the price to Grey of his brilliant exploit being but the loss of two officers and a few privates, "a loss," as Stedman says, "too trifling almost to be mentioned." The resourceful energy of Grey won for him the *sobriquet* of "No-Flint," while his success freed the British advance from further annoyance.[1]

Howe's march along the Lancaster Road was checked at Sweed's (or Swede's) Ford, which, however, he made no attempt to cross, but by a series (as Washington calls them) of perplexing manœuvres, drew away the American general thirty miles from Philadelphia, and then by a very smart piece of work got the whole of his army across the Schuylkill unmolested.[2] There being nothing now between him and

[1] There is a long and graphic account of the action in Moore's *Diary of the Revolution*, i. 498; cf. also Gordon, ii. 516; Stedman, i. 295; Fortescue, iii. 217.

[2] Gordon, ii. 517: "On the afternoon of 22nd (September) Sir William Howe, having drawn away Washington 30 miles from Philadelphia, instead of attacking him on the right, agreeable to the idea he had seemingly affected to impress, ordered the

Philadelphia, Howe, within a week after Grey's brilliant rearguard action, entered the city, where a cordial if a party welcome awaited him. The army marched towards the city in two divisions. Cornwallis passed through with his division and encamped to the south of the town, near by the confluence of the Delaware and the Schuylkill. Sir William Howe fixed his head-quarters to the northward, within easy reach either of Philadelphia or of Germantown, for at the latter place the bulk of his forces lay encamped.

The reception in the city of the British appears on the whole to have been flattering. The Quakers generally and most of the professional people were still anxious for the peace which is so fertile of good gains and prosperous occupations. Congress had fled. The question for Congress was whether to seek refuge in York or Bethlehem; ultimately the handful of Congress-men retired to York, and "Howe and his bandits" occupied the whole peninsula on which Philadelphia stands.

Germantown has already been mentioned as being an integral part of the modern city of Philadelphia, and, like Bronx and Harlem, places so intimately associated in New York with the events of 1776, has been absorbed into the activities of its great neighbour. But it then lay six miles from the centre of Philadelphia, a long straggling street built colonial wise, that is, without supervision or controlling plan, and extended for two miles. The founder of the village had wisely made ample allowance for a spacious main road, and for convenient cross roads.

"The principal street of this our town," writes Pastorius, "I made sixty feet in width, and the cross street forty feet, the space or lot for each house and garden I made three acres in size. It was a pleasant place, a very fine and fertile district,

grenadiers and light infantry of the guards to cross the Schuylkill at Fatland's Ford . . . and the Chasseurs at Gordon's Ford to the left of the Americans. At midnight the army moved and crossed without opposition.

with plenty of springs of fresh water, being well supplied with oak, walnut, and chestnut trees, and having beside excellent and abundant pasturage for cattle. Our German society have in this place now established a lucrative trade in woollen and linen goods, together with a large assortment of other useful and necessary articles."[1]

So wrote Pastorius some seventy years before the event of the struggle for Independence. In that interval of seventy years Germantown had prospered vastly; the wealthy men of Philadelphia had enriched the scene with handsome country residences and laid out ample gardens; the place became a settlement of prosperous Quakers and Germans. No class of men in America were more opposed to the Revolution than were the prosperous Germans by policy, and the Quakers on principle; the former being phlegmatic enough to reflect, that, as Johnson used to say, it makes very little difference to a good citizen under what form of government he lives; and the latter on a principle, which they formulated in a well-known address:

January 1776.

> The benefits, advantages, and favours we have experienced by our dependence in and connection with the King's Government, under which we have enjoyed this happy state, appear to demand from us the greatest circumspection, care, and constant endeavours to guard against every attempt to alter or subvert that dependence and connection.

As a matter of history the Quakers owed much to the favour of the Crown. Charles the Second had by direct intervention checked the brutal persecution of this sect by the Puritans of New England. James the Second had confirmed to his Quaker friend, William Penn, a vast region for his private property, previously granted to him as "his own by His Majesty of England Carolus 2nd." For these and other such favours the Friends were sincerely thankful, in which mood they were reluctant to bite the bounteous hand that had fed them.

Hence the concurrence of so many propitious cir-

[1] F. D. Pastorius; cf. Hart, *Contemporaries*, i. 163.

CHEW HOUSE, GERMANTOWN.
From a Painting by Russell Smith.

cumstances—a friendly people, roomy houses, green pastures, orchards and gardens, plenty to eat and more to drink—made Germantown a kind of earthly paradise to the weary British troops. They had been six weeks at sea on three weeks' provisions; they had landed within a hundred miles of Philadelphia on the 25th of August, and had been marching and counter-marching for a weary month amidst blinding hail or storms of rain before entering that city; they had lost nearly all their horses, and it would seem that the haulage of their artillery, like the bringing of those famous brass pieces from Marseilles to Paris in 1792, had been done chiefly by hand. At any rate, to settle in a country over whose products the sensuous lips of John Adams watered the melons, the peaches, the apples, the nuts, the poultry, the sweet hams, the beautiful cheeses, and the spun butter, was too delightful both in fact and fruition for Howe not to avail himself of the happy opportunity. The greater part of his army, then, was in scattered array, encamped at Germantown, while he himself, with his personal suite, and Madame, occupied headquarters in a convenient house on the main road between the village and Philadelphia.[1]

Chew House.

On the left-hand side of the village street stood (and still stands) a fine, strongly built house of stone, capacious and on a slight eminence commanding an extensive view, the mansion of Benjamin Chew, Chief-Justice of the Province, presumably the Mr. Chew Graydon speaks about as watching with such anxious interest the march of Washington's troops through Philadelphia early in September of this year. In an adjacent field was encamped the 40th Regiment (Musgrave's), while the rest of this division of the British lay athwart the village and the main road connecting York with Philadelphia, and to the south of the two forty-foot wide cross roads Pastorius mentions. The British troops betook themselves to

[1] Stenton, James Logan's house, a fine mansion in the best eastern colonial style.

washing clothes, to pipe-clay and buttons, and general furbishing up, after the rough service of nearly three months. Their vigilant and energetic foe knew his opponent's temperament quite well enough to conjecture that there would be an *entr'acte* of a day or two on Sir William Howe's arrival at the comfortable house at Stenton. The head of the village was but twelve miles from the American position, from which four roads almost parallel led direct to Philadelphia. Washington was perhaps ill-informed as to the exact distribution of the British army. Some letters from the British camp had been intercepted, from which it was inferred that the force at Germantown was little better than a strong outpost, because the information conveyed the notion that the Guards, Grenadiers, and the handful of British mounted men were in Philadelphia, while three regiments, it was said, were down the river at Chester clearing away obstacles on the river, and preparing the heavy baggage for transmission to the capital city. Washington's audacious plan was to capture by surprise all the British troops in Germantown. October mornings are misty or even foggy in Pennsylvania as elsewhere; sunrise at six o'clock would allow for a leisurely night march of some twelve or fifteen miles, so as to bring the men without distress to an easy striking distance just before dawn. The General's idea was to avail himself of the four roads in front of him, and of the Maltese cross kind of principal alignment of the village, with its sixty-foot and forty-foot roads, and to deliver a time attack on four lines of approach. There were to be a frontal movement, two flank movements, and a longer movement to pass beyond the British position and seize the main road beyond Germantown, leading towards Philadelphia. It was a fine classical idea, which with the assistance of disciplined troops and commanders accustomed to co-operation might have succeeded, and have reduced Howe to the position of a rat in a steel-trap. There is no question that Howe had timely information of

See his Orders, October 3, 1777.

# GERMANTOWN

4. October 1777




Stanford's Geog.l Estabt. London

London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd.

*From Howe's Report to Germaine, Oct. 18, 1777, and The Valley Forge Orderly Book, Oct. 3, 1777*

the scheme; but he did nothing by way of spade work, or operating on garden walls, to strengthen the defence of the village. His subsequent apology mentions that he did not surmise that after their previous reverses the Americans would make any serious attempt on his position. At any rate, the action presents features suggesting a partial surprise of the British. On the morning of the 4th of October they lay obliquely asprawl of Germantown, across the main road, with their extreme left resting on the Schuylkill. Marshall's opinion is that General Howe expected an affair of outposts, and was not ready to meet any solid attack, and that the surprise was complete.[1] Germantown, according to the plan of Pastorius, was a place of detached houses with walled gardens and orchards. "Strong and small enclosures," Marshall calls them, tenable in the hands of a skilful sapper against any force the Americans could have brought against it. As the stubborn defence of Chew House was fatal to Washington's plan, it may be surmised how effective all these walls and palings might have been made by a prudent general. The American guns proved so weak[2] that, brought to bear upon a stoutly built stone edifice, their shot merely knocked off corners and chips, or else broke into ineffective bits.

[1] Marshall, iii. 188. Although General Howe in his official letter states: "Intelligence of the approach of the American army to have been received at three o'clock in the morning; yet there is reason to believe that only small parties of observation could have been expected, and that the surprise was complete."

[2] As to the hitting power of guns of that period, marvellous stories are told, but such stories should be regarded with suspicion. In 1779 bitter complaints were lodged against both the quality of the guns and of the ammunition in the British Service. A commission of enquiry reported adversely. Sir Wm. Congreve said there were in 1779 but four barrels of honest powder in the British Fleet. Sir Thomas Blomefield condemned 496 guns. It is an obvious inference that ordnance in the Continental army was at least equally bad. Guns burst very frequently. On the imperfections and inferiority of the British artillery during the last years of the eighteenth century, see Fortescue, iv. pt. ii. chap. 30.

The Americans, then, advanced on the four roads indicated in the plan of attack, the Commander-in-Chief marching with Sullivan's brigade in the frontal movement, which easily drove the British outposts before them down a hill, and entered a village. Some American writers describe how fast the British ran away, and how Wayne's men especially wrought carnage without quarter with the bayonet, in revenge of No-Flint Grey's exploit ten days before; it is, however, notorious that at this time at least most of Washington's men had no bayonets. The 40th Regiment, at any rate, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Musgrave, was able to withdraw in sufficient order to enable that officer to occupy Chew House with six companies of that gallant corps; a movement that turned the fortunes of the day against the Americans. The 40th kept up a heavy fire from every aperture of the house, and all attempts to dislodge them were ineffectual.[1] Presently four field-pieces were brought up, to no purpose, and the American attack was relaxed while Washington, Reed, and Knox had a hasty interchange of views as to what had better be done. Chew House being practically at the centre of the British position, to capture it would crumple up Howe's defence, while to leave it uncaptured would expose a column in retreat after disaster to extreme peril. The fog, now thickened with powder smoke, became too dense for the advancing Americans to keep to the line of their instructions, or in touch with each other. Meanwhile Greene, advancing against the British right wing along his appointed line, reached a cross road, and hearing tremendous firing on his right front, concentrated as it were in one spot, judged it best to bring his men obliquely forward to support his

[1] Cf. the spirited account of this exploit of Musgrave's in *Historical Records of the 40th Regiment* (South Lancashire) by Capt. R. H. R. Smithies. A medal of honour shows Chew House on an eminence spouting fire from every orifice. Chew House, like the Old South and Washington's Headquarters in Morristown, is now treated as an ancient monument under a public trust.

colleagues Sullivan and Wayne; but the fog mixed with the smoke being very heavy, the new-comers fired into the fog where the flashes seemed thickest, and their fusillade enfiladed their friends. In the ensuing confusion No-Flint Grey turned up with a brigade from the left of the British line, and began driving in Sullivan's right. To Grey had been assigned the charge of the British left, resting on the Schuylkill, but the American militia despatched along this line of attack were either cautious or inadequate or instructed to make a mere feint; at any rate their attack was feeble enough to liberate Grey, who always had the knack of being wherever most required. On the extreme British right the fourth line of American attack was pushed home with considerable success. The Guards, the 25th and 27th of the line were forced out of their encampment back along the road which passed Stenton, Howe's headquarters. At about nine o'clock that morning the general position was: on the British left the American militia being badly led were a negligible quantity; the American centre and right were in terrible confusion owing to the converging of Sullivan's and Greene's brigades at the wrong time and in the wrong place, while the American turning movement had succeeded so far as to isolate this outflanking brigade from the main body, and leave it unsupported. At the psychological moment, Major-General Grant moved the Die Hards and the 55th in the direction of the extreme British right, thus threatening this section of the American attack in its rear. Meanwhile Cornwallis, asleep in Philadelphia while the attack on Chew House raged furiously, was roused by the firing, and in the briefest of time was with the Grenadiers hastening from Philadelphia. "The Grenadiers," says Howe, "ran most of the way." But ere they arrived the battle, which, according to Brigadier-General Henry Knox's watch, had lasted two hours and a half, was over, the Americans were in full retreat, the fog befriending them, and by half-past nine in the morning the British regiments had returned to

9 A.M. October 4, 1777.

their separate quarters to breakfast. The encampments of the 40th, the 25th, the 27th, and that of the Guards must have been sadly disarranged by the visit of the American troops. Heavy losses on both sides attended this stubborn engagement. The Hessian casualties were only 24 with no one killed, but the British casualties amounted to 517, inclusive of 70 killed. The American casualties were 673, inclusive of 152 killed. The Board of War, according to Gordon, reported that of the Continental and militia officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, no less than quite 240 were killed, wounded, and missing. "The number of missing among the Americans," says Gordon, "is no rule by which to judge of the number captured by the enemy, as many of the missing who do not return to their colours go home." In other words they deserted. About 400 Americans were made prisoners, among whom were 54 commissioned officers, including Colonel Matthews, a Virginian officer of high reputation both for skill and courage.[1]

The casualties in Howe's army proved proportionately more severe because the British losses in officers and men might only be replaced by drafts from over the Atlantic, while the American supply of combatants lay close at hand. It is true that the local militia were coy. In the somewhat guarded references to their services in the older American writers, who ran some personal risk by adverse criticisms of their compatriots' conduct in this war, it seems, at this period at least, the Pennsylvanian and Maryland Militia had nothing much to be proud of. At Chadd's Ford after Wayne's defeat by Grey, at Billing's Point, where militia had been stationed in defence of the river approaches to Philadelphia, and on the American right at Germantown, the militia were

[1] Cf. Gordon, ii. 525; Marshall, iii. 184 *seq.*; Stedman, i. 300; Fisher, *Struggle for Independence*, ii. 39 *seq.*; Fortescue, iii. 218; Howe's Report appended to this chapter; Ford, *Writings of Washington*, vi. 93, 96; Johnson, *Life of Greene*, i. 83.

inefficient or craven. There was a crop of enquiries and courts martial by authority of Congress after this brief campaign. Major-General Stephen, who commanded in the left wing of Washington's army at Germantown, was found guilty of being drunk on duty and of disgraceful conduct during the retreat. Generals Wayne and Maxwell were acquitted after enquiry into their conduct, but Maxwell was understood to be a failure. General Smallwood had done little that he was asked to do in the way of harassing Howe's advance, and General de Borre's brigade at Brandywine behaved so badly that, accused by Sullivan of insubordinate conduct, rather than face an enquiry directed by Congress, he resigned. The unfortunate Sullivan had himself been the subject of a strict military enquiry but a short time before these events. His defeat at Long Island, his misfortunes at Brandywine and Germantown, added to failures elsewhere, procured for him the reputation of being an unlucky General—the kind of man whom Napoleon considered to be the worst of all colleagues, whatever might be his personal skill, prudence, courage, and devotion.

Of the Germantown affair, the honours remained with Washington.[1] The dubious conduct of Conway, the mishaps to Sullivan's and Greene's brigades, the dense fog, and weakness of the militia contingent, lost him the game. But the audacity of his plans, as in the case of his success at Trenton, revealed the high gifts of the soldier who forces a fight under disadvantages arising from his adversary's personal temperament or folly. Howe's apology for his neglect at Germantown of the customary precautions for the protection of a scattered encampment has already been

[1] Cf. Washington's *Orderly Book*, 3rd and 5th October 1777, for his disposition of troops and comments on this battle; the dates of his orders are ill arranged; that of 5th October is on p. 66, and that of 3rd October on p. 72. Washington's account of his defeat is meagre; he speaks of sundry causes of failure "which cannot be accounted for," and directs a special report to be made of all unsoldierly behaviour. He was badly served.

noticed. It has been said in his defence that he knew the fighting value of his men at a pinch, and that his reliance on their qualities was justified by the result. Admitting this plea, it may be pointed out that the loss of valuable lives at Germantown must have been much increased by Howe's imprudence, while it is surely bad policy for any commander or owner of men, or of cattle, to expend their value by way of proving it. Washington commanded an army more numerous than Howe's total force; and there were thousands of Americans whose fighting qualities and courage were beyond question. Of the careless disposition of the British regiments he had full information; here lay Musgrave just outside Chew House, and Knyphausen along the line of the Old School Lane which led from the Schuylkill to the High Street of the town, while nearly two miles away lay the Guards with the 25th and 27th Regiments. Cornwallis, with a handful of dragoons and the Grenadiers, had quartered in Philadelphia; in fact, a little army not amounting to 6000 men was cantoned over many miles of country. This scattering of Howe's force suggested to Washington his audacious attack. Howe, it may be remembered, at Christmas 1776 had particularly instructed the unfortunate Rahl to use spade and pick-axe for his protection at Trenton. But at Trenton the earth was frozen sufficiently to render spade and pick-axe useless. At Germantown spade and pick-axe on ground saturated with rain, aided by loopholed walls and a few bags of earth, would perhaps have deterred Washington from making his attempt. The moral effect of this action on both armies was immediate. The American army, it being now October, melted away, for the militia dispersed to their homes. Many of the officers, seeking solace after war's alarms, retired to Reading, a delightful town situated in a beautiful country. Howe repaired to Philadelphia, where he closed his final chapter of active service in the pursuit of ignoble pleasures.

The effect of the battles of Brandywine and Germantown was to reduce Howe's fighting force very seriously. At the Head of the Elk his command may have comprised 12,000 men; yet in the course of five weeks at least 2000 men of this small number were put out of action by death, wounds, and disease.

Stedman blames Howe for his inaction after Brandywine. He says:

> The victory does not seem to have been improved in the degree which circumstances appeared to have admitted.

The present estimate of Howe's conduct of the war does not agree with the notion that neither Stedman nor Galloway is worthy of much credit in their criticisms of Howe. But Stedman, if one may venture to say so, seems to have ignored the influence of the weather. By all contemporary evidence the rains and storms of that September were excessive.

> "The soldiers," says Marshall, speaking of Washington's army, "were exposed to heavy rains, without shelter, and compelled to march in deep roads, and repeatedly to ford considerable streams, and so had the British in following them."

Two or three days after the battle of Brandywine, it has already been mentioned how Washington attempted to check the Royal army from advancing on the Lancaster road towards Philadelphia. What happened? There was a storm of rain that lasted for about thirty hours. Both armies were drenched to the skin. Neither army was furnished with great-coats. Water ran down and over the accoutrements in such quantities that the cartouche boxes were soaked through and the cartridges rendered quite useless, while the accumulated puddles and mire rendered the roadless country almost impassable, and the movement of baggage and heavy artillery quite impossible. Washington, who was marching light, got back with some despatch to his base; but Howe, quite reasonably, in consideration of the paucity of his numbers, deemed it imprudent to expend his slender stock of men in rapid movements, or to leave

unprotected the line of his communications with Chester and Wilmington. It may be borne in mind that Lord Howe with his fleet remained in the Chesapeake, and that, to be of any service to his brother William, the fleet should have been in the Delaware; yet six weeks after the disembarkation at the Head of Elk, and four days after the battle of Germantown, elapsed ere Lord Howe dropped anchor below Philadelphia.

The campaign is remarkable in either army for the prominent appearance of two young men who each subsequently played a very conspicuous rôle for their own side in this war. Banastre Tarleton, a cornet of the King's Dragoon Guards, had been nominated by Howe to the sinecure office of brigade major of cavalry, serving in that capacity at Brandywine, in which engagement it is probable that the dragoons did not muster forty mounts. At Germantown this handful arrived on the scene when all was over but the cheering: whether Tarleton was with them or not does not seem clear. The corps of mixed troops, mounted and unmounted, subsequently known as the British Legion of American Loyalists, was placed under the command of Tarleton early in 1778. The exploits of this corps and of their dashing commander belong to the second part of the history of this struggle.

On the Patriot side emerged the Marquis de Lafayette, whose subsequent career was so phenomenally dismal. At Brandywine, fighting as a volunteer, he endeavoured to rally some flying Continentals, and was wounded. His comments on the discipline, the appearance, and the quality of Washington's troops have attracted considerable attention. Both Tarleton and Lafayette in 1777 were of the age when all is golden and gay. They both shot their bolt young. Tarleton, after the close of the American War, returned to his native land, where his later years were spent in adverse criticisms of Lord Wellington's strategy and tactics. He wrote memoirs or accounts of himself, which by cautious readers are regarded with some reserve. Of Lafayette, "the friend

of Washington" as some Frenchmen called him, and "the accomplice of Madame Veto" according to other Frenchmen, the history of France claims the records. Neither Lafayette nor Tarleton realised to their world the brilliant anticipations of their early manhood, spent perhaps amidst a stress and strain that discounted the work of maturer years. At any rate, one became a waif and stray and was lost in the vortex of Continental politics at the age of thirty-two; the other a hanger-on of a society in which eccentricity was the chief note of distinction.[1]

Howe at this time, finding himself somewhat short of men, sent word to Germaine that at least 10,000 troops should be despatched to America to enable him to push with vigour the campaign of 1778. Meanwhile the approaches to Philadelphia along the Delaware were obstructed by obstacles which, among other contrivances, seem to have included a kind of submarine mine. The clearance of these matters occupied more than a whole month, entailing severe loss to a force already sufficiently attenuated, and among other lives, expended that of Donop, an officer of distinction in the Hessian or German contingent. The Americans had fortified the approaches to the city with surprising skill, and defended them with remarkable tenacity. Had the militia of New Jersey done their duty, it is quite reasonable to suppose that Lord Howe's support to his brother William would have been nullified. "But no dependence is to be put on the militia," wrote Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, who had charge of the American defences of the Delaware, to his chief, who was thus coerced by circumstances into weakening his main or Continental army to supply defenders of these strongly constructed and skilfully arranged forts and redoubts. As the struggle proceeded

[1] Major-General Tarleton's account of himself was the subject of very severe strictures by Colonel M'Kenzie in 1807. There is a brief account of Tarleton by Colonel Pearse, D.S.O., in *The Cavalry Journal*, January 1910. On General Marie Paul Joseph, Marquis de Lafayette, see *Lafayette in the American Revolution*, Tower, Philadelphia, 1895.

there was a kind of localised campaign in the southern tracts below Philadelphia. Both sides called for reinforcements to maintain the operations. Howe thinned out Sir Henry Clinton's command by five battalions, which arrived from New York about the 15th of November, and were at once absorbed into the division Cornwallis. Washington called for reinforcements to be drafted from the successful army of the North, and acquired the invaluable help of Daniel Morgan and his riflemen. Young Lafayette recovered from his wound, was brigaded with Morgan's men, and wrote to Washington in expansive terms about the masterly shooting of these *coureurs de bois*; but as in the same letter he uses of the militia similar language, allowance may be made for some word-painting on the part of a young gentleman who was determined to be pleased with all that he saw, heard, or even imagined. Consequently much bloodshed ensued on both sides; the British lost a fine frigate, the *Augusta*, by fire, and probably sustained a thousand casualties during these six weeks. Washington's army, on the other hand, at the close of the campaign, towards the end of November, was worn out with incessant and not very successful operations.

Exhaustion of both armies in December 1777.

The British, having now made secure their sea communications, settled down with their chief to make the best of a hard winter. On their arrival in October, Philadelphia was found to be without some of its society leaders, although enough ladies and gentlemen remained to render the winter season quite agreeable, and to organise that very remarkable social function called the Mischianza at the close of the season's gaieties. The deportation of certain leading Quakers to towns at some distance had left some family mansions empty; a few other families had fled from the face of an army whose reputation for violence, rapine, and wanton cruelty had been carefully fostered by rumours, reports, a hostile Press, and by the other usual means. Some of the prosperous citizens retired to the town of Reading.

Here, according to a member of that cheerful set,

. . . the winter was gay and agreeable notwithstanding that the enemy was in possession of the metropolis. The society was sufficiently large and select, and a sense of common suffering at being driven from their homes had the effect of more closely uniting its members. Besides the families established in this place, it was seldom without a number of visitors—gentlemen of the (Continental) army, and others. Hence the dissipation of cards, sleighing parties, balls, etc., was freely indulged.

Intrigues against Washington.

And it was here that was hatched that cabal against the chief gentleman of the Continental army, who remained with his starving, frost-bitten, and discouraged men at the Valley Forge. Here Mifflin, Conway, and Charles Lee, in secret agreement with Gates, tore Washington's military reputation to rags. It was in this refined and Patriotic society Graydon heard Conway express himself,

. . . that no man was more of a gentleman than General Washington, or appeared to more advantage at his table, or in the usual intercourse of life; but as to his talents for the command of an army, they were miserable indeed.

Conway, however, had not acted with conspicuous success in charge of the American right wing at Germantown. Conway had been found in a farmhouse during the action by two field officers, who observed his extreme agitation on their enquiring what he was doing there. He answered that his horse was wounded in the neck. It was pointed out to him that, whether mounted or not, his place was with his brigade, then under fire on the right front. It is alleged, however, that he declined to move, all of which incidents were subsequently reported to Congress. Meanwhile Conway, with other members of the cabal against Washington, enjoyed during that winter the suave delights of Pennsylvanian society in Reading. Thus the close of the campaign of 1777 in the Middle States finds Howe making himself exceedingly comfortable in Philadelphia, certain leading Continental generals mutinously conspiring at Reading, and Washington himself the only mainstay and hope of the Revolution, endeavouring with indomitable spirit to

keep the remains of the Continental army from mutiny and dissolution at the Valley Forge.

## APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVI

### HOWE'S REPORT ON THE BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN

(Public Record Office) Colonial Office, 5, 236

The Enemy having received a Reinforcement of Fifteen Hundred Men from Peuks Kill, one Thousand from Virginia, and presuming upon the Army being much weakened by the Detachments to Philadelphia and Jersey, thought it a favorable Time for them to risk an Action. They accordingly marched at Six o'Clock in the Evening of the 3d from their Camp near Skippach Creek, about Sixteen Miles from German Town.

This Village forms one continued Street for two Miles, which the Line of Encampment, in the Position the Army then occupied, crossed at Right Angles near a Mile from the Head of it, where the 2d Battalion of Light Infantry and the 40th Regiment were posted.

In this Line of Encampment Lieutenant-General Knyphausen, Major-Generals Stirn and Grey, Brigadier-General
[P. 154] Agnew, with seven British & three Hessian Battalions, the mounted and dismounted Chasseurs, were upon the Left of the Village, extending to the Schuylkill, the Chasseurs being in Front.

Major-General Grant and Brigadier-General Matthew with a Corps of Guards, six Battalions of British, and two Squadrons of Dragoons, were upon the right,—the 1st Battalion of Light Infantry, and the Queen's American Rangers, were advanced in the Front of this Wing.

At three o'Clock in the Morning of the 4th, the Patrols discovered the Enemy's Approach, and upon the Communication of this Intelligence, the Army was immediately ordered under Arms.

Soon after the Break of Day the Enemy began their Attack upon the 2d Light Infantry, which they sustained for a considerable time, supported by the 40th Regiment, but at length being overpowered by increasing Numbers, the Light Infantry and a Part of the 40th retired into the Village, when Lieutenant-

Colonel Musgrave, with six Companies of the latter Corps, threw himself into a large Stone House in the Face of the Enemy, which tho' surrounded by a Brigade and attacked by four pieces of Cannon, he most gallantly defended, until Major-General Grey, at the Head of the three Battalions of the 3d Brigade, turning his Front to the Village, and Brigadier-General Agnew, who covered Majr.-Genl. Grey's Left with the 4th Brigade, by a vigorous Attack repulsed the Enemy that had penetrated into the upper Part of the Village, which was done with great Slaughter. The 5th and 55th Regiments, from the Right engaging them at the same time on the other Side of the Village, compleated the Defeat of the Enemy in [P. 155] this Quarter.

The Regiments of Du Corps & Donop being formed to support the Left of the 4th Brigade, and one Battalion of Hessian Grenadiers in the Rear of the Chasseurs, were not engaged, the precipitate Flight of the Enemy preventing the two first Corps from entering into Action, and the Success of the Chasseurs, in repelling all Efforts against them on that Side, did not call for the Support of the latter.

The first Light Infantry and Pickets of the Line in Front of the Right Wing, were engaged soon after the Attack began upon the Head of the Village, the Pickets were obliged to fall back; but the 1st Light Infantry, being well supported by the 4th Regiment, sustained the Enemy's Attack with such determined Bravery, that they could not make the least Impression on them.

Two Columns of the Enemy were opposite to the Guards, 27th and 28th Regiments, who formed the Right of the Line.

Major-General Grant, who was upon the Right, moved up the 49th Regiment with four pieces of Cannon to the Left of the 4th Regiment, about the Time Major-General Grey had forced the Enemy in the Village, and then advancing with the Right Wing, the Enemy's Left gave Way, and was pursued thro' a strong Country between four & five Miles.

Lord Cornwallis, being early apprised at Philadelphia of the Enemy's Approach, put in motion the two Battalions of British and one of Hessian Grenadiers, with a Squadron of Dragoons, [P. 156] and his Lordship getting to German Town just as the Enemy had been forced out of the Village, he joined Major-General Grey, when placing himself at the Head of the Troops, he followed the Enemy Eight Miles on the Skippach Road, but such was the Expedition with which they fled, he was not able to overtake them.

The Grenadiers from Philadelphia, who, full of Ardor, had

run most of the Way to German Town, could not arrive in time to join in the Action.

The Country in general was so strongly enclosed and covered with Wood, that the Dragoons had not any Opening to charge, excepting a small Party on the Right, which behaved most gallantly.

# CHAPTER XVII

## THE NORTHERN CAMPAIGN OF 1777—MONTREAL TO BENNINGTON

GERMAINE and the King had revised Burgoyne's plan of campaign called the Expedition from Canada, binding him down to the strictest details of movement, allowing him few alternatives of action. The King, however, seems to have been somewhat in awe of Germaine. He knew this Minister to be a rancorous man, with a more than besmirched military reputation, and jealous of any gentlemen of the army in high command. He also knew the man to possess a determination intolerant, in the pursuit of intrigue or pleasure, of obstacles in check of the consummation of his purpose. He was aware that this Minister was either disliked or despised,[1] and it is not quite certain that both these sentiments towards him did not themselves find a place in the royal breast; and yet for reasons now very obscure he retained Germaine in office and administration long enough for the man to ruin whatever slight chance of recovering by conquest the revolting provinces Great Britain ever possessed.

The plan of campaign comprised the capture of the line of the Hudson. The line of the Hudson, for the understanding of this plan, may be said to begin at

[1] Germaine was continually the object of personal insults from old officers. After the Saratoga disaster, Colonel Luttrell in Parliament said that the British army had to seek safety in flight, and that "he saw one who had set the example in Germany, and was fit to lead them on such an occasion." As he uttered this insult, the speaker was but a yard or two distant from Germaine.

Sorel or Montreal, and to end in the Narrows of New York Bay. Sir Henry Clinton lay at New York, with the sea for his base, and a powerful British fleet within hail for emergencies. The Hudson is navigable all the way to Albany, and such obstructions and forts as impeded or harassed navigation had been masked or rendered harmless. Fort Lee and Fort Washington had fallen in 1776, while, as was afterwards proved, the forts constructed higher up the stream, Forts Montgomery and Clinton, presented no obstacles that might not without serious resistance be brushed aside. Clinton's force in New York consisted of a respectable number of men, while in Rhode Island he had at call a considerable reserve. Had Burgoyne been directed to land at New York, and to avail himself of the well-known Loyalist feeling prevalent in that province, it is highly likely the advance of their combined battalions had taken the form of a mere demonstration in force. A strong British grip of the Hudson river from Albany to New York would sever the Eastern or New England States from the remaining disaffected area, and by isolation not only gradually wither away the resources of the town understood to be the storm centre of the rebellion, but also effectually check reinforcements reaching Washington's army from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and the other eastern divisions. But the Cabinet had decided that in no case was Burgoyne to proceed by sea from Canada to New York. The mandarin of the Colonial Office appears to have been afraid of losing Canada, notwithstanding Arnold's failure
1775. and the death of Montgomery in their calamitous attack on Quebec. American Loyalist opinion considered that Germaine, on the principle of holding a candle to the devil, made Burgoyne chief of this expedition because he was of the Opposition; but in appointing Burgoyne to an independent command Germaine seized the occasion of inflicting a slight on Sir Guy Carleton, whom he hated. Burgoyne,

Germaine's rancour against Carleton.

on arrival at Quebec in May, had presented his credentials containing minute instructions to Carleton how to act in furtherance of the expedition from Canada. Carleton had been conspicuous for his success in management of his very difficult province, to which service may be joined his repulse of the marauding expedition promoted by Patriots against 1775.
Canada, at a time when Canada still regarded the southern colonies as bound to the Crown by the same ties as herself. The failure of their expedition did not provoke Carleton to reprisals. Many Americans fell into his hands, ragged, hungry, and sickly, to find themselves the objects of an almost paternal solicitude on the part of the Governor of Canada. He put clothes on their backs, shoes on their feet, and food in their wallets, exhorting them to return peacefully to their homes, and to leave him to his own repose in the management of tens of thousands of French-Canadians, with whom the memory of the fall of Quebec was more recent than welcome. His clemency was not approved in Whitehall, where, being regarded as inert and unresourceful, the King did not venture to push Carleton's claims for consideration under the notice of Germaine and Lord North, although it was well understood that the King would have preferred to see Carleton in charge of the enterprise.

It says much for Burgoyne that, although he had become the official instrument of the slight offered to his senior officer, he managed to retain Carleton's regard in a friendship always expressed in cordial terms. But Burgoyne's mellow disposition is admitted. Sergeant R. Lamb, who served in this campaign, tells us how greatly Burgoyne was beloved by his army. Anburey confirms this opinion. Madame de Riedesel offers evidence of his joyous disposition under very adverse circumstances. After the memory of his disasters had become indistinct, Burgoyne in the House of Commons supported in generous terms a proposition to confer a pension on Carleton's family

—a project that would have matured previously but for the rancour of Germaine.

Had the expedition for the isolation of the New England States advanced from New York with Clinton in command of ten thousand men, the success of the British arms had been certain. At this time the American "Army of the North" was commanded by Schuyler. This New York gentleman, whose services in the north have been characterised as being "more solid than brilliant," possessed a mere simulacrum of an army, and was perhaps unfitted by temperament for the leadership of New Englanders, excited as they were by the stimulating influence of a liberty, on which in their personal conduct they placed no practical limitations. He disliked New Englanders, and they retaliated by hating him. Graydon describes Schuyler's bias against New Englanders.

Maj.-Gen. Schuyler.

Graydon, a Philadelphian captain, was dining with Schuyler's family at the General's headquarters on Lake George, when a New England captain was announced, who

> . . . "was neither asked to sit down, nor take a glass of wine, and was dismissed with that peevishness of tone we apply to a low and vexatious intruder." "The man," Graydon adds, "in his proper sphere might have been entitled to better treatment. He (Schuyler) certainly was at no pains to conceal the extreme contempt he felt for a set of officers who were both a disgrace to their station and the cause in which they acted."[1]

The General's haughty demeanour induced the New Englanders to flatly refuse service in the Northern army, which had at this time been described by a military visitor as having "commissaries without provisions, quartermasters without stores, generals without troops, and troops without discipline."

Schuyler, in anticipation of Burgoyne's advance from the north, called for an army of 15,000 men, with a further condition that the bulk of the troops should be men of the South, that is, Philadelphians or Virginians. His request was not granted; he was instructed to raise

[1] Cf. above, p. 24 n.



MAJOR-GENERAL PHILIP SCHUYLER.
From Irving's *Life of Washington*, 1858.

and equip locally as many regiments as possible. To his call New England States turned a deaf ear; their mutual jealousies and long-standing animosities, added to the antipathy entertained towards Schuyler personally, caused recruiting to be very slow, and the quality of the recruits, officers as well as men, poor. Madame de Riedesel reports that after the capture of Burgoyne's army the escort conducting the prisoners of war to Boston consisted of New Englanders, of whose officers "some had been shoemakers, who on our halts made boots for our officers, and sometimes even mended our soldiers' shoes."[1] Officers from the sister States resented commissioned men engaging themselves to mend the shoes and shave the chins of private soldiers, whether British or Continental. Feudal ideas about knightly demeanour lingered yet among Virginian and Philadelphian and Knickerbocker gentlemen.

"The Army of the North."

Mr. E. F. de Lancey states that in July 1777 Schuyler had only 2500 men under him at Fort Edward, and that after the Americans retreated from Ticonderoga his numbers, increased by the retreating force, were only 4500, of whom 2500 were Continentals or regulars, and the rest militia.[2] Of these, two Massachusetts regiments deserted in a body, bound homeward. Schuyler consequently withdrew before the British advance; his shadow of an army decreasing all the time, until he had not 4000 men to meet the approaching enemy.

August 4, 1777.

"We have," wrote Schuyler to Washington, "not above 4000 Continental troops, if men, one-third of which are negroes, boys, and men too aged for field or indeed any other service can be called troops. The States from whence these troops came can determine why such boys, negroes, and aged men were sent. A great part of the army took the field in a manner, naked, without blankets, ill-armed, and very deficient in accoutrements. Too many of our officers would be a disgrace to the most contemptible troops that ever collected, and

[1] Madame de Riedesel (edition 1827), p. 194.

[2] E. F. de Lancey's notes to Jones's *New York*, i. 674.

have so little sense of honour that cashiering them seems no punishment. They have stood by, and suffered the most scandalous depredations to be committed upon the poor, distressed, ruined, and flying inhabitants." [1]

The marauding propensities of the American militia are in the reports of their own commanders a matter of common remark.

This being, according to corroborative evidence, the state of the Northern army, it appears obvious that a British advance up the Hudson from New York would have pushed the American force backwards towards Canada.

Burgoyne at Montreal.

Quitting these pleasing speculations as to what might have been, we join Burgoyne in Montreal in June 1777. He had on his arrival discovered matter for his most stringent censures, in the fact that all his plans had already for some weeks become the common talk of the town. How these stories got about is by some considered traceable to the plague of women, by others to Germaine's inability to keep his mouth shut. At any rate the expedition from Canada, in every detail of its movement, seems to have been well discussed everywhere between Morristown and Montreal.[2] The delays customary in that leisurely age, when all business appears to have closed with the three o'clock dinner, were increased both by the apathy of the Canadian-French, and by their actual opposition to the

[1] Sparks, *Washington Letters*, pp. 392-395; of these complaints about the conduct of men and officers in the field, *Orderly Books* and Correspondence afford interminable evidence; *e.g.* Washington in Pennsylvania about the date of his receipt of Schuyler's letter, quoted in the text, "regrets he is so frequently obliged to censure officers in General Orders for neglect of duty and other offences." He even directs (6th September 1777) that under certain circumstances officers are to be instantly shot. Gordon, ii. 489; on the negroes in the Revolutionary army, see Chapter IX. p. 9.

[2] Major Pausch, Hanau Artillery, mentions that his men were *au mieux* with Canadian damsels and matrons; their camp and quarters, like the encampment at Boston Common in 1775, were places of common resort—intrigue, espionage, gossip abounded.

preparations going forward. Burgoyne reached Quebec on the 6th of May, after which date four weeks 1777. elapsed before any sign of preparation was obvious. He required 1500 horses for his artillery and military train, and a large number of batteaux for navigation of the inland seas, usually spoken of as lakes. The government contracts were everywhere managed on the same principles as were recently the administrative contracts of certain London Boards of Guardians, for every contract was subject to a squeeze of the financial sponge by every hand into which it came. It is asserted, for instance, that timber for the government batteaux planned for building in Quebec had to be brought from England, owing to the objections of certain timber merchants in Bristol and elsewhere. This assertion may refer to an extreme case, but in view of the corruption Army or Government contracts everywhere seem to engender, Burgoyne's aims were baffled or frustrated, as were Washington's, by the malfeasance of contractors. If Congress complained of certain Quaker firms making a corner in boots in Philadelphia at the time the Continental army was practically shoeless, if Washington complained that contractors robbed his troops on every hand, not to say anything about the later experiences of the British army down to 1902, there is in this direction ample apology for the slowness and insufficiency of the preparations during May 1777 for this most hazardous expedition. There is a tendency to blame sometimes Carleton, sometimes Burgoyne, for want of foresight. As well blame Lord North for the delays in finding British recruits for the British army. All these high personages were victims of the system of marauding, extending from my Lord the Paymaster of the Army, or Sir George the Treasurer of the Navy, down to Nipcheese, the purser's clerk in Lord Howe's flagship the *Eagle*, or to any deputy-sub-assistant-commissary in the pay of Mr. Joshua Loring of Boston.

The traditional censure of Howe for the failure of

Burgoyne's expedition is not accepted in these pages. Enough weight of blame for failure in other quarters already lies on the shoulders of Howe. Both British and American writers, particularly the latter, regard Howe as a kind of St. Sebastian, at whose unprotected frame any dart may be cast. Mr. J. R. Green is perhaps the exception, who calls him an active general, and leaves him with that simple phrase. Whether it is Stedman, or Jones, or Bancroft, or Fiske, or Professor Tyler, or Major-General Cullum, or Mr. Lecky, or Mr. S. G. Fisher, the concert of adverse opinion, either in tones superlative and shrill in the American style, or in Stedman's deeper notes, is consistently harmonious. Mr. S. G. Fisher has laboured the points against Howe with remarkable ability, but with a touch of acerbity too. Galloway and Johnstone, contemporaries of Howe, attacked him both before the House of Commons and by pamphlets and papers. Paine asked whether it was worth while for Howe to keep an army in the field simply to get once a year into comfortable winter quarters. Cullum calls upon his fellow-countrymen to be truly grateful that such an incompetent man was placed at the head of the British army, chiefly because George III. desired to promote whose coat was crossed by a bar sinister of royal origin. Jones's savage irony has already been quoted.[1] Howe's defence was not convincing, and for obscure reasons his apology for himself was not allowed to be concluded in the Committee of the House of Commons entrusted with the enquiry.

It is morally certain that he was not free to tell the whole story, whether to his credit or discredit ; and now it is highly unlikely the story will ever be fully told. Among the salient points are that all three generals—Howe, Burgoyne, and Carleton—were instructed from

[1] Paine, *Works*, i. 165. Cullum's opinion is in Justin Winsor, vi. 291 n. Captain B. James, *Diary*, p. 29, speaks in the same strain. James served under Lord Howe at New York.

Whitehall; that Carleton was addressed in terms of such official frigidity, that he immediately resigned his post as Governor-General of Canada; that Burgoyne started on his expedition southward undermanned and too late; that Howe's movements on Philadelphia were at first approved; that his applications for more troops were declined; and that Whitehall subsequently withdrew its approval of Howe's movement on Philadelphia in a document that lay unnoticed in some office pigeonhole for weeks after Burgoyne was a prisoner of war.

The expedition thus started some time in June, poorly equipped for its task. There was a vast armament of artillery — "A powerful brass train of artillery," Gordon calls it; among the finest and best supplied for an army of that size.[1] The total force numbered less than 8000 men, of whom about two-fifths were Germans. There are remarkable differences in the estimates of the total of this field force when the march was made for the South. Burgoyne says that his command consisted of 6740 regulars, exclusive of artillerymen, 250 Canadians, and 400 Indians. Six companies of artillery brought up his number to something short of 8000 men. Sir Guy Carleton retained for the defence of Canada about 4000 men. Burgoyne had hopes to secure the assistance of at least 2000 Canadians to act as guides, and as a kind of army transport corps. Their duties were to comprise boating, haulage, and carriage of stores over the portages. Special preparations had been made for conveying batteaux, rafts, and canoes across the tract of land which lay between the final waterway southward to the northern arm of the Hudson, for ten miles of

The expedition starts. 1777.

July 1, 1777.

[1] Computed to be 146 pieces of various weight. Of these 90 were left *en route*. The remainder, accounted for by Burgoyne (*Narrative*, pp. 8 ff.), should not have been a serious encumbrance, yet they were so found to be by him. Washington, a few months later (early in 1778), giving instructions for the making of pieces for his army, particularly mentions the unwieldy cannon which embarrassed Burgoyne's movements so much, as things to be carefully avoided. Beatson estimates Burgoyne's artillery at 138 pieces.

a saddle of land had to be traversed by a traveller leaving Lake George to gain the Hudson.

The local contingents.

The services of Canadians skilled in woodcraft, keen hunters and excellent marksmen, would have proved invaluable; and by no one been more fully appreciated than by Burgoyne, who had written eloquently about the special perils of marching through the forests extending southward of the inland seas, between Lake George and Albany. But for various causes Burgoyne's expectations were vain. Canadians declined service, probably, according to Jones and other Loyalist writers, for the reason that the veterans (as the British troops were called, most of whom had not yet been under fire) flouted and snubbed the local men. Complaints by provincials about the insolence and arrogance of European officers towards their provincial comrades-in-arms were as numerous as justifiable. The provincial contingent, according to Beatson, was about 700, who alleged they were scurvily treated by Burgoyne and his divisional generals, and that they were set "in the forefront of all the army to receive the first blows of the enemy, and be guardians to each wing and rear; and that the loyal provincials under his (Burgoyne's) command were killed, ten to one, of the Royal army."[1] These provincials were, many of them, either refugees who had quitted Boston for Halifax and Canada under Howe's protection in March 1776, or were Loyalists of the province of New York, whose fidelity to the British Crown remained unimpaired, for, as has already been noticed, this wealthy and prosperous province was for the most part Loyalist.

The power of the Loyalist party was probably greater in the province of New York than in any other province, but their leaders lacked the courage and decision of character needful to turn it to the best advantage. The wealthy merchants, the proprietors of the great feudal manors (the patroons), the

[1] Cf. De Lancey in Jones, p. 685. Cf. also General Horatio Rogers's explanatory chapter to his edition of *Haddon's Journal and Orderly Book*, pp. lvii, lx, lxxix, lxxx.

adherents of the Church of England, more numerous here than elsewhere, the Dutch farmers, and the recent German immigrants were generally disposed to be loyal, or absolutely neutral. In the city of New York, two-thirds of all the property was owned by Loyalists, and outside there was scarcely a symptom of disaffection.[1]

But property and capital are ever timid. Neither the patroons nor the Dutch settlers would fight. None the less, ultimately most of them were attainted and their estates confiscated. So being not unfriendly to the British, what influence they had was expended in their favour; it is consequently held with some show of reason that more courtesy and consideration might have vastly increased the ranks of the provincial battalions. At least, when, after Bennington, the vultures began to gather about the doomed army of Britain, they swarmed up from the eastward, from New Hampshire and Massachusetts and Connecticut, but not from New York. American Loyalists said that had Burgoyne listened to the provincial colonels prior to the battle of Bennington, that disastrous expedition had never been despatched. British historians, however, have either accorded scanty notice to the provincial contingent, or have not noticed them at all. The provincial's lot was indeed a hard one. Slighted by the professional military men, shot on sight or hung by their Patriot captors, ruined by attainders or wholesale confiscation, and denied the tardy recognition of historians, they are the real martyrs of this struggle. To these men when taken prisoners the Patriots showed little compunction.

After the battle of Bennington the Tories (that is, the captured provincials) were the sport of the soldiery; they were tied together in pairs and attached by the traces to horses, which were in some cases driven by negroes. The same spirit is evident in the remark of a soldier made after the battle. "One Tory who had his left eye shot out was led by me, mounted on

[1] Cf. E. Cruickshank, "Butler's Rangers," *Lundy's Lane Historical Society*, p. 12.

a horse who (*sic*) had also lost his left eye. It seems to me cruel now, it did not then."[1]

From these simple reports, we are led to infer that the Tories tied to horses ridden by negroes were either maimed beyond future recovery or knocked to pieces. Burgoyne heard of the fate of these unhappy captives and made his protest, both on behalf of the provincials and the Germans, who suffered treatment equally barbarous. At Bennington very few British soldiers fell into the hands of Americans, who gave their prisoners little quarter. Burgoyne remonstrated in dignified terms:

> It is with great concern I find myself obliged to add a complaint of the bad treatment the provincial soldiers in the King's service have met with. I have reports upon oath that some of these men were refused quarter after having asked it.

Gates, formerly an officer on the British establishment, responded to this charge with a kind of bantering irony; but Burgoyne's charges are now admitted to have been based upon facts. It is certain that but a fraction of these barbarities has been recorded; such records as there are, come to the surface of things as confessions, or in scanty diaries kept by illiterate men. Mr. Bolton apologises:

> If the thought and action of the time appear unworthy of men fighting for liberty, it is well to stand as they did with the contemptuous redcoat and his prison ship, toward the rising sun, and the treacherous Redskin with his scalping knife, toward the western sun; there was no time for over refinement.[2]

Albany was subsequently the scene of much Jedburgh justice. One diarist notes that seven Tories were hung there in one day.

Yet of the good faith of men presenting themselves for service in the British ranks there was after-

[1] Cf. C. K. Bolton, *The Private Soldier under Washington*, p. 215.
[2] Bolton, *ut supra, loc. cit.*

wards sound reasons to doubt. Burgoyne in a private letter to Germaine wrote : July 11, 1777.

> Some hundreds of men professing themselves Loyalists have come in wishing to serve, some to the end of the war, some for the campaign. Though I am without instructions on this subject, I have not hesitated to receive them, and as fast as companies can be formed, I shall *post* officers. I mean to employ them (the Loyalists) to keep the country in awe, and in procuring cattle, and to foster the impression caused upon public opinion, should provincials be seen acting vigorously in the cause of the King.[1]

The British, after the capture of Ticonderoga, entered the rebellious country, whereupon Burgoyne notes that:

> The Vigilance Committees around and in front of him (that is, to the southward) watch and imprison suspects, compel the neutrals to take up arms, to remove their cattle, and burn their corn, under penalty of immediate death ; they have hanged large numbers of Loyalists ; they are devastating the country with fire and sword.

Putting these statements together, it is reasonable to surmise that the Vigilance Committees may have had something to do with the inflow of local men seeking enlistment in the British ranks. At any rate the disaster at Bennington appears to have been largely due to treachery, as will be seen farther on.

The Indian Question.

We reach now the question of the employment of Indians in the Northern campaign.

In no detail of their conduct of the war have the British authorities met so much censure as in respect of their bringing in of Indians into this quarrel. The atrocious cruelties inflicted upon their captives by Redskins ; their practice of scalping ; their silent and stealthy methods of warfare ; their indiscriminate murder of infants, children, and women ; their use of fire and flame in attacks on Colonial homesteads ; the ghastly records of personal reminiscences ; the massacre of wounded men, of the sick, and of women and children

[1] Burgoyne to Germaine, 11th July 1777.

after the guaranteed surrender of Fort William Henry;[1] and a host of minor instances of torture and blood, in the warfare of the Border, had excited in Colonial houses an unquenchable horror of the Redskin, and had given rise to the saying that the best Indian is a dead Indian, and to the practice of shooting Indians on sight wherever met. Notwithstanding these feelings of repulsion so justified in Colonial eyes, all authorities, French, British, or Colonial, had made use of the Redskin as an ally against their respective foes. The main facts are admitted. Indians brought Braddock to his
1755. doom in his foolish expedition to Fort du Quesne. Indians aided Montcalm in his capture of Fort William
Fort William Henry, afterwards Fort George. 1757.
Henry, and claimed afterwards all the profit and plunder of the capture. The treachery of the Indians on that fateful day made the cry, "Remember Fort William Henry," a signal for no quarter, when Redskin or Canadian woodsman in later episodes of warfare was screaming for mercy.

On the other hand, loyal Colonial settlers in western New York, up along the smaller lakes and about Ontario's eastern shore, had built up a kind of offensive and defensive alliance with the Long House; the Six Nations, whose eastern tribe, the Mohawks, guarded the Hudson, and whose western tribe, the Senecas, watched the headwaters of the Ohio.

These tribes had a system of land tenure, the like of which holds good in the Maori Reservations in New Zealand. The title to their land was vested in all full members of the tribes, including the women. No conveyance of land could be made without the authorisation of each tribe concerned, symbolised by the affixing of the tribal mark, under the hand of the head

[1] Cf. Bradley, *The Fight with France for North America*, pp. 192-199, for a vivid description of that "unpardonable crime," as he calls it. Massacres, however, were not all on one side. The Paxton Boys of Pennsylvania murdered in cold blood a whole settlement of Indians in Lancaster (Pa.) in 1763.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE SIX NATIONS, VALLEY OF THE MOHAWK.

man of each tribe, to the document of conveyance. This complicated system of land transfer was the parent of frequent and pernicious fraudulent transactions. Of the innumerable crimes committed on the persons and property of coloured men all over the world by European settlers in the name of civilisation, the robberies and murders perpetrated on the Redskin form no inconsiderable chapter. Among the earliest acts of George III. was a proclamation forbidding the conveyance of Indian land to Europeans, private individuals, by bargain and sale, or under any other form of contract. As represented by Sir William Johnson, the King's agent in those parts, the White father across the Black water was a kind of earthly providence, always benevolent and often beneficent. Sir William Johnson's overlordship and protectorate of the Six Nations of the Long House, exercised with great prudence and firmness, has become the subject and material for much heroic reminiscence and romantic writing. His sudden death removed the hand of one who restrained as well as protected. But with his death the murders and land-grabbing by Colonials multiplied and increased. The Long House of the Six Nations dimly understanding the quarrel between the Great White Chief over the Sea and his Colonial children, had a general impression that the King was within his rights, while they had daily experience that the Colonial whites were oppressively in the wrong. They remained, therefore, loyal to the British Crown, yet deprived of their protector and guide, their uncertainty what to do in these times of change resulted for a considerable period in their doing nothing.[1]

Sir William Johnson.

1774.

But the Whigs of New England, being keenly alive to the irreparable loss sustained by the King's friends on Johnson's death, had secretly approached

[1] A map of the territory of the Long House, inscribed by Guy Johnson, 1771, to Governor William Trion (*sic*), was sent to Lord Hillsborough, and after some vicissitudes found its way back to the States. It is now in the New York State Library.

the Indian tribes by means of two missionaries, emissaries of a Presbyterian Board of Missions among the Oneidas and Onondagas, two tribes of the Long House. Of these missionaries, Mr. Kirkland was an ardent Whig and a most successful proselytiser. Kirkland, a type of the Scots Presbyterian settled in the Colonial hinterland, hated England as a kind of Valley of Hinnom, and the English as Amalekites.
1775. Among the tribes lying against the borders of Connecticut and Massachusetts his mission had been so entirely successful that several Indian bands went down to Boston to take their full share of the American siege operations there. Kirkland, whose opinion appears to have been that the preaching of Christianity is best set forward by the assertion of the preacher's political views—an idea not yet without weight in some quarters —taught the Indians fantastic things about George the King, who had raised the price of powder to three dollars a gill, and intended to cut off the supply of powder altogether. As they lived by their guns this information filled the Indians with dismay. Accusations were preferred against the missionaries ; it was said they refused to baptize the children of the Indians whose loyalty to the British Protectorate could not be shaken. In such ways the propagandist operations advanced. Kirkland, as mentioned above, had been approached in 1775, before the actual outbreak of hostilities, with a request that he would use all his influence to engage the Long House on the American side to "whet their hatchets and be prepared to defend their liberties and ours." This appeal was made in vain. Nevertheless, Indians commonly served in the American army. Washington used them as scouts. There were enlisted Indians at the battle of Long Island, and in the operations about New York, in which their usefulness was somewhat spoiled by a fondness for rum, unquenchable. Many also declined to enter the American service unless permitted to carry on war in their own way, that is, according to the approved

traditional methods of Border warfare. It is beyond all doubt that Indians were enrolled in the American battalions before the English had invited that class of recruit to join in the struggle. Some American writers ignore the assistance rendered by the Indians, but it is right to point out that other American writers frankly admit the insincerity of the charges levelled at the English authorities. 1776.

"The Indians," says Mr. Andrew M. Davis, "engaged upon the American side produced no material influence upon military movements; the responsibility for the intention is the same as if the effort had been successful." [1]

In the face of the evidence collected and recorded by later American writers, it is instructive to observe that in 1776, when Jefferson was drafting "the one American state paper that has reached to supreme distinction in the world, and seems likely to last as long as American civilisation lasts," he included in the indictment of George the Third, since known as the Declaration of Independence, the following clause:

He has endeavoured to bring upon the inhabitants of our frontiers the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions of existence;

and that while this clause was in penning, instructions to Washington were in drafting, authorising him to call forth and engage the Indians of the St. John's (Nova Scotia) and the Penobscot tribes.[2] Nova

[1] A. M. Davis, in Justin Winsor, vi. 614. Cf. also "Butler's Rangers," mentioned above.

[2] Cf. *Transactions of Congress in Journals*, 8th July 1776: "that General Washington have permission to call forth and engage in the service of the United States as many Indians of St. John's, Nova Scotia, and Penobscot tribes, as he shall judge necessary." He is directed to use the New England influence in this particular matter. The negotiations of Congress with Kirkland are mentioned above, Vol. I. p. 164; see note, p. 165.

Scotia, a part of the King's dominion, was at that time in absolute quietude, and doing its best to provide a resting-place for Loyalists fleeing from the wrath of Congress as materialised by local New England Patriots. But as it is now admitted that the absorption of Indian tribes into this quarrel was first set moving by the Americans, further enlargement of this subject is unnecessary. The Declaration of Independence has been censured on many grounds by the compatriots of its authors; but the annual promulgation to American children of such a misleading statement as this clause about Indian warfare, may, it is hoped, cease some time before American civilisation ceases.

The enlistment of Indian savages in the American ranks was in full operation a whole year before Burgoyne began to summon braves to his assistance. As Indians had taken part in every war in America during the struggle between France and England for North America, it became inevitable that the tribes must also be drawn to take sides in this contention. Burgoyne's route or line of march lay through a country and along a line, occupied from time immemorial by powerful Indian tribes. He could not have advanced ten miles into their country without either collision or collusion. Alliance with Indians was most offensive to English gentlemen, especially to men of Burgoyne's temperament; but as he needs must employ them, he thought fit to utter to the tribes willing to serve the British flag a long and stilted address, which at the best was pompous and at the worst was tactless.[1] Among other exhortations he mentioned how he regarded them as brothers in warfare, but that it was his task

[1] This speech attracted a great deal of attention, and was much ridiculed. Cf. De Fonblanque, *Life of General John Burgoyne*, Appendix F; Lamb's *Journal*, p. 134; Gordon, ii. 477; Marshall, iii. 241, and in many other places — especially in Stone's collections of what may be called *Burgoiniana* (all published in Albany, New York).

from the dictates of our religion, the laws of our warfare, the principles and interests of our policy, to regulate your passions, where they overbear, to point out where it is nobler to spare than revenge, to discriminate the degrees of guilt, to suspend the uplifted stroke,—

and so forth, in language intended for appreciation in St. James's, but probably quite unintelligible to the braves assembled by the Bouquet River, for the Indian tongue was and is somewhat sparse in the vocabulary of abstract ideas. But of one thing the braves seem to have been appreciative—they were told by interpreters that they must not scalp the living nor murder the unarmed. From their subsequent behaviour they appear to have regarded Burgoyne's vetoes as unwarrantable interference with their reasonable liberties and customs. There were but five hundred of them, who from the very first began to give trouble. Burgoyne's refusal to allow them to do their own fighting in their own way appears to have paralysed their value as warriors, while it directed their energies into probably more destructive or at least more mischievous channels. Colonial opinion blamed him for this interference. It was said in Quebec

. . . that he encouraged the Indians to join him under their own captains, and to fight the enemy in their own way, the only argument that could have prevailed with the Indians to join him, and that he virtually broke faith with them in his harangue to the chiefs in the camp by the Bouquet.

The murder of Miss McCrea.

It was also pointed out that the Americans had put no such restrictions on the Indians in their employ. To add to his perplexities occurred the murder of Miss McCrea. This young lady was betrothed to an officer of a provincial corps newly raised to join Burgoyne's army.[1] The legend is

[1] Mr. W. L. Stone has, it is well known, devoted much time to Burgoyne literature, and is regarded as a final authority on matters relating to this expedition. But a perusal of Mr. W. L. Stone's work leaves one with an unsolved doubt whether

that Mr. Jones, her betrothed, appears to have been anxious about Miss McCrea's safety, because more than once Patriots when unable to expand their wrath upon Tories had managed to find a little compensation by annoying their accessible kinsfolk or friends. At any rate Mr Jones, it is said, at the price of an anker of rum, had secured for this lady the escort through the bush of two Indians, who brought her in safety to a spot within easy distance of his quarters. Unhappily the two Redmen disputing about the ownership of this reward of good service, one of them settled the question by slaying Miss McCrea. Thus ran the common legend of her death. The news of this crime spread all over New England and New York with the rapidity of bad news. Burgoyne was held responsible for the murder. The most violently worded accounts of this outrage were diffused by the Patriot press. It was alleged that the murder had been committed in the presence of 300 regulars, and in sight of an advance party of Americans, who could give no assistance. Similar stories were spread all over the Continent. The literature of the murder of "Jenny McCrea" is considerable.[1] The effect was to involve Burgoyne in augmented embarrassments. He demanded the

he was a genial *gobe-mouches*, or briefed himself as against Burgoyne. His collection of poems connected with the expedition contains many poems in painstaking metres by the Rev. Wheeler Case on the death of Jenny McCrea, while his account of this incident differs materially from that of either Baxter or Fiske ; see next note.

[1] Mr. Fiske, *History of the American Revolution*, says of this victim : "How she came by her cruel death was never known." The actual facts proved were few, the amplification of them as intentionally mischievous. Mr. Baxter (editor of *Digby's Diary*) says she was shot accidentally by Americans, and that her remains being exhumed in later years, there was no sign of her having been scalped. But, for all practical purposes, had the crime been a matter of public observation, as was the assassination of the Empress of Austria, the effect on public opinion could not have been greater.—Fiske, i. 276 ; Baxter in *Digby's Journal*, a long note, p. 235.

OLD BLOCK HOUSE, SCHENECTADY.

Schenectady lay in the heart of the Mohawk country. Type of the slender border defences in Colonial days.

NEAR SKENESBOROUGH, LAKE CHAMPLAIN.

immediate surrender and execution of the reputed murderer. Unhappily Burgoyne had himself provided some justification of the invectives addressed to him in connection with this tragedy. In his bombastical Proclamation to the people of New York and New England he wrote:

> I have but to give stretch to the Indian forces under my direction, and they amount to thousands, to overtake the hardened enemies of Great Britain wherever they may lurk.

His "thousands" of Indians had never been above 500, who at the date of the Proclamation had dwindled to less than half that number. His attempt to get the reputed murderer hanged was futile. Men who knew the Redmen well, told him that, were he to take vengeance upon his Indian prisoner, all the braves would withdraw in dudgeon from the army and show their resentment by murdering every Canadian that chanced across their homeward path. Burgoyne being thus powerless against the habits of a whole people, had to bear the stigma of a crime he could neither prevent nor punish. He became the object of Burke's whirling denunciations, and to smaller men a kind of hone or strop on which to sharpen their tongues. Yet his own sentiments were quite hostile to the Indian alliance. "I ever believed their service," said he in the House of Commons, "to be overvalued, sometimes insignificant, often barbarous, always capricious," [1] and he might have added always useless. Sergeant Lamb describes how in affairs of outposts they showed the white feather; while at Bennington, their number being about eighty, they proved to be a mere encumbrance.

[1] *Parliamentary Register*, ix. 218, and Lord Harrington's evidence in Committee of the House of Commons, Questions 6-23. "They (the Indians) are little more than a name. If indulged for interested reasons, in all the humours and caprices of spoiled children, like them, they grow importunate and unreasonable upon every new favour. Left to themselves they would be guilty of terrible enormities."

The expedition moves southward.

Under such inauspicious conditions Burgoyne's expedition from Canada began to move to the southward in June 1777. At the outset the British troops sailed along the chain of lagoons called Lake Champlain, in a fleet of 366 small vessels with banners flying[1] and streamers displayed, to the sound of military music. Accompanying this armada were the *Royal George* of 26 guns, the *Inflexible* of 22, the *Thunderer* of 14 guns. In front of the flotilla and round about were the Redmen in their canoes; a huge water party, rendered gay by splendid weather, and illumined by the smiles and witchery of a somewhat numerous bevy of women. Probably ten thousand was the number approximately of that Katabasis. Of the troops themselves, Lamb speaks of them as being in a high state of discipline, and as having been kept in the winter quarters with greater care in view of this expedition.

Burgoyne's *family* and subordinate officers comprised men of uncommon ability, experience, and devotion to their profession. His second in command, Major-General Philips, a distinguished artilleryman, had seen service in Germany. Major-General Baron de Riedesel presents a personality made prominent not only by his own writings, but by the pen of his lively and charming spouse, who, if her portrait speaks the truth, possessed, among other gifts, a most delightful and expressive countenance.[2] Baron de Riedesel had already served a year in Canada, under the command of Sir Guy Carleton, taking an active part in the expedition of

[1] Whatever these banners were they did not include the regimental colours. When the dispute began about the fulfilment by Congress of the Saratoga Convention, complaint was made on the American side that no British regimental colours had been surrendered; on which Burgoyne replied these colours had been left behind in Canada. Burgoyne's reply is not corroborated by the history of the colours of the 9th Regiment; nor by Mme. de Riedesel's account of how she contrived the concealment of the German colours.

[2] There is a fine portrait of the lady in Mr. W. L. Stone's edition of her *Journal*.

1776. Having, therefore, good experience of Canadian operations he was put in command of the German contingent of about 3000 men. It is consequently somewhat baffling to read in his Memoirs that

> From the beginning of 1777 General Riedesel was never permitted to take a part in the deliberations held by the British generals in their councils of war in regard to the military operations, nor was he ever made acquainted with the instructions which General Burgoyne had received from his government on that subject.

Yet Burgoyne, in his statement about this expedition laid before the House of Commons, speaks in the highest terms of de Riedesel's services. Perhaps this opinion was an after-thought; for the baron appears to have had a full share of the insolent hauteur at that time pervading English society; a fact his sprightly wife discloses in her unqualified resentment against Burgoyne. Then there were Colonel Kingston, Lord Balcarres, the gallant Fraser and the gallant Acland, of whom the two former survived to appear before the House of Commons to loyally support their chief in his defence, and of the two latter, Fraser was killed, Acland was captured. Lord Harrington, the veteran officers, Hamilton and Powell, and Brudenell, the heroic chaplain, in a day when chaplains were not only few (there were four of them in this army) but perhaps somewhat inferior men, may also be mentioned. The General's *family*, the divisional officers, the brigade commanders were a fine body of experts, and the army, with the exception of the German contingent, assembled at Crown Point, were full of spirit and eager for a brush with the rebellious foe. Anburey wrote: 1779. July 1, 1777.

> As to our army, all I can say is that if good discipline joined to health and spirit among the men at being led on by General Burgoyne, who is universally esteemed and respected, can ensure success, it may certainly be expected.[1]

[1] Anburey excludes the Germans from this estimate: "The Germans, to the number of 20 or 30 at a time, will, in their

The array of artillery was prodigious. Gordon, as mentioned above, speaks of the "brass pieces" as forming part of a train unequalled for an expedition of this magnitude. One hundred and thirty-eight guns, mortars, howitzers made up the total armament. The greater number of these were park guns, that is, intended for garrison use only. As the expedition advanced, guns were detailed for the forts and ships—St. John's, Ticonderoga, Fort George, and the ships named above—and when the distribution of artillery was complete, probably not more than twenty-six field-pieces proceeded with the army as it groped through the woods south of Champlain. Fraser's division took along ten pieces, with the men of their service; the Germans had four light pieces, and the whole artillery force was completed by the distribution of twelve pieces among three mixed battalions. The actual number, therefore, of cannon accompanying the army on its southward march was not excessive, but whatever its amount, the difficulties of moving it were discovered to be almost insuperable.

July 12, 1777. "I hope," wrote Burgoyne to Germaine, "this will be the last water business of this kind I shall ever have to do with, for I honestly confess I never met with so much fatigue, in consequence of very heavy artillery, stores, etc., being so often landed and embarked during the course of this service."

The artillery proved, however, to be insufficient for the battering down of the abattis and blockhouses

conversations, relate to each other they are sure they shall never see home again, and are certain they shall soon die. Thus it is that men who have faced the dangers of battle and shipwreck without fear (for they are as brave soldiers as any in the world) are taken off; a score at a time; this is a circumstance known to every one in the army." Anburey (Thomas) was a volunteer in Burgoyne's army, who remained in America captive until September 1781. His *Travels through the Interior Parts of America in a Series of Letters*, London, 1789, were done into French and German in 1791. Major Pausch, Hanau Artillery, corroborates Anburey's strictures on the *morale* of the German troops.

constructed by the Americans, while the slow movements of this arm retarded the general advance of the expedition.[1]

The German contingent.

Of the conduct of the German contingent during this brief campaign there were some hostile critics. About their courage and soldierly qualities there is no question. But the Hessian brought with him neither a liking for England nor a dislike for America. Burgoyne confesses that the purpose of the expedition demanded the impulse of a good deal of enthusiasm, and hints that the German troops were not exactly afire in the cause. Perhaps the exclusion of the Divisional Commander de Riedesel from the General's councils of war, may have had a damping effect on the German ardour. It was, at any rate, noted that German battalions moved in a leisurely and somewhat spiritless way :

> . . . encumbered as they were by haversacks, long-skirted coats, ponderous swords, enormous canteens, grenadier caps with heavy brass ornaments, much powder and pomatum in the hair, and clumsy queues, they jogged spiritless, through dense forests, over mere tracks of roads, heartsick of a mercenary warfare, and longing after their dear Fatherland.[2]

To these drawbacks were joined the jealousies, natural to the occasion, somewhat accentuated, too, by the hauteur of the British officers. Burgoyne's *apologia* for the Germans in extenuation of his disasters was :

> The mode of war in which they (the German troops) were engaged was entirely new to them ; temptations to

[1] The question of the artillery in this expedition is confused by conflicting statements. The figures in the text are from Burgoyne's own reports. But he speaks of having 20 cohorns in addition to the larger pieces. A *cohorn* (coehorn or cowhorn) is a small mortar for grenades, named after the inventor, a Dutch officer. Artillery was the subject of very close questioning in the enquiry into the conduct of the expedition by the House of Commons in 1779.

[2] Lieutenant W. Digby (53rd Regiment) speaks with disparagement of the Germans ; he thinks they behaved badly at Freeman's Farm and elsewhere (*Journal*, p. 288). Cf. also Preface to de Riedesel's *Journal* (ed. 1827), American edition.

desert were in themselves great, and had been enhanced and circulated among them by emissaries of the enemy with much art and industry. Jealousy of predilection in the allotment of posts and separate commands ever subsists among troops of different States, and a solid preference of judgment in the commander-in-chief often appears a narrow national partiality. . . . I studied to throw them (the Germans) into situations that might give them confidence in themselves, credit with their Prince, and alacrity in the pursuit of an enterprise, which, when its difficulties were considered, in fact required enthusiasm.[1]

Under such auspices then, on leaving Crown Point, the expedition proceeded at the outset with the proverbial merriness of a marriage bell. Burgoyne, elated with his victorious progress, wrote to Germaine :

I must beg leave to give your Lordship joy of this our success over his Majesty's rebellious subjects. I rejoice in it much, the more so as I have looked upon the expedition to (*sic*) Canada to be of your Lordship's planning.[2]

Burgoyne had told his army in a kind of bulletin :

The services on this expedition are critical and conspicuous. During our progress occasions may occur in which no difficulty, no labour, nor life are to be regarded. The army must not retreat.

The advance for the first twelve days was thus a kind of triumphal progress. Yet were there certain symptoms indicating serious disorder. Major-General Philips issued a warning thus :

July 1, 1777.

Major-General Philips is sorry he is under the necessity of repeating what he thought would have been sufficiently well impressed upon the officers' minds, that fatigues and difficulties which certainly attend this campaign, made no doubt they would go through the same with cheerfulness, with credit to themselves, and zeal for the King's service, yet they cannot but

[1] Burgoyne, *State of the Expedition, etc. 1780*, 132. "I touch with tenderness and great reluctance," he wrote, "points that relate to the dead. My defence compels me to say my cautions were not observed, nor reinforcements advanced with the alacrity I expected."

[2] Burgoyne to Germaine, 12th July 1777.

be sensible that some things have happened not quite to his satisfaction.

His officers were for the most part young fellows with the defects of their time of life, but what an amount of quiet insubordination and irregularity is hinted at by Philips' having to issue an order insisting upon the ammunition wagons being used on the line of march for their obvious purposes and not for officers' kits and belongings! He actually threatens to burn all the stuff he finds in the cartloads other than the material of the artillery. The order is repeated ten days later, emphasising the General's displeasure. Two days later he complains that officers, being driven, so to speak, from their raids on the artillery carts, have seized the provision carts with their horses to carry their own personal baggage and "for other purposes." He has occasion to pass severe strictures on the fact that no less than thirty carts were appropriated to the use of Burgoyne's own camp equipage, vehicles, as he points out, collected in the service of the King for the use of his army. There are other signs of indiscipline in this army, which protracted itself even into Boston itself after the Convention of Saratoga. If Burgoyne authorised the appropriation of thirty carts, with their horses, for the conveyance of his *batterie de cuisine* and his chests of wine, then there may be some credibility in the story Madame de Riedesel tells about his splendid suppers and his drinking bouts. It should be borne in mind that in those days, although the expression *train* is common enough, there was but a very rudimentary organisation of the military and artillery train, nor was there any attempt at detailed organisation before Napoleon's efforts in that direction in 1800. The frequency of Philips' complaints, and the weakness somewhere suggested by his iteration of them, indicate something wrong with this expedition even in the days of its ephemeral triumph.

Indiscipline.

August 7, 1777.

August 19, 1777.

For this surmise Burgoyne's own *Orderly Book* offers corroborative evidence. Thus:

> The officer who was so unmindful of his duty some days ago as to quit his post to attend upon private business, having expressed a thorough sense of his misconduct, and as far as in him lies atoned for the same by evident marks of concern, is released from arrest (for) . . . the officers of this army in general do not want an example of punishment to impress upon their minds a knowledge of the great principles of their profession, a consciousness of their respective stations, and a regard to personal honour, and he (Burgoyne) forgives and will forget the fault in question, convinced that it is impossible it should happen twice.

This unnamed officer was freely pardoned for an offence of which the customary penalty was death: three weeks before a man of the 9th Regiment had been shot for the same offence. But the disorderly conduct of officers, either expressly censured or indicated by innuendo, is a somewhat painful feature of Burgoyne's daily orders. He reprimanded officers for using for their private ends horses and carts belonging solely to the public service. He hints that officers are privy to the hiding in the woods and the stealing of horses, and that commissaries and agents lend themselves to these fraudulent transactions. In fact, this class of complaint continues right up to the first Battle of Freeman's Farm; to say nothing of complaints about the indiscipline of soldiers in roaming in search of potatoes and corn. Burgoyne, as late as 18th September 1777, mentions that "to the great reproach of discipline and of the common sence (*sic*) of the soldiers, who have been made prisoners, the service has sustained a loss within ten days that might in action have cost the lives of some hundreds of the enemy." Heavy morning and evening fogs contributed much to make the enticements of the woods irresistible.

September 1, 1777.

The first objective was Ticonderoga. Ethan Allan, Benedict Arnold, and the Green Mountain boys had captured this most important post early in 1775 in the

Ticonderoga.

TICONDEROGA, 1908.

course of a filibustering expedition described above. Ticonderoga lies seventy-five miles direct south of Cumberland Point, from which the expedition had started on the 20th of June, and fifteen miles south of Crown Point, where the army had disembarked on the 26th of June. Thence the army marched on either hand of the lake shore, while the stores, in batteaux, proceeded towards the headwaters of Lake Champlain. In front of the army on the 1st of July appeared two forts, one on the east, the other on the west shore of these same waters, the one called Fort Independence, the other was the famous Ticonderoga. From the time of its capture by Arnold down to the end of 1776 the Americans had worked at this position to make it impregnable. Connecting the two forts had been built a bridge, and on the north or Canadian side of the bridge a huge boom—works that occupied ten months to construct.[1] The combination of the two forts, strongly trenched and supplied with artillery, with the abattis obstacle work, at which the Colonial militia were experts, might have presented a most formidable check to the British advance. But in their general scheme the American engineers had overlooked the probabilities of the position being turned. General St. Clair held the place with three thousand ill-assorted and worse-equipped men, among whom, nevertheless, were some of the best shots in the American army under the command of Colonel Francis, a most competent and capable officer. To the south of this very strong position lay a hill known as Sugar Hill. Major-General Philips, an officer of long service and a good artillerist, had been placed in command of the British contingent advancing along the

[1] Cf. Lamb's *Journal* for this date. The author describes what he saw in detail. He also gives a long account of the fortification of Ticonderoga, assuming the readers to know what he means by the "old French lines." There is a clearer description in Marshall, iii. 248, generally followed by subsequent writers. Ramsay, *American Revolution*, ii. 29, says Ticonderoga had no water-supply and no barracks.

left or eastern bank of the inlet towards Ticonderoga which terminates Lake Champlain. His experienced eye quickly observed the tactical advantages of this eminence, while noticing that it remained unoccupied. Whether the Americans had left this hill unprotected because it was thought to be impregnable, or whether, as some think, the garrison was too weak in numbers to defend all the ground entrusted to it, remains an open question. Philips, at least, planned and executed its capture without much difficulty. From the moment the British flag floated over Sugar Hill, Ticonderoga became untenable. St. Clair, apprised by his scouts that the British forces, already in possession of three-fourths of a circle around him, might be expected to close the circumference within a very few hours, withdrew from this menacing situation, leaving his reputation behind him. Thus all the works in or about this important outpost of the United States were captured with very little trouble. The Americans without loss of life got away southward. Among other hindrances to Burgoyne's pursuit Mount Independence was set on fire. Meanwhile the great boom built up to the north of the bridge was holding up the flotilla, the batteaux with their cargoes, the little gunboats, the brigs, *Royal George* and *Inflexible*, and the canoes of the Redmen. But the handy men of the British flotilla made short work of the boom on which so much material and labour had been expended. Lamb, who probably saw the demolition of the structure, says the forcing of the boom occupied about the same time as he took in describing the operation. Burgoyne, who appears to have remained on board the flotilla, passed onwards towards the falls of Skenesborough, which lie some miles to the south. The English naval officers pushed on in pursuit of the American galleys, which had been hurriedly loaded up with stores and artillery, overtook them, captured two out of five galleys, and achieved the destruction or seizure of the whole of the American water force to the number of

Capture of Ticonderoga.

two hundred vessels of all sorts and tonnage. Gordon describes graphically the flight of the Americans:

> The General (St. Clair) meant to push for Skenesborough, and there to have met the 200 boats and 5 armed galleys, on board which were embarked at night as much cannon, stores, and provisions as time would permit. All the cannon that could not be removed were to be spiked up, and many were. The knocking off of the trunnions was omitted, as it might alarm the enemy. Previous to striking the tents every light was to be put out. Though the evacuation was resolved upon about three in the afternoon, it could not be carried into execution till night, and it was at a season when nights were at their shortest and when it was moonlight. The necessity of keeping the matter a secret until the very moment prevented any preparatory steps to expedite the business.[1]

But the officer commanding on Mount Independence set fire to his residence,[2] and so illumined the hill that the movements of the retreat were fully disclosed. Perhaps this conflagration gave rise to Burgoyne's report that the whole place was on fire. Confusion ensued among the Americans, who withdrew in a manner not unlike a rout, at any rate for a few miles. The exertions of St. Clair gradually induced something like order. The retreating force reached Castleton, thirty miles to the south-east of Ticonderoga, through a country heavily timbered, intersected by streams, and interspersed by lagoons. Their retreat was covered by two regiments which appear to have comprised some of the toughest material of the American battalions. These halted at Hubbarton, and were attacked next morning by Fraser. July 6, 1777. Burgoyne had directed Fraser and de Riedesel to urge on pursuit, and in the execution of this order the British regiments outmarched the Brunswickers, plunging into action without waiting for their allies. Colonel Francis, who fought in the American rearguard, an experienced bushman, set up a splendid defence from breast-

[1] Gordon, ii. 482.

[2] He was a Frenchman. It is according to the fitness of things that Americans impute much of the misfortunes at Ticonderoga to alien officers. The British made similar strictures on the Germans.

works of felled trees added to the natural embarrassments of the territory. The British force was outnumbered, and ran a close risk of being routed, but de Riedesel came up, bands playing,[1] and making such a parade that the Americans, conjecturing the German force to be in full strength, retreated, leaving dead or dying on the field Colonel Francis and many other brave men. De Riedesel is said to have brought up only eighty men. Digby calls them "a party of Germans." The Americans fought with conspicuous bravery, yet among them were certain notable instances of pusillanimous conduct, and one, at least, of treachery. Colonel Hill of the militia disobeyed orders. Two regiments from the reserve were directed by St. Clair to advance to the support of the fighting line; they refused obedience.

Sixty Americans, with rifles clubbed in token of surrender, were allowed to come within ten yards unharmed, when they suddenly stopped, fired a volley, and ran into the bush.[2]

Major Acland, being shot through the legs, was lying helpless when an American militiaman approached to kill him, but was checked by his own officer. Killing the wounded seems to have been an occasional practice of the *francs-tireurs* on the American side.[3]

The engagement was very strenuous, with serious loss of life. The British lost the services of at least one-quarter of their whole number. Major Grant of the 24th was the first to fall, shot down by a scout, according to the new American tactic of killing off commissioned officers by preference. Lord Balcarres

[1] Stedman's detail. Lieut. Digby (p. 209) mentions in his *Journal* that he came under fire for the first time in this action.

[2] Fortescue, iii. 225, quoting Anburey, i. 330.

[3] Complaints about the barbarity of the Patriots are not uncommon. Howe's comments on the murder of Captain Philips of the 35th add that several such outrages had occurred. Young Cosby Philips of the 62nd, lying wounded at Freeman's Farm, was murdered by an American militiaman. W. L. Stone tells a grim story of how some Patriots caught and hung, amidst a violent storm of wind and rain, six Loyalists at Schuyler's House, N.Y.

was badly wounded. About seventeen officers were put out of action. Next day the British could muster little more than 500 men. The wounded lay about under little pent-houses made of bark to shelter them from sun or rain. The heat and the rain were terrible. The swamps of to-day's downpour became the pestiferous puddles of the morrow's tropical heat. The ground was swarming with rattlesnakes, the air with mosquitoes, while around prowled wolves which disinterred buried carcasses and left the gnawed remains to add to the stench of the woods. No medical or surgical appliances lay nearer than Ticonderoga, for the surgeons had "forgotten" the medicine chests. The force, according to Digby, had for two days nothing to eat but the carcass of one cow. Sergeant Lamb was put in charge of the wounded; he had no help except that rendered by the wife of a man of the 23rd regiment, a heroic woman, who had never left her husband's side during the engagement. For a whole week Lamb took charge, while torrents of rain ruined all the feeble first-aid arrangements he could compass for his miserable patients. His instructions were to surrender at once to a hostile force, and to place the wounded under their protection; but the British force was hurriedly withdrawn for fear of an attack in strength by the Americans, who, however, were marching quickly to the southward.

At the end of ten days the Americans had lost all the Border forts, a large flotilla of two hundred details, a hundred pieces of cannon, and a prodigious quantity of stores. They had also lost most of their ammunition. Messages to the district towns about commandeered all leaden tubes, pipes, gutters, and window casements and sashweights, to make bullets. Schuyler now withdrew towards Albany. Burgoyne concentrated himself on Skenesborough, close by the final waters of the muddy Champlain. A general review was ordered, divine service of thanksgiving was performed, and a *feu de joie* fired amongst general

rejoicing. At Skenesborough he remained for three weeks, giving his men time to digest his general order of the 10th of July. At the end of three weeks action was resumed. Roads and bridges were constructed by the advancing army, which progressed about a mile each day. More than forty creeks, with little fordable streams, pools, and lagoons, embarrassed the scanty ranks and necessitated every man's becoming both sapper and woodsman. Burgoyne's numbers were too small to admit of the detachment of companies to act either as convoys for provisions or as garrisons for strongholds. He begged Carleton to send men of his command to occupy Ticonderoga, but Carleton, pleading stringent instructions from Whitehall, sent back a flat refusal to Burgoyne's request. Burgoyne's letter to Carleton enumerates reasons which Carleton must have acknowledged as cogent :

Burgoyne's vain appeal to Carleton.

> My communications will widen so much as I proceed, the drain upon the army for posts will be so considerable, not to speak of detachments and safeguards to protect and awe the country, that if that first diminution is not replaced, my effective strength may become inadequate to the service intended.

However, Carleton, in whose mind rankled both the substance and the terms of Germaine's letter of instructions, appears to have resolved to interpret the letter with the utmost punctilio. He pleaded that he could do nothing. Hence Burgoyne's effective force was diminished by nearly a thousand men detached for Ticonderoga.

The General was busy wielding his pen in his much-admired and elegant style. A long despatch contained, as has been mentioned above, his warm congratulations to the Colonial Minister on the success of the Minister's own plans. Yet in the despatches and letters of this time he reveals an undertone of great anxiety. He either cannot or does not trust the Loyalists ; he is short of supplies. With no enemy in front of him and no one on the line of his communications, yet his men

have been two days short of food. There is plenty of stuff and a full supply of stores if he could get them up to the front. At the portage between Lake Champlain and Lake George every effort is being made to get provisions and stores over to Lake George with the batteaux; but there is a shortage of labour, horses are few, and the Canadians are unwilling agents of his plans. His men had no tents, no camp kettles, no spades, although on Lake George there should have been ample supplies if only transport were available.

The army occupied now a long straggling position with twelve miles of front, the western or right wing, facing southward, resting on Lake George, and the eastern or left wing resting on Skenesborough on some bluffs just to the west of the little town. Headquarters were at Skenesborough, and the distracted General writes:

> It is unfair to compare or judge an American campaign according to European ideas; how zealously so ever a general in such an undertaking as mine may be served by the chiefs of departments, for one hour he can find to contemplate how he shall fight his army, he must allot twenty to contrive how to feed it.[1]

The instructions conducing to the partial immobility of his brigades drew from him a reluctant protest.

> Your lordship will pardon me if I a little lament that my orders do not give me the latitude I ventured to propose in my original project for the campaign to make a real effort instead of a feint on New England. As things have turned out, were I allowed to move to my left instead of to my right I should have little doubt of subduing before winter the provinces where the rebellion originated.

This humbly worded protest occurs twice in his correspondence.

[1] These letters and messages, public and private, are dated as from 11th July to 20th August 1777. Burgoyne's original despatches are said to be lost, but copies are in the Record Office (C.O.F. 5, 236). In the same volume may be seen Germaine's fulsome letter to Howe, forwarding the King's conferment of the K.B.

However, whatever visions of failure may have haunted the mind of the Commander-in-Chief and the shrewder of his subordinates, the success of the expedition to the army at large seemed to be assured. And when arrived at Whitehall the news of the bloodless campaign—the capture of Ticonderoga, the destruction or confiscation of such vast quantities of American stores and artillery, the flight of the rebels, the fact that Schuyler did little but retire slowly to the south before the British advance—the Court and the King were elated with a certain hope of victory. It was immediately suggested that the Red Riband should be conferred upon Burgoyne, as it had already been conferred upon Howe, but for some obscure reason Burgoyne had declined by anticipation the K.B. He had told influential friends at home he should certainly refuse the knighthood were it offered to him. On getting wind of the royal intention these friends informed Germaine of Burgoyne's determination, and to save the face of every one concerned, the honour proposed was withdrawn. Had the proffer gone forward the promotion would have come to hand about the date of the Convention of Saratoga.

Weeks were occupied in a slow general advance. The American axe had been busy in advance of the British front. Along the roads and tracks every score of yards a tree had been felled. Everywhere as they advanced the British became more hopelessly entangled in the forests and lagoons. Gradually, however, at the cost of some minor actions entailing slight loss of life, but at the price of Herculean efforts which taught his men, as Burgoyne remarks, woodcraft, the British
July 30, 1777. expedition reached Fort Edward and the Hudson.[1] Burgoyne was now forty miles from Albany, and in

[1] Digby, p. 240: "We moved on farther to a rising ground, about a mile south of Fort Edward, and encamped on a beautiful situation, from whence you saw the most romantic prospect of the Hudson's River interspersed with many small islands."

about as hopeless and helpless a position as his bitterest foe could have devised for his downfall. As they retired before his advance the Americans took great pains to destroy all supplies that could not be removed. They left neither a hoof nor a blade of corn.

"It was a desert," says an officer of the German contingent, "not only with reference to its natural sterility, and Heaven knows it was sterile enough, but because of the pains which were taken, and unfortunately with too great success, to sweep its few cultivated spots of all articles likely to benefit the invaders."

News, however, was brought in that large quantities of stores, especially of provisions, were accumulating at Bennington, a town within ten miles of the border of Massachusetts, and about thirty miles to the south-east of Fort Edward. Burgoyne planned a raiding expedition, entrusting the execution of his design to Lieutenant-Colonel Baum and a mixed force of Germans, Loyalists, Indians, Canadians, about 500 in all. De Riedesel's dismounted dragoons or chasseurs, who had saved the situation at Hubbarton, and a small body of fifty riflemen chosen from the British regiments, formed the nucleus of this hope of the army. A contingent of the Hanau artillery with two guns, Peter's corps of Loyalists, and a handful of Canadians completed the force. Of the Indians a certain number embarrassed the movements of Colonel Baum. "The savages cannot be controlled; they ruin and take everything they please," he reported to his Commander-in-Chief.

Burgoyne's instructions to Baum were very minute, elegantly expressed, and filled many folios.

The object of your expedition is to try the affections of the country, to disconcert the councils of the enemy, to mount de Riedesel's dragoons, to complete Peter's corps, and to obtain large supplies of cattle, horses, and carriages.

Burgoyne mentions 1300 horses as the least supply to be fetched in, and the careful General even indicates

that the confiscated horses are to be fastened together in strings of ten for sending along to Fort Edward, and adds many other interesting directions with the minuteness of a chef to his assistants.[1]

Lieutenant-Colonel Baum did not know English, and the countryfolk did not know German. Thus equipped, he sallied forth "to try the affections of the country." In his slow advance through forests and over mountains, it was reported all over the region that he was a gentleman of easy disposition, and willing to accept recruits practically on their own testimonials.

He allowed people to go and come from his camp, readily believing the professions of sympathy with the royal cause, and imparting to them most fully and completely all information as to his strength and designs. This course did not meet with the approval of his subordinates. They believed that concealed beneath the plain manners and open countenances of the visitors there was a keenness and avidity in collecting facts, and that under the guise of simple questions and a careless listening to the answers valuable information was being intentionally sought for, and too readily obtained.[2]

It appears to be certain that many neighbourly people dropped into the British camp, because Burgoyne had ordered that the property of rebels was not to be respected, while the Committee of Safety at Bennington had issued private commissions with right of search, to authorise the holder to arrest any person

[1] Burgoyne to Baum, 14th August 1777: As to the number of Indians there is contention; Burgoyne, who ought to have known, says 80. Fiske (i. 283) says: "500 Riedesel's men, with 100 newly arrived Indians and a couple of cannon," constituted the force. De Riedesel says for himself that he was strongly opposed to the expedition, but that his advice was not sought. Yet he drafted Baum's instructions.

[2] *The Centennial History of the Battle of Bennington*, 1877, F. W. Coborn, p. 88. The author, perhaps, has not allowed sufficiently for the fact that Baum knew no English and the provincials knew no German. Brisk dialogue, with questions clearly put and as clearly answered in such a case, is uncommon.

. . . you shall have sufficient grounds to believe are enemies to the United States of America, and you shall seize all their movable effects, and you are to call to your assistance such person or persons as you shall find necessary.

The few farmers along the line of the British were thus in rather a bad way; it is reasonable to suppose that if a little finessing could save their game they would finesse. Later American writers roundly impeach these unfortunate victims of civil warfare as cowards.

Baum was allowed a fortnight for the completion of his venturesome enterprise. Breaking camp on 12th August, he reached Bennington three days later. Reports of the concentration of a force three times as numerous as his own had already reached him. These reports were confirmed on his arrival near Bennington. Instead, therefore, of his executing a surprise attack on the Americans, he found it necessary to entrench himself. Very heavy rains rendered all fire-arms useless, but facilitated spadework. Baum's force contained only 300 regulars, of whom 50 were English marksmen. As soon as the Redmen found themselves to be in real danger they retired. Thirty or forty provincials had been left some miles behind to take charge of captured stores. The morning of the 16th of August broke with a clean-washed earth and a cloudless sky. The scanty number of the Germans displayed by the morning light put heart into the American attack.

Bennington. August 15, 1777.

Colonel Stark, commanding the Americans, had at his disposal about 1800 men. He determined to make a feint frontal attack, while despatching about 600 men, some by the right and others by the left, to the rear of the entrenched position. If we may credit the report of a German officer who fought on that day, Colonel Baum was as dull-witted a man in his way as the ill-starred Rahl was in his. Captain Glick asserts that Baum was the mere dupe of the shallowest pretences.

He was somehow or other persuaded to believe that the armed bands, of whose approach he had been warned, were

Loyalists on their way to make tender of their services to the leader of the King's troops.

He consequently withdrew his advance parties "from positions which might have been maintained for hours against any superiority of numbers, and in fact was guilty of an almost incredible fatuity of perception." Gordon thinks Burgoyne was duped in a similar way. Major Skene assured him "the friends to the British cause were as five to one, and they only want the appearance of a protecting power to show themselves": and that, diverted by this assurance from his original intention of throwing forward a very large force to surprise Bennington, he despatched a comparatively feeble expedition.[1] Colonel Baum, thus entrapped, had to put up the best fight he could. His Indians did not wait for the jaws of the trap to close. They got away in good time with the loss of two or three warriors. The Germans, the Loyalists, and Fraser's English marksmen fought with the utmost bravery and tenacity in defence of their poor entrenchments. Finally the last tumbril of their ammunition blew up with a huge noise, and left them with nothing but bayonet and sabre for armament. Enclosed and falling rapidly in their tracks, they were all either captured or killed, with the exception of Glick, who, with sixty men, burst through the hostile circle and found refuge in the depths of the forest. Baum, mortally wounded, died in the evening about sunset. The action had lasted two hours. The American militia dispersed to plunder the camp. While thus engaged Colonel Breyman, with a second German division, was drawing nigh. After the departure of Baum for Bennington, and on receipt of a message from him that the rebels were in force on his front in larger

[1] Colonel Skene of Skenesborough, highly thought of by Burgoyne, is credited with persuading him to march by way of Skenesborough instead of keeping to the line of the lakes, in order to get practicable roads made to his property in the depth of the forests and lake country. Colonel Skene had served with Abercromby in 1758; cf. *History of Lake Champlain*, Palmer, p. 104.

numbers than it would be prudent to attack without reinforcements, Colonel Breyman was despatched with more German auxiliaries. Heavy rains and the inefficiency of his cattle retarded Breyman's advance. It was impossible to get his artillery along at a rate exceeding two miles an hour, and without his artillery Breyman considered it unwise to advance. Hence he covered about twenty-four miles in sixteen hours. Early on the morning of the battle he was within six miles of Bennington, but for some very obscure reason did not arrive on the scene of action before evening, although all reports concur in describing the noise of the fighting near Bennington from three to five o'clock in the afternoon as loud and continuous. Breyman was thus too late, and although he caught the American militia searching for plunder, yet the marching up of the American Colonel Seth Warner with reinforcements stiffened the American defence, and the giving out of their ammunition broke up the value of the German artillery, on which Breyman seems chiefly to have depended. The Americans captured the German field-pieces, but the Germans made their retreat as good as the fatigue of their enemies and the close of the day permitted. The whole action reflected great credit on the Americans, who were vastly stimulated by their success. For trophies they had the four brass pieces, twelve brass drums, 250 dragoon swords, and 700 prisoners.[1] Of slain the number was given at 300. These figures taken altogether exceed the whole German force. It will be remembered that Glick had got away with 60 men. To reconcile these estimates with the

August 16, 1777.

[1] Gordon, ii. 541. American writers adopt Gordon's figures. Mr. Fiske, prompted, doubtless, by a wish to enhance the success of the Americans, says that the Germans consisted of picked troops selected from the veterans who had fought at Minden eighteen years before in 1759. As a matter of fact most of the rank and file in this expedition were recruits. Few soldiers in those days reached the age of forty. Burgoyne's despatches about Bennington were, it seems, lost. De Riedesel wrote to Germaine about this engagement a letter now in the Record Office.

facts is not possible; the result, however, remains that Burgoyne's plans had failed, and that his little army was depleted by 500 men. The prisoners in the hands of the Americans had a terrible time of it. The provincials or Loyalists were brutally treated. New England men and the settlers in the Hampshire Grants were hard-grained, hard-fisted men, exasperated by the accounts circulated about the murder of Jenny McCrea, and made desperate by Burgoyne's proclamation. Horrid cruelties were inflicted upon the Loyalists by the victors, who subsequently expressed their regret at their former excesses. Much, therefore, of the evidence has been hushed up, yet a few grisly things sticking up out of the ground thus trodden flat suggest the grim total.

Burgoyne has been severely censured for sending German troops to do all this bush fighting. Light infantry might have achieved success under Fraser, who was a man of quick movements, and had some knowledge of bush fighting. Stedman says both the German colonels acted as if they were on open roads in Germany; they halted every ten minutes to dress their ranks. The equipment of the German was terribly heavy. Washington Irving, in his *Life of Washington*, says that the helmet and sword of one of de Riedesel's dragoons weighed as much as the whole kit of a British soldier. As the full marching kit of a British soldier is now up to about sixty pounds, and in those days was nearly eighty, Mr. Irving's estimate may be accepted as a jest; but it is beyond all question that the German uniform and weapons were quite unsuitable for surprise work. De Riedesel's chasseurs or dragoons were not horsed during the whole war, and being booted and spurred, and burdened with other heavy cavalry appointments, they made but indifferent infantry.

Burgoyne, with his army now reduced by these losses and by the garrison left at Ticonderoga to less than 6000 men, was by this time eastward of Saratoga.

He could neither advance nor retreat. Being quite disillusioned as to the aid Loyalists could offer :

"I have daily reason," wrote he, "to doubt the sincerity of the professing Loyalists. The great bulk of the country is undoubtedly with the Congress in principle and zeal, and their measures are executed with a secrecy and a despatch that are not to be equalled." [1]

For three weeks he lay on the east side of the Hudson awaiting supplies and some reinforcements from Canada. This seems to be the period that Madame de Riedesel describes from her sylvan retreat as so delightful.

In consequence of the unfortunate engagement which shortly afterwards took place at Bennington, I had the pleasure to see him (her husband) again on the 18th, from which we passed three weeks in a delightful tranquillity ; a few days after my arrival news was received that we were cut off from Canada.[2]

Madame and her husband with their children were now at Fort Edward, on the eastern bank of the Hudson, about ten miles south-east of Lake George. At the end of the third week the British moved across the Hudson to the west side, and advanced towards Saratoga. Burgoyne having by this time scraped together about thirty days' food with other stores, moved along the right bank of the Hudson southward towards Albany. Whatever plans the General had formed soon became matter of common conversation. September 11.

"I observed with surprise," wrote Madame de Riedesel, "that the wives of the officers were beforehand informed of all the military plans, and I was so much the more struck with it as I remembered with how much secrecy all dispositions were made in the armies of Duke Ferdinand during the Seven Years' War."

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[1] Burgoyne to Germaine, 20th August 1777.

[2] The influence of this lady over her husband is remarkable. "My husband," she notes in her *Journal*, "had left Fort Edward to join the army ; but as soon as he heard of our arrival he came back on the 15th and remained with us until the 16th, on which day he was obliged to rejoin his troops." This is the date of the affair at Bennington ; cf. also Vol. I. pp. 277-278.

The camp women disseminated farther afield the gossip of the officers' wives, so that the Americans easily discovered everything worth knowing.

It does not appear that the spirits of the army were in the least degree dashed by the disasters and losses at Bennington, or the derelict condition of the expedition. Madame de Riedesel had an enormous coach made to take not only herself and her three children, but her two female attendants, her bundles of light summer dresses, and other flimsy accoutrements of a lady's summer campaign. Moving about an hour's ride behind headquarters, she followed in the midst of the troops, who sang and longed for victory. The march lay through endless forests and a beautiful district, and so forward to heights above Saratoga.

September 13, 1777.


SARATOGA
Oct. 10, 1777
British
Americans
0
½
1
One mile
MORGANS RIFLES
BRITISH H.Q.
MAIN
BODY
UNDER
GATES
Fishkill River
British retreat from Freeman's Farm
Saratoga
OLD FORT
RIKEDESEL
SPECHT
HANAU
PARK
ARTILLERY
Bridge of boats *
Shallows
Hudson River
FORT
2 Guns
FELLOWS
* By which the British crossed in their advance to Stillwater from Fort Edward.
Stanford's Geog' Estab', London.
London Macmillan & Co. Ltd.

# CHAPTER XVIII

## SARATOGA

MEANWHILE remarkable changes had come over the affairs of the American Army of the North, as Congress called it. General Schuyler, earlier in this campaign with a phantom of an army, found himself quite inadequate to resist successfully the British advance. Ticonderoga and the four sister forts had fallen into Burgoyne's hands ; the grand boom above Ticonderoga had been destroyed, large accumulations of stores had been captured or dissipated, with the consequence that Congress and its partisans were much cast down in spirit, and began to look about for a victim for the appeasement of the popular wrath. It has already been mentioned that General Philip Schuyler was of an ancient New York family: to an aristocrat by descent, a patroon by inheritance, and a gentleman by taste and feeling, the hostility of the New Englanders was unappeasable. The Northern campaign was going on to the west of the New England border in a district over which in peaceful times New England farmers reigned supreme. Feeling in Congress ran high ; it was suggested by Schuyler's enemies that the eastern militia would flatly refuse service under a general whose personality was odious to them, and whose antipathy towards them was too strong to be explained away by his friends. Schuyler's foes prevailed.

We have given New England men what they will think a complete triumph in the removal of generals from the north-

ward, and sending Gates there, I hope New England will now exert itself to its utmost efforts.

Thus wrote the irrepressible John Adams to his wife. Later on he told her :

I think we shall never defend a post until we shoot a general. No other fort will ever be evacuated without an enquiry, nor any officer come off without a court martial.[1]

Indeed the Congress in its anger was, in a dim sort of way, following the (reputed) example of the Wise Men of Carthage of a former day. The Punic Congress was said to have crucified, impaled, flayed alive, or done to death by some lingering method, any gentlemen of the navy or army who returned from the wars without success. Congress ousted Schuyler, insulted Greene and Knox, reprimanded Stark, snubbed Benedict Arnold, court-martialled Sullivan, St. Clair, Wayne, and Matthews, and promoted a cabal against Washington himself. At the same time it held Charles Lee and Horatio Gates in high repute. In later days Gates fell upon evil times, and now no one has a good word for him.

"There can now," says Mr. Fiske, "be no doubt that the appointment of the incompetent Gates was a serious blunder, which might have ruined the campaign, and did in the end cause much trouble both for Congress and for Washington."[2]

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[1] John Adams to his wife, 11th and 19th August 1777; cf. *Proceedings of Congress*, 7th July 1777; cf. also Gordon, ii., on the Campaign of 1777.

[2] Mr. Fiske says of Gates: "That when fighting was going on he was a man of sedentary habits." Gates had been in the British service, beginning his campaigning with Braddock—and so continuously in the British army—until the Peace of 1763. Gates was godson to Horace Walpole, but was born in the family of the second Duke of Leeds. He was trained to the profession of arms, and was a man of much capacity but of a jealous disposition, and guilty of base treachery towards Washington, whose close and trusted friend in earlier days he professed to be.

It is said that he was a guest at Mount Vernon when the news of Lexington arrived there. Modern American opinion points to the

Murray's *Impartial History of the American War, 1778.*

Gates arrived at Stillwater, a few miles south of Saratoga, at a time when the success at Bennington was bringing in the New York and Eastern farmers by the score. Much of the harvest was already over. Word had passed round that the British were pretty well enclosed in a ring fence, and that there would be good shooting that autumn. In a very few weeks the Americans, whose ragged and attenuated battalions had been the subject of Schuyler's caustic comments, began to muster as many thousands as they had previously mustered hundreds. At the conclusion of the brief campaign of Saratoga, Gates had an army of 20,000 men. Among the chiefs of his command were Daniel Morgan and Benedict Arnold. Arnold, usually called by American writers the Traitor, was a man of an ancient Connecticut family, and the fourth Arnold in direct succession to bear the name of Benedict. He was gifted with amazing soldierly qualities, and is probably among the foremost of the great generals America numbers among her gifted sons. He had the dash of Murat, and the keen eye of Kléber; he became, men said, in actual fighting filled with a kind of fury. To consummate courage he added the insight that with a flash sees either the weakness or the strength of the enemy's disposition. He showed a remarkable versatility for affairs. He was in turn bookseller, compounder of drugs, ship captain, merchant of West India goods, soldier, naval officer, and dealer in Canadian products. Born in Connecticut, he died in London. Looked upon by a relenting American opinion of later days as the real hero of this campaign, the grand Saratoga monument erected in 1877 gives him mention. Gates, Schuyler, Morgan have both inscription and effigy. Arnold's

reaping by Gates of the success Schuyler had rendered certain. As to his soldierly qualities, he at least understood how to reap the fruits of success. Generally speaking, such credit as he won at Saratoga was lost afterwards at Camden. (Cf. Fortescue, iii. 312, Battle of Camden, 16th August 1780.)

effigy is not there, but an inscription makes both a record and an implication.

Arnold's exploits, his wounds, his escapes, his hardihood, and his treason, how at one time he was the darling of every fighter in the States, and second in command to Washington, how at another time his name became a curse and a hissing, belong as much to the region of romance as they do to the sober pages of history. It was at this time his unhappy lot to be ever the object of the rancorous hostility of the New England party in Congress, as it indeed was the lot of every man for whom Washington expressed any admiration or preference.

Such too was the case with Daniel Morgan, that remarkable bushman and sharpshooter. A New Jersey man whose early training and experience had been in the hinterland of Virginia, he had collected and was the leading spirit of a body of marksmen probably at that time without compare in any part of the world. Morgan's huge frame and stature, his handsome features, his rough yet kindly demeanour, and the glamour attaching to his mysterious earlier adventures on the Indian borders, made of him an ideal scoutmaster in a war of surprises, guerillas, and snipers.

General Horatio Gates with his ever-increasing force lay in the neighbourhood of Stillwater, and to the north of him, within four miles, Burgoyne with his small but compact army had pitched his camp. Under the direction of the Polish engineer Kosciusko, some skilful spadework had been done on Bemis (Bemus) Heights, a kind of mamelon immediately to the west of the Hudson. A good road to Albany along the banks of the river was enfiladed by Kosciusko's redoubts and batteries, although the whole mamelon was incompletely fortified.

September 17, 1777.

Behind the shelter of these fortifications Gates, with ample room and skilful dispositions for retreat, thought it prudent to await the British attack. Burgoyne had determined to force Gates's position or

perish. His construction of his orders from Whitehall left him no option but to fight his way through to Albany. On the 19th of September he quitted his camp, himself commanding in the centre; de Riedesel despatched along the west bank of the Hudson, to turn the American position; and Fraser to the right. With Burgoyne marched the 9th, 20th, 21st, and 62nd Regiments; the 62nd Regiment left Canada in June five hundred strong, and at the close of this campaign was reduced to fifty men with four or five officers. Although the prudent Gates abode within his lines, scouts in considerable numbers scoured the forest in front, so that the British advance was discovered early in the afternoon. De Riedesel meanwhile was developing the turning movement, and Fraser with Grenadiers, Light Infantry, and the 24th Regiment was advancing to his assigned position.

First Battle of Freeman's Farm.

For about an hour or so the chief American army remained inactive; but Arnold, on whom the fury of fighting had now fallen, almost compelled Gates to order the left wing to advance and turn Fraser's position. Arnold, at the head of 3000 men[1] with expectation of more to follow, fell on Fraser, who, however, had already attained a position in a place called Freeman's Farm, from which Arnold could not dislodge him. Arnold, perceiving that further attacks on Fraser would be futile as well as sanguinary, and with remarkable insight surmising that Fraser would not leave the advantageous position now in his occupation without orders, executed a change of front to his own left and fell upon Burgoyne's centre. This part of the British line had been weakened by the detachment of the 9th Regiment to

[1] Stedman's estimate is 5000. Fraser's force of Grenadiers and Light Infantry belonged to the 9th, 20th, 21st, 24th, 29th, 31st, 34th, 47th, 53rd, and 62nd Regiments. The entanglement in the forest was so great, that the action did not commence till the afternoon, although only four miles separated the combatants. Gordon, ii. 551, says Arnold remained in camp the whole time; a statement repeated by S. G. Fisher, following Bancroft and Graham, on which see Fiske, i. 327.

act as reserve, whereby Burgoyne's immediate and effective command could not have amounted to more than 1100 men. Arnold had passed some advice back to Morgan, who indeed needed no instructions, for he had perched up in the bigger trees some of his deadliest shots to kill the British officers. In those days there was a good quantity of brass and gilt about an officer's dress, and especially a little half-moon of metal which, hanging by a chain about the neck, symbolised the handsome gorget of the older costume. Morgan's men did their share of this battue excellently; the English officers fell like pheasants; only one English artillery officer (Lieut. Hadden) was on his feet at the end of this action. The three English regiments charged again and again with the bayonet, for which weapon the Americans, like the Boers in later days, felt an overwhelming aversion; but more men came up from the American camp on Bemis Heights, and Arnold was pressing home his final attack when de Riedesel arrived on Arnold's flank, and compelled the Americans to desist. Had Gates moved out himself with two or three thousand troops, beyond all doubt the British centre would have been crumpled up. But the judicious Gates is said to have occupied his energies among the wagons to the rear of his position, making his teamsters acquainted with the smartest methods of getting away before an advancing foe.[1]

The battle of Freeman's Farm, halfway between Stillwater and Saratoga, proved to be on either hand very costly. Both sides fought furiously for more than four hours. Burgoyne behaved during the action with conspicuous bravery. Bullets hit his accoutrements at least three times. He displayed fine soldierly qualities, gave his orders calmly, and directed with great care the operations of his little army. Upon three regiments, the 20th, 21st, and 62nd, reduced by the detachment

[1] Gordon, ii. 522, says loading and unloading wagons formed part of a daily drill, as a precautionary measure, devised by Gates. American critics of Gates do not support this view.

The Operations near **STILLWATER** between Sept. 17 and Oct. 10, 1777, including the two engagements at **FREEMAN'S FARM.**




London Macmillan & Co Ltd.

*Note. These Engagements are sometimes called the Battles of Bemis or Bemus Heights.*

of their flank companies to form part of Philips' division, the brunt of the fighting fell. The British centre resisted Arnold's and Morgan's attack the whole afternoon. The inference from their stout resistance is that the straight shooting was not all on one side. The 62nd is said to have comprised some of the best shots in Burgoyne's army. Evening closed down on the British bivouacked on Freeman's Farm, and the Americans returning to their camp and quarters on Bemis Heights. According to Gordon the action kept itself going in one quarter, till eleven o'clock at night. Colonel Kingston before the House of Commons estimated that the British had 500 men put out of action; the American Board of War put the American losses at 319.[1] It is, however, most difficult to compute approximately the losses as well as the number of the men engaged in this as in other actions of this war. The loss, however, to Burgoyne was appalling. Of his Indian allies, never of much value to him, a great number at once quitted the British service to seek enrolment in the American ranks, where a hearty welcome was afforded them. His provincial or Loyalist troops had partly melted away, and there were no more recruits from Canada; while for his other soldiers, British or foreign, as each man fell, there were no substitutes nearer than men in Ireland. His army was thus in desperate straits.

Meanwhile there appears to have passed in the American camp a bitter altercation between Arnold and Gates. Arnold was for renewing the American attack on the 20th, because the British were much shaken, reduced in number, hampered with their September 19, 1777.

[1] Gordon's account of the battle of Freeman's Farm is among the most detailed of the older narratives. He gives the name and strength of all the New England regiments, and speaks with due appreciation of the sturdy resistance of the British centre. The earlier American writers do not cheapen American valour by belittling their foes. Burgoyne complained of the wild firing of his troops, who got out of hand and fired without orders; cf. his O.B., 21st September 1777. Digby's account is too general to be of much value.

wounded, and not yet entrenched. Gates brushed the suggestion aside. Arnold retaliated with a complaint that his efforts the previous day had not been adequately supported, and blamed his chief for his lack of energy. After a wrangle Arnold departed to his own quarters. Gates then sent word of the withdrawal of Morgan's rifles from Arnold's command. Arnold immediately sent in his papers, demanding a pass or safe-conduct to his own home. Gates granted with alacrity the safe-conduct, and sent off an account of the American victory to Congress, omitting to make any mention of Arnold's name. The hero of Freeman's Farm was for quitting his place at once, but a great petition, signed by men of all ranks begging him to stay, kept him in his tents, where without authority or jurisdiction he awaited the turn of events. Gates considered it wise to leave him alone.

On both sides there were dejection and alarm. Burgoyne had failed to break through the American barrier; the Americans had failed in their counter attack to oust Burgoyne from his place.[1] The barren laurels belonged to Burgoyne, the substantial gain, however, now lay with Gates. Men were coming in to join his battalions in scores; his policy was to sit tight and wait. Disquieting reports had reached him from Albany that another British force was ascending the Hudson to menace his communications. News to the same effect had reached Burgoyne. The messenger was probably one of three or four despatched by Sir Henry Clinton to announce his plans and hearten up Burgoyne in his most precarious position. Of the other men it is likely their fate was capture and death. Gates appears to have known of Sir Henry Clinton's advance from New York. His apologists

September 20, 1777.

[1] Gates encountered vast difficulties in keeping his 12,000 men fed; at times too, as was ever the case with the American commanders, he was short of ammunition; there was little lead in his camp. The windows, roofs, and water-spouts of Albany had already been stripped of lead.

say that his knowledge of the cloud gathering behind him, made him chary of using up his men on the morrow of the action at Freeman's Farm. The skill and good fortune of the nameless man who brought the cheering message to Freeman's Farm now failed him, for while returning to Sir Henry Clinton with Burgoyne's reply he was captured and hanged.[1] Burgoyne, however, had, like Sir Henry Clinton, sent another messenger by another route. Captain Scott of the 53rd Regiment got through in safety. Both the English Generals were now acquainted with their respective positions.

While danger was thus menacing the rear of the American army, disaster had overtaken Burgoyne's line of communication with Canada. Independently of Gates and without his knowledge, the American militiamen from New Hampshire and New York, by a series of attacks on the six forts over which the British flag was flying, endeavoured to cripple the value of Ticonderoga. It was not thought advisable to assail directly that commanding position, but to destroy all the batteaux at the portage between the northern end of Lake George and Lake Champlain, which design, if achieved, would add seriously to the already overwhelming embarrassments of the British. The exploit was carried out by the capture of the batteaux and of three or four companies of the 53rd Regiment. A few days later at Diamond Island in Lake George, the Patriots met a repulse with the loss of a considerable quantity of these spoils, but the net result was to the credit of the Stars and Stripes.[2] Burgoyne might have at once retreated; but his assurance that Gates would

[1] His story is written in Lamb's *Journal* (21st September 1777), who adds: "This was the only messenger from him (Clinton) or Sir Wm. Howe, which had reached our camp since the beginning of August."—Cf. also Captain Scott's *Diary*, in De Fonblanque, p. 287.

[2] It was but a few weeks before these events that the national flag of U.S.A. had been authorised by Congress; cf. *Proceedings, etc.*, 14th June 1777.

not remain to be entrapped between two British armies kept him at Freeman's Farm.

Clinton's Advance on Albany.

Sir Henry Clinton, it will be remembered, had been left in charge of New York and Rhode Island with sufficient battalions for the defensive. Early in October about two thousand men from England arrived at New York after a voyage of uncommon duration, the fleet being six weeks overdue. But their arrival gave Sir Henry Clinton a good nucleus for a small expeditionary force of 4000 men which was rapidly put together, and began to move up the river; but too belated to avail the luckless Burgoyne. About forty miles above New York had been constructed with great skill and labour a boom to impede navigation of the Hudson. On the eastern bank contiguous to the boom lay a fortified post commanded by the veteran bushman Israel Putnam, one of the stalwarts of former Colonial wars. Clinton surprised this post, captured the stores, ousted the garrison, and drove Putnam to the west bank of the river. Next day Clinton sent two thousand of his men over the river, who, in two bodies of about a thousand each, marched to the surprise of Forts Montgomery and Clinton, which had been constructed at about a mile apart to guard the passes of the Western Highlands as well as the river. Both attacks were entirely successful, although the fighting at Fort Montgomery was very sharp, entailing considerable loss, for the fort was well planned and protected by the usual outwork of trees skilfully felled and interlaced.[1] The Americans in consequence of this ably devised and executed enterprise lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners about 400 men, besides about 70 guns, all their stores, and the whole of the boats collected on the north side of the now useless boom.

October 3, 1777.

New Jersey.

The British were thus masters of the Western Highlands, and their lighter boats had the advantage of

[1] Sir George Warrington took part in this engagement, as he tells in his own inimitable style in *The Virginians*; see his narrative in chapter xliii.

an unimpeded run northwards to Albany. On the 7th of October a force, proceeding up the river another forty miles, destroyed stores and a few minor fortified posts.

Captain Scott of the 53rd, one of Burgoyne's emissaries, got through to Sir Henry Clinton, who at that date was on board Commodore Hotham's ship in the river. Leaving next day for Burgoyne's headquarters with the good news of the capture of the two forts, and of the clear passage to Albany, this brave man crossed the forests to within a short distance of Freeman's Farm, only to hear of the consequences of the second battle in that place. October 9, 1777.

Gates, apprised of the American losses on the Hudson, had every reason to reflect that with Sir Henry Clinton at a place only sixteen miles below Stillwater, and a messenger on his way to Burgoyne with this cheering news, his own position stood in peril. But the news reached Burgoyne too late.

Between the former battle of Freeman's Farm and the second engagement on the same ground was an interval of nearly three weeks. The two armies lay within cannon shot of each other behind their own entrenchments; affairs of outposts causing aimless loss of life occurred from time to time. The British were now put on short rations, which does not appear to have prevented the gallant Madame de Riedesel from inviting the chiefs of the army to dine with her. She had personally witnessed the whole of the former battle of Freeman's Farm, and when on the morning of the second battle her husband mentioned, that a reconnaissance in force was for that day, she did not feel much alarmed. The preparations for dinner went forward, the table was laid, but at three o'clock a solitary guest arrived in a handbarrow mortally wounded. This untoward guest was Brigadier-General Fraser, whose services on the right flank of the British in the former engagement had been so conspicuous. He expired in Madame de Riedesel's dining-room next morning. Second Battle of Freeman's Farm. October 7, 1777. Death of Fraser.

Burgoyne's forward movement was imperative. The enemy, as he well knew, were increasing daily by hundreds. It being now morally certain the British force was doomed, all the countryside resolved to be in at the death. He began with a flank movement somewhat of the nature of a reconnaissance in force. His division was composed of Germans under de Riedesel supported by Colonel Breyman, and British commanded by himself supported by Generals Philips and Fraser. Moving away to the right front from the encampment, he was advancing towards the American position, when a violent assault from Morgan's deadly rifles, with eight battalions in support, converted the engagement into an American attack in great strength on the British position, of which the left wing, consisting of British grenadiers and the German contingent under Breyman, was rapidly enveloped by an overwhelming number of the enemy. Major Acland wheeled rearwards his flank company of grenadiers, and thus blunted the American attack for an hour or two. The Brunswickers finally, on the left centre, fell back in confusion, but the remaining German troops fought with persistent courage and coolness until overwhelmed by numbers. Colonel Breyman was slain, and his men were compelled to retreat with the loss of all their artillery and equipment, leaving their wounded in the entrenchments. While disaster had thus befallen the British on the left, matters had fared no better in another part of the field. A very heavy column of Americans much strengthened by riflemen was enveloping the British right, which became so hard pressed that General Fraser weakened Burgoyne's centre by withdrawing the 24th Regiment with some Light Infantry to support the distressed right wing. At this juncture the whole remaining line began to retreat slowly towards their camp, while Burgoyne hastily sent a message to the artillery to retire with all speed, but his aide-de-camp Sir Francis Clarke was shot down ere the message was delivered,

to the great disadvantage of this little distressful army.

The British were retiring in an orderly manner, when Arnold, although suspended from duty and absolutely without official authority, burst into the action at the head of a strong contingent to storm the British position. He was quite unsuccessful at the British centre, which inflicted upon him great losses, but with yet more and ever-increasing numbers he fell on the British right and, by the giving way of the Germans, established himself on Burgoyne's right flank, and won the key of the position.

Burgoyne himself remained under fire all that dreadful day. Lieutenant Digby of the 53rd was near him towards the close of the engagement, and reports that—

> He appeared greatly agitated, as the danger to which the lines were exposed was of the most serious nature at that particular period. I should be sorry from my expression *agitated*, that the reader should imagine the fear of personal danger was the smallest cause of it. He must be more than man who could undisturbed look on, and preserve his natural calmness when the fates of so many were at stake and entirely depended on the orders he was to issue.[1]

The darkness of a late autumn day closed the sanguinary struggle. It had been a fight in which conspicuous bravery and determination had been displayed in every quarter of the field. The dashing frenzy of Arnold; the ripe experience of the gallant Fraser; the stolid resistance of Colonel Breyman; the splendid courage of the youthful warriors, whether privates or officers, who made up most of the English contingent, witnessed to the military qualities of the combatants, whether American or British or German.

Fraser fell fighting under Burgoyne's own eye.[2]

[1] Digby, p. 289.

[2] His death is assigned to one of Morgan's marksmen. Colonel Morgan pointed out to the man the person of Fraser with the injunction to kill him. This feature of warfare, that of killing officers by selection, was a novelty and considered unsportsmanlike by the British. The practice of the American marksmen was afterwards generally adopted, to the reduction of the gay appearance of

Of the artillery, every man was shot down, every horse killed. Sir Francis Clarke, aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, was mortally wounded as he rode with a message that Burgoyne subsequently declared would have changed the fortunes of the day had it been delivered. This was the officer who earlier in the campaign brought into the British camp a captured American flag—the Stars and Stripes, then newly authorised as the flag of the United States. He died in Gates's quarters. Many of Burgoyne's officers were mere children. Ensign Henry Young of the 62nd was perhaps in his sixteenth year. Madame de Riedesel heard him die in a room next to her own. With much vicarious sympathy she had allowed her maid-servants to lend him a mattress to die on. Ensign Cosby Philips was in his fifteenth year; he, disabled by a shot, was lying on the ground and then was mortally wounded by an American camp-follower and robbed. Lieutenant Hervey was also sixteen years of age; and many others of a like tender age perished. In fact, Burgoyne's "veteran" army was recruited from children of a larger growth; elder boys kidnapped, pressed, or, as the case may be, sold into the service by the parish authorities in Merry England.[1]

The diminished and defeated expedition from Canada was now in a terrible plight. Such miserable hospital accommodation as there was, had proved to be quite unequal to the wants of the sick and wounded, even before the final action. Incessant rains, with sharp frosts at night, induced agues, pneumonia, rheumatisms, with all the other sequels of insufficient food and inadequate clothing. The heavy garments suitable for autumn wear had been sent back to Ticonderoga from Skenesborough. Meanwhile the gallant Fraser and

officers in the field. Nelson's death was doubtless due to his star and brilliant costume.

[1] Digby, p. 188, is emphatic on the subject of the recruits in the force. Three ensigns lying in the same grave numbered in the aggregate only fifty years of age.

others lay dead, and on the next day, towards evening, he was buried, according to his last wish, in the redoubt so recently committed to his charge. The ceremony of Fraser's burial under the fire of the enemy has engaged both Burgoyne's fluent pen and Graham's brush. That was a most impressive scene when the warrior's corpse, wrapped only in a sheet, was lowered into its hasty grave, while Mr. Brudenell, the senior chaplain, read the service for the Burial of the Dead. But as the retreat of the whole force was delayed until the conclusion of the ceremony, it was afterwards felt, and freely said, that the delay added to the misfortunes of this luckless army.

All the generals with their attendant officers stood about the grave; on which an American battery concentrated its fire, but as the practice was poor, nobody was hurt. It should be added that the American General, on ascertaining what was proceeding, gave the order not only to cease firing, but that minute guns should mark his appreciation of Fraser's gallant and glorious end.

Burgoyne's retreat.

The same night the army began to fall back towards the Hudson in the direction of Fort Edward, in the hope of getting to the eastward of that river before the arrival of the enemy. It rained incessantly on the 9th and 10th of October; an atmospheric condition in favour of the British, for, as has been before pointed out, there was no musketry practice possible in those days of priming and flint-lock in very damp weather, and the British supremacy with the bayonet was incontestable. But the enemy had no intention of coming to close quarters. Arnold the impetuous had been badly wounded in the second action at Freeman's Farm, while the cautious Gates, with full information as to the condition of Burgoyne, was contented to weave around the British army a network of redoubts and breastworks, and he had already profited by these delays to lay hold of the banks of the Hudson eastward at the fords and by spadework render the river impassable.

Every point of his strategy being thus made secure, Gates on the 14th of October held Burgoyne in the hollow of his hand. It is true that the British, being now quite aware that they were compassed about on every side, endeavoured with axe and spade to render their position impregnable. However, the necessity for an American attack was not immediate, for the British had insufficient food, little clothing, and were quite exhausted; so exhausted that in hundreds they threw themselves down on the miry and sodden ground to fall into an immediate sleep.

At this point of the misfortunes of the expedition Madame de Riedesel's narrative is full of surprising statements. She roundly accuses Burgoyne of incapacity and of criminal indulgence in drink and debauchery. She says there was plenty of fresh meat in the camp, but that the commissaries were too indolent to distribute it. She speaks of herself as indignantly expostulating with Burgoyne for his pusillanimous behaviour, and states that her husband had given advice which if adopted would have secured the safety of the army. In fact, this lively lady takes no pains to conceal her hatred of Burgoyne. Doubtless the relations between his superior officer and de Riedesel were strained. He mentions that he was never admitted to the councils of the chief of the army, and alleges that again and again he put in his protest (for instance, with regard to Bennington) respecting Burgoyne's plans. Probably the good lady's animosity was strengthened by her husband's professional pique and resentment. De Riedesel made direct communications to Germaine after the affair at Bennington without reference to his superior officer.[1] It was, however, a custom of the time that unscrupulous men used freely, to the great detriment of subordination and discipline.

There was now a huddle of women and children, with hundreds of sick and wounded, on some elevated

[1] Cf. the letter in Record Office, C.O.F. 236. Knyphausen similarly wrote to Germaine after Brandywine.

ground lying to the eastward of Saratoga, between that village and the Hudson. Twenty thousand Americans encircled the hapless Burgoyne, whose force did not now amount to 5000 men. Burgoyne's own account is that "his magazines were exhausted, the weather was unusually severe, the men were worn out by toil and privation, by hard fighting and incessant watching, were without shelter, and short of food. The store batteaux in the river were commanded by the enemies' batteries, and provisions had to be carried up hill on the shoulders of the troops under a galling fire." Digby adds that the horses and oxen crowded into the British lines began to die fast, and the stench ensuing was terrible. Meanwhile, the American sharp-shooters placed in the tops of the trees kept up a continuous sniping, while the enemy's cannon was brought closer to enfilade the British, who were now compelled to construct a system of traverses. At this juncture Burgoyne sent, by Lieutenant-Colonel Kingston, a kind of challenge to Gates to direct an attack on the British position; but Gates, of course, declined the suggestion that he should burn his fingers when the chestnuts were already out of the fire. After some *pourparlers* the famous Convention of Saratoga was signed.

October 14, 1777.

October 16, 1777.

The terms of the Convention were for the British more than reasonable. The British troops were to march out of their camp, and the artillery out of their entrenchments, with the honours of war, and proceeding to the verge of the river, were to leave all their arms and cannon there, at the word of command of their own officers. All troops were to be granted a free passage to Europe, on condition of their not serving in North America again during the war. Under the head of troops were included all followers of the army, women as well as men, boatmen, drivers, artificers, and sutlers.[1]

Saratoga Convention.

[1] Digby says the money in the military chests was distributed to the British troops before surrender. At Sedan, 3rd September 1870, many regimental chests were emptied in the same way.

The minor details were of similar clemency, and highly creditable to Gates's prudence and humanity. Prudence, because he had no means of feeding his captives, while his army of farmers and woodmen had already begun to scatter; humanity, for by sitting quietly in his leaguer he might have reduced the whole British force by starvation.

The Canadians refused as prisoners were dismissed on parole to their own homes under a guard of Indians.[1]

Burgoyne, in his final address to his little army, read over the Articles of Convention, added that the terms were better than he had any right to expect, and concluded with an assurance that with provisions enough, or any hope whatever of extricating himself, he would not have surrendered.

About ten o'clock we marched out according to treaty, with drums beating and the honours of war; but the drums seemed to have lost their former inspiriting sounds, and though we beat the "Grenadiers' March," which not long before was so animating, yet then it seemed by its last feeble effort as if almost ashamed to be heard on such an occasion. I shall never forget the appearance of their troops, the Americans, on our marching past them; a dead silence universally reigned through their numerous columns, and even then they seemed struck with our sad situation, and scarce dare lift up their eyes to view British troops in such a situation. I must say their decent behaviour during the time merited the utmost approbation and praise.[2]

Madame de Riedesel was gratified to observe that every one seemed touched at the sight of a captive mother and her children. In fact, this good lady found some tribute to herself in every turn of the British

[1] Elijah Fisher's *Journal*, 17th October: "Gen. Burgin and his howl army surrendered themselves Prisoners of Ware, and come to captelate with our Army and General Gates. Five thousand seven hundred Prisoners, besides the seven hundred toreys that Gen. Gates would not take as Prisoners of Ware, that the Ingens garded to Canady, surrendered themselves." Fisher had served at Bunker Hill in 1775; at Saratoga he was 19 years old.

[2] Digby's *Journal*.

misfortunes. She adds every one was pleased at the intense anxiety and strain being thus brought to an end. The day ended with a fine dinner-party in General Gates's quarters, and as Madame de Riedesel was the only lady of the party, she accepted an invitation to dine *tête-à-tête* with General Schuyler.

Thus closed the famous expedition from Canada;[1] the welcome fruits of which had been prematurely anticipated with much joy in official quarters both in Windsor and Whitehall. The opinion of the army at the time traced all these misfortunes to Germaine.

Sir Guy Carleton wrote a few weeks after this disaster :

> This unfortunate event, it is to be hoped, will, in future, prevent Ministers from pretending to direct operations of war at 3000 miles distance, of which they have so little real knowledge as not to be able to distinguish between good, bad, or interested advices ; or to give positive orders on matters, which from their nature, are ever on the change ; so that the expedience of propriety of a measure at one moment may be totally inexpedient or improper in the next.[2]

Lieutenant Digby's opinion may be reckoned fairly representative of the men of his class and rank ; he says :

> Thus was Burgoyne's army sacrificed, either to the absurd opinions of a blundering ministerial power (and) the stupid inaction of a general (Howe), who from his lethargic disposi-

[1] Private Letter, 12th November 1777, in R.O., C.O.F. 5, 236. I add nothing here about the events of the winter spent in Boston by the Convention troops. Evidence of indiscipline among the Americans is considerable. On 10th January 1778, a provincial severely wounded two men of the 9th Regiment ; on 7th February a man of the same regiment was badly wounded. Lieutenant Richard Browne, of the 21st Regiment, was shot on Prospect Hill, and so forth. Philips, in charge of the Convention troops, was moved to say it was no use asking for justice in Massachusetts, for he believed every principle of it had fled from the Province. Heath, the American general in Boston, a common-minded man, laughed at Philips. In the midst of it all, the irrepressible Madame de Riedesel gave a ball with much success.

[2] Cf. R.O., C.O.F. 5, 236.

tion neglected every step he might have taken to assist their operations.

But Howe affirms that at no time was it his intention to assist the Northern army.

"I was surprised," he wrote on the 22nd of October 1777, from Philadelphia, "to find the General's (Burgoyne) declaration in his message to Sir Henry Clinton by Captain Campbell, that he would not have given up his communications with Ticonderoga had he not expected a co-operating army in Albany. Since, in my letter to Sir Guy Carleton, a copy of which was transmitted to your Lordship, in my despatch of 2nd April 1777 (No. 47), and of which His Majesty was pleased to approve, I positively mentioned that no direct assistance would be given by the Southern army. This letter, I am assured, was received by Sir Guy Carleton, and carried by him to Montreal before General Burgoyne's departure from thence."

If this be so, Burgoyne, before leaving Montreal, must have clearly understood that Howe had no intention of stretching out his hand to help the expedition from Canada.

Yet Howe, as we may recall to mind, had carefully planned an expedition for the capture of the Hudson, in a despatch to Germaine, in which he had proposed that:

An offensive army in the Province of New York, to arrive up the North river to Albany, to consist of not less than 10,000 men, and 5000 for the defence of New York and adjacent parts.

And

A defensive army of 8000 men to cover Jersey, and to keep the Southern army in check, by giving a jealousy to Philadelphia, which I would propose to attack in the autumn.

The suggestion was coldly received in Whitehall, and not subsequently noticed.

The sequence of events appears to be:

1. Howe, in November 1776, proposes to Germaine a plan of campaign, comprising an advance of 10,000 men up the Hudson to capture Albany.

2. Howe, in April 1777, writes to Carleton before Burgoyne's arrival in Canada that the expedition from Canada would get no help from the Southern army (Howe's) by co-operation at Albany. May 6, 1777.

3. Carleton, in July 1777, sends an unqualified refusal to Burgoyne's request for men to keep open the line of communication to Canada, and to garrison Ticonderoga. Carleton pleads in defence his stringent order from Whitehall.

4. Burgoyne writes to Germaine two despatches, complaining of the stringency of instructions from Whitehall, alleging that a reasonable liberty of action would have been better counsel. August 1, 1777.

Thus Howe's masterly idea of November 1776, being pigeon-holed, in April 1777 he writes a letter (of which the terms met "with His Majesty's approval"), completely obliterating the idea of November 1776. Carleton cannot help Burgoyne, who before leaving Montreal was warned not to expect help from Howe. Who tied up this knot? Who sent off Howe to the south, locked up Carleton in Canada, and made Burgoyne's expedition from the first an enterprise of overwhelming peril? Burgoyne, in a moment of expansion and flattery, offered Germaine the whole credit of the expedition. Perhaps Digby's words, "the absurd opinion of a blundering ministerial power," best summarise the influence that broke Burgoyne, and wore out the patience of Howe. July 12, 1777.

On the 22nd of October Burgoyne, a prisoner of war, was the guest of General Schuyler in Albany. On the same day Howe submitted his resignation. He had been rebuffed, both by the Secretary of War, Barrington, and by the Colonial Minister, Germaine. Early in 1777 his disappointment at being fobbed off with a few men and a dozen or so horses was acute.[1] Without mounted troops and short of artillerymen, a Howe resigns, October 22, 1777.

[1] Howe to Germaine from New York, 2nd April 1777; the same to the same, 24th April, 7th July, 9th July, 30th August, 22nd October, 30th November, 1777.

plan he devised for making regular artillerymen out of the Provincial Volunteers, with the same pay and uniform as those of the Regulars, was coldly received at home. Having requested that to each of his lieutenant-colonels might be granted, as a mark of the King's favour, the nomination to one ensigncy, his request was refused. He proposed that a local company of chasseurs should be enrolled ; his proposition was rejected. In like manner, when Burgoyne proposed that some of his lieutenant-colonels should have local rank as brigadiers, his proposition was disallowed. Howe complains that the Hessian chasseurs, intended to be mounted in America, have left their saddles and bridles behind in Germany. No notice was taken of this slight omission. In consequence of these and other slights he wrote :

> From the little attention, my Lord, given to my recommendations since the commencement of my command, I am led to hope that I may be relieved from this very painful service, wherein I have not the good fortune to enjoy the necessary confidence and support of my superiors.

In a further letter to Germaine, he accuses Lord Barrington of inflicting upon him slights and contumely :

> I shall not trouble your Lordship further than to express my hopes of being relieved, in consequence of my letter of the 22nd of October, from all disputes with the Secretary of War, in which it is with great concern I find I have not met with a support reconcilable to my situation.[1]

His position had become truly untenable. The appointment by the Lords of the Treasury of Sir George Young as Muster-Master-General to the foreign troops, with instructions to report direct to Whitehall, without reference to his superior officer, Howe reckoned to be a grievance. And in fact, as subor-

[1] Howe to Germaine, 3rd April 1777. Philadelphia, during the six months' or so occupation by the British, was described by two eyewitnesses in most disparaging terms ; and so, for the matter of that, was Reading during the same winter, occupied, as it was, by the Continental officers.

dinate officers were encouraged to write to Whitehall or to the members of the Ministry, unofficial yet confidential reports and criticisms of their colleagues and superiors, the custom must occasionally have given rise to embarrassments.

Having thus resigned his command, Howe sat down to wait for his recall. His conduct in Philadelphia during this winter has been subjected to very severe and probably quite reasonable criticism. Naturally a lethargic man, a *bon vivant*, fond of his glass and his lass, he took advantage of the excellent gifts of that most comfortable city of Philadelphia, to enjoy himself in a steady fashion, and so spent his time. October 22, 1777.

Washington's army was within easy reach; the roads, hard with frost, were quite practicable for artillery and supplies; the American General had within call never more than 3000 men. Howe, after all deductions made for losses at Brandywine, Germantown, and on the Delaware, must have had more than twice that number.

Winter operations were in those days, with the lack of appliances and comforts, very arduous, and brought with them heavy losses special to that time of the year. There was no prospect of any reinforcements from Great Britain, while recruiting from provincial and Loyalist volunteers went forward too slowly to be satisfactory. To attenuate and enfeeble his small force, in view of the disasters reported from the North, may have appeared to be a perilous line of policy, considering that the only victory in sight was the capture of a few hundred men at the American encampment of the Valley Forge, for it was a pious opinion in Philadelphia that in this region at least the American resistance would taper away to a vanishing point.

Much has been written about the sufferings of the American troops during the winter. It was reported that out of 5000 men no less than nearly 4000, according to the returns of 1st February 1778, were unable to go on duty for want of clothes, while The Valley Forge.

of this number scarcely a man had a pair of shoes. As to the accommodation for the sick, wounded, or disabled, it was said that to enter the hovels called hospitals was for a quite healthy man to incur the risk of immediate death. Marshall says that the miserable provision made for the infirmaries and hospitals was "misapplied." He means that peculation and embezzlement were prevalent even in these sordid and filthy quarters. Typhoid fever and the class of pestilential ailments known as putrid fevers are said to have raged in these poisoned abodes of suffering. How far men, ill-clad or not clad at all, with no shoes, no blankets, scanty shelter, and insufficient food, could and did really resist the rigours of a Pennsylvanian winter must ever remain a matter for imaginative speculation. It is possible that Tyrian dyes have been infused into the colouring of the pictures of the episodes of the Valley Forge. Patriotic feeling occasionally enlarges upon the sufferings of Washington in contrast with the indulgence of Howe in his Capua. While one writer enlarges on the terrors of the time, another, who served on the medical staff, does more than hint that the Americans were not in such a desperate condition. There was plenty of firewood and a good water-supply. Dr. Waldo of Connecticut at Christmas time 1777 says :

> Cold and smoke make us fret. But mankind are always fretting ; we are never easy, always repining at the Providence of an Allwise and Benevolent Being, blaming our country or faulting our friends. But I don't know of anything that vexes a man's soul more than hot smoke continually blowing into his eyes.
>
> The poor sick suffer much in tents this cold weather. But we now treat them differently from what they used to be at home, under the inspection of old women. We gave them mutton and grogg to start the disease from its foundation at once ; we avoid pills, powders, boluses, tinctures, cordials, and all such insignificant matter which cause the patient to vomit up his money instead of his disease. But very few of the sick die.[1]

[1] *Journal* of Dr. Waldo, New York, 1861. The Valley Forge *Orderly Book* affords little information about the material conditions

It appears then that on both sides at the close of 1777 there was a kind of paralysis. That the British could have turned the Americans out of their camp at the Valley Forge is conceded by American writers; that the game was not worth the candle seems to have been the opinion of Howe, discouraged, slighted, indolent, and already by his resignation diminished in authority. At any rate nothing was done during those months but a tedious exchange of cartels about the condition and relief of prisoners. Howe had captured about 5000 Americans; these captives became the subject of a long and unsatisfactory interchange of demands and demurrers between the Commanding Officers. Congress interfered a great deal with Washington's plans, not unfrequently with a certain vulgar coarseness and thirst for retaliation, quite distasteful to the high judicial qualities of the American Commander-in-Chief, and equally repugnant to Howe. Finally, most of the Americans were left in bonds, Congress taking the line that as a British soldier was of more value to the British commanders than an American soldier was to the American commanders, there was no real equation of exchange.[1]

Meanwhile the Convention of Saratoga was disannulled. Congress discovered that sundry cartouch

The Saratoga Convention annulled.

of the camp life. On the other hand, it casts a sidelight on Washington's troubled times with his officers and men. The Brigade Orders are chiefly about courts martial: for instance, in February 1778 twelve separate Courts were set up to try officers for embezzlement, stealing dead men's effects, cowardice in the field, and such-like offences. On the other hand, Washington, in his General Order of 1st March 1778, speaks with disdain of the hardships of the past winter. "American soldiers," he wrote, "will dispise the meanness of repining at such trifling strockes of adversity."

[1] These tedious negotiations are given at length in Marshall, iii. chapter v. Samuel Adams approved of this breach of the Convention. Wells, his biographer, iii. 4, 5, records his own disapproval of the action of Congress; cf. Fortescue, iii. 289 ff.; Gordon, iii. 46 ff.; Gates's own letter (3rd December 1777) to Congress is a complete exoneration of Burgoyne from any suspicion of *mala fides* as to the surrender of kits or equipments.

boxes had not been surrendered in the general delivery of equipments, and that Burgoyne's lists of non-commissioned officers were inaccurate. This assembly of lawyers showed itself in very poor colours indeed compared with the chivalrous conduct of its own nominees and favourites, Gates and his staff.

They, indeed, behaved with the spirit of high-minded men, who, conscious in themselves of the value and virtue of a sustained courage, recognise with admiration the possession of that lofty quality in a fallen foe. But the lawyers were too many for Burgoyne. Flustered and homesick, pestered by the people of Boston, he took to writing letters, of which, of course, the lawyers soon made lutestrings. With one flimsy pretext, then another, they flouted Gates, and disregarded the protests of Washington and of other generals. As to the men of the ranks, it was hoped that inducements for them to join the American army might prevail, and every temptation was cast in their way to this end ; the policy of Congress from the first had endeavoured to seduce both the Hessians and the English soldiers from their allegiance. It appears to have been tacitly resolved that the soldiers should not be allowed to quit the American shore. They were therefore moved southward towards Virginia, where, after great hardships, some escaped, as Sergeant Lamb did, to rejoin the English army ; others perished in the attempt to escape, and thus, thinned out by sickness and hardships, disappeared, leaving no trace behind, the rank and file of the expedition from Canada. Very little is now said by American writers of repute in defence of the Congress which disannulled the Saratoga Convention. It is painful to find a man of the rank of a general arguing that because Burgoyne, before the document of Convention was finally signed, hesitated between one day and the next as to what he had better do, therefore Congress might plead his example as to delay after the Convention had been signed, accepted, and acted upon. But Mr. Fiske offers an impartial estimate of the facts.

"This sacrifice," he says, "of principle to policy has served only to call down the condemnation of impartial historians, and to dim the lustre of the magnificent victory, which the valour of our soldiers and the self-devotion of our people had won in the field."[1]

Elation of the Patriots.

Their victory at Saratoga was celebrated by Patriots throughout the Thirteen States with solemn rejoicings. The colleges at Boston were illuminated, a bonfire set up on the common, a salvo of thirteen guns in honour of the Thirteen States, and a *feu de joie* in honour of General Gates; these doings as described by contemporary chroniclers would be the type of all public rejoicings. In private a few citizens were blown to pieces, or maimed beyond repair.[2] The salute of thirteen guns, fired several times during the day, usually finished with the bursting of a piece or two. In Great Britain the Whigs received the news of their country's shame with much rejoicing. The news arrived in London on 2nd December 1777, to the great glee of Horace Walpole and his friends. Walpole says:

> The King fell into agonies on hearing this account, but the next morning at his levee, to disguise his concern, affected to laugh and to be so indecently merry that Lord North endeavoured to stop him.

The King later on proclaimed a general Fast, which, naturally, in those days aroused Olympian laughter. Walpole, having stigmatised the Fast as a ridiculous solemnity, quotes with approval:

> First General Gage commenced the war in vain,
> Next General Howe continued the campaign,
> Then General Burgoyne took the field, and last
> Our forlorn hope depends on *General Fast*.

[1] Fiske, i. 342. General Cullum's argument of the *tu quoque* order is appended to his article on the "Struggle for the Hudson," in Justin Winsor, vi.

[2] Smith's *Journal*, 20th October 1777 (Sunday): "Our people were hereupon mad in their rejoicings. Benjamin Tukey's arm was blown off at the shoulder, and he died." This incident was at Falmouth (Portland, Maine), where later the same *Journal* records "a mad day of rejoicing ended in killing Mr. Rollins." Curwen (*Journal*, p. 167) says the news reached London, 14th December 1777.

Joy of the Whigs.

The Whigs could hardly conceal their exultation; the disgrace and loss of the British arms were exaggerated and chanted about the streets in doggerel ballads. In the House of Commons, Burke, Fox, Barré were now ablaze with that intellectual fiery devotion to liberty, which those Pharisees, the apologists of slavery, the press-gang, and the system of executive justice which brought upon London the name of The City of Gallows, ever professed.[1] In fact the ballads, written and printed in England in disparagement of their King, their country, their soldiers, and themselves by Englishmen at this time surpass in ribaldry the well-known collection of anti-English ballads of American authorship by Mr. Frank Moore.

If Philip Freneau in America could write of George III.—

> In him we see the depths of baseness joined,
> Whate'er disgraced the dregs of human kind;
> Cain, Nimrod, Nero, fiends in human guise,
> Herod, Domitian, these in judgment rise.
> And envious of his deeds I hear them say,
> None but a George could be more vile than they—

what are we to say of a caricature owned and kept in his collection by Mr. Burke[2] entitled *Par nobile fratrum*, wherein King George is shown mumbling at the end of a human bone, while the other end occupies the jaws of a Redskin cannibal.

Of criticisms of this campaign there has been a full sheaf, both British and American. The chief feature about the later strictures is that they repeat in fuller form the last words on the matter uttered a century ago. Stedman and Digby, the former at greater length

[1] There is little evidence that any of these champions of freedom moved a finger to redress the awful social and material condition of the masses of the people, which steadily deteriorated during the last thirty years of this century. Fox, in fact, by his debaucheries and insolvency must have plunged many a poor soul into the depths of that social Gehenna.

[2] Cf. *Caricature History of the Georges*, Thomas Wright, F.S.A., p. 336, for some account of these ballads and caricatures.

in a continued argument, the latter in patches of remark scattered here and there in his most interesting *Journal*, said nearly all that was to be said. Stedman's animadversions comprise a review of Burgoyne's own defence of the expedition from Canada, the apology for himself given in Committee of the House of Commons in 1778. Digby's somewhat hesitating exceptions jotted down for private reference only at the time of the events, and from day to day, carry with them a certain freshness of impression of much value.

It was generally felt that the original blunder lay with Germaine in not appointing Sir Guy Carleton to command the expedition, and that the overloading of the expedition with artillery was a tactical mistake. The enormous delays caused by the artillery hampered the quickness of movement on which the success of the expedition depended. The slowness of Burgoyne's movements after 12th July gave time for the creation of those entrenchments and fortifications which rendered artillery necessary, that is, the provided remedy created the disease. How feeble was Schuyler's defensive force, and how necessary it was for him to retreat at the speed of the British advance, have been commented on. But when the Americans saw the British troops wasting days and weeks and months without making the smallest progress, it is no wonder they recovered their spirits and assembled in much greater force than ever. In the whole of General Burgoyne's vindications of himself it was observed his method was to state a necessity for every one of his measures taken singly ; and not as links of one chain or system of action ; while taking care to pass over the material circumstance that the fresh necessity invariably originated on his own part from some previous omission or blunder.

Except on Judge Jones's theory, that Burgoyne was the dupe of Colonel Skene, who wanted a road made to some newly purchased property, and persuaded the English General to cause such a road to be made under

pretence of its military necessity,[1] it has not been made clear why, having command of all the waterways leading to the Hudson, Burgoyne should have abandoned this natural and common road, and have wasted a month constructing bridges and causeways over morasses and streams, besides cutting his way through the dense undergrowths of an ancient forest. All the journals and diaries concur in expressing the delight of the writers in finding themselves once more free from the gloom, the obstacles, and tracklessness of these interminable woods. Reference is frequently made to the fact that while there was plenty of material accumulating at the head of Lake George, regiments, detached here and there to perform operations quite needless, had the waterways been followed, now found themselves foodless and shelterless at distances from the lake not remote in point of miles, but very remote in point of intervening obstacles.

General De Peyster, with accurate knowledge of the region and after careful study, corroborates earlier opinions that Burgoyne could have reassembled at Ticonderoga (after the affair at Hubbarton) by the 10th of July, could have reached Fort George on the 12th, and having left all his heavy equipments, guns, and such-like in depot under a guard, could have reached Fort Edward on the evening of the 13th of July. From this point to Albany is about fifty miles. With six or ten days' rations, and an extra supply of ammunition sufficient for a battle of that period, Burgoyne could have swept Schuyler out of his path with ease, and could have occupied Albany on the 16th, but his false movement lost him the campaign, and secured in the end American Independence.

General De Peyster's opinion is in confirmation of Gordon's view, who writes :

> Had the British commander returned immediately to Ticonderoga, and advanced from thence in the most expeditious

[1] Cf. Jones, i. 202.

manner, with a few light pieces, instead of suffering any delay by dragging along with him a heavy train of artillery, he might have been at Albany in a very short time.

Burgoyne admits that he was not unapprised that the great part of his difficulties might have been avoided by falling back from Skenesborough to Ticonderoga by water, in order to take the more commodious route by Lake George, but he thought a retrograde movement might give rise to what he, in his Defence of his Conduct of the War, called a "resistance of delay."

It is hard then to see why, in view of Germaine's meddling and Burgoyne's defective judgment, the failure of the expedition should be saddled on Sir William Howe. The British Colonies have everywhere become the grave of great reputations, but if Howe's reputation perished in America, it was not amidst that lovely country about Lake George, the Adirondacks, and the Hudson, of which the America of to-day keenly appreciates the beauty.

Out of this dreary and unhappy contest the British soldier at least emerges with his reputation not merely unsullied but enhanced. Nowhere in the history of the British Army up to that date were there more splendid deeds of discipline and devotion than at Bunker Hill, of which gallantry, if any subsequent display of bravery can be the rival, it was surely the stand made by the Artillery and the Sixty-second, the Twentieth, and the Twenty-first Regiments, at the first Battle of Freeman's Farm.

# APPENDIX

## GERMAINE'S LETTER TO HOWE

Colonial Office, 5, 243, f. 175b.

WHITEHALL, 14*th Jany.* 1777.

Honble. Sir Wm. Howe. No. 1.

SIR—Having always been of Opinion that the Possession of Rhode Island would be attended with the most beneficial Consequences, I was extremely happy to find (by your separate Letter of November 30th, 1776) that you had thought proper to send an Expedition to that Place. And though it must be confessed that Winter and bad Weather are formidable Enemies to contend with, I cannot help being sanguine in my Expectations from Troops whom you have accustomed to Success in all their Undertakings, And I am the less able to entertain the smallest Apprehension of a Miscarriage, when I reflect that you entrusted the Command of those Troops to Men of such tried Courage as Lieutenant-General Clinton and Lord Percy are known to possess: But, be the Event what it may, I shall ever think that the Importance of the Object was an ample Justification of the Attempt, even if the Enemy had been better prepared for an Opposition to your Enterprize.

With regard to the Army under the Command of Lord Cornwallis, the Men have been brought into such a State of Perfection while they were under your Eye, that they must unavoidably act with such Rapidity when put in Motion, as induces me to flatter myself that His Lordship's Progress in East Jersey, notwithstanding the advanced Season, will be considerable. And it is the Ground of much Satisfaction here to know that your Troops had, after the fatiguing Operation of the Campaign, so fair a Prospect of extensive and good Winter Cantonments, as that District can afford them.

It was a great Mortification to me to be informed that the Army from Canada had thought it right to leave Crown Point unoccupied, and repass the Lake. I trust, however, that my Expectations are likely to be gratified, when I presume the Army will make more rapid Advances the next Campaign, and reach Albany sooner than you seem to expect.

1. Your well-digested Plan for the Operations of next Campaign has been laid before His Majesty; but I must decline for the present to trouble you with any Remarks upon it. For as your next Letters (of which I am in daily Expectation) will

probably throw new Lights upon the Subject, His Majesty thinks proper to withhold His Royal Sentiments thereupon, until he shall have had an Opportunity of taking into His Consideration the whole State of this momentous Affair. When the King has so done, Major Balfour will be immediately dispatched to you with all necessary Instructions.

2. When I first read your Requisition of a Reinforcement of 15,000 Rank and File, I must own to you that I was really alarmed; because I could not see the least Chance of my being able to supply you with the Hanoverians, or even with the Russians in time. As soon, however, as I found from your Returns, that your Army, if reinforced with 4000 more Germans (which I trust will be procured for you), 800 additional Hessian Chasseurs, and about 1800 Recruits for the British, and about 1200 for the Hessian Troops under your Command, will consist of very near 35,000 Rank and File, I was satisfied that you would have an Army equal to your Wishes, especially when I considered that the Enemy must be greatly weakened and depressed by your late Successes, and that there was Room to hope that you would not find it difficult to embody what Number of the Provincials you might think proper for particular Parts of the Service, in which Expectation, Cloth for 3000 additional Suits, and Camp Equipage for 8000 are ordered and will be sent to you. And here I must afford you the Satisfaction of knowing, that whatever Degree of Support the Rebels may have been taught to expect from Foreign Powers, I have great Reason to believe that Doctor Franklin will not be able to procure them any open Assistance.

3. The Artillery have, on all Occasions, behaved well: and as their Appearance has hitherto had so desirable Effects upon the Enemy, I wish it was in my Power to procure you another Battalion of so useful a Corps; but it is not. You may, however, depend upon having as many sent to you as I can get together with some light Six and Three Pounders. You will also have such a Number of Officers sent out to the Guards, as will make them compleat to the present Establishment, independent of those employed on the Staff.

4. It would be impossible to procure for you, in any reasonable time, the 300 Horses which you desire: And as the Expence of sending them to so great a Distance is enormous, and the Hazard of their arriving safe very great, it is intended to send you only 100, which is more than will be necessary for compleating the Establishment of those you already have, as it appears, by your Returns, that you want only 77; and, it is

hoped, that with such as you may be able to procure in the Country will answer your Purpose.

5. All that I need say to you at present concerning the ten Ships of the Line which you solicit, is that Lord Sandwich will write fully to Lord Howe upon that Subject: And as I apprehend you lay so great a Stress upon that Request, with a View to the Demand that you may have for the Services of the Men, in the Debarkation, and in otherwise assisting your Troops, it gives me pleasure to acquaint you, that I have reason to hope such a Force will be sent you as will be deemed sufficient by yourself and Lord Howe.

6. Colonel Prevost being a good Officer, His Majesty is willing, on your Recommendation, to grant him any reasonable Request; and therefore commands me to acquaint you that, if you are of Opinion that the Appointment of him to the Rank of Brigadier-General will be for the good of the Service, and not prejudicial to the Pretensions of any other Officers, it is His Pleasure that you appoint him to act in that Capacity only so long as he shall continue to serve in America, as you know his Corps is destined for the West Indies, as soon as it can be spared from the American Service.

I have the Satisfaction to inform you that his Majesty hath been pleased, on your Recommendation, to order Doctor Morris to be appointed Inspector of the Hospitals.—I am, etc.

GEO. GERMAIN.

The summary of this letter is :—

1. Howe's *well-digested* plan for the operations of the next campaign comprised his counsels for the Expedition to Canada, up the Hudson, and along the Lakes. The plan was laid aside.

2. Howe's demand for a reinforcement of 15,000 men is declined on the ground that Germaine is convinced the men are not required for the work to be done.

3. Howe's request for another battalion of artillery cannot be satisfied.

4. Howe's desire to be furnished with 300 horses cannot be granted, because they are not really necessary.

5. Viscount Howe's requisition for ten more Ships of the Line is referred elsewhere.

6. Howe's recommendation of Colonel Prevost for promotion is granted with so many limitations as to render the concession almost nugatory.

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